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Abstract 
This work is a discussion of the history of the construction and propagation over time (1949-
2002), by New Zealanders, of positive images of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This was 
done primarily through the New Zealand China Friendship Society. The thesis also looks at 
China-aligned communist parties, students who went on New Zealand University Students’ 
Association study tours in the 1970s, and key interlocutors such as Rewi Alley. These other 
groups had cross-membership with the NZCFS but differing engagements with China. 
The images propagated by the New Zealanders altered over time in response to changes in the 
PRC, developments in New Zealand, and shifting characteristics amongst the people who were 
engaged in the practice of producing images of the PRC. The thesis looks at how these observers 
of the PRC, and the organisations which they are combined, are themselves created, and see 
themselves, in relation to their process of viewing the PRC. 
This idea of a shifting sense of China and the changing sense of self is explored using a range of 
ideas. These include ideology, subjectivity, concepts of truth and practices of truth-telling. The 
thesis is an attempt to provide a sympathetic reading of a wide range of material and trying to 
understand what the PRC has meant at different times, in different circumstances and to 
different people. Accounts of the PRC are examined contextually. This involves the re-reading of 
a range of texts that have ‘written’ the PRC for those New Zealanders who, in different 
circumstances, have themselves been sympathetic to projections of successes taking place in the 
PRC.  
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Introduction 
When Mao Zedong declared the Chinese people Liberated and proclaimed the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) there were just a handful of New Zealanders who had the sort 
of contact with China that meant that their relationship continued with ‘New’ China.1 On the 
whole this small group found themselves in conflict with the majority of New Zealanders who 
subscribed not only to the ‘China has been “lost” to communism’ thesis but also who saw ‘Red’ 
China as a real threat to ‘world peace’.2 
The New Zealanders in question were mainly Pakeha – Chinese New Zealanders and Maori were 
few. They lived in a New Zealand that was dominated by ideas relating to the Cold War and 
within a society in part structured towards an essentially white New Zealand produced by 
exclusionary immigration.3 Further, most of the people who are the subject of this thesis did not 
know Chinese. The end point of this study, the winding down of many of the relationships 
discussed here from the late 1990s, corresponds with the growth of a sizeable population of New 
Zealanders who had come from the PRC. Prior to that there was almost no-one in New Zealand 
who had experience of living in the PRC. This began to change in the 1970s as people who went 
to the country to learn Chinese, to be diplomats, to teach and to undertake business increased. 
With few exceptions, the latter are not the subject of this study. The groups who are the focus of 
this thesis are distinguished by a shared belief in the social transformative capacity and reality of 
the CPC-led Chinese project.4 
This work is the story of how this small group of New Zealanders, and those who followed them 
with the same endeavour, attempted to construct and propagate a positive image of China. This 
was done primarily through the New Zealand China Friendship Society (NZCFS).5 This study 
also looks at China-aligned communist parties and students whose engagement with the PRC 
occurred through their involvement in New Zealand University Students’ Association (NZUSA) 
study tours. The images propagated by the New Zealanders altered over time in response to 
changes in the PRC, developments in New Zealand and shifting characteristics amongst the 
people themselves engaged in the practices. 
                                                        
1 Most contact between New Zealand and China from the 1920s through to the pronouncement of the PRC was either 
by missionaries, who were almost all out of China by 1951, or through the familial ties of Chinese New Zealanders. 
Contact for the latter was considerably difficult in the early period of the PRC, even more so after the start of the 
Korean War. 
2 See the first parts of chapter 3 for more discussion about this. 
3 Barry Gustafson, ‘New Zealand in the Cold War World’, in Alexander Trapeznik and Aaron Fox, Lenin’s Legacy Down 
Under, Otago University Press, 2004, 23. Patrick Ongley and David Pearson, ‘Post 1945 International Migration: New 
Zealand, Australia and Canada Compared’, International Migration Review, 29, 3, Autumn 1995, 176-793 particularly 773-
775. 
4 The Communist Party of China (CPC) is often written in English as the CCP or Chinese Communist Party. I have 
used CPC as this is how the Party tends to refer to itself in English language materials and is also consistent with the 
nomenclature used by the Marxist inspired New Zealand groups to refer to their organisations: CPNZ, CPA, etc. 
5 The Society went through a number of different names. For simplicity I will usually refer to the ‘Society’ or the 
NZCFS. 
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The ‘China threat’ construction was a recent one although it built on historic ones. Just a few 
years earlier China and New Zealand had been on the same side of a war against Japan. Chinese 
resistance to Japanese aggression had been a cause celebre in New Zealand and the toil of the 
Chinese peasants, as witnessed from a New Zealand that also regarded itself as having an agrarian 
identity, had been largely favourable. Although New Zealand, since European settlement, has 
been one of the most highly urbanised countries in the world, its export economy was developed 
under colonisation as a supplier of agrarian products to the United Kingdom. This is an 
important linkage between the New Zealand left and PRC radicalism – there was a strong 
emphasis on involvement with agricultural labour and factory work as part of the political action 
in Maoism and in the practical experience and cultural imaginary of people in the New Zealand 
left in this era: large numbers of New Zealanders had personal experience of physical labour in 
either rural or urban contexts from the 1950s to the 1970s and this cut across class lines.6 
Intellectuals such as R.A.K. Mason and Communist leaders such as Victor Wilcox each had 
experiences as rural labourers. This was different from other Western countries, where members 
of the working class were less likely to shift back and forth between agricultural and factory 
labour, and where members of the intelligencia were less likely to have worked in farming or in 
factories at some stage in their lives. Maoist emphasis on the agrarian sector, and on agricultural 
mechanisation undertaken as a revolutionary activity, sounded less remote from everyday politics 
and economics in New Zealand than it might have in other rich countries. Leftist New 
Zealanders translated both what they read and what they saw in Maoist China into terms that 
fitted with their own economies – material and moral – in which ideologies and technologies 
associated with rural egalitarianism closely linked to mechanised farming, and strongly 
interpenetrating rural and urban sectors, even including such structures as farming cooperatives, 
seemed to be present in both systems. 
New Zealand’s most famous son in China, Rewi Alley, said that in the 1920s he had read in the 
Weekly News ‘on the great revolution in China’ and decided he ‘would like to go and have a look 
at [it]’. 7  Given the agrarian links identified above, Rewi Alley’s involvement with rural 
industrialism was a significant issue from both the New Zealand and Chinese ends. Alley’s 
exploits with Indusco during the War of Resistance and activities such as the transport of sheep 
to China along the Burma Road by CORSO fuelled the public imagination, albeit in a colonial 
manner not necessarily suited to the new environment.8 
                                                        
6 Richard Bedford and Brian Heenan, ‘The people of New Zealand: reflections on a revolution’, in Holland, P.G. and 
Johnston, W.D. (eds), Southern Approaches: Geography in New Zealand, New Zealand Geographical Society, Christchurch, 
1987, 133-77. 
7Rewi Alley, Rewi Alley an Autobiography, New World Press, Beijing, 1987, 42. 
8 Indusco is the Industrial Cooperatives Movement, founded by Edgar and Peg Snow. Rewi Alley was the international 
face of the movement and become essentially its CEO within a short time of it being established. Most foreigners were 
encouraged to leave ‘New China’ after Liberation, this was especially true of those the Communist Party considered to 
have been engaged in an imperialist or colonial activity, such as missionaries, or those accused of having worked too 
closely with the former regime. The latter category included almost everyone connected with international donor 
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The image of China depicted by those there during the Japanese occupation had drawn an 
extremely sympathetic audience in New Zealand, especially when New Zealand too was at war 
with Japan. In fact this time represented, for the first time, the beginning of a shift away from a 
preponderance of anti-Chinese racism.9 According to the Korean War scholar Ian McGibbon 
[Underlying] New Zealand’s attitude to Asia and Asian was a sense of racial superiority, 
deeply embedded in the national consciousness through more than a century of 
perceiving that part of the world through imperialist lenses… Chinese were regarded as 
inscrutable, untrustworthy, corrupt.10 
Yet the image of the toiling Chinese peasant, subjected to unconscionable treatment at the hands 
of the invaders, resonated with the New Zealand public fearing the same. But since most of the 
New Zealand fighting force was in Europe, and England was still ‘home’ to so much of colonial 
New Zealand, China remained an explored and distant ‘other’. The foundation of the friendship 
relationship, however, was forged in this period, and in the period of civil war after Japan’s 
surrender (1945-1949).  
While most New Zealanders were fed a diet of China ‘being lost’, those New Zealanders with 
firsthand experience presented an image of ‘unimaginable suffering of the people under Chiang’s 
Kuomintang regime’ (KMT).11 The KMT did have its supporters, William Goddard for example, 
but the NZCFS consisted of people who believed in the idea that everything was going to change 
under the CPC.12 For them, the Communist Party of China represented order, stability and a new 
beginning.13 For those who would be the founders of the NZCFS, the PRC was ‘New China’, a 
project to which they were prepared to offer their complete support. Yet despite their initial 
activities, the historical interest and the agrarian connection, China was quickly constructed 
through the popular media as an enemy and as a threat. As New Zealand made its commitment 
to the containment of communism, China was depicted as a ‘coiled dragon’ whose unfolding 
would spread socialism and the ‘yellow peril’ southwards. This was exacerbated by war on the 
Korean peninsular, where New Zealand and Chinese troops faced off against one another.14 
Reflecting this popular position, New Zealand’s involvement in the Korean War was supported 
by both main political parties, had universal press approval and only the ‘numerically insignificant 
                                                                                                                                                              
agencies. CORSO was the Council of Organisations for Relief and Services Overseas. Of even Indusco’s Bailie 
Schools the new government was unimpressed: ‘It was too closely associated with missionary activity, foreigners and 
the Nationalists to be a desirable model for New China’, (Anne-Marie Brady, The Myth of Rewi Alley, RoutledgeCurzon, 
London, 2003, 54).  
9 For an alternative view – that racist policies continued until the 1980s, see Nigel Murphy, ‘Poll Tax & Other Anti-
Chinese Legislation’, Paper presented at Crouching Tiger, Hidden Banana Conference, Auckland, 4-5 June 2005. 
10 Ian McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War, vol 1, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1991, 1996, 16. 
11 Barbara Spencer, Desert Hospital in China, Jarrolds, London, 1954, 166. 
12 See Jeremy Taylor, “Taipei’s ‘Britisher’: W. G. Goddard and the promotion of Nationalist China in the Cold-war 
Commonwealth”, New Zealand Asian Studies Review, 9, 2 (December, 2007): 126-46. 
13  This remains the official position: see Bill Willmott, past-President and Life Member of the NZCFS when 
interviewed by Linda Clark on Radio New Zealand’s Nine-to-Noon on 8 November 2002. 
14 See McGibbon, 16. 
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New Zealand Communist Party’ opposed the commitment of New Zealand troops. 15  Rewi 
Alley’s efforts to speak against New Zealand’s participation, and to condemn what he referred to 
as biological warfare on the part of the United Nations troops, resulted in official efforts to 
discredit him throughout 1952.16 
The organisation that was formed to represent alternative images of the PRC, the New Zealand 
China Society, was actually dreamed up in China. Alley and Shirley Barton, the latter in China on 
behalf of CORSO and working with Alley’s Indusco project, wrote to their New Zealand 
supporters suggesting that they convert the support they had offered through aid into political 
support for the new regime.17 This was by no means an easy task as the small-scale publications 
supporting China or opposing New Zealand’s commitment in Korea were officially denounced 
as ‘communist fronts’ and dissenting views to the majority had ‘difficulty finding expression in 
the press’.18 
Shirley Barton worked with Alley in China where she was Chinese Field Secretary for CORSO 
from 1947 until CORSO’s work formerly finished with Liberation. She stayed in China and 
assisted Alley with the production of his first two books, Yo Banfa, which she edited, and its 
companion edition The People Have Strength, published after she returned to New Zealand. She was 
also an important confident for both him and R. A. K. Mason, whom she saw and corresponded 
with regularly. Her papers, now deposited with the National Library, show she continued to be a 
regular and effusive correspondent with Alley, helping him, in part, to craft his messages in 
accordance with developments in New Zealand. She was a member of the CPNZ, having worked 
with the CPNZ bookstore (Progressive Books) and the CPNZ-dominated Peace Council before 
she went to China and she formally joined the Party after her return from China in 1953. Whilst 
in New China she attended the Asia-Pacific Peace Conference, which is discussed in chapter 2, 
joining the New Zealand delegation in Beijing as an observer. She became Secretary of the then 
Auckland-based New Zealand China Friendship Society on the retirement of Mabel Lee for 
health reasons in 1954 and was the first National Secretary when the society was formed on a 
national basis, with Mason as President, in 1958.19 
Other early prominent participants had also been to China to see things with their own eyes, as 
part of a tradition that would be crucial to legitimating their claims to having experiential 
knowledge about China.20 They included nurses Kathleen Hall and Isobel Thompson who had 
                                                        
15 McGibbon, 82. 
16 Director of Information Services to Minister in Charge of Publicity and Information, 21 October 1952, ATL, 
Marshall Papers, folder 22/2. 
17 Letter to Wolfgang Rosenberg (Rewi Alley Aid Group) 1 August 1952, Barton papers, ATL. 
18 McGibbon, 310. 
19 Tom Newnham, New Zealand Women in China, Graphic Publications, Auckland, 1995, 70-80. 
20 The idea of first-hand experience being crucial to understanding the ‘truth’ of China is discussed further in chapters 
3 and 5. 
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both worked during the war years in northern China, and Professor James Bertram who had 
been a correspondent in China and later a Japanese prisoner of war. 
Kathleen Hall went to China in early 1923 and spent two years studying Chinese before working 
in mission hospitals in Datong, Hejian and Anguo. In 1933 she set up a cottage hospital in 
Songjiazhuang, a small village in western Hebei. By 1938 the area lay in the no-man’s land 
between the Japanese-occupied lowland and the mountain headquarters of the Eighth Route 
Army. Hall made trips to Peking to collect supplies for the hospital and when asked by the 
medical adviser to the Eighth Route Army, Norman Bethune, a Canadian doctor, she would also 
bring back medical supplies for the army. In 1939 the Japanese carried out a punitive raid on 
Songjiazhuang, destroying the mission and hospital, and demanded Hall be expelled from China. 
Back in New Zealand, she spoke on China whenever she had the opportunity and worked for the 
missions, for the China Aid Council and for CORSO. She was involved in setting up branches of 
the New Zealand China Friendship Society. In March 1960 she met Rewi Alley for the first time, 
home on a visit from his work in China. She returned to China to take part in the national day 
celebrations in Beijing later that year and visited China again in 1964 as a guest of the Chinese 
Peoples Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.21 
In 1935 James Bertram accepted a travelling fellowship from the Rhodes Trust to visit China, 
and spent 1936 in Beijing learning Chinese. He made his way the following year to Xi'an, where 
KMT leader General Chiang Kai-shek had been seized by officers sympathetic to the 
communists, a crisis that led to the formation of the United Front against the Japanese invaders. 
After interviewing Mao Zedong in Yan'an (the first British journalist to do so), he travelled for 
five months with the Eighth Route Army in north China. These experiences resulted in his books 
Crisis in China (1937) and North China Front (1939). During these two years Bertram became 
acquainted with a number of the men and women who would later take high posts in communist 
China. He later worked for Song Qingling’s China Defence League (CDL), soliciting and 
distributing western refugee and medical aid. Bertram worked for the league in Hong Kong until 
the Japanese seized the colony in December 1941. He became a prisoner of war in Hong Kong 
and Tokyo for nearly four years. After the war, he also travelled for a period throughout New 
Zealand as a CORSO representative and directed help once again to Song Qingling and to Rewi 
Alley. The remainder of Bertram's life was spent as an academic. He was active for a while in 
groups such as the Society for Closer Relations with Russia and the New Zealand China Society, 
but was never attracted to the Party politics that sometimes dominated those organisations. He 
returned to China with the official cultural group discussed in chapter 2 in 1956, and again in 
                                                        
21 Hall, Mary. 'Hall, Kathleen Anne Baird 1896 - 1970'.  Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, updated 22 June 2007, 
http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/ (accessed 23 April 2010). 
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1986 as an honorary guest of the Chinese government for the anniversary of Chiang Kai-shek's 
capture.22 
Isobel Thompson worked in China as a nurse with CORSO, the Field Service Unit (Quakers) 
and the Chinese Welfare Fund (headed by Song Qingling) from 1947 until June 1950. She met 
and worked with medical doctor George Hatem, a close confident and friend of Rewi Alley who, 
like Alley, was to spend the rest of his life working in China. Through CORSO she worked with 
Shirley Barton and on her way back to New Zealand, she stayed with Kathleen Hall in Hong 
Kong. She joined the NZCFS on her return but never took up a leading role in the organisation. 
She would return to China in 1990, as a member of a ‘prominent person’s delegation’.23 
When the Society was founded its participants ‘represented’ China in both a diplomatic and 
literary sense, reflecting its centrality to the people-to-people relationship.24 The Society and its 
activities provided the principal means by which an official, or even pro-‘New China’, perspective 
was represented to the New Zealand public and its officials. This thesis investigates how China 
was constructed and represented over the period from China’s Liberation in 1949 until the 
fiftieth anniversary celebration of the NZCFS in 2002. 
As those responsible for external propaganda in the PRC changed how they represented China, 
so too did the PRC’s ‘support organisation’ in New Zealand. Yet the representations did not 
simply map onto one another. The way that the PRC has been represented in the activities of the 
NZCFS has also reflected the relationship that the NZCFS has had with New Zealand society, 
the relationship that the NZCFS has had with Chinese authorities, and changes in the New 
Zealand domestic situation. Further, the Society and the other organisations involved in this 
study repositioned themselves, as did the individual members thereof, in the face of such 
changes. This process of subjectivity, of becoming subjects, as events played out in China and in 
the relationship with China is a further area of investigation. 
This work draws on archival material obtained from long-standing members of the NZCFS, 
including official records. I interviewed a broad cross-section of people engaged in people-to-
people activities, in both New Zealand and the People’s Republic. In China, these included 
foreigners resident in China, people involved in hosting people-to-people activities, people in 
leadership positions in the key organisations, and people retired from people-to-people activities. 
Interviewing the latter, in particular, gave me an understanding of the changes and continuities in 
people-to-people goals, activities and outcomes during the fifty-three years since the People's 
Republic of China was founded. 
                                                        
22 Thomson, John. 'Bertram, James Munro 1910 - 1993'.  Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, updated 22 June 
2007. http://www.dnzb.govt.nz (accessed 23 April 2010). 
23 Newnham, New Zealand Women in China, 73-77. 
24 The term ‘represent’ as used in the sense of ‘standing in the place of’‘, is common to both the idea of ‘representing 
your country’ as a diplomat and ‘representing’ something by way of description. See below for further discussion. 
‘People-to-people’ is discussed in chapter 1. 
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Given their political nature, the issues I wanted to discuss could have been considered sensitive. 
Central to my research is the changing representation of China abroad. A common claim is that 
the PRC's people-to-people activities constitute propaganda, and that foreigners engaged in them 
are somehow disloyal, even 'traitors', to their own countries.25 Undertaking research into such a 
sensitive issue, while relying on official Chinese government connections (in this case quasi-
official), can be difficult. Although I found some hesitancy among members of some of the 
organisations I approached, this did not in the end constitute a real barrier. 
In part the reason for this was that I quickly rejected the approach of some of the others who 
have investigated the phenomenon of people-to-people diplomacy. Many who have explored 
these questions have approached them from a standpoint that those involved have been 
manipulated and duped. The most obvious examples of this are David Caute, Paul Hollander, 
Herbert Passin, Simon Leys (Pierre Rickmans), Stephen Mosher and Anne-Marie Brady. They 
have been joined more recently, although to varying degrees, by Timothy Kendall and Agnieszka 
Sobocinska who both look at Australian images of the PRC constructed through eye-witness 
travel.26 
For these authors, those engaged in the activities detailed through this thesis have been ‘willing 
captives to the PRC’s strict system of control over foreigners’.27 They ‘failed to question the 
reality of what they saw, taking their ability to see the truth for granted’.28  ‘Every Western 
visitor… fell under the Chinese policy for the management of foreign visitors, Waishi jilu, the 
“Chinese shadow play” by which foreigners’ perceptions were carefully stage managed by the 
centralised leadership of the Chinese Communist Party’. 29  They were ‘agents in their own 
censorship, happily bearing witness to a fantasy of Chinese Communism, a “giant socialist theme 
park” which claimed to be the happiest place on earth.’30 
What was most striking about the visits to China, however, was not whether or not what people 
saw was representative of what was the general state of the country, but that what had been 
chosen to show to outsiders was so different from what a New Zealand Government of the time 
might have chosen. The fact that the Chinese state in the contemporary era chose to show off 
                                                        
25 See for example the media coverage and discussion in New Zealand of Rewi Alley’s trips to New Zealand in the 
1960s, or even that which accompanied the release of Anne-Marie Brady’s book on Alley in 2003 (Anne-Marie Brady, 
Friend of China: The Myth of Rewi Alley, RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2003). This is discussed in chapter 7. 
26 David Caute, The Fellow-Travellers: Intellectual Friends Of Communism, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988. Paul 
Hollander, Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, 1928-1978, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1981. Herbert Passin, China’s Cultural Diplomacy, Praeger, New York, 1962. Simon Leys, Chinese 
Shadows, Viking Press, New York, 1977. Stephen Mosher, China Misperceived, A New Republic Book, Harper Collins, 
New York, 1990. Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic, Rowman 
and Littlefield, Maryland, 2003. Timonthy Kendall, Ways of Seeing China: from Yellow Peril to Shangrila, Curtin University 
Books, Freemantle, 2005. Agnieszka Sobocinska, ‘Australian fellow-travellers to China: devotion and deceit in the 
People's Republic’, Journal of Australian Studies, 32, 3, 323-333. 
27 Sobocinska, ‘Australian fellow-travellers’, 324.  
28 Timothy Kendall, Ways of Seeing China, 99. 
29 Anne-Marie Brady, Managing Foreigners, 93. 
30 Kendall, Ways of Seeing China, 116-117. 
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things which would be similar to the indicators New Zealand states might use – impressive 
buildings, flashy shopping streets and good restaurants, historic and natural sites – suggests that 
the commitment to an alternative order in China and by those looking to China from New 
Zealand has diminished. 
Non-Chinese academics concerned with China in New Zealand and elsewhere have tended to 
shy away from the activities of friendship societies, communist groups and short-term visitors to 
China. One consequence of this is that the insights of people who were not necessarily highly 
literate in Chinese or did not approach the country from an academic perspective, or who did not 
live there, could be dismissed as simplistic. Equally, the people who threw their lot in with the 
CPC and chose to live there in the 1950s and 1960s, are often seen as dupes or puppets. These 
critiques are simplistic. There is a more complex picture to the sympathisers and short-term 
visitors and this thesis seeks to develop a systematic account of what these people thought and 
perhaps, why they thought it. It is a history of their truth-telling, rather than trying to tell whether 
or not what they said was true. 
In talking with those involved in these activities, and putting to them the allegations that are 
commonly made, the idea of wilful complicity in a grand lie is simply not compelling. Further, by 
reading these accounts in this way, the interpreters have ignored much of what the person 
engaged in providing the account had to say. My interview subjects showed a complex and 
sophisticated understanding of their role. The overwhelming sense was that people knew exactly 
what it was that they were engaged in and that they were willing and conscious participants in a 
process that was designed to lend assistance to a project that they supported – the development 
of the People’s Republic of China and improvement of lives of the Chinese people. 
The manipulation theses are based on some claims that simply do not stand up to evidence. 
Sobocinska, for example, says that ‘Tourists were issued with a centrally-planned itinerary which 
showcased the most positive aspects of the Chinese state and left no time for anything else’, and 
that ‘Contact with foreigners was forbidden for Chinese citizens without the necessary 
accreditation’.31 Brady claims that ‘even fluent Mandarin speakers had to conduct conversations 
in English through their interpreter’. These may be majority positions, I am not in a position to 
say, but as is detailed in this thesis they are not universally true.  It seems to me that if someone 
had a particular experience then that experience should be accepted as true, if only for that 
interlocutor. If a visitor to the PRC saw something then that experience was a real one, even if 
what they saw was special or constructed just for their visit. By looking at these real experiences 
and the truth, for them, of people’s accounts a picture of a changing China can be drawn. It is 
precisely the questions of discontinuity and change that I am interested in. 
                                                        
31 Sobocinska, ‘Australian Fellow Travellers’, 330. 
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It is not a question of distinguishing carefully between the dreamed and real version of China – 
and then favouring one or the other. Michel Foucault, one of the major architects of 
understanding of social reality, an intertwined set of textualities that help to create and structure 
our daily experiences of reality, is useful here. In Foucault’s Les mots et les choses (1966, translated 
as The Order of Things) he moves subtly between the West’s simultaneously topographical and 
utopian sense of China. It is at the same time a ‘precise region’ and a ‘reservoir of utopias’, a real 
place and a non-place (utopia). It is a ‘site of space’ in a ‘dreamworld’, a tangible place in an 
intangible space. As China moves from a ‘dreamworld’ to the earth’s ‘other extremity’, ‘China’ 
becomes both the name of the place that exists in the imagination and in the world at the same 
time, like a dream from which one cannot be sure one has woken up, or a reality in which one 
thinks one is dreaming. Foucault acknowledges the real force of dreamed China, and the degree 
to which that China constructs the appearance of Western reality. China – the name alone – 
works not simply as a single vision of otherness, but as something like a library, full of books 
with the same name but different texts. For these subjects, their China, imaginary or otherwise 
was, is just like the real one. 32  The fragments of experience and insight which the New 
Zealanders I have surveyed relate should not be treated as matters of fantasy or delusion but 
attempts by people to try to find out some truth about what they were seeing, even if these truths 
were often considerably at variance with the ones produced by other observers. With historical 
phenomena as complex as those unfolding in China in the years after 1949 one would expect 
there to be a whole complex of true observations, but we can equally expect that in an area where 
there is bitter and violent political contest, there will be intense struggles over what is true. With 
this in mind it seemed sensible that instead of second-guessing or critiquing such accounts, I 
took them at face value. Where people claimed a particular motive then I have accepted it. Where 
the record is silent and it is important for my analysis I have articulated what I believe to have 
been behind things. I have tried to do this in a way that is faithful to the motives of those 
involved. I am interested in how the images changed over time, the process of such changes, and 
the construction of subjectivity in this context. What had gone on to cause changes in the images 
that were now being propagated? What was different about what was being said? What was 
different about those doing the saying?  
This is certainly not to say that there is no ‘real’ or that context is not important. For the period 
between 1 October 1949 and 22 December 1972 there was no official recognition of the PRC by 
the Government of New Zealand. There were no diplomatic representatives exchanged, no 
embassies, no official state-to-state discussions or negotiations. During this period most contact 
between China and New Zealand took place at the sub-state, or people-to-people, level. China’s 
                                                        
32 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, Vintage, New York, 1970, xix. Foucault’s 
work is rich and I am not intending to go much further into it here. Perhaps it is enough just to note that after 
Foucault, it is hard to ignore the very systemic presence of historical imagination and its effects, in light of nuances 
existing on individual levels. 
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image was thus represented through the activities of what the Chinese refer to as ‘people-to-
people diplomacy’. International relations literature refers to this under a whole range of 
descriptors: informal diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, civilian diplomacy, popular diplomacy, and 
Non-Government Organisation (NGO) diplomacy. Note that these are conceptually and in 
practice different things, yet the PRC uses people-to-people diplomacy as an umbrella term to 
cover these unalike things.33 
If concepts of ‘discussing’, and ‘standing as an advocate for’, both refer to the notion of 
‘representation’, then we are naturally drawn to the work of Edward Said, who wrote so 
influentially on the idea of representing the ‘other’, in particular the ‘Orient’. Said identifies what 
he termed ‘Orientalism’ as a ‘style of thought’, or a form of geographical and spacialised 
knowledge which is structured by a relationship of power and based on an ontological and 
epistemological distinction between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’. He also refers to Orientalism 
as academic and governmental knowledge and as a ‘corporate institution’ that has the power to 
dominate and restructure the Orient. Said insists on a dynamic exchange between these different 
forms, that is, between authors, scholars, and administrators on behalf of the state. Orientalism, 
although not universally accepted, can be productively extended to the representational 
techniques used by New Zealanders to construct an image of China.34 
A relationship that these New Zealanders had with the PRC is more than just the process of 
representing. It is also the sense of self of those doing the relating. Reflecting on the curious, 
paradoxical, and imaginary relationship that exists between China and the West one is reminded 
of Lacan’s theory about the ‘mirror stage’ that describes how a small child identifies with their 
mirror-reflection and accordingly achieves a kind of self-identity. This birth of the ego is, 
however, only achieved by an already alienated image, as the child identifies with an ideal-ego 
that seems to be in full control of its body. The frustration born out of the child’s incomplete 
control of the various parts of his own body that don’t match the image of the ideal-ego lays the 
ground for aggressive feelings against the seemingly more perfect others the child will meet later 
in life.35  
If it is this imaginary register that directs our response to others then theories like that of Said’s 
‘orientalism’ will never elucidate cross-cultural encounters fully. The attention to China is of a 
different character than the mix of imperialism and hegemonic knowledge Edward Said outlined 
with his hypothesis of a western ‘orientalism’. China, for those looked at in this study, was not an 
‘other’ to be studied in order to dominate it. And in contrast with the orientalists’ engagement in 
                                                        
33 The terms tend to be used synonymously in official PRC material. See the discussion in chapter 1. 
34 Said, Edward, Orientalism, Penguin, 7th Edition, 1996, especially 2-4. Echoing Foucault, Said suggests that there is no 
such place as the one that people are representing in their texts. He wrote: ‘In the system of knowledge about the 
Orient, the Orient is less a place than a topos, a set of references, a congeries of characteristics, that seems to have its 
origin in quotation, or a fragment of a text, or a citation from someone’s work on the Orient, or some bit of previous 
imagining, or an amalgam of all of these’ (Said, Orientalism, 177). 
35 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English, W.W. Norton, New York, 2007, 75. 
  15
what they perceived as a hostile but still strangely familiar Orient, China was often a place for 
projections and reflection about their own culture - a third space outside the dichotomies of 
orientalism, a place that could be filled with all kind of fantasies about such things as a ‘happy 
life’, ‘the new man’, and ‘full equality’.  In this sense ‘China’ came at one time to encapsulate a 
romantic dream of pure social togetherness from pre-modern society, a return to a ‘people’s 
culture’ unsullied by consumerism, pornography and decadence. 
Lisa Lowe calls this ‘postcolonial orientalism’, which refers us back to Said. Much work coming 
out of Orientalism has focused on the ways in which Western texts produced their own colonial 
experiences as part of an attempt to ‘manage’ the colonial situation. Lowe, and others, would still 
regard these texts which valorise China as orientalist – even as they try for a sympathetic, anti-
Western reading of the East. In doing so, she raises a number of troubling questions, not least of 
which is how the West might ethically talk about the East when even praise can be taken as 
fundamentally mistaken. The question of praise – the fantasy in the name of the other – is central 
to what Eric Hayot refers to as the ‘Chinese dream’.36 
One the one hand, the Marxist enthusiasms of many of those sympathetic to the PRC made 
them rather unsympathetic to the idea of China as a mysterious other. There is a difference 
between the kind of colonial knowledge structures Said criticises and the revolutionary 
modernising projects of sympathisers with the Chinese revolution. However, it might still be said 
that a hidden Orientalism haunts the thought of enthusiasts for People’s China, particularly the 
idea that China was a place from which to make a critique of New Zealand society. Yet, for those 
observers, People’s China furnished a puritan fantasy rather than a fastasy of luxury and 
sensuality. 
There is a question here regarding the kind of knowledge that one has of a society which one 
visits periodically as contrasted with the kind of knowledge one has of a society in which one 
lives. The distinction at some level is that of the spectator rather than the participant, and entails 
a different kind of knowledge relationship. These participants were not permanent residents in a 
society which was experiencing revolutionary transformation: they were faced then with a 
particularly problematic situation in that the constant shifts in the entity with which they were 
engaged complicated even further the relationship of the traveller/spectator. The pro-
revolutionary traveller/spectator was doing something different from travellers of other kinds; 
they were also doing something different from the resident. The knowledge is not simple, and 
should not be dismissed in comparison with the knowledge of either the resident or the non-
revolutionary traveller. 
                                                        
36 Lisa Lowe, Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms, Cornell University Press, 1991, Eric Hayot, Chinese Dreams: 
Pound, Brecht, Tel Quel, University of Michigan Press, 2003. 
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One way through these conceptual complications is to focus on the changing motivations of 
those interested in supporting the CPC-led project in the PRC. In doing so we stop looking 
simply at representations of China and look instead at those doing the representing. For the New 
Zealanders who were sympathetic to the project underway in the PRC then, there was a reflective 
process by which they themselves were constructed in relation to the object of their interest. In 
order to be supportive of the project underway in the PRC, the organisations in New Zealand 
have been forced to keep reinventing themselves in relationship to it. 
This idea of a shifting sense of China and the changing sense of self that this requires, calls upon 
post-foundational philosophy such as that of Alain Badiou – himself in a tradition that draws 
upon but surpasses Foucault, Lacan and Said.37 If the traditional notion of ‘truth’ in Anglo-
American analytical philosophy encompasses a fixed notion to be ‘discovered’, and the post-
modernist turn opened up the possibility of multiple truths – and at its most extreme no truth – 
then post-foundational philosophy looks at ‘truth’ as the real; it is the viewers and their multiple 
subjectivities that keep changing. At the core of Badiou’s analysis is the notion of Being through 
fidelity to an Event. For Badiou, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), and its 
rupturing of the relationship between party and state, constitutes such an event in PRC history.38 
On a lesser scale, even outside this transformative event to re-write the existing situation in its 
entirety, this idea of identity through fidelity to an event it still illustrative of a shifting and 
changing sense of self in relation to a relationship with a changing representation of a situation. 39 
A travelogue is revealing of this process. One visits and sees. The way that a viewer represents 
what they see is naturally subjective, but the subject viewer themself is changed as a result of the 
viewing. There is another possible tension. If the viewer wants to have a constant relationship 
with the thing they have viewed, but that the thing, in this case the PRC, keeps changing, then 
they too are forced into a state of flux. In order to be supportive of the project underway in the 
PRC, the organisations in New Zealand have been forced to keep reinventing who they are, and 
who they are in relation to China. Badiou’s notion of such changing subjectivities provides a real 
insight into this process.  
An example of this is the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ). In the late 1950s the 
CPNZ would have described its relationship to the CPC as one by which they were all included 
in the great brotherhood of communist parties. Its self-identity was that of a (national) 
communist party amongst many. When it took sides during the Sino-Soviet split, however, the 
CPNZ defined the CPC as an ‘orthodox’ party standing against the Communist Party of the 
                                                        
37 See Peter Hallward, ‘Order and Event’, New Left Review, 53, September-October 2008. Further, Badiou also has a 
hint of Habermas (see chapter 2), as Hallward writes, ‘[for Badiou] a truth must be universally and even “eternally” 
true, while relying on nothing more, ultimately, than the militant determination of the subjects who affirm it’ 
(Hallward, ‘Order and Event’, 98). 
38 Alain Badiou, Polemics, Verso, London, 2006, 291. 
39 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2003 and Badiou, The 
Century, Polity, London, 2007. 
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Soviet Union (CPSU)’s ‘revisionism’, and itself similarly as ‘orthodox’. By the last 1960s, with the 
GPCR in force, the CPC was clearly no longer an ‘orthodox’ Marxist-Leninist party. The CPNZ 
also saw itself as ‘revolutionary’. In the mid-1970s, as China experimented with what was to 
become ‘Market Socialism’, the CPNZ represented the CPC as reflecting the specificities and 
particularities of what was needed in Chinese circumstances – and itself therefore as tolerant of 
such differences. This did not continue and in 1979 the CPNZ broke with the CPC, reaffirming 
its position as an ‘orthodox’ party against what it described as ‘new revisionism’.40 
The NZCFS, similarly, although differently, reinvented itself throughout its fifty years of 
engagement and support of the PRC. It began as an organisation that down-played the politics 
taking place in China in order to promote peace and engagement. It developed into a committed 
advocate for recognition, simultaneously promoting China’s road to development as a lesson for 
other underdeveloped countries. As this position morphed into the claim that ‘New Zealand can 
learn from China’ it became an enthusiastic supporter of the transformational potential of the 
GPCR. This engagement with and embracing of Chinese politics culminated in a whole-
organisation discussion on the ‘Theory of the Three Worlds’ and its applicability to 
understanding the world at the time. As China’s projection of its domestic politics to its 
supportive organisations lessened, the NZCFS became a facilitator of ‘prominent persons’ 
engagement with the PRC, working with elites instead of a mass base. Struck by a serious crisis of 
confidence and self-assurance after Tiananmen, it would become in the early 1990s an 
organisation promoting little more than ‘Chinese culture’, without politics and without apology. 
Yet as China grew economically and in terms of global influence – through the 1990s to the turn 
of the millennium – so too did the Society’s sense of the rightness of its cause and its self-belief. 
The thesis looks at these broad themes. 
The work itself is divided into seven chapters. The first attempts to situate the concept of 
‘people-to-people diplomacy’ by placing it internationally and historically. With respect to the 
history of ‘people to people diplomacy’ I offer an interpretation of the changes in self-definition 
that those engaged in these activities on behalf of the Chinese state have used and how these 
reflect a changing China. I trace different conceptions of people-to-people diplomacy: as 
proletarian internationalism, international NGO activism and public diplomacy. 
Chapter two explores the notion of ‘telling the truth’. This is an important concept for those 
involved in the relationships explored in this thesis for a commitment to ‘truth’ and ‘accuracy’, 
and challenging what they perceived as ‘untruths’ about China are a consistent refrain in their 
materials. The chapter explores different approaches to truth, truth-telling and truthfulness and 
looks at how these have been utilised by those who have engaged in supporting the CPC-led 
project in China of building the PRC. 
                                                        
40 This is discussed in chapter 4. 
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Chapter three is the first of two chapters that explicitly trace the representations of the PRC that 
have emerged through the activities of the New Zealand China Friendship Society. The first of 
these looks at how change in the New Zealand Society affected its representations of China 
(1949-1976) while the second considers how change in China affected those representations 
(1976-2002). I review the representations made by the NZCFS of the PRC over the period, 
seeking to understand and interpret the changes in the images involved. While the discussion 
necessarily dwells on how these representations reflected the PRC’s own projection, in the first 
of these the focus is on how the particular engagement that those doing the representing had 
with the PRC and how this served to shape the images they constructed about China. 
In the fourth chapter I explore the idea of ideology in the representation of China through an 
exploration of New Zealand’s Marxist-Leninists and their imagining of the socialist project in the 
PRC. A principal focus is on the Sino-Soviet split and the Communist Party of New Zealand’s 
development towards a close association with the Communist Party of China - particularly the 
reasons for their closeness on questions of ideology. I also explore what happened to the idea of 
‘China’ for some of the post-CPNZ parties: the Organisation for Marxist Unity/Struggle Group, 
the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of a Communist Party of New Zealand 
(Marxist Leninist), and the Red Flag Group. The source material is a series of interviews and 
personal papers, the People’s Voice, New Zealand Labour/Communist Review and the smaller parties’ 
publications. 
Chapter five looks at the New Zealand student study tours to the PRC and the images 
constructed through them. The source material is a series of interviews conducted around the 
reunions which were themselves inspired by the showing of films taken by students on NZUSA 
tours to the PRC during the GPCR in 1971 and 1974.41 In this chapter I show that there was 
more discontinuity than continuity in the experiences of these two tours, just two years apart, and 
explore the reasons for that. I map those changes more broadly, showing that the 
contemporaneous international visitors represented by the Committee of Concerned Asian 
Scholars in 1971 and the Tel Quel group in 1974 reflect these same changes. 
I show that for the students there were essentially two quite different groups, reflecting a 
changed engagement with the PRC. The first, in 1971, was made up of leaders enthused with the 
transformational capacity of socialism – for China – and for a closer relationship between New 
Zealand and China. The second trip I look at in this way, in 1974, was made up of radical 
activists who saw China’s Cultural Revolution as offering a transformative path for changing 
New Zealand society. As in the NZCFS chapters, I show that these changes in those who sought 
                                                        
41 1974 was the third of the NZUSA-organised tours. The trip in 1973 did not reflect the characteristics of either of 
these positions, having an ‘in-between’ status. Later tours (which took place from 1975 to 1978) reflected the 1974 
perspective although with reducing radical commitment. Hence my focus is on the 1971 and 1974 tours. 
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to relate to the PRC reflected changes in domestic Chinese politics, and changes in New Zealand 
society. 
Chapter six is a second chapter on the NZCFS. It also reviews the representation of the PRC, 
and looks more at how the changes in the way that members of the NZCFS represented the PRC 
reflected changes taking place in the PRC. Like its predecessor, it is based on interviews, internal 
documents, and publications. I draw on the ideas of Wang Hui, who argues that ‘China’ has 
moved from being a political to a cultural descriptor for the Chinese state and how the Party and 
State have become one. I show that the same thing has happened for the representation (and the 
activities) of the NZCFS.42 
The seventh chapter looks at the NZCFS’ heroes; Rewi Alley and Kathleen Hall, noting that the 
heroes are presented differently over time and also differently to New Zealanders than to 
Chinese, since particular references are made that will resonate differently to the different target 
groups. Further to this, the images that the heroes take in each context are different at different 
times. Over his sixty years living in China, Alley’s representation is in flux, which itself reflects a 
changing and shifting PRC and a shifting relationship between China and New Zealand. 
Reflecting a problematic historiographical period for the PRC in the early 1990s, another ‘hero’ 
in Kathleen Hall is produced who does not have the same connection to the Chinese state that 
images of Alley carry. 
This reflects an important aspect of the transmission of the tales of travellers – the construction 
of the image that is given to the travellers themselves. For the stories of story-tellers have veracity 
attached to them, at least in part, through how the story-teller is remembered. The NZCFS 
makes a significant claim for its own legitimacy by an appeal to its own history. Given the change 
in the PRC, and New Zealanders relationship with it, there has naturally been the changing 
construction of Alley, which has also seen the emergence of Hall. 
In some respects, this thesis is nothing more than an attempt to construct a history of the 
changing people-to-people relations between the PRC and New Zealand. In that respect it is not 
yet complete. The material is too rich, and still constantly being unearthed, to be able to do it 
justice in a single volume. Instead I have attempted a re-reading and contextualisation of the 
material produced by supporters in New Zealand about the PRC, and tried to look at the 
construction of images involved, while looking at ideas of hegemony, utopia, ideology and above 
all the idea of shifting subjectivity. Each of these chapters explores, in slightly different ways, one 
of these themes, alongside the concept of change and how subjects – in this case the viewers 
from New Zealand – are created in relation to the object of study, the People’s Republic of 
China. 
                                                        
42 Wang Hui, ‘Depoliticized Politics, From East To West’, New Left Review, 41, September-October 2006, 42. 
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Chapter 1: People-to-People Diplomacy in Context 
Putting the PRC’s people-to-people diplomacy in context requires more than coming to terms 
with the changing domestic situation, developments in the international situation and the 
ideological debates that have been a feature of China since liberation. 43  Examining China’s 
approach to people-to-people diplomacy in context also requires locating China’s practices within 
an international context. All countries undertake activities that could be called people-to-people 
diplomacy. Differences in approach are due to time, circumstance and ideological outlook rather 
than anything essentially Chinese.44 
The image that the PRC has chosen to project to the world has changed over time in accordance 
with its particular needs. As the domestic situation in the PRC has changed, so too the goals the 
CPC, and by extension the Chinese party-state, has sought to achieve through people-to-people 
diplomacy changed. From the founding of the PRC in 1949 to the break with the Soviet Union 
in 1963 the images were dominated by what might be termed ‘peace diplomacy’; from 1963 to 
1976 by proletarian internationalism and utopian projections; from 1976 to 1989 increasingly 
state-centred needs dominated and the images were characterised by ‘normalising’ and ‘cultural’ 
projections; after a break for the disruption caused by the Tiananmen incident these same foci 
for national image building continued anew. This was increasingly the same as other countries’ 
projections, as the idea of a Chinese alternative to ordering society faded. In accordance with 
changes in goals and outlook, the specifics of the image that was being projected also changed. 
Sometimes these have been particular, or can be viewed as having been particular, but there have 
also been patterns and elements of continuity. In addition, the method by which China has 
chosen to project these images has been subject to corresponding changes. These changes and 
continuities over time have related to both domestic change and global influences on the PRC. 
Examining these changes provides for a contextualisation of China’s people-to-people diplomacy. 
The ideological outlook that dominated the PRC until the death of Mao, and has lingered in 
some form or other, meant that people-to-people diplomacy in practice has reflected socialist 
practice as well as changing ideas of this. The conceptualisation of such practices in the socialist 
system has been quite different from the conceptualisation of them in liberal-capitalist diplomacy. 
For socialist countries they have been seen as part of a global movement for revolutionary 
                                                        
43 David E. Apter, Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994. For an analysis 
that develops similar ideas to explain the transition from Maoist to post-Mao China, see Kalpana Misra, From Post-
Maoism to Post-Marxism: The Erosion of Official Ideology in Deng's China, Routledge, New York, 1998. For an application of 
changing ideological position flowing into CPC practice see G. C. Lim, M. H. Lee, ‘Political ideology and housing 
policy in modern China’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 1990, 8, 477-487 and Mahmoud Ezzamel, 
Jason Zezhong Xiao, Aixiang Pan, ‘Political ideology and accounting regulation in China’, Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 32, 2007, 669–700. 
44 In philosophy, essentialism is the view that, for any specific kind of entity, there is a set of characteristics or 
properties all of which any entity of that kind must possess. It is permanent, unalterable, and eternal; and present in 
every possible world. This viewpoint has been criticized by Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre, and many modern and existential 
thinkers. To the extent that essence implies permanence and inalterability, essentialist thinking tends to agree with 
political conservatism and militate against social change. 
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internationalism rather than simply winning friends overseas. Japan’s post-war diplomacy might 
be seen as a parallel and contrast since it similarly operated from a position of distrust. After 
World War Two, the Japanese state was anxious to win friends in countries like New Zealand 
and to humanize the image of Japan, in particular in response to the image of Japan as a monster 
during the war.45  There is a contrast however with the revolutionary style of people-to-people 
diplomacy, in that it did not, in any way, seek to challenge the idea of nation-states at any level, 
whereas the more radical phase of Chinese socialist people-to-people diplomacy sought solidarity 
across states on the basis of revolutionary class-consciousness, which implied a rejection of a 
state-centred world. 
In some respect, those attracted to the revolutionary version of people-to-people diplomacy were 
attracted precisely because it seemed not to be about sovereignty and geo-political influence: just 
as a liberal democrat diplomat might be concerned about a foreign policy that does not conform 
with foreign policy ‘norms’, people anxious to see an alternative to ‘normal diplomacy’ wished to 
see and be part of a version of diplomacy that was not in pursuit of self-interest. While the CPC-
led activities were based on ‘international solidarity’ and ‘revolutionary class consciousness’, such 
seemed to be true. In the aftermath of the Mao effort (and by some analyses from the formation 
of the PRC) this has seemed to be increasingly downplayed.46 
Accordingly, since 1976, when the revolutionary aspects of the Chinese state’s activities have 
been less prevalent, people-to-people diplomacy has looked more like that practiced by other 
states. In terms of contemporary international relations literature, people-to-people diplomacy 
can therefore be examined simply as part of a process of national image building and public 
diplomacy. In this view, ‘sub-state’ diplomacy, such as what China refers to as people-to-people 
diplomacy, is simply part of a range of activities that seek to influence public opinion.47 Literature 
that looks at public diplomacy, which almost crosses into the realm of public relations, tends to 
take as its focus an understanding that such activities are a feature of the international activities 
of most large states. 
In these terms, what the PRC engages in is not an exception to ‘normal’ state behaviour. Indeed, 
writing of the international relations activities of the PRC, as Michael Swaine and Ashley Terris 
                                                        
45 For a discussion on Japan’s post-war diplomacy, see Kazuo Ogoura, ‘Japan’s Postwar Cultural Diplomacy’, CAS 
Working Paper Series No. 1/2008, Centre for Asian Area Studies, Freeie Universitat Berlin. Ogoura writes that ‘during 
the 1950ies and 1960ies, the goal of Japanese cultural diplomacy was to transform the prewar image of Japan as a 
militaristic country into a new image of Japan as a peace-loving nation. Japanese officials therefore emphasised such 
cultural activities as the tea ceremony and flower arrangement, in the hopes they would convey Japan’s serene, peace-
loving nature to the world’. 
46 See Fred Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power, Macmillan,1999, 113-116. This 
is discussed below. 
47 The Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) has itself changed how it 
described what it was engaged in. In the 1950s it was Peace Diplomacy, in the 1970s people-to-people diplomacy, the 
early 1990s NGO diplomacy and it now refers to its activities as people-to-people diplomacy again (Ling Ting, 
interview, Beijing, 6 August 2003). 
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conclude, there is little that has been unique.48 They identify three primary goals: 
First and foremost, the preservation of domestic order and well-being in the face of 
different forms of social strife; second, the defence against persistent external threats to 
national sovereignty and territory; and third, the attainment and maintenance of 
geopolitical influence…49 
Domestic well-being, national security and international influence are goals that are hardly unique 
to the PRC. Swaine and Terris also show that the PRC has been unexceptional in other 
important ways. For example, they identify that the PRC has adapted its grand strategy to its 
relative power at each period in time, thus it has proved itself to be pragmatically sensitive to the 
need to moderate its position when it is weak and be more confident and assertive when it is 
stronger. They regard this as typical state behaviour. As Kenneth Lieberthal wrote, ‘A careful 
look at the full sweep of Chinese history demonstrates that strategic thinking in China can be 
understood along lines quite familiar to students of other countries’.50 As Swaine and Terris 
show, since normalization in 1971 when the PRC joined the United Nations, the approach the 
PRC takes to multilateral regimes in spheres like nonproliferation, trade, nuclear development, 
and human rights is pragmatic and unsentimental. Where joining a regime brings asymmetrical 
benefits to the PRC’s own developmental and foreign policy goals, the PRC joins. Where the 
balance is less one-sided China is less enthusiastic, and where the regime runs counter to its 
interest it refuses participation. There are plenty of other examples of such behaviour, where 
countries, like the PRC, take a self-serving approach to such issues. Such examples include 
Australia and the United States regarding the Kyoto Agreement, and the United States with 
respect to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child or the International Covenant 
on Social and Economic Rights, and the Helen Clark-led New Zealand government’s position 
with respect to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.51 
However, despite contemporary similarities, ideas about Chinese exceptionalism still persist. To 
some extent this is a result of a simple lack of faith and trust in the intentions of the PRC, but 
underpinning such a foundational position is an underlying belief that the Chinese state is simply 
different from other states.52 This projection of Chinese difference is really a representation of 
                                                        
48 Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future, Rand Corporation, 
Santa Monica, 2000. 
49 Swaine and Tellis, x. 
50     Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘China’s Grand Strategy and Chinese Exceptionalism’, International Studies Review, 2001, 207. 
51 New Zealand was one of just four countries that voted against the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. The others were also colonial settler societies: Australia, Canada and the United States. Although 
after the 2008 election the new government reversed this position, the case shows that the particularities of New 
Zealand’s history can mean that New Zealand is out of step with the international community, although usually 
regarding and often presenting itself as a model UN member. 
52 Chris Connery, ‘The China Difference’, Postmodern Culture, 2.2, 1992, online journal see 
http://muse.uq.edu.au/journals/postmodern_culture/v002/ 2.2r_connery.html. 
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China being contra to the west and of China standing apart, and on its own.53 Part of the reason 
for this understanding is the United States’ own sense of universalist exceptionalism. Richard 
Williamson argues thus: 
American exceptionalism is grounded in the belief that American values have universal 
application. Human rights, religious tolerance, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, 
representative government, and so on are not merely for the fortunate few, but are the 
inalienable rights of all mankind. These values are transcendent. They are values for 
which American patriots have died. It is the opportunity and responsibility of Americans 
today to keep faith in those values at home, as well as in the animation of our foreign 
relations.54 
The representation of Chinese exceptionalism can be construed in that China stands outside 
international standards, that is the standards of the West and in particular the United States. It is, 
as Chris Connery argues, ‘China’s teleological failure to adhere to how things should operate’, 
although not necessarily from how western powers do operate. Yet because the PRC is not the 
West, it therefore represents some sort of outsider status. For Connery, 
‘China’ is problematic as a determinable category and the consequence of the ‘China 
difference’, from a nostalgic margin, or an area of nationally defined knowledge, or an 
essentialising critique of Western hegemony is always ‘reducible to a gesture of denial’.55 
The existence of a China difference on the basis of presenting an alternative model of socialist 
diplomacy, however fleeting, is underemphasized in most discussion. Instead, Chinese 
particularism has been claimed to be based in some ‘Confucian tradition’ albeit, incongruously, 
alongside representations that this same tradition was being destroyed. Although not at all 
sympathetic to the goals being pursued by the CPC and the PRC, for Stephen Mosher 
The mystical invocation of Culture and History to explain Chinese Communist Party 
practices is all the more odd in view of Mao’s conscious and violent rejection of China’s 
past.56 
Citing Ping-to Ho’s finding that Maoist ideology is wrapped in a ‘two-thousand year old bottle of 
authoritarianism’, Mosher notes that given the rarity of societies based on individual freedom 
internationally, until the very recent period, claiming the ‘reappearance of authoritarianism’ after 
                                                        
53 For further discussion of the representation of Asia, and China in particular, as ‘other’ in Western media, see David 
Birch, Tony Shirato and Sanjay Srivastava, Asia: Cultural Politics in the Global Age, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2001, 
especially 9-13. 
54   Richard S. Williamson, ‘Nation-Building: The Dangers of Weak, Failing, and Failed States’, The Whitehead Journal of 
Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, Winter/Spring 2007, 14. 
55  See Connery, ‘The China Difference’. 
56 Stephen Mosher, China Misperceived, Harper Collins, New York, 1990, 104. Maurice Meisner makes a similar point, 
‘the aim was not to revitalize old Chinese traditions but to find ways to bury them’. (Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China: A 
History of the People’s Republic, The Free Press, New York, 1977, 5). 
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1949 ‘scarcely constitutes convincing evidence of continuity’.57 For Mosher, presciently, the CPC 
is Marxist, rather than Chinese. For Anne-Marie Brady, in contrast, the People’s Republic of 
China’s approach is unique and uniquely Chinese. She even consistently refers to it by its Chinese 
name to distinguish it from other countries’ practices. 
The origins of many of the methods and much of the terminology of China’s waishi 
system lie in the practices formulated by the Soviet Union from the early 1920s…. As in 
all processes of cultural exchange, the Chinese communists did not adopt Soviet 
approaches to foreign relations wholesale. What they did… was to apply them and 
interpret them in terms that were culturally appropriate to Chinese norms and 
traditions.58 
For the Chinese involved in the early exchanges they were involved in something universal, 
reflecting how those who interacted with them from the West saw what they were engaged in. 
Later, when the revolutionary practices subsided, the activities mirror the activities of other 
states. The reading of the activities needs to be understood in terms of the contextual aims and 
the particularities of the political situation of the PRC and those who engaged with it. It is this 
context, rather than Chinese exceptionalism, that provides a deeper understanding of the 
practices involved. 
 
People-to-People Diplomacy in Theory and Practice 
One way that the PRC’s image has been represented to New Zealand, in both a figurative and 
loosely diplomatic sense, has been through the activities of what the Chinese refer to as ‘people-
to-people diplomacy’. The international relations literature sometimes refers to this as ‘cultural 
diplomacy’, ‘informal diplomacy’, ‘popular diplomacy’, ‘sub-state diplomacy’ and ‘NGO 
diplomacy’.59 
There is a lot of differentiation between the various forms of diplomacy that are subsumed 
within the term ‘people-to-people diplomacy’. In addition, there was a complex interaction 
between the ideal of an alternative diplomacy, linked with PRC radicalism, and pragmatic 
problems related to the PRC not enjoying recognition by many states in the world prior to 1971. 
                                                        
57 Ping-ti Ho, China in Crisis: China’s Heritage and the Communist Political System, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1968, 5, and Mosher, China Misperceived, 104.  For Mosher, the most striking connection is the ‘organisational, 
ideological, and policy isomorphism between the PRC and the USSR’ (Mosher, China Misperceived, 105). 
58 Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic, Rowman and Littlefield, 
Maryland, 2003, 8. 
59 See Herbert Passin, Chinese Cultural Diplomacy; Nathan White, ‘People’s Diplomacy: its use by China to influence 
Japan 1949-76’, Journal of Contemporary China, 3, 1979; Allen Whiting, China Eyes Japan, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1989; Margaret Fisher and Joan Bondurant, ‘The Impact of Communist China on Visitors from India’, Far 
Eastern Quarterly, 15, 2, 1956; Anne-Marie Brady, Managing Foreigners; Josh Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, where these 
terms are used virtually interchangeably to describe the same activities. See also ‘Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of 
Public Diplomacy’, Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, U.S. Department of State, September 2005. 
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It is the complex position outside the norms of the international order, especially between 1963 
and 1971, which made it possible for the PRC to appear uncorrupt in the eyes of dissenting 
populations in countries like New Zealand. Since people-to-people diplomacy is part of a radical 
alternative to normal diplomacy, it cannot always be equated in a straight-forward way with 
national image building. However, since the current friendship apparatus in Beijing is heir to a 
very complex legacy, those involved in it will be apt to smooth over the contradictions and 
historical and political shifts that have affected it between its original incarnations and the 
present. 
The PRC began its people-to-people activities on 2 October 1949 with the establishment of the 
Chinese People’s Committee to Safeguard World Peace (CPCSWP), that same month the Society 
for Sino-Soviet Friendship was started, both under the leadership of Song Qingling. 60 According 
to those involved, these organisations were delineated from the operations of the state. ‘There 
was no need for direction’ since the aims of those involved ‘were the same’ as the CPC, which 
also led the government. The CPCSWP and the Chinese People’s Association for Cultural 
Relations with Foreign Countries (CPACRFC) were ‘mass organisations, driven by members’, 
however ‘the aim of the government and the organisation were the same’. The goals of the first 
interactions with foreigners were ‘to end the isolation of China… and to make friends all over 
the world’. As proof of their independence from the state they pointed to the relationship with 
the African National Congress in the 1960s. The ANC supported the Soviet Union ‘but we still 
supported them. We didn’t mind that they had close relations with the Soviet Union, we just 
supported them. Later some of them came to China and we grew closer together’.61 
The primary agency by which the PRC now conducts its people-to-people activities is through 
the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) or as it is 
abbreviated to in Chinese youxie. In additional there are other agencies such as the Chinese 
People’s Institute for International Affairs, the New China News Agency (Xinhua),62 the Chinese 
Organisation for International Understanding, the International Liaison Section of the CPC, and 
the Society for People’s Friendship Studies. Youxie and many of these other groups are officially 
non-government organisations in China and youxie even attends United Nations conferences for 
NGOs in that capacity. Although it also grew out of the CPCSWP (and the Peking Peace 
Committee, which hosted the Peking Peace Conference in 1952), youxie officially began as the 
                                                        
60 Song Qingling was the widow of Sun Yatsen and first Vice President of the PRC. She founded the Chinese Welfare 
League which served to channel Western aid to China during the Second World War. She also started the magazine 
China Reconstructs (now China Today). For more on Song Qingling see, Israel Epstein, Woman in World History: Soong Ching 
Ling (Mme Sun Yatsen), New World Press, Beijing, 1995. 
61 Wang Jinghua and Li Jianping, foundation members of the Chinese People’s Committee to Safeguard World Peace, 
interview, Beijing, 24 July 2003. 
62 In Hongkong Xinhua operated as a quasi-Embassy, although this is not always the case. See Peter Wesley-Smith, 
‘Chinese Consular Representation in British Hong Kong’, Pacific Affairs, 71, 1998. 
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Chinese People’s Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.63 It is headed by a 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs, it is staffed by foreign affairs functionaries who are seconded 
from the PRC diplomatic service, and is described by some as a GONGO or Government 
Organised NGO.64 
In New Zealand the NZCFS, the tours it organises and those who attend its local activities, 
communist parties attracted by the model represented by the PRC, and other organisations such 
as the New Zealand China Trade Association, are each made up of disparate individuals, their 
companion Chinese organisations are intimately connected with the Chinese state. There are still 
parallels in New Zealand of the Chinese organisations, such as the Asia New Zealand 
Foundation which undertakes some similar activities in terms of hosting visitors from Asia, 
projecting an image of New Zealand to Asia, and engaging New Zealanders with Asia. Like the 
Chinese organisations it represents itself as an independent foundation. Yet, like them, the Asia 
New Zealand Foundation is largely, but not exclusively, government funded, undertakes a large 
number of its activities alongside branches of the state, and has been most commonly headed by 
someone who was formerly involved with the New Zealand diplomatic service.65 Similarly, Sister 
Cities’ organisations are effectively part of local government.66 
The structures represented by the Asia New Zealand Foundation were not present in the 1950s 
and 1960s. They are a product of the post-Cold War order in which the various market 
economies in the world tend to have similar kinds of structures. That youxie is similar suggests 
that China in the contemporary period is more like these market economies than one might have 
expected, and they both belong to what Michael Dutton would refer to as the ‘Age of 
Contract’.67 
Before the emergence of literature on ‘national image building’ and ‘public diplomacy’, few 
international relations theorists acknowledged the existence of people-to-people activity. In 
addition, in the PRC’s case since the recognition question was resolved in the 1970s, when state-
to-state activity began to take place, analysis of sub-state activity fell away. Those who have 
                                                        
63 See chapter 3 for discussion regarding the Peking Peace Committee. The CPACRFC was also established by Song 
Qingling to act as an umbrella for the various country-based societies. 
64 For example, CPAFFC Vice President Madam Li Xiaolin has been with the organisation since 1975.  She served as 
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66 See Wellington Xiamen Association, Sister Cities: A Resource Book, Wellington Xiamen Association, Wellington, 2003. 
67 Michael Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics, Duke University Press, Durham, 2005, 262-265. 
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looked at it have tended to use definitions that strongly suggest Chinese or communist 
exceptionalism: 
[People-to-people diplomacy] may be thought of as a process by which a communist 
state attempts to project its influence into a foreign country through a broad array of 
programs designed to reshape attitudes in the target society and prepare the way for 
mobilizing pressure on the foreign government to adopt policies conforming with those 
desired by the communist state. Conceptually, people-to-people diplomacy is to be 
distinguished from traditional government-to-government diplomacy and party-to-party 
diplomacy.68 
At least since 1978, when the Chinese party-state ‘rigidified’, this distinction between what the 
PRC practices and what other states engage is at best arbitrary. Yet a feature of much of the 
examination of China’s people-to-people diplomacy is that both the activities and motives of the 
PRC are examined from a perspective of hostility or from the perspective of agencies that see 
themselves in the role of rivals to the PRC’s activities in this area.69 The attempt to influence 
public opinion in other countries has hardly been unique to the PRC. For those supportive of the 
aspirations of the project represented by the PRC, supporting it was a natural extension of their 
political perspective. It was also completely consistent with their humanist values such as the 
desire for peace and cross-cultural understanding.70 
 
Ideological Difference: Proletarian Internationalism 
For Marxist Leninists, the practice of people-to-people diplomacy is an integral and essential part 
of building and maintaining relations with other countries. In this sense, people-to-people 
diplomacy is a complement to state-to-state and party-to-party relations. As Don Ross explained, 
for him 
The aim of people-to-people diplomacy is to give effect to the desire of the people for 
peace, to involve their participation, to heighten their sense of responsibility, to support 
state policies of preserving world peace and relations of mutual benefit etc, by 
                                                        
68  Nathan White, ‘People’s Diplomacy'. 
69  Among the works commonly invoked to ‘explain’ the purpose of China’s people-to-people activity are Lim Lien’s 
The Chinese Communist’s United Front Strategy and Policy for International Diplomacy, published by the World Anti-Communist 
League, China (Taiwan) Chapter. Nathan White left his position at Columbia University shortly after writing the article 
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much as you can read into titles, those on this sort of topic are often revealingly partisan Frederick C. Barghoorn, The 
Soviet Cultural Offensive: the role of cultural diplomacy in Soviet foreign policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1960 being 
a case in point. 
70  See the chapter 3 for more about the motivations of people involved in these activities in the early years. 
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establishing wide-ranging contacts between people of different countries.71 
Marx's attitude to the idea of the nation is revealed in his approach to the ‘Polish question’, 
which itself was determined by his general strategy for revolution. Marx regarded tsarist Russia as 
the main enemy of the working class. Since there was no working class in Russia at that time, 
there was no immediate possibility of revolution in Russia.72 Therefore Marx supported Polish 
independence as a means of striking a blow against the main enemy, Russian tsarism. For both 
Marx and Lenin the national question always occupied a subordinate position to the class struggle 
and the perspective of the proletarian revolution. Marx originally supported Polish independence 
but was opposed to the independence of the Czechs and was also opposed to the ‘national’ 
liberation movements in the Balkans in the latter half of the 19th century. These two apparently 
contradictory positions were motivated by revolutionary considerations. Marx considered that, 
whereas a victory of the Poles would have represented a blow against Russian tsarism and would 
have had revolutionary implications, the national movement of the South Slavs was used by 
tsarism as a tool of its expansionist policy in the Balkans. 
The national question for Marxists was subordinate to the question of revolution or in a post-
revolutionary society to the building of socialism. The project of socialism is of primary 
importance and the idea of the nation is to be marshaled to support that project.73 In addition, 
for someone like Don Ross, representative of New Zealand’s Marxist-Leninists, the basis of 
people-to-people diplomacy lies within the world outlook of Marxism-Leninism. This theory 
states that the masses are the motive force behind all historical development and social progress. 
That is, the masses play the decisive role in production and through this in political and cultural 
affairs.74 
People-to-people diplomacy links the socialist state with ‘the masses’ of the other 
country to arouse their revolutionary consciousness and seek solidarity with those whose 
own position in society is understood to make them sympathetic to socialist ideas.75  
For Ross then, people-to-people diplomacy went beyond a state-to-state, or even a socialist state-
                                                        
71 Don Ross, interview, Whangarei, 17 April 2003. Ross was the editor of Struggle from the mid-1980s until 2004. He 
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72 Vladimir Lenin, ‘The Right of Nations to Self-determination’, Lenin Collected Works, 20, 108. 
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to-people relationship. People-to-people diplomacy was simply a reflection of the joining 
together of those who were similarly engaged in the Marxist project to bring forth a new society. 
There were various discussions regarding the validity of nationalism amongst people on the left 
in the period that this thesis examines. In fact part of the initial force of Benedict Anderson’s 
seminal Imagined Communities was Anderson’s identification of the Sino-Vietnamese war as a 
watershed - because it involved a conflict between socialist countries that were ‘the first to occur 
between regimes whose… revolutionary credentials are undeniable, …[without] attempts to 
justify the bloodshed in terms of a recognizable Marxist theoretical perspective’.76 It had seemed 
in the early 1970s that nationalism was finished, a 19th century idea that would disappear; the fact 
that commitment to nations has proved stronger than a commitment to class in the course of the 
last thirty years has been a matter of ideological confusion for many sympathetic with Marxism. 
Many of the people in New Zealand who were enthusiastic about China in the 1960s and 1970s 
had little sympathy with dominant and state-centred forms of New Zealand nationalism. The 
intensity of Chinese nationalism in the 1980s was one of many things that puzzled people who 
thought that Mao’s China had been an advocate of human rather than national liberation.77 
The practice of people-to-people diplomacy is also based on Marx’s theory of knowledge which 
contends that knowledge is dependent on and develops from experience and practical activity.78 
Visits to socialist countries provided a learning experience for those involved. There have been 
various opportunities for this: Russia in the 1930s, China from the 1950s and especially in the 
1970s, Cuban and Nicaraguan work teams in the 1980s. Those involved in applying Marxism-
Leninism to New Zealand conditions had contact with China in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
experienced progress during the period of socialist construction. For them, people-to-people 
diplomacy gave concrete expression to the role of the people in promoting what they saw. A 
country that saw itself as engaged in socialist construction would accordingly encourage overseas 
visitors to see for themselves what was happening. 
Don Ross was impressed in what he saw of the CPC, China’s working classes and other people 
engaged in socialist construction.79  The cadre they met seemed to be highly aware of class 
struggle. As a supporter of the Marxist-Leninist project, he understood that the ‘exploiting 
classes’, inside and outside the PRC, ‘would resist socialist transformation and would attempt to 
undermine the new regime’. He saw this in what he regarded as attempts to misinform the people 
of the world and understood that international support was a significant prerequisite to defend 
the socialist state, to counter isolation and to gain recognition. For him and his ilk, the PRC’s 
efforts to build on the work of those who had been supporters of Rewi Alley’s work in China, 
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78 Mao Zedong, On Practice, Selected Works, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1, 291. 
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and to transform those supporters into members of the NZCFS, was an example of this desire 
for international support.80 
Those New Zealanders whose connection with the revolution that brought into being the PRC 
was support for Marxism-Leninism reflected upon on the conditions and the situation 
confronting the people engaged in socialist construction.81 They saw what was happening in 
China in terms of a larger revolutionary scheme, a conceptual framework which has subsequently 
disappeared, but was powerful at the time. They regarded imperialist powers, especially the US, 
as hostile to revolutionary struggle for independence and socialism, and that the propaganda of 
the imperialists needed to be combated. In addition they regarded the capitalist class as 
possessing state power in New Zealand and having a monopoly over the news media. They 
expected the capitalists to attempt to isolate the PRC ideologically, economically and politically 
through conducting an anti-communist campaign. For Don Ross, ‘Such campaigns, in absence of 
anything else, would achieve success by “misleading people”’.82 Those engaged in supporting the 
PRC saw their efforts in challenging the mainstream images of the PRC as more than a 
‘commitment to accuracy’, it was part of a wider struggle for socialism. 83  Working people, 
especially those from countries as geographically isolated as New Zealand, faced great financial 
difficulties in visiting socialist countries. Yet the ability to speak the truth of the successes of the 
project of building socialism required such eyewitness accounts.84 
The simultaneous ‘commitment to accuracy’ and a conceptualization of engagement in a wider 
struggle for socialism are at the core of what was going on. The two things run together, and now 
that the revolutionary socialist vision is rather weak in world terms, all that is left is the factual 
errors which such sympathizers made in their accounts. If China was a matter of hope rather 
than simply a matter of fact, then the drives of these observers to explicate achievements and to 
play down problems are easier to understand, especially if they saw themselves locked in a battle 
with a hostile and distorting media. 
There’s a possible contradiction here, between the ideals of what people-to-people diplomacy 
was meant to be and its actuality – including the idea that it was manipulation, and a strategy used 
because the other forms of diplomatic engagement weren’t there. Were these tours in fact about 
revolutionary engagement or were they window dressing, or a bit of both? 
In Marxist-Leninist diplomacy, there had been a long heritage of people-to-people activity. Lenin 
had paid special attention to developing contacts with overseas people, especially from the USA. 
Some of this is documented in Savva Gangulov’s Lenin Talks to America. This book is a tribute to 
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82 Ross, interview. 
83 Compare this with James Bertram’s position, which is discussed in chapters 2 and 3. 
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Lenin’s activities in personal diplomacy where, Gangulov writes, he ‘fought for the hearts and 
minds of men, winning over the best of those who came from outside of our country’. 85 
Gangulov, himself a Soviet diplomat, notes that the activity ‘began with Raymond Robins, an 
American who came as an enemy but left a friend’.86 Under Stalin’s leadership of the Soviet 
Union, this work continued.87 So by the time that the PRC was founded there was quite a 
historical precedent for what should be undertaken to spread the word about the Chinese 
revolution and socialist construction. 
Even amongst progressive people, little was known in New Zealand about China in 1949.88 
Following the founding of the PRC, the Korean war involved the PRC in a war with countries 
such as New Zealand and led to a lot of publicity that was critical of the Chinese revolution. 
People-to-people activity by New Zealand’s supporters of the Chinese revolution and the 
relevant Chinese organizations was ‘stepped up’. Rewi Alley contributed to this work through his 
involvement in the peace movement.89 
For people like Ross, then, as a New Zealander whose activities were inspired by Marxism-
Leninism: 
Internationally there exists a great desire for social change, which they attribute to the 
excesses of monopoly capitalism. As they understood and experienced, many individuals 
were attracted to the revolutionary experiments of the Soviet Union and the People’s 
Republic of China. These individuals are not confined to working people (for example, 
HG Wells and Russia, James Bertram and China) so people-to-people diplomacy could 
utilise the abilities of such people to advance the goals of understanding what they 
understand as the successes of revolutionary transformation.90 
For Marxist-Leninists, people-to-people diplomacy puts ‘the people’ at the centre of the 
occasion, in the same way that they believe socialism does: 
The significance of people-to-people diplomacy can only be understood when the 
essential features of a socialist administration with its people are understood. Contrary to 
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the relations pertaining to monopoly capitalist class minority rule, where the relationship 
is one of domination and subordination, the relationship between a socialist 
administration (government) and its people is one of cooperation, common interests and 
aspirations.91 
As Marxist-Leninists understand it, neither a revolution nor socialist construction can be 
achieved without the fullest participation of the people. Towards the goal of developing friendly 
relations with people of other countries, the conscious and willing involvement of the people is 
essential. For those involved in people-to-people diplomacy, there was also a role for helping to 
create the conditions for these exchanges to flourish and to mutually assist both sides in practical 
ways: 
For a socialist government people-to-people diplomacy plays a strategic role in the 
defence of the gains of the revolution, the defence of socialist construction, world peace, 
and friendship between nations, by countering the designs of imperialist circles to isolate 
the socialist country politically, to undermine its economy, to block trading relations, 
import of advanced technology.92 
For Ross, it was only ‘when people have real political power led by the working class and its 
revolutionary party can people-to-people diplomacy genuinely flourish and contribute to world 
peace’. 93  He pointed to historical experience that in part explained some of the shifts and 
downgrading of China’s people-to-people diplomacy since the 1980s.94 For them all organisations 
working for peace, friendship, establishing/building relations with socialist countries, in whatever 
field, are giving expression to the needs and aspirations of ‘the people’. Members of the 
communist movement also believe that they are part of this general effort to give expression to 
the needs of the people. 
There is a natural conflict between this idea of the needs and aspirations of ‘the people’ and what 
the PRC increasingly expressed as a state-centred nationalism, in particular from the 1970s. As 
Fred Halliday notes, central to the idea of the progress offered and promised by communist 
transformation ‘was the idea of totality’, in aspiration, capability and locus. Socialism would solve 
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the problems that capitalism could not, including ‘the national question’. Although as early as 
1960, the Chinese leadership was suggesting that 
The socialist revolution cannot triumph at a single stroke in all countries of the world 
simultaneously. It will come, separately and gradually as a result of the inherent factors 
of society in the various countries and the political awakening of the people themselves, 
their own efforts and their preparations for revolution.95 
Internationalism, in the original Marxist sense, is incompatible with the conventional kind of 
nationalism, which consists in defending and advancing the national interests of a particular 
country. But since socialist states are all forced to play international politics, that comes, 
according to Horace Davis, with ‘all the hypocrisies that that involves’ and the heads of state 
‘must… put the interests of their countries first’.96 The same Marxist internationalism, however, 
is quite compatible with support for anti-imperialist movements, especially if these are socialist 
orientated. In 1972, the Romanians, Davis cites approvingly, claimed that the pursuit of national 
interests is ‘true internationalism’.97 This is the essence of internationalism – so long as it is 
employed to support the international socialist revolution. 
Even after its break with Moscow, the CPC never sought a sustained way to organize an 
international following. Even after other communist parties followed China’s line they tended to 
act in an individual way, paying merely an ideological tribute to Mao Zedong. In contrast to 
Soviet proclivities, Beijing tended to resort to broad appeals to the peoples of the world, even as 
it went beyond its sympathetic fraternal communist parties to form alliances with states and 
nationalist movements. 
This is not to say that China did not systematically and consciously seek to promote and sustain 
revolution abroad. The PRC continued to espouse a world view in which both revolution and 
nationalism had a central part. Halliday finds that ‘it was only in the early 1970s when, 
maintaining its opposition to Moscow but seeking to find a repproachment with the USA, China 
began to back away from support for revolutions abroad’.98 
For Halliday, recognizing the conflict between internationalist and statist concerns is not to say 
that the latter is a disguise for the former and that revolutions are simply national or imperial 
projects. It is inaccurate, he writes, to conclude that revolutions easily abandon their 
internationalist orientation. As long as there is a significant divergence between the domestic 
constitution of states an element of confrontation continues. 
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The central question is not whether the revolutionary state is ‘socialised’ in its external 
relations, but whether in the longer run the pressures of the external context lead not 
just to changes in foreign policy but also to an internal change, whereby the commitment 
to an alternative path of social development is abandoned.99 
The relationship between nationalism and internationalism is thus a subjective one, much like the 
question of truth explored in the next chapter. It depends upon the desired goals of the person 
engaged in the activity. If it is employed to achieve socialist aims then nationalism is an 
embodiment of internationalism and ‘progressive’, if not then it is parochial and reactionary. 
 
People-to-People Diplomacy as 'Public Diplomacy' 
If the essence of diplomatic activities is to develop and cultivate favourable perceptions and 
attitudes then it is logical that governments pay attention to the needs and desires of foreign 
public opinion in foreign policy making and communication. Over the last few decades, the study 
of diplomatic communication, historically based primarily on ‘government-to-government’ and 
‘diplomat-to-diplomat’ interactions, has expanded to include ‘government-to-people’ contacts. 
Public diplomacy is now understood as an indispensable vehicle of international relations.100 
Broadly defined, public diplomacy refers to: 
a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring 
about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well 
as its national goals and current policies.101 
This is extremely similar to White’s definition of people-to-people diplomacy found earlier, with 
the allusions to it being the sole preserve of communist states stripped away. It encompasses a 
wide array of activities, ranging from media programmes (Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, 
CCTV-9), to cultural and educational programmes (Fulbright scholarships, British Council, the 
Colombo Scheme, Confucius Institutes).102 The goals of these programmes are often twofold: 
achieving political advocacy and culture communication, with the former aiming to build support 
for particular foreign policies and the latter developing overall better understanding of peoples 
and cultures.103 
                                                        
99 Halliday, Revolution and World Politics, 135. 
100 Jarol Manheim, Strategic public diplomacy and American foreign policy: the evolution of influence, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1994, 3. 
101  Hans Tuch, Communicating with the World: U. S. Public Diplomacy Overseas, Macmillan, New York, 1990, 3. 
102 Eytan Gilboa, ‘Mass Communication and Diplomacy: A Theoretical Framework’, Communication Theory, 10, 2000. 
275-310. 
103 Gifford Malone, Political Advocacy and Cultural Communication: Organising the Nation’s Public Diplomacy, United Press of 
America, Lanham, 1988, 3-4. 
  35
In many ways public diplomacy is a form of international public relations. Benno Signitzer and 
Timothy Coombs argued that with similar concepts, objectives and tools, these two areas of 
communication practice are ‘in a natural process of convergence’ and that ‘modern nations find 
themselves more and more in the area of public relations as they attempt to influence the 
opinions of foreign publics’.104 
For much of the period the PRC’s public diplomacy bore little resemblance to that of the 
organizations cited here. There was tension too, between ‘soft-power’ type diplomacy and 
beacon of revolutionary diplomacy; there was always soft-power diplomacy in the revolutionary 
era, but it was always in tension with calls for radicalism. Zhou Enlai encompasses both these 
dimensions. There are parts of the contemporary order of Chinese public diplomacy that have 
their origins in the Mao era, but other parts of it are part of an attempt to convince people that 
China is a ‘normal’ country not an exporter of revolution. 
In 1978 Philip Lesly noted that ‘virtually all nations now conduct international public relations 
programs’. Yet for him ‘sophistication varies greatly’, depending on the awareness a particular 
nation’s leaders and on the size of the country involved while large country’s seek what Joseph 
Nye popularized as ‘soft power’.105 As Lesly wrote, ‘Programs among smaller nations tend to be 
directed toward tangible goals, such as tourism, investment in local industry, and marketing of 
local products’.106 
A third component of public diplomacy is around the promotion of particular policies. For some 
this fits uncomfortably alongside ‘cultural activities’, in part because of an association with covert 
intelligence agencies. However, a wide array of official and quasi-official operations are used to 
influence the outlook and behaviours of key individuals and organizations abroad. An example 
was the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) support for noncommunist trade unions in France 
and Italy following World War Two. 107  In the United States many of what were formerly 
functions of the CIA have been taken over by the semi-official National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), and the CIA’s role has receded.108 Two Chinese parallels of direct political 
campaigns were the PRC’s work through friendship groups to promote the political goal of 
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formal diplomatic recognition and the use of public relations agencies to create favourable 
publicity around the bid for the Beijing Olympics.109 
Many embassies have press attaches whose job it is to cultivate their country’s image. German 
institutions serving image cultivation abroad include the Press and Information Office of the 
Federal Republic, the foreign cultural policy section of the foreign office, the Goethe institutes, 
the German Academic Exchange Service, the Humboldt Foundation, foundations of the political 
parties, the Carl Duisberg Society, Deutschlandfunk radio, Radio Deutsche Welle, and Trans-Tel 
sells German television programmes. According to Allen Hansen both Germany and France 
spend about 1% of their annual budgets for such purposes.110 France spends upwards of $US5 
billion on information and cultural activities. For France, this form of public diplomacy is an 
essential instrument of foreign policy; it funds 70% of the budget of the Agence France Press 
(AFP) news agency.111 
The United Kingdom also has at its disposal the British Council, the activities of which 
encompass language teaching, cultural exchanges and presentations, and libraries. The British 
Council was founded in November 1934 ‘to make the life and thought of the British people 
more widely known abroad and to cooperate with the Dominions and Crown Colonies in 
strengthening the common cultural traditions in the British Commonwealth’. During Britain’s 
conflict with Nazi Germany, the Germans argued that the British Council was an instrument for 
the political and cultural encirclement of Germany and ejected from the German Republic.112  
Increasingly, what the PRC engages in is understood as public diplomacy, as Ingrid d’Hooghe 
argues: 
Public diplomacy may not be a current term in China, yet China has certainly developed 
a remarkable array of activities that together form a consistent and quite effective public 
diplomacy policy.113 
Activity undertaken which is defined as public diplomacy has a clear parallel to that understood 
as people-to-people diplomacy. In 1957 Belgium initiated a PR campaign in the United States 
designed to boost sales of Belgian products there.114 The aim of the PR firm, Communication 
Counsellors Inc (CCI), was to ‘put Belgium on the map for the American public’. This was the 
same year as the Beijing Opera troupe toured Australia and New Zealand and which is discussed 
in chapter 3. CCI supplied the business press with information materials; key business people and 
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newspaper publishers were sent a newsletter with ‘facts and figures’ about Belgium; and Belgian 
products were advertised in publications, on the radio, and on television. The activities 
conducted by Belgium’s Public Relations company and the CPAFFC are similar although the 
target market reflects some differences. The immediate goals are different reflecting the 
international situation that saw China diplomatically isolated. However, broadly speaking, the 
desire to promote national image is clear and unambiguous.115 
In the early years of the Cold War, public diplomacy was widely viewed unapologeticly as a form 
of psychological warfare. Those responsible for U.S. policy tended to conceive of public 
diplomacy as part of an arsenal of capabilities that could an ought to be used in the developing 
worldwide struggle against the Soviet Union and the worldwide communist movement. Public 
diplomacy programmes thus emerged as an independent dimension of national strategy fully 
comparable to diplomacy, military force and economic power. None of these activities were 
politically controversial at the time, but reflected a broad consensus among American elites that 
‘propaganda’ (as it was still widely called) was a legitimate and important tool of policy and topic 
for serious academic study.116 In an era of rigid alliance systems and nuclear stalemate, public 
diplomacy seemed to offer the West an offensive strategy option that was otherwise lacking. Yet 
the difficulty of bringing about quick changes in the Soviet bloc was probably underestimated, 
while the usefulness of propaganda as a stand-alone weapon of political warfare in the Third 
World was overrated.117 With the American involvement in Vietnam becoming unpopular, the 
idea that the ‘hearts and minds’ of the world’s masses could be won to the cause of the West 
came to seem not only problematic but morally repellent.118 
Criticisms of the PRCs public diplomatic activities has a heritage in two factors. The first comes 
out of an ideological position where the other country’s activities are ‘propaganda’ and one’s own 
is ‘information’ or only produced to counter such propaganda.119 Accordingly such thinking is 
bound up with prejudice, ideological difference and a Cold War mentality. Yet there is also a 
second heritage, a growing skepticism of the morality of engaging in activities that at their heart 
are about manipulating the way that other people think, even if one regards the goals, and even 
the particular tactics, as being well motivated. Yet the practices continue and will always be linked 
to achieving clear benefits for the state involved. As Cames Lord, himself significantly involved 
in the United States public diplomacy activities wrote, 
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Those in positions of authority thus cannot escape a responsibility for ensuring that U.S. 
public diplomacy conforms to American policy and advances palpable national 
interests.120 
So too for the PRC’s propaganda activities. 
 
The Changing Focus of the People’s Republic of China  
Alongside changes in the way that the West has seen or viewed China, the PRC’s own activities 
have also changed in accordance with changes in political focus, ideology, and its understanding 
of the international situation. Herbert Passin was an early examiner of what he called ‘China’s 
Cultural Diplomacy’. In the 1950s and 1960s, he identified that ‘cultural relations with China are 
very strongly affected by the political atmosphere at particular moments’.121 These ideas about 
change and continuity are explored in chapters 3 and 6 with respect to New Zealand 
organisations engaged in these activities. The changes in cultural relations, or people-to-people 
diplomacy are closely related to the CPC’s own periodic and official re-evaluation of its 
contemporary history.122 
Another useful study is Gerry Groot’s work on the United Front in Chinese politics.123 His 
shifting timetable of United Front politics maps onto the global context and is related to 
Dutton’s friend/enemy thesis. He identifies a fluctuating relationship between the CPC and the 
PRC’s official minor parties and groups. He draws on Gramsci’s ideas on hegemony and explores 
how the CPC looked outside of its own members and successfully incorporated at times broader 
and then other times more narrowly defined groups to advance its campaign goals. Groot’s 
theory is that the CPC’s relationship with minor parties and groups is reflective of United Front 
policies in general. The periodisations that he identifies are also likely to be pertinent since 
reaching out to different strata in Chinese society is likely to have followed a similar trajectory to 
that undertaken internationally. 
Groot identifies seven periods in the CPC’s United Front activities: Building Socialism [1949-
1955], when the groups that had been involved in the united front against the GMD withered. 
This was followed by a period of Blooming and Contending until the Anti-Rightist Campaign 
[1955-1957]. Opinions and involvement of other groups was initially encouraged but this was 
quickly followed by a crack-down against those not deemed to be supportive of the socialist 
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project. The build-up to the GPCR [1957-1966] saw a rise in United Front activities which is 
identified as a time of Hibernation and Renewal [1966-1981]. This saw the virtual disappearance 
of all groups that were not identified with the revolutionary aspirations of the Chinese state. 
Groot considers that after 1981, the United Front reemerged as Deng Xiaoping looked for allies 
outside of the CPC itself on his return to power. Groot calls this Rebuilding for the New Era 
[1981-1986]. It coincided with economic reforms. This was followed by Political Reform [1986-
1989], where space was made available for alternative viewpoints under the oversight of Zhao 
Ziyang, and Expansion [1989->], as the CPC needed more allies in the face of the events of May 
and June in Tiananmen Square and sought to diffuse the sense of estrangement by many parts of 
Chinese society that had led up to those events. 
For Michael Dutton, an analysis of the shifting sands of the Chinese revolution involves an 
explicitly political process since the regime itself is founded in what he calls ‘commitment 
politics’. Drawing on Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt he places the central aspect of the 
Chinese revolution as the binary distinction between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ with an explicit 
reference provided by Mao’s phrase that begins his Selected Works: ‘Who are our enemies, who are 
our friends? That is the question of the first importance for the revolution’.124 The question of 
where the line between friends and enemies is drawn is a shifting one. As Dutton wrote in his 
study of Chinese policing, ‘To police this revolution was to patrol this ever shifting thin red line 
that separated revolutionary friend from reactionary enemy’. He further points to periods when 
there was unity in the face of external ‘enemies’, where the collection of friends was permitted to 
grow, and ‘revolutionary excess’ where in the absence of external enemies the greatest threat to 
the revolution was seen to come from the ‘enemy within’. Finally, consistent with other 
chronologies, Dutton identifies that with the end of the radical period (following the death of 
Mao and the arrest of the Gang of Four) ‘politics was no longer painted in binary colours but 
took on a very different and more complex hue’. For Dutton, ‘economic reform transformed the 
single political question of friend and enemy into a multitude of discrete and largely non- or even 
de- politicizing questions… Policing stability, not the political line, became the new order of the 
day’. This new era, as Dutton describes it, becomes the Age of Contract.125 
The period immediately after ‘Liberation’, then, was one when the distinction between friends 
and enemies was a sharp one, although this was relaxed (or the line shifted) as the state felt more 
comfortable with itself, until the Anti-Rightist Campaign when the distinction became more 
acute again. The conflict with the USSR saw an external threat and a wider search for friends 
until the GPCR which was a period of sharp contrast between those considered supportive or 
not of the correct revolutionary line. The end of the radical period saw the end of the binary 
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distinction and a space for many who would not have fitted into the category of ‘friends’ in 
earlier periods to be accorded a relationship with the Chinese state. 
Combining these analyses, a periodisation of the image projection activities of the PRC can be 
produced. The 1950s and the early 1960s were largely a period of ‘peace diplomacy’. The PRC 
was officially engaged in a process of leaning towards the USSR, and its activities were in part 
designed to prevent war between the socialist and capitalist camps so as to allow for China’s 
development. Meetings such as the Peking Peace Conference drew Chinese from the All China 
Federation of Trade Unions, academics, returnee Chinese and the head of the Chinese Society 
for the Promotion of International Trade.126  Outside the PRC those involved in friendship 
activities tended to represent similar groups and were often also engaged in the peace movement 
in their respective countries.127 There were periods when there was a tightening, broadening and 
tightening of the united front to include people further away from, or restriction to be closer to, 
the ideological underpinnings of the socialist project. This tightening, broadening and then 
tightening again was associated with the Five-Antis Campaign (1952), the Hundred Flowers 
Campaign (1956-57), followed by the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957-58) and the Great Leap 
Forward (1958-59). 
The period 1962 to 1976 was a period of utopian and political transformation at home and the 
projection of ideas advocating these same ideas externally. China was seen as the home of the 
world centre of revolution, the Soviet Union and its allies increasingly an enemy to be opposed 
even more vociferously than the West. Although the CPC projected a more rigid orthodoxy in 
terms of ideology, it simultaneously broadened the range of people it sought to bring into contact 
with that ideology.128 As we will see, the friendship organisations became broad fronts of sector 
groups, and tried to build links with teachers, students, indigenous peoples as well as workers, 
and others with particular capacity to be influential with the public such as artists and writers. 
This period is also of particular significance because of the CPNZ’s stance on the Sino Soviet 
split. 
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Wang Hui argues that the post-Cultural Revolution period (1976-1982) was accompanied by the 
‘end of politics’ as Chinese increasingly saw ‘politics’ as referring to the excesses and turbulence 
of a discredited period.129 There was less political engagement by the NZCFS with the internal 
campaigns and ideological disputes within the PRC. One manifestation of this was that amongst 
the friendship organisations there was an increased tendency to republish of material from the 
CPC and PRC rather than produce their own material. This was coupled with the belief that to 
show support for the PRC required the adoption of ideas considered correct in the PRC.130 In 
addition this period saw an end to the sense that China meant something for New Zealand to 
draw from, in particular an end to utopian and aspirational aspects of China as a political vision. 
It also saw the end of the special relationship between the CPNZ and the CPC. 
The re-starting of people-to-people diplomacy after the Cultural Revolution had profound 
implications. This was a time when those enamoured with Cultural Revolution radicalism in New 
Zealand were becoming disenchanted with China. In addition, this period saw the conflation of 
the party and state activities of the CPC and state organs of the PRC. The CPC reconfigured its 
activities away from supporting ‘leftist and anti-revisionist’ parties in favour of ‘advancing state 
interests’.131 When the people-to-people organisations were restarted after the GPCR they were 
part of the PRC’s Foreign Affairs apparatus.132 Wang Hui refers to this as the ‘rigidification of 
the party-state’, which he puts down to an attempt by those who were engaged in a ‘thorough 
negation’ of the Cultural Revolution to undertake a process of ‘”depoliticizing” faction fights and 
bureaucratization’.133 
The early 1980s, until 1989 was a period that is exemplified by debates over the meaning of, and 
the nature of, culture under China’s processes of modernisation. Liu Kang, drawing on Fredric 
Jameson, suggests that late capitalism is dominated by questions of ‘culture’ and that this too has 
dominated the activities of the Chinese party-state.134  
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This change in the theme of culture was part of a shift from a revolutionary to a nationalist 
paradigm, with the CPC redefining itself as the party that represents China, with many of its basic 
positions coming close to the line of the old KMT. 
In New Zealand, increasingly, connections were drawn with those who were interested in 
‘Chinese culture’. At the same time, a relationship with the PRC organised around ‘prominent 
people’ replaced one based on mass participation. Increasingly these were business people. There 
was an attempt to both commodify and leverage support for the PRC off a notion of culture. 
However, all such efforts were disrupted by the events of May and June 1989 in and around 
Tiananmen Square. 
The crisis around the events of Tiananmen led to a dramatic rethinking of what it meant to be 
engaged in a friendship relationship with the PRC. It was a time of great uncertainty. However 
this was eventually followed by what Josh Kurlantzick calls a ‘charm offensive’ through the 1990s 
and early 21st century.135 In part this was an extension of the cultural-based activities of the pre-
Tiananmen period but combined with a more systematic approach of engaging with Western 
elites in part accompanying an increased assertiveness of the Chinese party-state. One of the 
ultimate conclusions of this systematic process has been the practice of establishing Confucius 
Institutes.136 Thus the PRC has begun to operate on the level of the governments of France 
(Alliance Française), Germany (Goethe Institutes), Britain (British Council) and Japan (Japan 
Foundation).137 
 
China's National Image Building 
In 2003, Wang Hongying wrote that ‘Chinese leaders have repeatedly called for the improvement 
of the country’s image abroad’. 138  In order to coordinate its image-building efforts, the 
Communist Party of China had established an Overseas Propaganda Department under the Party 
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Central Committee in 1990, and the Chinese government followed this in establishing a new 
Information Office under the State Council in 1991.139 Wang has identified that, for example, it 
issued white papers on subjects such as on human rights, the situation in Tibet, China’s national 
defence, and the environment. These papers are designed to explain to the international 
community China’s positions on what have been identified as being sensitive questions. Wang 
regards these papers as 
presenting a step forward from the days when the Chinese government simply brushed 
aside international criticisms of Chinese policies without engaging directly with the 
arguments.140 
In addition, the Chinese government has begun to hire international media expertise to polish 
China’s image.141 In 1991 it employed the American firm Hill and Knowlton to lobby the US 
Congress for the unconditional renewal of most-favoured-nation trade status for China. In its bid 
for the 2008 Olympic Games, the Chinese government hired another American firm, Weber 
Shanwick Worldwide, to run its public relations campaign.142 
There have been continuities, in terms of the PRC sponsoring and organising cultural events in 
other countries to help improve the PRC’s image. For many New Zealanders this began in 1957 
when a Beijing Opera Troupe visited Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. The troupe 
performed to appreciative audiences but had a political focus too – it was connected to the 
efforts to gain political recognition for the PRC by the New Zealand government. 143  Such 
cultural activities have continued. In 2000, the PRC spent millions of dollars and sent cultural 
groups on a road show in the United States. The director of the PRC’s State Council Information 
Office explained the motive behind this undertaking was that he hoped: ‘some day an American 
president will say something good about China’.144 In 2001 Chinese Central Television reached 
an agreement with AOL Time Warner to begin broadcasting English-language programmes in 
the US around the clock, hoping to present Americans with an image of a softer and gentler 
China. This is now also in other countries.145 
A new aspect of these activities is represented by Confucius Institutes. The first of these opened 
in Seoul in November 2004. Many have since been established in other countries and one opened 
in Auckland, New Zealand, in 2007. As of November 2008, there were 307 Confucius Institutes 
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in 78 countries. 146  The Chinese Ministry of Education aims to establish 1,000 Confucius 
Institutes by 2020. Confucius Institutes are one of the focuses of Josh Kurlantzick’s book Charm 
Offensive: How China’s soft-power offensive is transforming the world and have been subjected to other 
criticism too. Some critics have pointed out that unlike other cultural institutes, such as the 
British Council and the Goethe Institute, the Confucius Institute operates within universities and 
thus some of its activities are less visible.147  The Institute has also attracted concern from some 
Western governments. Members of the Swedish Riksdag have expressed concerns that the 
Institute provides a platform for the Chinese government and the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service said the Institute is part of the PRC’s bid to win over western hearts.148   
Wang Hongying’s study made a quantitative content analysis of coverage of a related aspect in 
Peking Review. She charted the type of actor in international affairs that the Chinese government 
has portrayed the PRC to be. 149  Her summary of the results of a content analysis of 
representations of the PRC’ foreign relations in Peking Review between 1958 and 2002 shows that 
over forty years the PRC government attempted to build images of China in international affairs 
around a series of themes. These were that China was peace-loving, a victim of foreign 
aggression, socialist, a bastion of revolution, an anti-hegemonic force, a developing country, a 
major power, an international cooperator, and an autonomous actor. The data indicates that over 
time, there have been both changes and continuities in these images projected of the PRC by its 
government. On the side of continuity, the government has consistently pursued an image of the 
PRC as a peace-loving nation, a victim of foreign aggression, an opponent of hegemony and a 
developing country. On the side of discontinuity, the Maoist era (from 1949 to 1976) saw the 
government emphasising the images of China as a socialist country and supporter of revolution. 
During the reform period (from 1976 to the present), the government de-emphasised those 
images. Instead it highlighted the images of China as an international cooperator and a major 
power.150 
Looking closer into this data reveals a consistency with the other periodisations that have been 
identified above: the promotion of socialism in the late 1950s, retreating after the failures of the 
Great Leap Forward, then the promotion of a revolutionary image through to the ‘twilight’ of the 
Cultural Revolution (1972-76), and a cooperating, ‘normal’ member of the world community 
since the mid-1970s. 
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National Image in Theory 
In National Character and National Stereotypes Hubertus Duijker and Nico Frijda discuss problems 
connected with the idea of national character.151 They approach this idea from the perspective 
that such a thing exists, although, as Karl Deutsch argues ‘a nation is [merely] a group of persons 
united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbours’.152  
Benedict Anderson is perhaps the leading thinker on the idea of the ‘nation’. He defines it as ‘an 
imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’.153 A 
nation is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image 
of their collective nature. Ernst Gellner makes a similar point when he declares that 'Nationalism 
is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not 
exist’.154 Gellner claims nationalism masquerades under false pretences and he equates 'invention' 
with 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than with 'imagining' and 'creation'. He implies thereby that 
'true' communities exist. For Anderson, in contrast, all communities larger than primordial 
villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. These imagined 
communities are to be distinguished, not by the level to which they are false or genuine, but by 
the style in which they are imagined. Members of a nation are connected to people they have 
never seen through the tools used to construct the modern nation such as the census, the map 
and the museum.155 
The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them encompassing 
perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie 
other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind. The most messianic 
nationalists do not dream of a day when all the members of the human race will join 
their nation in the way that it was possible, in certain epochs, for, say, Christians to 
dream of a wholly Christian planet.156 
According to Anderson, the nation is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an 
age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-
ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm… For him, ‘the gage and emblem of [the modern nation] is 
the sovereign state’. 
The nation is imagined as a community, because, regardless of what goes on within the 
nation-state, each nation is ‘conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’. For 
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Anderson, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, ‘for so many millions of people, not 
so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.157 
For Anderson this is not just explanation but also critique. His expectation, like other leftists, was 
that nationalism would wither away, to be replaced by ‘real’ criteria, such as that based on class or 
on a commitment to a cause. As mentioned above, the Sino-Vietnamese War undid this belief. 
Whether or not there are essential national characteristics and the extent to which these are 
constructed, there are national images. Conflicting characteristics about other nations are 
ascribed and the fact that most of these are gross exaggerations or irrelevancies does not prevent 
circulation of the images.158 Robert LeVine argued that most human populations are hostile to 
some other groups and carry negative images of them.159  This tendency to devalue others, 
especially when there is little knowledge about them, can extend so far as to deny their very 
humanness. Reflecting the work of Edward Said, very often the evaluation of foreign peoples is 
made through contrasts: human beings vs. barbarians; the faithful vs. infidels; civilized vs. 
natives; Whites vs. Blacks, and such like. Even history has been interpreted to fit such contrasts. 
Greek civilisation, had its roots in African and Semitic cultures, yet it was stylized into a notion 
of pure European culture, other cultures being more or less barbaric. Such polarizing labels are 
also used for political systems: democracy and dictatorship, communism and capitalism; 
individualism and collectivism. In 1994 a brochure published, in German, by the Croatian 
Tourism Office described Croatia as trying to defend ‘the splendid achievements of Western 
civilization against the barbarian aggression from the Orient’.160 
References to the past, often artificially created, are crucial to the creation of national identity and 
national image. Appeals to the past, as Said points out, are among the most common strategies 
used in interpreting the present. Said emphasised the mobilizing power of images and traditions 
and their fictional, or at least romantically coloured, fantastic quality. Yeats gave the Irish 
nationalist struggle something to revive and admire, an Irish past. Byron was of similar 
importance to the Greek struggle for independence. According to Kenneth Boulding, the 
conception of an image means not only the conception of the present, but also aspects of its past 
and future expectations. National image, can be defined then as the cognitive representation that 
a person holds of a given country, what a person believes to be true about a nation-state and its 
inhabitants. Of special importance to political action is the benevolence or malevolence imputed 
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to other nations through such images, as well as the historical component of the image.161 Said 
claimed that during the Algerian War of independence the process of decolonisation encouraged 
Algerians and Muslims to ‘create images of what they supposed themselves to have been prior to 
French colonisation’.162 
Boulding summarises this: 
On the whole the images of the international system in the minds of its decision-makers 
are derived from a process that I have described as ‘literary’ – a mélange of narrative 
history, memories of past events, stories and conversations, etc, plus an enormous 
amount of usually half-digested and carelessly collected current information… it would 
be surprising if any images were formed that even remotely resembled the most loosely 
defined realities of the case.163 
 
Changing Images of the People’s Republic of China 
Western images and attitudes concerning China have been divided and conflicting. For Stephen 
Mosher, the strikingly consistent feature of the images of China is inconsistency.  
The most that can be conceded is that America’s intense and long-running emotional 
involvement with China – which some have described as a love-hate relationship – has 
exaggerated the swings between the ‘good’ China and the ‘evil’ China.164 
Several chronologies have captured changing Western opinions about China over the years. One 
such chronology was presented by Harold Issacs in 1958. He characterized the chronology as 
shifts from The Age of Respect (in the Eighteenth Century), The Age of Contempt (1840-1905), 
The Age of Benevolence (1905-1937), The Age of Admiration (1937-1944), The Age of 
Disenchantment (1944-1949), The Age of Hostility (1949-[1958]).165 In reviewing American’s 
perception of China after the Communist Party of China came to power in 1949 and up until the 
1989 Tian’anmen student demonstration, Mosher ignores Issacs’s pre-PRC chronology and 
extends the analysis through to the present. For him the period from the founding of the 
People’s Republic through to the Nixon visit continued as The Age of Hostility (1949-1972). 
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This was followed by The Second Age of Admiration (1972-1979), The Second Age of 
Disenchantment (1977-1980), and the Second Age of Benevolence (1980-1989).166 
Richard Madsen presents a timeline that is organised around whether American liberals saw their 
vision for the PRC as likely to come to pass or not. He presents the 1950s as a ‘bitter debate 
about “who lost” China’ becoming a breeding ground for McCarthyism. The late 1950s and early 
1960s were clouded by ‘anxiety about the spread of Chinese communism… a more virulent and 
evil version than its Soviet counterpart’. In the 1970s, the Nixon and Kissinger’s efforts to 
engage with the PRC were ‘a beacon of hope for Americans immersed in the gloom of the 
Vietnam War’. By the 1980s, ‘the opening of China was a harbinger of the liberalization of the 
whole Communist world: finally “they” were becoming like “us”’.167 
In Western Images of China, Australian academic Colin Mackerras divides views about China 
between 1949 and 1986 into three sub-periods: 1949 to 1966, 1966 to 1976 and 1976 to 1986. In 
1949, the dominant image was one of China being ‘lost’ to communism, suggesting that the 
country was leaving both the international community and the world market, ‘as if China was a 
belonging, subject to losing and finding. On the whole the image of China which Western 
governments tried to convey to their people was more negative during these years than at any 
preceding time’.168 
For Mackerras, a ‘very persuasive image… was of China as a totalitarian society without any 
freedom’. Then, however, the decade 1966 to 1976 saw ‘enormous ramifications for Western 
images of China’. The doubts about the Vietnam War caused a rethink of attitudes towards Asia, 
the Cultural Revolution raised questions about the nature of the Chinese revolution, and Nixon’s 
visit to China meant that the United States ‘no longer regarded China as a major enemy’. Since 
1976, Mackerras argues, ‘one of the dominant images Westerners held of China was that, while 
retaining its essential Chineseness, it was progressively and willingly becoming more like the 
West’.169 
While each of these periodisations suggests dichotomy and wild swings between extremes, others 
have suggested that the love/hate understanding can occur simultaneously. ‘To Americans’, write 
Wang Jian and Chang Tsan-Kuo, with an obvious reference to Said’s Orientalism, ‘China is at the 
same time familiar and strange, peace-loving and belligerent, civilized and barbarian’. According 
to other China-watchers, western public attitudes toward China have become more divided and 
                                                        
166 Mosher, China Misperceived, 21. 
167 Richard Madsen, China and the American Dream, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995, ix. 
168 Colin Mackerras, Western Images of China, Australia-Asia Papers No. 41, Centre for the Study of Australian-Asian 
Relations, Griffith University, 1987, 4. 
169 Mackerras, Western Images of China, 8, 16 and 57. 
  49
contentious since the reforms in the late 1970s, accompanying China’s great progress in 
economic development.170 
On the one hand, the prospect of China as the world’s manufacturing and consumer market is 
ever more enticing to Western businesses. On the other hand, the last great ‘Communist’ power: 
China, and the indisputable world superpower: the United States, appear to be inching towards a 
clash between two seemingly incompatible civilizations.171 Stories of China’s economic success 
are balanced by stories of its impending economic collapse; the story of the PRC lifting millions 
of people out of poverty balanced by stories of wide-spread ‘human rights abuses’ and failure to 
live by the standards the Western world sets.172 
 
Guided Tourism 
In the face of these conflicting and mostly negative images, the PRC embraced from ‘Liberation’ 
a system of ‘guided tourism’, whereby visitors were invited to be witness to the reality of what 
was going on in China but to be managed in terms of what they saw and what they were told 
about what they were seeing. 
This process of managed exposure towards discrete political goals had antecedents, both in terms 
of Marxist Leninist diplomacy, as detailed above, but also in the West. In order to mobilise public 
opinion in favour of the United States entering WWI and to convince ‘every corner of the 
civilised globe the full message of America’s idealism, unselfishness, and indominitable purpose’, 
President Woodrow Wilson established the Committee on Public Information under former 
journalist George Creel. Creel regarded one of his most effective ideas was to bring to the United 
States ‘delegations of foreign newspaper men’ such that they might ‘see with their own eyes, hear 
with their own ears’, and be able to report on America’s morale and effort.173 This was the 
practice of guided tourism that would be followed by the Soviet Union, and later the People’s 
Republic of China. When James Bertram spoke with Zhou Enlai in 1957, Zhou complained: 
so many Americans really believe what one journalist wrote in their papers – that China 
is ‘one vast concentration camp’… what sort of concentration camp is that, when I 
myself am in it, when all of us are in it? … Of course this story is not true. But how can 
we prove that to the Americans, if they will not come to China to see for themselves?174 
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The Chinese practice had some features that differ from Creel’s, in part reflecting the small 
numbers involved, and the close connection between the groups involved and the State itself. 
These particularities made the activity powerfully compelling in giving a sense of status to the 
visitors. As Bertram related: 
If a mixed group of Chinese tourists came to Wellington, I wondered as we left, would a 
New Zealand Prime Minister agree to receive them? It was not impossible... But that he 
should be prepared to give nearly two hours to serious discussion of the main problems 
of his Government with them, inviting their questions and replying to them in detail 
[was] inconceivable.175 
Note that Bertram was likely a special case, and his presence undoubtedly changed the nature of 
this particular delegation and affected the welcome given to them. Bertram had a special place in 
the history of the CPC as he is the only foreigner whose interview with Mao appears in Mao’s 
Selected Works, so he was not simply anybody and his delegation was more than ‘a group of… 
tourists’, even though he seems not have sensed this. Note too, another tour that was also not an 
ordinary one (as is detailed in chapter 5) the 1971 NZUSA delegation, had a similar audience 
with Guo Moruo. 
In the PRC, what the visitors ‘saw with their own eyes’ and ‘heard with their own ears’ could 
successfully overcome all that they had been told back in New Zealand. For Ron Smith, for 
example, his visit to the Institute of Nationalities and interview with Tibetans steeled him to be 
able to argue with those in New Zealand who complained of the ‘Chinese invasion of Tibet’, or 
advocated for the restoration of the rule of the Dalai Lama: 
we had long interviews getting the harrowing life stories of three Tibetans – two 22-year 
old women ex-serfs, and a 21-year old male slave who had run away from his owner and 
walked for 22 days to find a People’s Liberation Army camp.176 
As is discussed in the next chapter, the guided nature of their experiences often meant that the 
visitors deliberately engaged in practices to overcome their own scepticism at being shown ‘only 
the best’.177 Yet for those who expected to see a new society being born their ideas were only 
reinforced. As Smith wrote ‘As everywhere, we picked houses at random and the occupants 
enthused about life being heaven now compared with hell before’.178 
Barbara Tuchman, a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, travelled on a guided tour in 1972. She 
railed against the constraints of the tour, which she put down to ‘the nature of the Marxist 
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system’ and that for Chinese, to control things is ‘in their blood’.179 However, when left to 
wander one day in Yan’an: 
we blundered into the courtyard of the local high school… and were invited by smiles 
and gestures into the reading rom. It was the only institution unalerted to our coming 
that we managed to visit. In the fact that nothing was notably different or deficient in 
comparison with the planned visits to pre-selected schools lies the significance. What the 
revolution and the Communist regime have accomplished… speaks for itself. Visitors do 
not need to be carefully steered and shepherded to see that.180 
The idea of control was not universal. Jack Shallcrass, who selected students to tour the PRC in 
1971 and went himself 11 years later, said of those on the NZUSA Study Tour whom he met on 
their return:  
when they were in China they got to do whatever they wanted – at each location they 
would be asked ‘what do you want to do?’ and then that’s what they would be shown. 
No one could say that they were denied any opportunity.181 
Critics would suggest that the level of care that the PRC took to organise these experiences was 
substantial, and often unnoticed by people with limited experience. The argument would go that 
no-one would risk telling a foreigner bad things: it was simply too risky at the time. But this does 
not mean that many people were not sincerely proud of the achievements of the revolution. 
Instead, for David Caygill, the difficulty was not in terms of control but cultural barriers 
preventing a greater level of understanding. 
The questions we asked were from our own culture. We met a student who had just 
finished high school… I asked him ‘What are you going to do now?’. The answer 
eventually came back ‘it depends on the need of the state’. I meant ‘what are your 
individual aspirations?’ but he couldn’t comprehend the question – or at least didn’t 
interpret the question that I had asked in that way. He didn’t answer begrudgingly - or 
anything. It was just speaking from a different cultural experience.182 
When the US Public Relations firm CCI was conducting a campaign on behalf of the Belgium 
government in 1957 they advocated flying journalists to the Brussels Trade Fair. Although, this 
was rejected for cost considerations, CCI had argued that 
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the money would have been well spent because after trips of this kind the editors 
concerned do feel a sense of obligation and invariably reciprocate with favourable stories 
and features.183 
Claire Donovan reflected this. Although she subsequently said that on her return from the PRC 
she had begun to have grave doubts about what she had seen there, and her own commitment to 
Marxism-Leninism began to wane, in part as a result. Yet this was not reflected in what she wrote 
for the Dominion ‘out of a respect for [her] hosts’.184 
For the students in the 1970s, the obligation they felt extended beyond just writing stories. They 
were quite prepared to put aside the most extravagant claims of Maoism and concentrate on what 
to them made sense, to overlook the rhetoric, even though these might have otherwise have 
pointed to dysfunction in the system. 
They would hand out plates of cigarettes at functions in the same way as we would hors 
d’oeuvres and I remember asking ‘haven’t you heard of lung cancer’ and the reply was 
‘don’t worry about that, lung cancer is caused by the stresses and strains of capitalism’. 
That was nonsense of course. On the delegation there was a range of views but there 
was no confrontation. We were there to learn.185 
Even by the late 1970s, the practice of guided tourism was by no means unique to the PRC. 
When Michael Crook went to the United States in the early 1970s, he found that the USIA was 
conducting exactly the same activities in the US as he had witnessed in the PRC.186 He got a job 
accompanying Chinese tour parties as ‘up and coming Chinese’ were introduced to the US 
system. His particular task was to listen to see if the guests found anything they did not like so 
that it could be worked on or that disliking could be better understood and addressed for the 
next time around.187 
There are many who have regarded guided tourism as not being particularly troubling. When 
John K. Fairbank addressed the issue of ‘guided tourism’ in his book China Perceived; Images and 
Policies in Chinese-American Relations, he wrote that guided tourism presents a distorted image but 
given how poor and inaccurate the dominant image of China was in the United States, ‘guided 
tourism is a plain necessity’.188 This sense of providing a ‘balance’ was also invoked by James 
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Bertram, who claimed: ‘I have tried to dwell here on the more encouraging features of the 
Chinese scene, because it seems to me important that people in Western countries should 
appreciate them’.189 
Yet what matters also is that what the Chinese would show their guests was different from what 
the Americans (or New Zealanders) would have shown their guests. In 2006, NZCFS Leader 
Marie Greetham noted that while the Chinese choices of what to show were now much closer to 
that which Westerners would show off, there were still differences: 
the trip I went on included museums and Shanghai’s magnificent new port rather than 
the fomer Tibetan serfs’ dirt huts I saw in the late 1970s, [however] I was still struck at 
how a pre-school would suspend its classes for an afternoon so that the children could 
be gawked at by a group of non-de-script foreigners. 
 
Conclusion 
Context requires an understanding of the changing ways in which the PRC had conducted its 
people-to-people diplomacy and a mapping of this against other geo-political and ideological 
factors. In the PRC’s case, the ideological framework saw the focus on ‘peace diplomacy’ in the 
1950s, where links were drawn with peace activists and organizations on the basis of preventing 
further war between capitalist and socialist states and challenging anti-communist beliefs that 
socialist states wanted war. 
The 1960s for the PRC was dominated by the Sino-Soviet split, which saw the PRC reach out to 
a broader number of supporters, yet its commitment to Marxist orthodoxy also saw it focus on 
the question of class and ideological commitment in terms of how those relationships developed. 
Increasingly the image it projected was one of revolutionary utopianism, and of a universal 
project offering an alternative for humanity. 
After the death of Mao Zedong, however, the PRC began to project a state and nation centred 
image, based increasingly on ideas of culture, ‘normal’ state behaviour and projecting historical 
continuities. The immediate period was dominated by a de-politicisation process and a rigidifing 
of the relationship between the Party and State. Although Tiananmen disrupted the projection of 
the PRC’s chosen images, the post-Mao changes continued anew and apace through the 1990s 
until the end of this study. 
Contained within the term ‘people-to-people diplomacy’, for the PRC, is a range of different 
activities. These have included: proletarian internationalism, national projection, people’s 
diplomacy. These different activities have different characteristics and have appeared at different 
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periods, in accordance with the changing needs and conditions the PRC has faced. This chapter 
has charted the different types of activities and drawn a useful periodisation that will be able to 
examined in conjunction with, in order to help describe and explain, the activities of New 
Zealanders sympathetic to the PRC in later chapters. 
There is a lot of differentiation between the various forms of diplomacy that are subsumed 
within the term that the organizations connected to the PRC favour of ‘people-to-people 
diplomacy’. Further, there was the important interaction between the ideas of an alternative 
diplomacy, which was linked to the radicalism of the PRC, or its perceived radicalism, and the 
pragmatic problems the PRC faced at not having formal diplomatic links with many states. 
Accordingly, people-to-people diplomacy cannot always be equated in a straight-forward way 
with national image building, but there are significant similarities. 
For Marxists, the national question for Marxists was subordinate to the question of revolution. 
Marxism-Leninism suggests that bringing the masses into socialist construction, including of the 
international order, is essential for progress. Proletarian internationalism was bringing together 
those who would struggle together to bring about the universal and international Marxist-
Leninist project. While supporting a socialist country was an aspect of that practice is was a 
means to the end of global communism, not an end in itself. 
There is a natural conflict between this idea of the needs and aspirations of ‘the people’ and what 
the PRC increasingly expressed as a state-centred nationalism, in particular from the 1970s. Yet 
since socialist states are all forced to play international politics, states tend to put the needs of 
their countries first. Although controversial, it is likely that many Marxists believed that doing so 
was in fact ‘true internationalism’ – so long as it is employed to support the international socialist 
revolution. For others though, the increasing similarities between how the PRC behaved and 
other states, not based on an aspirational alternative, meant that they would lose interest in the 
PRC altogether. 
One consistency through the period examined here is the use of the tool of guided tourism, 
whereby foreigners are brought to the PRC and taken through a managed visit. It is focused on 
what they want to visit, although various observers have also been struck by what it was that the 
Chinese hosts wanted them to see, and supplied with guides and interpreters to explain, in 
appropriate terms, what they are bearing witness to. 
Even this approach, albeit consistent, has also changed in accordance with the question of 
context. New Zealanders in the 1970s were struck by what their hosts were interested in showing 
them, in the 2000s far less so, since the trip would include the same sorts of things that visiting 
dignitaries might be shown in New Zealand. The target market for such tours also changed, from 
those sympathetic to seeing socialism in practice, as part of an international commitment to the 
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Marxist project, through to ‘prominent people’, who tended to be either civic and community 
elites or those with access to the mainstream media and who could produce good news about 
China. By the late 1990s, if such visitors had had a commitment to socialism it might be 
considered a burden rather than an attraction. The distinction between friends and enemies was 
not related to ideological commitment, merely to whether or not someone might say nice things 
about the PRC. 
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Chapter 2: Telling the Truth 
This thesis looks at changing representations of China. I focus in particular on those images that 
were adopted and projected by its friends in New Zealand-based organisations. These 
organisations included the New Zealand China Friendship Society, the Communist Party of New 
Zealand (and derivations thereof), and for a period, the New Zealand University Students’ 
Association. Each of these organisations in turn, for they have had at times understandings and 
therefore representations of China in conflict with one another, has attempted to make its own 
ideas about China into a hegemonic perspective or orthodox view. This process has, naturally, 
involved an attempt to make the representation authoritative or to make a claim in some way to 
truthfulness. At the heart of the discourse about the People’s Republic of China at the centre of 
this thesis has been the notion of representing the ‘truth’ about China. 
This chapter looks at ideas of truth and how those ideas relate to the activities of the groups 
identified above. In particular, I look at a range of ideas about subjectivity and objectivity with 
respect to truth and what they reveal when examined alongside the activities of those 
organisations committed to telling what was, for them, the truth about China. I do this by 
examining what claims to authority the groups use in their representations of China, with a 
particular focus on the claims of empiricism that have accompanied New Zealander’s eye-witness 
accounts of travel to the PRC. Finally I explore how Alain Badiou’s ideas on truth and the event 
– whereby an occurrence of what Badiou calls a truth-event makes previous understanding of the 
truth untenable – can be used to understand the disruption to the accounts of activities in the 
PRC that are explored in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
Alain Badiou has gained renown in contemporary continental philosophy for his theory of truth 
as a situated ‘truth-procedure’ consisting in the practice of fidelity to an event. Badiou's theory of 
truth has gained notoriety as a critique of postmodern philosophy and post-structuralism, 
articulated from within the tradition of continental philosophy. Of additional pertinence, Badiou 
was a member of a Maoist party in the 1970s and still regards himself as both a revolutionary and 
an activist.190 He wrote in 2006 that Maoism ‘is part of our political current… I can say “our”, for 
I was part of it, and in a certain sense, to quote Rimbaud, “I am there, I am still there”’.191 His 
current political activities include articulation on behalf of the sans-papiers, identification as a 
Maoist comes amidst his discussion on the significance of the Cultural Revolution. I will return 
to Badiou’s notion of truth through fidelity to the event with respect to the events that shaped 
the truth of the PRC to its New Zealand friends later in this chapter. 
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Approaches to Truth 
Sympathy with the communist or socialist project that China in some way represented was a key 
part of the early attraction of the PRC. Yet depictions of China were far more commonly 
couched in terms invoking the real than the utopian.192 James Bertram, for example, denying that 
he was a fellow traveller of the Chinese revolution, explained that he was required by a 
‘commitment to accuracy’ to acknowledge ‘the real nature of [communism’s] achievements in 
China’.193 Similarly, when the NZCFS was formed in 1952, one of its goals was to ‘clear the mists 
of ignorance and provide accurate information leading to mutual understanding and mutual 
respect between our two peoples’.194 
According to Terry Eagleton, a brief history of truth might go something like this: in pre-modern 
times, truth was by and large a phenomenon set apart from the material world, considered above 
everyday realities. Truth was thought to dwell ‘in some Olympian sphere of its own’; or truth was 
conversely deeper than the real, ‘lurking exclusively at the heart of things’. Revealing the truth for 
pre-modernists meant discarding the ‘empirical shells of phenomena’ in order to get at the vital 
essences of things. For Eagleton, this view of truth survives well into modernity, pointing to 
Hegel among others; but he writes that it is only with modernity that truth ‘descends to earth on 
a dramatic scale’, as people turned from religious explanations and began to focus their accounts 
on the actually existent.195 
A dictionary definition of truth reveals multiple meanings. These include honesty, good faith, and 
sincerity in general, which might be better defined as truthfulness196, to agreement with fact or 
reality in particular.197 There are differences amongst philosophers and scholars with respect to 
what constitutes truth; how to define and identify truth; the roles that revealed and acquired 
knowledge play; and whether truth is subjective, relative, objective, or absolute.198 There are at 
least five substantive theories contending as a proper basis for deciding how words, symbols, 
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ideas and beliefs may properly be considered true. These theories are usually entitled: 
correspondence, coherence, constructivist, consensus and pragmatic theories.199 
According to correspondence theories of truth, true beliefs and true statements are true because 
they correspond to the actual state of affairs. These theories attempt to draw a positive 
relationship between thoughts or statements and the things or objects they refer to. It is a 
traditional model, the heritage of which can be traced to classical Greek philosophers such as 
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. These theories hold that the truth or the falsity of a representation 
is determined in principle solely by how it relates to objective reality, by whether or not it 
accurately describes that reality. 200   
On the face of it, NZCFS President Roy Evans was applying a correspondence theory of truth 
when he wrote that: 
Those members of our Society who have visited China know – they know that this country 
of over 700 million people are enjoying a rapidly rising standard of living. They know that 
the Chinese have their priorities right. They also know that here in New Zealand we do 
not have our priorities right… under our private enterprise system… our priorities are 
completely haywire. There is something to learn from China.201 
Evans was arguing that the things that the New Zealanders saw in China, on their study tours, 
were true – and that the revolutionary activities in China were truly transforming China for the 
better. He, and the rest of the Society at this time, knew this because it corresponded with what 
those committed to the socialist project already knew about the world. Many modern theorists 
have noted that the idea behind correspondence theory cannot be achieved independently of 
analysing such additional factors. Such critics of correspondence notions of truth assert that there 
are yet other issues necessary to the analysis, such as language and translation, interpersonal 
hierarchies, community and societal interactions, personal biases and other factors involved in 
deciding what is seen as truth.202 
There are a complex series of claims being made by Evans, in which facts and values are 
interchanged. Note that it is the eye-witness experience that is the source of knowledge – a 
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skeptic might ask how Evans knew that the lives of 700 million people were being improved. 
Evans is stating convictions rather than facts, and he is constructing the members of the NZCFS 
not only as those who know more about China but also as those who know more about where 
New Zealand should be headed. 
Although Marxists are concerned about the problem of truth and authenticity, in part it is simply 
explained through their commitment to their cause, yet it is also worrisome precisely because of 
what might be done in the service of the project to which they are committed. In particular it is 
worth noting that Owell’s 1984 came out before the formation of the PRC, and placed a 
particular burden on supporters such as those in the NZCFS since it was instantly well-known as 
a critique, from a social-democratic perspective, of totalitarian rule.203 While Marxists’ views of 
truths are in some respect subordinate to the agreed project of Marxism, liberalism challenges 
this. Liberalism holds that state authority such as that under socialism can be a threat to the truth 
because it prevents some people from saying what is true. 
Constructivist ideas of truth, which emerge partly in response to such criticisms, instead hold that 
truth is constructed by social processes. Normally this results in truth being accordingly 
historically and culturally specific, and shaped through power understood as struggles within a 
society.  At its extreme, constructivism views all knowledge as ‘constructed’, because it does not 
reflect any external transcendent realities (as a correspondence theory might hold). Rather, 
constructivist perceptions of truth are viewed as contingent on some agreed norms, subjective 
human perception, and social experience.204 Many constructivists believe that representations of 
physical and biological reality, including race, sexuality, and gender are socially constructed.205 
Hegel and Marx were among the early proponents of the premise that truth is socially 
constructed, in their case by the dominant structures of the current epoch.206 
This idea of a constructed, subjective and contingent truth comes through very clearly from 
talking to those currently involved in China friendship activities. It explains the activities and 
statements of those who came before them in the face of criticisms that they were ‘political 
pilgrims’,207 ‘fellow travellers’208 or in some way being ‘managed’, willing or otherwise, by the 
regime.209 
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Michael Crook’s parents had each come to China in the 1930s and worked to promote the PRC 
in the West after 1949.210 He has since continued their work. He takes up this constructed notion 
of truth to explain his parents’, and their peers’, motivations: 
the truth… for these people there was no need to brainwash, [the great success of the 
PRC] was their truth. The different experiences that these people went through led to 
their different understandings.211 
He noted the particularism of those who were enthused about the CPC’s project for China: 
there were an awful lot of foreigners came to China in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s. The 
Shanghai that my dad arrived at in 1938 had Russian dance halls, it was a paradise for 
adventurers. There were people there for all kinds of reasons: some to make money, 
whatever. [Those who became friends of China were a] selective group. Take for 
example Ma Haide/ George Hatem, [he] left his practice in Shanghai and went to North 
China to work with the communists. When Alley took his first holiday he heard there 
was a flood, so he went to the flood. He didn’t go to the beaches of Thailand or those 
things that expats do now… Perhaps for the average person tumultuous social events 
get in the way. The friends of China were not these average people.212 
What Crook reveals here is an interaction between a set of political beliefs and a set of 
perceptions of what counts as true. What is required as evidence to persuade the supporter of a 
particular political project is different from that required for someone not committed to that 
project. Commitment to ideals – sincerity – is central to explanations about truth for socialists. 
Alley was sincere, and had the correct values, therefore he can be believed. Others might criticise 
people like Alley on almost exactly parallel reasoning: that he was hiding the truth precisely 
because of his sincerity and it was his lack of objectivity that distorted the truth. 
Further along a continuum away from ‘transcendent’ reality, some post-modern thinkers claim 
that what passes for truth is in fact, merely, a process of mass consensus of the public. This idea 
would mean that no effort, or application of theory or experiment, is required to arrive at truth, 
since truth is in effect only a by-product of social processes. Such ‘consensus theories’ hold that 
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truth is whatever is agreed upon, or in some versions, might come to be agreed upon, by some 
specified group. Such a group might include all human beings, or any subset thereof consisting of 
more than one person.213 Although he does not identify as a post-modernist, among the current 
advocates of consensus theory accounting for the concept of ‘truth’ is the philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas.214 For Habermas, truth is what would be agreed upon in an ideal speech situation.215  
Habermas argues for a radical democracy where even statements as to what exists are subject to a 
contested discourse where ‘the truth will out’. 
The idea of contested notions of ‘truth’ or at least truth claims is at the heart of the struggle for 
making the NZCFS’s ideas about the PRC hegemonic or orthodox. The Society saw one of its 
functions as contributing to ideas about the PRC, without which alternative ‘truths’ that would 
be unhelpful for its other goals might be formed. As NZCFS President Jack Ewan wrote, ‘Our 
job is not propaganda for China but all would agree that we couldn’t go wrong in publishing the 
truth about China’.216 When it incorporated in 1977, for example, the NZCFS included as a goal 
‘To oppose and correct misrepresentation and misunderstanding of the policies and actions of 
the Chinese government and people’.217 While accepting the power of hegemony and consensus 
ideas about truth – and seeking to influence representations about the PRC – the Society often 
found itself challenging the prevailing view. This was true when it argued for recognition for the 
PRC, for Taiwan being part of China, and that Communist Party of China-instituted programmes 
were successful in improving the living standards of hundreds of millions of Chinese. Later, these 
disputes were also with others with whom they had previously been closely aligned, and who had 
agreed with those previous campaigns. For example when CPNZ cadre withdrew from the 
NZCFS in the late 1970s, in part because of disputes over China’s international activities and in 
particular over the Theory of the Three Worlds, the Society organised a workshop that 
encouraged ‘[the popularising of] China’s Foreign Policy, Including “Chairman Mao’s Theory of 
the Differentiation of the Three Worlds”’.218 That workshop noted debate about China’s foreign 
policy, the Gang of Four and the Theory of the Three Worlds but reported that the confusion 
was manufactured: ‘some people have been confused by the nonsense of the capitalist press 
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which calls the present Chinese leadership “moderates” and the disgraced “gang of four” 
“radicals”’.219 
The workshop showed that the Society believed in a single truth, regardless of the requirement to 
engage in popularising it. It declared that all members had a responsibility to study China’s 
foreign policy and to be ‘well-informed as to the situation’ and, as Jack Ewan was reported to 
have pointed out, ‘The Theory of the Three Worlds must be discussed. It is a clear statement of 
the present situation in the world’.220 
In contrast, in 2002, looking back on this same period, Michael Crook’s thoughts certainly 
reflected a subjectivity of truth: 
To a large extent truth, when it is presented, is subjective to the extent that, given one’s 
life experience, equips one in a certain way with a certain understanding. Take for 
example my father who died at 93 a few years ago, and Alley died aged 90. These people 
came to China in the 1920s and 1930s as young people in a time of great turmoil and 
how could they not be struck by the difference after Liberation? How could they not go 
overboard and be positive? That was their truth, their great truth.221 
Crook further acknowledged that not only was the subjectivity due to the particularities of the 
person, it was also historically contingent: 
My mother got so cross the other day when a Chinese colleague was doubting whether 
the land reforms were really such a great idea. The direction in China today is giving 
back land titles to the families they were taken from under land reform. Is it right to 
hand it back is one question but even if the answer is ‘yes’, then that’s a separate 
question which is ‘Was it right to take it away in the first place?’. China’s very different 
now, it’s a different time it’s a different set of circumstances.222 
These ideas are consistent with those of the theologian Soren Kierkegaard. For him, while 
objective truths are final and static, subjective truths are continuing and dynamic. The truth of 
existence is a living, inward, and subjective experience that is always in the process of becoming. 
Kierkegaard wrote that the values, morals, and spiritual approaches a person adopts could only 
become truly known when they have been inwardly and subjectively appropriated. Human truth 
cannot be found separate from the subjective experience of one's own existence; this experience 
is itself defined by the values that underpin one's way of life.223 
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Perhaps the best example of this, from the representations of the PRC involved in this study, was 
those who said that they knew what they were saying was an incomplete picture of the truth, but 
that it balanced equally incomplete negative images. In his final words of the book that details his 
trip to the PRC in 1956, James Bertram wrote: ‘I have tried to dwell here on the more 
encouraging features… because it seems to me important that people in Western countries 
should appreciate them’.224 Propaganda that prevented war, or eased the relationship between 
NZ and China was justified – especially since objective truth was elusive anyway. 
The position that truth is subjective, in particular because of ideological perspective, surfaces 
again and again in accounts of travel to the PRC. It is often employed to dismiss anti-China 
perspectives as having been pre-determined: 
Our New Zealand party brought back from China (as they had certainly taken there) a 
number of very different points of view. To Charles Hilgendorf, the most striking thing 
about present day China was that ‘it really is Communist. There is a complete 
dictatorship, intensive and all-pervading propaganda, secret police and spies, 
standardisation of thought, armed soldiers seldom out of sight and mass executions’.… 
To Ormond Wilson, most things in China seemed ‘a good deal better than I had 
expected… My personal impression was that there is far greater ease and easiness in 
China than I recollected in my encounters with totalitarian countries elsewhere’. All of 
us, I have no doubt, were trying to tell the truth as we saw it.225 
Four years prior to Bertram’s account, Margaret Garland, herself convinced of the ‘truth’ of 
claims that the United Nations forces, in particular the United States forces, had used germ 
warfare in Korea against Chinese troops, wrote: 
The effect of the exhibition on us was mixed. All of us felt that the evidence shown 
here, plus the report of the International Scientific Commission, looked pretty 
conclusive. In fact, none of us had much doubt about it, though one or two thought that 
our opinions were not of much value, and others that we could not be convinced that 
the USA had engaged in bacteriological warfare from this evidence. Others of the 
delegation who disagreed with this view interpreted it to mean fear of coming out 
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honestly with what we believed and I noticed a tendency for the party to split into two 
groups.226 
Karl Marx engaged with the idea of subjectivity obscuring an actual existing truth. For him, 
knowledge should be thought of in a realistic fashion. The subject does not create the object, for 
the object exists independently of the subject. Knowledge results from the fact that copies, 
reflections, or photographs of this actual existing reality are present in the mind. In contrast to 
the conservative thought of much of his day, Marx held that the world is not unknowable but 
rather is entirely and thoroughly knowable, and that the true method of knowing consists solely 
in science combined with technical practice.227 The peculiarity of Marxist materialism lies in the 
fact that it combines this realistic outlook with the pragmatic. From the notion that all contents 
of our consciousness are determined by class perspective, it follows equally that each class has its 
own science and its own philosophy. An independent, non-class-based science is impossible. 
Further, the truth for communists is whatever leads to success, and practice alone constitutes the 
criterion of truth. While knowledge is a striving for absolute truth, it is relative, answering to the 
needs of the movement.228 
How to combine Marx’s belief in an absolute truth and the subjectivity of perspective has 
confounded Marxists ever since The German Ideology. Vladimir Lenin argued that a summation of 
relative truths would reveal the absolute truth. In Materialism and Empiro-criticism he claimed 
‘human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth, which is 
compounded of a sum-total of relative truths’.229 Mao challenged this notion in his essay On 
Practice. In it he wrote: 
Marxists230 recognise that in the absolute and general process of the development of the 
universe, the development of each particular process is relative, and that hence, in the 
endless flow of absolute truth… knowledge of a particular process at any given stage of 
development is only relative truth. The sum total of innumerable relative truths constitutes 
absolute truth.231 
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For Mao, then, innumerable relative truths are needed in order to reach absolute truth. While this 
goal should be strived for – through a process of ‘practice, knowledge, again practice, and again 
knowledge… with each cycle the nature of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level’ – this 
process will naturally and logically be an endless spiral.232 
Alain Badiou reveals his own heritage in Maoist thought by continuing this notion. For Badiou 
there is an absolute truth but that truth only exists in a particular moment (which he calls ‘the 
situation’) and since truths become untrue with the passage of time they cannot be achieved over 
time. The foundation that is needed for a truth to be able to worked towards is being continually 
disrupted by events, each giving rise to a new conceptualisation of truth. Badiou has gained 
renown in contemporary continental philosophy for his theory of truth as a situated ‘truth-
procedure’ consisting in the practice of fidelity to an event. According to Badiou, truth-
procedures are situated, singular, subjective, and universal.233 
 
How To Discern Truth From Non-Truth? 
Metaphysical subjectivism holds that the truth or falsity of all propositions depends, at least 
partly, on what we believe. In contrast, metaphysical objectivism holds that truths are 
independent of our beliefs. Relative truths are statements or propositions that are true only 
relative to some standard, convention, or point-of-view, such as that of one's own culture. 
Relativism is the doctrine that all truths within a particular domain are of this form, and entails 
that what is true varies across cultures and eras. For example, moral relativism is the view that a 
moral statement can be true in one time and place but false in another. This is different from the 
less controversial claim that people in different cultures and eras believe different things about 
morality: moral relativism claims that the moral facts themselves are different. Thus, justification 
is a normative notion. The standard definition is that a concept is normative if it is a concept 
regarding or depending on the norms, or obligations and permissions (very broadly construed), 
involved in human conduct.234 
Despite the problems with objectivity and justification, we hang on to ideals about truth as 
important for our sense of humanity. In Truth and Truthfulness Bernard Williams argues, against 
deniers of the possibility or importance of objective truth, that it is indispensable to any human 
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society to accept both truth and truthfulness as values, and sincerity and accuracy as 
corresponding virtues.235 Such beliefs do not need to imply anything disreputably metaphysical. 
On the contrary, Williams argues, Nietzsche believes that while a vindicatory history of the 
notions of truth and truthfulness certainly has to be a naturalistic one, that is not to say that such 
a history is impossible. Such an understanding of truth and truthfulness can lead us to the less 
elevated and more realistic hope that truth, as a human institution, will continue to sustain the 
virtues of truth 
in something like the more courageous, intransigent, and socially effective forms that 
they have acquired over their history… and that the ways in which future people will 
come to make sense of things will enable them to see the truth and not be broken by 
it.236 
In order to argue that what one is saying is the truth there is often the claim to some authority. 
One of the most famous attempts at this is Marco Polo’s account of his travels, where he claims 
that everything he has either seen himself (he being trustworthy due to his noble birth) or heard 
from ‘men of credit and veracity’ is therefore true: 
Our book will relate them to you plainly in due order, as they were related by Messer 
Marco Polo, a wise and noble citizen of Venice, who has seen them with his own eyes. 
There is also much here that he has not seen but has heard from men of credit and 
veracity.  We will set down things seen as seen, things heard as heard, so that our book 
may be an accurate record, free from any sort of fabrication.  And all who read the book 
or hear it may do so with full confidence, because it contains nothing but the truth.237 
Those documenting the successes of the PRC in the years immediately after Liberation harnessed 
not only the persuasive power of the eye-witness account but attempted to convey why the 
particular evidence that travellers were told seemed so convincing to them. As Margaret Garland 
wrote: 
There was no mistaking the emotion with which these peasants spoke. Rewi Alley and 
Nancy Lapwood, as well as Dr Chou, the Dean of the University of Peking, were deeply 
moved for they knew the truth of what was being said and I daresay a great deal more of 
what lay behind this kind of story.238 
This was the sort of remark that made me so sure that the people who were showing us 
the sights, conducting us on our tour, believed in what they were showing us themselves. 
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Professor Chou, who is a scientist and a scholar with an international reputation, is not a 
man whose word I found it possible to doubt. There was no need for him to have said 
that unless he wanted to say it. I also had the same feeling about the information we got 
from other people. Listening to speeches and question and answer is one thing; 
observing the look on the speaker’s face and the tones of his voice is quite another, and 
it is in these that the foreigner who cannot understand the language reads the answer to 
his enquiry.239 
It was very important to these early travellers that they would be able to convince people that 
they had been able to get beyond propagandistic images to see ‘the real China’. Alan Monteith led 
the first delegation to go from New Zealand to the PRC to attend the Peking Peace Conference 
in 1952. He recounted a spontaineous trip to a church that the delegation requested, leaving it to 
the last minute before they suggested it: 
It couldn’t have been a set up. From the time we made the request to the time the car 
pulled up would have been no more than ten minutes… To some extent we deliberately 
did these things. We would leave it to the last minutes, [so that things] couldn’t be jacked 
up. In many cases we were doing it at times when it would be inconvenient for the 
people at the other end, we were kind of testing them, and it was no problem at all. 
When we came home we were told that things had been laid on for us but it couldn’t 
have been… do you see?240 
Before Margaret Garland left for China her conversations with friends had left her in no doubt as 
to the enormity of the task of being able to present what she discovered as being an honest and 
useful account of her experience: 
[One friend said] ‘You’ll see nothing whatever. They can easily fool you about what they 
are doing… You can go and be fooled and come back here and get yourself called a 
communist. That’s all you can do and if you take my advice you’ll stay at home…’. 
I rang up another acquaintance. ‘It’s no good. Anything good about Communist China 
you come back and say won’t be believed and anything bad about it will do no good to 
the cause of peace’, he said.241 
When Tom Newnham went to the PRC in the 1960s he too was aware of how anything he might 
report would be received in New Zealand. He details in his autobiography Interesting Times how he 
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‘had asked to visit villages in three areas … and in this I was given every assistance’. He writes 
that 
I knew that I would be accused of being taken to ‘showpieces’... However, during the 
whole month I did not get any such feeling. Already, in those days, my Chinese, both 
Mandarin and Cantonese was sufficiently good for me to understand what was being 
said around me. Many times I asked for impromptu changes to our planned route and 
these were always complied with. For example at a cotton factory I was discussing her 
work with a female employee and asked about her domestic situation, as I felt it would 
make a good case-study. Knowing that the employees lived very close to their work I 
asked if we could go and see her home. Within five minutes it was arranged and we went 
across to take snaps.242 
He records that at the woman’s home ‘I could understand what they were saying and it was 
totally natural and honest, nothing contrived’.243 Further he recounts a number of occasions 
when  
as we were travelling in a car from the special village I had looked at – I sometimes 
spotted another village over yonder and thought I would like to compare it. So I asked 
to be taken there. They always complied immediately.244 
The authority of the Society’s representations of the PRC depended upon a number of factors. 
Not least of which was the climate of anti-communism and the international situation. For 
example, they were considerably enhanced after China joined the UN and recognition moved 
towards becoming a reality and the status of Rewi Alley improved immeasurably.245 Compared 
with the virtual media blackout of his 1965 trip the NZ Listener in 1971 positively gushed: 
Public Meetings in Wellington and Auckland have drawn nearly 2000 to hear him… with 
the knowledge that he speaks for China on the public platform, he holds an audience 
spellbound.246 
For the NZCFS, refuting dominant images of the PRC was still an essential part of its activities. 
As National President Roy Evans claimed: 
The point is that the news media here does not give China’s side of the case. That is 
where the China Society must step in. By making it our duty to help our own people to 
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understand China’s policy and reasons for policy, we will be accepting the new role for 
our Society.247 
In the 1970s, tours continued to be the main source for instructing particular individuals about 
China, individuals who could propagate those images to a wider population. For the Society, 
there was nothing that could produce a more accurate and enduring image than that which had 
been observed with their own eyes. For example, the 1976 Worker’s Tour travelled to China after 
the death of Mao and during the factional struggles that led to the arrest of the Gang of Four. 
They saw it quite differently from foreign observers viewing the PRC from afar and reported that 
claims in the Western media of unrest, chaos and infighting were ‘completely at variance’ with 
what the group ‘witnessed first hand’.248 
These first hand experiences led to the production of other material. In March 1974 the 
Auckland Branch of the NZCFS organised a two-day ‘Seminar on China’. It featured speakers on 
trade, history, education, industry, literature, Rewi Alley, China’s foreign policy, medicine and the 
situation facing women and children. Every speaker had been on a tour to China and although 
their personal experiences formed only part of their presentation, this experiential knowledge 
underpinned their understanding of the PRC. The seminar, and the resulting publication of the 
speeches, represented an attempt to consolidate the impact of the tours of the early 1970s.249  
The novelty of visiting the People’s Republic, right through to the early 1970s, was such that 
almost all foreign travellers produced a record of what were seen as pioneering journeys.250 
Indulging in the personal, these travelogues, testimonies and eyewitness accounts draw their 
authority from this direct experience while combining a type of socio-political analysis with 
travelogue in an endeavour to produce and present new knowledge about China. 
Experience is employed as an uncomplicated foundation. Yet the experiential is employed to give 
authority not only to what is seen but also for what amounts to historical and cultural analysis. It 
is precisely the author’s personal authority that is called upon to protect the work from the 
charge of fictionality. The authority of each travelogue is based on the act of experiencing and 
observing China. Each author implies that cultural knowledge is licensed by observation and each 
establishes direct experience as the privileged mode of knowledge. 
Some years after other tourists began returning to the West expressing their praise for the 
People’s Republic, the Belgian-Australian Sinologist, Pierre Ryckmans, writing under the nom de 
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plume Simon Leys, published his alternative account of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese 
Shadows.251 In this text he dismisses all authoritative accounts of China, except his own, as an 
unambiguous staging of experience. In a disjointed collection of travel notes and personal and 
scholarly reflections, Leys claims that what tourists saw in China was mediated by the Chinese 
authorities and that the Maoist authorities’ tour de force managed to limit China to closely regulated 
areas. Leys regards the viewing practices of tourists as controlled by the state and ‘neutralised’ in 
a ‘frenzy of movement’. He dismisses these tourist accounts as the ravings of those carried 
through China in a cage.252 
I maintain that under the conditions in which foreign residents and visitors now live in 
the People’s Republic of China, it is impossible to write anything but frivolities, and 
those who think they can do something serious when reporting their Chinese 
experiences, or who pretend they describe Chinese realities when they are in fact 
describing the Chinese shadow play…  
The foreigner who wants to talk about ‘China’ can do one of only two things: he can 
copy down the official slogans… or he can try desperately to glean the crumbs of the 
reality denied to him, and to patch together as best he can a series of unrelated 
vignettes.253 
As Timothy Kendall argues, despite the presumption of a Chinese ‘reality’, the authors of eye-
witness accounts actually produced a striking unreality. In replicating the ideologically inflected 
sociological categories of existence they were shown – the collective farms, the hospitals, 
educational institutions, industrial plants, communes – these texts provide a series of descriptions 
about the interior of Leys’ ‘cage’. 
The revolutionary itineraries, the propagandistic offerings of guides, interpreters, model 
citizens, CPC representatives and other bit-players, come together to make these works 
appear less as objective, knowledge-generating accounts than as multi-authored socialist 
fictions.254 
However, in reading the accounts, Ley’s denigrations appear ill-informed. The travellers seem 
remarkably aware of both what they were engaged in and how critics might read it. One is hard-
pressed not to have some sympathy with people such as Margaret Garland and her account, 
given what she experiences. As she recounts: 
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We asked one peasant picked out from the crowd what were the illnesses the people 
now suffered from. The answer was, ‘There are no illnesses since Liberation’. Dr Yoh 
whispered to me, ‘That is nonsense of course. What he means is there is nothing like 
what there was. The difference is so great that some of these simple peasants really 
believe in miracles. You can’t blame them’.255 
An old lady reeled off [a list of the vegetables they now ate] and we could see it for 
ourselves. She added ‘Before, in all my life I have eaten only the peels of sweet potatoes 
and the waste from bean curd and we all went about like the pigs. Life is happy now we 
have Chairman Mao Zedong’. This may have been an exaggeration, but it is what she 
said, and it certainly seemed to come from her heart: tears stood in her eyes as she 
spoke.256 
Leys’ ideological perspective colours his own work and there are more complicated explanations 
for the process of truth creation than that of naïve viewers being lied to by their hosts. According 
to the Chinese hosts of the tours in the 1960s and 70s, visits to communes and factories and so 
on would not be accompanied by such declarations as ‘we are taking you to an average duck 
farm’.257 Typically, in contrast, the guide would say, ‘we are taking you to this amazing duck farm. 
This one has outshone all the others around’. It was the viewers, wanting to convince themselves 
of the superiority of the system they were witnessing in China who would return to New Zealand 
(or wherever) and be effusive about how all duck farms in China were amazing. As Michael 
Crook, himself both a tourist and a guide to foreigners visiting the PRC in this period, said: 
There was no deception! They were showing you the best. And you would write about it 
and it might carry an element of deception because the serious social scientist would say 
that they want to see the average… but there was no deliberate attempt to obfuscate.258 
Those who went on the student tours of the 1970s echoed Newnham’s demands noted earlier. 
They would ask to see a poor, a middle and a rich example. Even if these were all ‘models’, they 
would come away with a sense of the range of experiences on offer for Chinese in China.259 
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Intuition, Belief and Truth 
In Anne-Marie Brady’s Making the Foreign Serve China she details how each ‘foreign friend’ of the 
PRC was in some way ‘bought’ into the service of the propaganda state. At the heart of her 
analysis is an inability to comprehend that those who were enamoured with the project of the 
PRC had an ideological allegiance and were committed to some higher ideal that was served by 
propagating what they believed about the PRC. Instead she presents their motives as a result of, 
for example, crass materialism, deviance or duplicity. 
Brady argues, for example, that Israel Epstein had nowhere else to go except the People’s 
Republic of China and then, when sick, he depended upon the Chinese government for his 
medical care. This first point is based on a claim that Epstein’s application for residence in the 
United States had been rejected, which she puts down to his pro-CPC views during the climate 
of McCarthyist anti-communism. Epstein himself claims to have never made such an application, 
although he had written away to request the forms. He says that he left the US because he was 
having trouble getting his material documenting China’s successes published. So when Song 
Qingling, having established China Reconstructs, asked him to return to the PRC to edit it, he leapt 
at the opportunity. Although the Chinese government has provided for his healthcare in old-age, 
as it does for other former civil servants, Epstein does not felt restricted in voicing his concern at 
the retreat from socialism he believes characterises the PRC’s current political direction, or in 
continuing to note his belief in the tremendous successes since Liberation.260 
Brady also suggests that George Hatem’s medical practice in Shanghai was not financial viable 
and he thought he could make more from the communists. When he began a relationship with 
the CPC, she claims, he was driven by his commercial interests. Hatem, a Lebanese-American 
who took the Chinese name Ma Haide, served as a physician and adviser to the Red Army from 
the mid-1930s until the founding of the PRC. He became a Chinese citizen and the first foreign 
member of the Communist Party of China. He was later a senior figure in China’s public health 
initiatives, until his death in 1988. Hatem’s own account, and the biography written about him by 
Edgar Porter, suggests he was convinced of the desirability of a communist victory by the 
conditions he saw in Shanghai in the 1930s, and he made a commitment to their cause that he 
continued until his death.261 
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At the heart of it, however, is the fact that those who became spokespeople for the PRC were 
convinced of the desirability of the project underway in the PRC, and they supported that 
project. This coloured, although not always in a blinding way, their perspectives. The Crooks, for 
example, were communists and saw China as a calling. As Michael Crook described it: 
[My father], like Norman Bethune,262 fought in the Spanish Civil War, read Red Star Over 
China263 and came to China to be part of the revolution. There was never disillusionment 
because there was not an illusion. They were genuinely excited at what they saw and 
what they were part of. They supported land reform because they saw it as a good thing 
and they promoted it because they saw that advocating China’s cause to hold it up to 
other developing countries would be a valuable experience that could be adopted 
elsewhere, in India for example.264 
After 1949 when the Crooks became teachers and Alley became a ‘peace worker’, and Shirley 
Barton and Kathleen Hall went back to New Zealand and helped to establish the New Zealand 
China Friendship Society, some would describe their activities as ‘propaganda work’. But they 
simply saw it as a significant activity to undertake to support the project that they had become 
part of. Nobody told them to write letters or articles promoting the PRC since Liberation, it was 
simply something that they did because they believed in what they saw and in that to which they 
saw themselves contribute. As Shirley Barton explained to Rewi Alley: 
I can only say that whatever I decided to help was viewed by me as objectively as 
possible… I had learned to give help and support not for a person but for a cause – and 
to ‘take cognisance of the objective situation’ – an excellent, never failing guide… I 
backed you Rewi, both in Shandan and in Yo Banfa etc. not for your charms 
(considerable as these are!), but for what you are and what you represent – the cause you 
are identified with – the cause of the people of China and of the world.265 
According to Michael Crook, again speaking principally about his father: 
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It wasn’t like the Party or the government said to him ‘why don’t you go and do this and 
the other, why don’t you write some articles, why don’t you go on speaking tours’, it was 
just this inner thing.266 
Badiou’s use of the apostle Paul as an example to illustrate his procedure of truth transforming 
the state of being is not the only Biblical reference point of interest. When Robert Reid spoke of 
his introduction to Mao Zedong-Thought – which set off a life-long commitment to social 
justice and internationalist activity – he noted that he himself had never been to the People’s 
Republic of China.267 In doing so he recounted John 20: 29: ‘Jesus said, “Thomas, do you have 
faith because you have seen me? The people who have faith in me without seeing me are the 
ones who are really blessed!”’268 
Thomas is frequently dubbed ‘doubting Thomas’ because of that famous incident where he 
refuses to believe in Jesus' resurrection simply on the basis of the eye-witness testimony of his 
fellow disciples. Instead, Thomas insists that he must personally be an eye-witness of the risen 
Lord before he can believe that Jesus is risen. Yet, according to theologian Jack Crabtree, if you 
read the gospel accounts, you discover that every disciple  had an opportunity to believe in the 
reality of Jesus' resurrection merely on the basis of someone's eyewitness account (a person or an 
angel); and yet none of them believed until they had some first-hand empirical evidence of their 
own.269  
Two points follow from this discussion of the evidence required by Thomas and the other 
disciples for belief in the resurrection. The early Christians were not obsessed with wishful-
thinking and an unrealistic desire to overcome the power of death. Instead, they were hard-
headed realists. The second point is more significant: Why do people believe? Are they satisfied 
with something told to them by other people? Belief in something that is counter to our intuition 
or to everything else that we have been told is difficult. We have not seen, how can we believe?  
Those who believe without evidence do so because they want to believe. They make a choice: ‘I 
would prefer reality to be a certain way, so that's what I will believe reality is’.  We see examples 
of this desire to believe in the accounts of those New Zealanders caught up in wanting to 
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support the transformations underway in the PRC. Keith Buchanan was Professor of Geography 
at Victoria University of Wellington and President of the Wellington branch of the NZCFS. His 
representation of China’s commune system reflected the picture of revolutionary successes that 
China’s friends believed at the time.270 
Between 1959 and 1962… China experienced an unprecedented series of natural 
calamities… In the face of this situation the individual peasant would have been helpless; 
he would, as was the case [with] Old China, have starved in his millions. The 
organisation of the commune system gave him the means to fight… It was a lean period 
– but there was no starvation and China emerged from it more than ever convinced of 
the advantages of the commune system.271 
The time Buchanan was in the PRC coincided with the so-called Great Leap Forward. This 
period was one of expansive revolutionary enthusiasm and the apparent belief that volunteerism 
and marshalling the capacity of the Chinese people would be able to overcome anything. His 
account of the ‘success of the commune system’ was a common representation. It of course was 
consistent with a teleological progression from what people had seen before and therefore what 
people expected. It was also strongly correlated with other accounts. Ron Smith, who went to the 
PRC on a CPNZ delegation in 1961, wrote an account of that trip in his book in 2002 using his 
notes from the time. He said that he had witnessed poverty in China ‘aggravated that year by the 
last of a three-year’s series of droughts’.272 Forty years later, Smith was still strongly swayed by 
what he had seen, and been shown, at the time: 
Western China-watchers said there was widespread famine with millions of deaths. All I 
can say is that… the people we met said that food shipments were sent where needed. 
They denied any starvation and we never saw any sign of it. In the old days in a drought 
the landlords and merchants cornered the grain while the peasants starved. In this 
drought I am sure the Party officials, in the main, shared weal and woe with the 
people…273 
                                                        
270  Among other notable achievements he started the highly regarded academic journal Pacific Viewpoint. See the 
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Wellington School of Earth Sciences, Phillip Morrison (himself a member of the 1971 NZUSA Study Tour to the 
PRC) and senior lecturer Warwick Murray, entitled ‘Calling All Viewpoints’, Asia-Pacific Viewpoint, 44, 1, 2005, 1-5. For 
a contrary view, whereby claims made in support of the PRC (in this case over allegations of the use of Germ Warfare 
by US troops in Korea) clouded a view of the rest of someone’s career, see George Steiner, My Unwritten Books, New 
Directions, New York, 2008. In a chapter entitled ‘Chinoiserie’, Steiner details how Needham’s claims from the 1950s 
coloured Steiner’s interactions with him thereafter. Although invited to write a Needham biography it remained 
unwritten, in part because Steiner could not see Needham’s Science and Civilisation in China as other than a ‘mythology of 
learning… among [other] unicorns in the garden of reason’ (Steiner, Unwritten Books, 31). For a view that places travel 
such as Buchanan’s in context, see Brian Matthews, Manning Clark, A Life, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2008. 
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In contemporary accounts, such as those by Jasper Becker and Jung Chang, the Great Leap 
Forward is now associated with an unprecedented disaster and mass starvation.274 How do we 
reconcile what is known now with what these accounts claimed? What Buchanan and Smith 
understood about the ‘successes of the commune system’ mirrored what others were writing 
about the PRC. It strongly correlates with what Rewi Alley wrote in his contemporaneously 
published material.275 In his 1965 book on China, A Curtain of Ignorance, Felix Greene says that in 
1960 he travelled through areas of China where food rationing was tight but he did not see mass 
starvation. He also cites other eyewitnesses.276 All these observations indicate that starvation was 
not a nation-wide phenomenon. In fact the evidence that Jasper Becker relies upon emerged only 
in the 1990s. There were earlier accounts, but as Greene points out, those opposed to the regime 
in the PRC made unsubstantiated allegations about massive famines virtually every year and these 
were able to be dismissed as inaccurate and ideologically inspired. The ‘disaster’ claims were only 
taken seriously in the 1980s when the new Chinese leadership began to also attack the Great 
Leap Forward as part of the campaign against ‘ultra-leftism’.277 
The ideas of the day, then, reflected not only what people saw – and can reasonably be believed 
to have seen – but also the ideals of the day. Travellers to the PRC were told, as Smith was, that 
‘Despite 200 days of drought…[the commune] had got a record crop and were able to help other 
communes whose crops had failed’. 278  This was consistent with a belief that China was 
succeeding and any contrary claims, especially given the surfeit of evidence that those claims 
would be based on, were dismissed as those of ‘anti-communists’.279  
A decade later, George Rosenberg, instead of being concerned that universities in China had 
been closed for three years, wrote that the Cultural Revolution struggle at Qinghua University 
meant ‘there is every reason to hope that China has forever abolished the risk of creating a new 
class of privileged bureaucrats’.280 Throughout the rest of the 1970s students applied for the 
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annual tours by writing of how they wanted to visit the Chinese socialist paradise or to view 
‘socialism in practice’.281 
At its extreme, we might interpret this desire to believe in the absence of evidence as a severe 
form of correspondence theory. Comedian Stephen Colbert would refer to it as ‘truthiness’. 
Colbert popularized ‘truthiness’ in 2005 as a satirical term to describe things that a person claims 
to know intuitively or ‘from the gut’ without regard to evidence, logic, intellectual examination, 
or facts.282 By using the term as part of his routine, Colbert sought to satirize the use of appeal to 
emotion and the ‘gut feeling’ as a rhetorical device in contemporary socio-political discourse. He 
particularly applied it to U.S. President George W. Bush's defence of the decision to invade Iraq 
in 2003.283 
 
Truth Events and the Changing Subject 
For Badiou, we never get to the truth. Not only because we need to summate innumerable 
relative truths but also because the truth itself keeps shifting. What is true in one moment is not 
true in another. The moment at which this change in truth takes place Badiou calls a truth-event. 
When a truth-event occurs it gives rise to a new truth, most importantly the previous truth 
becomes impossible and the process of working towards the new truth begins. Badiou also 
constructs a new concept of the subject. For him truth is objective and universal. Since 
subjectivity is with the beholder then the discovery of the truth gives rise to a new subject in 
relation to that truth. The observer is (re)constructed in association with the truth-event. 
The major propositions of Badiou's philosophy all find their basis in Being and Event, in which he 
attempts to reconcile a notion of the subject with ontology, and in particular post-structuralist 
and constructivist ontologies. Two elements mark the thesis of Being and Event: the place of 
ontology, or the science of ‘being qua being’ (being in itself), and the place of the event — which 
is seen as a rupture in ontology — through which the subject finds his or her realization and 
reconciliation with truth.284 
Badiou concludes that while ontology can mark out a space for an inhabitant of the constructible 
situation to decide upon the indiscernible, it falls to the subject to nominate this indiscernible, 
this generic point and give a name to the undecidable event. Badiou thereby marks out a 
philosophy that refutes the apparent relativism and apolitical features of post-structuralist 
thought. Badiou’s philosophy is one of the radically new, of possibility and innovation of ‘events’ 
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or truths that rupture or break from the given situation. Echoing Jacques Lacan, Badiou argues 
that truth ‘punches a hole’ in the situation, and this truth-event that breaks from the situation 
induces a subject, which is a bearer of a truth. If, along with Badiou, we see truth as breaking 
from accepted knowledge, and the subject of an event of truth as breaking from the situation as 
it is, we may view Badiou as a philosopher who seeks to open up and maintain a space for 
thought to fill out these breaks.285 
The truth-events are real but are conditional, contingent and subjective in their interpretation. 
Badiou uses as an example Paul’s epiphany on the road to Damascus.286 For Paul the truth-event 
means that what he used to believe becomes impossible – he can no longer deny the resurrection, 
but exactly what the resurrection means is not clear. For Paul the event gives rise to a new 
universalism, a truth, which transcends the difference between Jew and non-Jew, or more 
particularly Greek and Jew. Crucially, Paul is constructed himself through the process. 
Dramatically, Saul becomes Paul. A new subject is born.287 
Badiou’s work is of direct relevance to the imagining and interpretation of the PRC by its New 
Zealand viewers. Not only are there a series of truth-events which are of themselves 
transformational, in each of them we find the viewer (in this case an organisation) transformed as 
it seeks to re-position itself in accordance with the new truth. Furthermore, not only is the 
interpretation of the truth-event subjective, but what constitutes a truth-event – an event that 
ruptures the existing situation and give rise to a new truth – is also and of itself subjective.288 
For the Communist Party of New Zealand, telling the truth about China is an ideological process 
and the ideological questions are the ones that are transformational: the practice of building 
actual existing socialism, the Sino-Soviet Split, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 
rapprochement with the United States, Deng Xiaoping’s ‘coup’ and the fall of the Gang of Four, 
market reform (or ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’), China’s participation in ‘The War on 
Terror’. Yet, for the New Zealand China Friendship Society, the truth-events that matter are the 
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events that rupture their descriptive narrative about China. These are Liberation, the Great Leap 
Forward, recognition of the PRC by New Zealand, the dispute with Vietnam, the repudiation of 
the Great Leap Forward, a change from ‘mass line’ to ‘leaders and prominent people’, and the 
Tiananmen Square incident. There is virtually no overlap between the key events for the two 
organisations. 
The Sino-Soviet split is a case in point. For the CPNZ this represented a moment where the 
communist world was forced to take sides, where there was no longer a united Communist Bloc, 
where the truth of a communist-led Soviet Union was shattered. The CPNZ itself was 
transformed through its rejection of Soviet ‘revisionism’ and took on a new role of propagating a 
new ‘orthodoxy’ very similar to the line promoted by the CPC. Through the event of the Sino-
Soviet Split the CPNZ became an anti-revisionist party. This event was crucial for the CPNZ. It 
was the basis of its understanding about China for the next decade and a half, it catapulted the 
party onto the world stage where CPNZ Secretary Vic Wilcox shared platforms with Mao 
Zedong, and it resulted in an acrimonious split in the communist movement in New Zealand. 
Yet for the NZCFS the matter was very clearly not important and it is all but ignored in the 
publications of the period. 
Other events that were transformative yet subjective were the series of events related to 
recognition of the PRC in 1971 and 1972: the PRC replacing the Republic of China (Taiwan) at 
the United Nations, the visits by Kissinger and Nixon, and the recognition of the PRC by New 
Zealand on 22 December 1972. These were vital for members of the NZCFS, as a culmination 
of a political struggle, and also because they made their activities a great deal easier. It was not 
until after recognition that the NZCFS began to have ‘Society tours’ to the PRC, for example, 
whereby the Society organised tours for all sorts of people, up to six a year, and by which it 
began to make a lot of money. Yet for the CPNZ and other radical groups recognition, and in 
particular the Nixon visit, represented something of a crisis. The China that they looked to as a 
beacon of hope became aligned with their enemy – or at least the enemy of those they protested 
on behalf of, the Vietnamese villager. 
The Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979 was a crisis for the NZCFS, with many members leaving, 
especially those who had been drawn into the Society because of anti-Vietnam war activities.289 
For them, China no longer represented the purity of an alternative model. The Society’s 
leadership was drawn into an impassioned defence of the Chinese position, for the most part to 
convince its own membership. However, for Marxist-Leninist parties still supportive of the CPC 
(this did not include the CPNZ by this stage), the war with Vietnam merely confirmed their 
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world view. It showed the truth of the threat of the Soviet Union (‘the main threat to world 
peace’), and its ‘encirclement’ of China.290 
Similarly, the events of May and June 1989 in Tiananmen did not affect those members of 
communist parties who still viewed China’s revolutionary trajectory favourably, yet it ‘almost 
destroyed’the NZCFS.291 For the Preparatory Committee and Organisation for Marxist Unity the 
events of Tiananmen merely confirmed that there was an ongoing struggle for socialism and that 
the Western imperialists would do anything to undermine the People’s Republic. 292  They 
accepted without question the official position of the Communist Party of China on what had 
taken place and undertook a study mission to the PRC to confirm that view. It caused no rupture 
or disruption of the Party’s image of China. 
For the NZCFS, however, the truth-event of Tiananmen transformed it and was to colour the 
Society’s identity for the next decade. Members of the NZCFS stopped believing in what they 
heard from official Chinese sources. The Society issued media releases condemning the Chinese 
government’s actions. NZCFS members stopped believing that the Chinese government 
represented the Chinese people. The Society’s leadership started talking about the organisation’s 
solidarity being between ‘the New Zealand people’ and ‘the Chinese people’. They no longer 
spoke of solidarity with the ‘China’ that represented the CPC-led project of socialist 
transformation and rejected a political engagement with the PRC. The NZCFS suspended the 
Society’s tours. The goal to ‘Tell The Truth About China’ was lost. Instead of adhering to its 
constitutional obligation to ‘To oppose and correct misrepresentation and misunderstanding of 
the policies and actions of the Chinese Government and people’, which would have meant 
promoting the Chinese government line on ‘the Tiananmen incident’ the constitution was 
reworded. The NZCFS no longer attempted to speak on behalf of the PRC. 
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Chapter 3: The New Zealand-China Friendship Society and its changing representations 
of the PRC 1949 – 1976. 
The Early Members 
From the beginning, those involved with the people-to-people relationship with China were 
sympathetic to at least some aspect of the communist vision that China represented. This was 
true even if, like James Bertram, they explained this by claiming that they were required by a 
commitment to ‘accuracy’ to acknowledge communism’s ‘achievements in China’. 293  The 
representation of China they propagated was strongly influenced by current fashions in left-wing 
orthodoxy as well as official Chinese revolutionary discourse – especially where those two 
currents happened to be in concert. In the 1950s this resulted particularly in the promotion of 
‘peace’. 
It was common in left-wing circles to equate peace not with pacifism but with the struggle 
against imperialism and for socialism. For those in the ‘peace movement’, by preventing 
imperialist war, they were allowing the socialist project to consolidate itself in China. The bulk of 
the early membership of the Society had been involved, or would concurrently be involved, in 
organisations such as the New Zealand Peace Council. One person reflecting this, who was at the 
first meeting of the NZCFS was Flora Gould, a national committee member of the CPNZ and 
secretary to the Peace Council.294 The first New Zealand delegation to the new People’s Republic 
was to the Peking Peace Conference, 295 led not by someone who had previously expressed any 
interest in China but by Alan Monteith, returned serviceman and chair of the New Zealand Peace 
Council. 296  It was in such organisations that the Society saw the opportunity to build its 
membership and a number of early activities were conducted in conjunction between the two 
groups, further assisted by leaders who were common to both organisations.297 Rewi Alley hosted 
the delegation in China. He had been shifted from his work as headmaster at the Shandan Bailie 
School and with the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives movement to be a ‘peace worker’ based in 
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Beijing. The committee that hosted the Peace Conference had been formed as the Chinese 
People’s Committee to Safeguard World Peace on 2 October 1949. It would eventually become 
the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), with which 
the NZCFS has its primary relationship now.298 
RAK Mason was representative of the New Zealand side of this. He would become the 
Auckland branch president in 1954 and the Society’s first national president and had been 
involved in the Peace Council. Although Mason and  Shirley Barton made ‘it a rule to keep all 
spare time and energy for China business’, they broke that rule ‘to help the H-bomb protests’.299 
For those who travelled to the PRC under the Society’s auspices in the 1950s, peace was a 
common refrain: 
Probably one of the most outstanding impressions I gained was of the sincere desire of 
the Chinese people for peace, so that they can go ahead to build up their standard of 
living by being given the opportunity to increase production through years of peace.300 
The general impression I had of China was that the people know where they are going… 
in order to raise the standard of living… they need peace, and it is fantastic to think 
China is a warlike nation. The very thing that would break down the reconstruction of 
China would be war, and it is logical to say that one thing more than anything else the 
Chinese people want is peace.301 
For many of the early members of the Society, ‘China’ had a meaning beyond the geographical 
location – it meant that alternative development project of a socialist state. As NZCFS President 
Bill Willmott said in 1992, at a celebration to commemorate 40 years of the Society, ‘Forty years 
ago, [NZCFS]… members were mostly people who wanted to publicise the achievements of the 
socialist countries, including China’.302 
The nature of the Society’s aims and the fact that the bulk of the participants were inclined 
towards or involved in left-wing politics meant there was very little need for the Communist 
Party of New Zealand to attempt to dominate the Society. In addition the conservative nature of 
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New Zealand society at the time meant that the NZCFS, and the contribution that it could make 
to combating anti-communism, was best served by having members who were not known as 
communists in the forefront.303  In addition there is some sense that the CPNZ regarded the 
Soviet Union as the centre of world communism and that support for China was meant to 
support this rather than represent an alternative model.304  
The New Zealand China Friendship Society was formed at a meeting in Auckland on 27 
February 1952. Mabel Lee instigated it and the first meetings were at her house. The Society was 
being actively promoted from China. Alley and Barton, then working with Alley as the secretary 
of Gong He, wrote to the New Zealand supporters of CORSO and Alley’s work with 
INDUSCO suggesting that the way to continue this support was to fight for political recognition 
of the new Chinese regime by way of a friendship organisation.305 Alley’s letter to Wolfgang 
Rosenberg sets this out: 
…in the matter of AID, it is now felt that China’s need is not so great as the needs of 
the struggling peace and friendship movements… the best way for friends overseas to 
help the Chinese people is to put all their efforts into maintaining and furthering of these 
friendly relations… may I venture to suggest that your group form the nucleus of a New 
Zealand China Friendship Association, with which I should feel honoured to keep in 
contact and give any help in my power.306 
Lee became secretary but when her eyesight failed she asked Shirley Barton, then back from 
China, to replace her. The latter was elected in March 1954. She commented: ‘It wasn’t an easy 
time to start a movement befriending the new China’.307  
Dorothea Beyda, Mason’s wife, also joined the Society. As she said to John Caselberg: ‘We 
sympathised with its aims and were only too ready to be roped in as members. This gave Ron a 
real interest and he took part with zest… We had meetings, lectures, film shows with films sent 
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from China’.308 In 1954 Mason, then Chairperson of the Society, wrote ‘Why China Matters to 
Us’, a pamphlet published by the Society. This stated: 
China is in the front rank of world importance today. Her population is one half of that 
of all Asia, one quarter of the whole human race… We in New Zealand have an especial 
interest in China, as a near neighbour and another Pacific country. Questions involved in 
relations with this great country are crucial for us all. It is the purpose of the New 
Zealand China Friendship Association to assist actively in their solution.309 
Typical of the early members of the Society, Mason’s other associations were with a trade union 
(the General Labourers Union whose paper he edited) and the Auckland Peace Council.310 
The Society was born in 1952 of ‘the necessity for a sane policy towards the newly established 
People’s Republic of China’.311 Its initial goal was for diplomatic recognition by New Zealand of 
the PRC and one of its aims was ‘To clear the mists of ignorance and provide accurate 
information leading to mutual understanding and mutual respect between our two peoples’.312 
Early members were left-wingers who had supported Alley and CORSO’s work in China, such as 
Wolfgang Rosenberg.313 The organisation of the Society was mostly taken over on their return by 
those who had actually been in China, such as Shirley Barton, just back from six years working 
with Alley for CORSO, Barbara Spencer, who had also been with Alley at Shandan, and Kathleen 
Hall whose story is discussed in chapter 7. 
There were few Chinese formerly involved in the Society because it was difficult, in particular for 
those whose own immigration status was unclear, to be seen to be supportive of Communist 
China.314 The fear of intervention from A few Chinese-New Zealanders who had citizenship 
such as Jim Wong, Nancy Goddard (nee Kwok) and later Jock Hoe rose to prominence but for 
many their involvement was either veiled in secrecy or through a companion front organisation. 
Jim Shew, Albert Wong and Bin Fon, among others, set up the latter, the so-called ‘Chinese 
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This was confirmed by Albert Wong and Bin Fon, interview, Wellington, 7 February 2004. 
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Cultural Society’. It was just for Chinese, which made it harder for the security services to 
infiltrate, and had no links with the CPNZ (which also meant that it was immune from the 
divisions in that organisation that impacted on the NZCFS in the 1970s).315 The Cultural Society 
organised films about the PRC, ‘to which many Chinese came because they wanted to know 
about and were proud of what was happening in their own country’. It also organised a very large 
welcome to the new Ambassador in early 1973. However, few would join the organisation, as 
they were afraid of being labelled as ‘communists’ and outside of the ‘New Zealand 
mainstream’.316 
Other members and early travellers to the PRC tended to come from socialist and trade union 
backgrounds, such as Bill McLeod and Bernie Hornfeck, and Nancy and George Goddard.317 
There were also individual visits by members of the New Zealand Labour Party people to China 
through the 1950s. In 1955 Warren Freer, a New Zealand Labour MP, and his wife went for a 
one-month visit. Former Labour MP Ormond Wilson led the 1956 tour that is discussed later. 
John A. Lee and Walter Nash spoke in favour of recognising the PRC. The earliest trade union 
contacts were through the left-wing trade unions such as the Labourers.318 New Zealand peace 
activists also had regular contact at this time. In April 1959, two vice-chairmen of the New 
Zealand Peace Council, Willis Airey and Warren Feer, were entertained at a banquet, with their 
wives, by Guo Moruo.319 From June to July 1960, H. W. Auland, a farmer and another vice-
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George was in the CPNZ. McLeod said there was a ‘China table’ and a ‘Russia table’ in the dock workers’ canteen and 
he sat with George on the ‘China’ one. He and Bernie Hornfeck, who is still involved in socialist activities in New 
Zealand as the Rotorua contact for of the Socialist Workers’ Organisation of New Zealand went to China and Russia 
on a CPNZ organisation delegation in 1958. From Bill McLeod, interview, Wellington, 25 September 2007 and Bernie 
Hornfeck, personal communication, Rotorua, 15 September 2004. 
318 The General Labourers Union left the FOL over its refusal to back the Watersiders during the Lockout of 1951, 
and was still refusing to rejoin despite CPNZ pressure for ‘unity’ in the trade union movement. The general secretary 
Pat Potter was a member of the CPNZ although would leave in 1956 over the USSR invasion of Hungary. 
319 Guo Moruo was a writer, historian and palaeontologist. Following the founding of the People's Republic of China 
in 1949, he held a number of high-level government posts. He was at times Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee 
of the National People's Congress (NPC) and of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). He 
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1949 until his death in 1978. He was one of the first intellectuals attacked during the Cultural Revolution, but was 
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meet visitors, in particular those who were themselves cultural workers (Tang Tao (editor), ‘Guo Moruo’, History of 
Modern Chinese Literature, Foreign Languages Press, 1998, 140-168). When the NZUSA delegation met him in 1971 he 
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sharing the position – so they were the nominal heads of the Chinese State.  
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chairman of the New Zealand Peace Council, and his wife spent, a month in China at the 
invitation of the Chinese Peace Council. It was Mr. Auland's third visit.320 
 
Producing An Imaginary of China  
The most common accounts of the relationships between China and New Zealand ignore those 
activities that take place ‘below’ state-to-state activities321 or look at them only in terms of how 
they were related directly to the State’s formal position.322 This approach ignores the possibility 
of gradual changes to official positions that occur by way of a process of the perception and 
interpretation of public opinion. Ideas and conceptions about identity and political communities 
are constantly evolving, although this may be reflected in a state’s behaviour only in an obtuse 
and indirect manner. The state-centred approach ignores that non-state actors are interesting in 
and of themselves. Accordingly, examining how their ideas develop and interact is a fruitful 
object of study even if the non-state actors have no significant impact on state behaviour.323 
The forging of this intersubjective context is a contentious process, but often particular 
representations are so successful that they become ‘common sense’ or hegemonic – they develop 
into a dominant discourse. Within the NZCFS this process was highly complex. Not only were 
the members of the Society themselves interpreting and developing a discourse about China, they 
were also involved in attempting to influence how China was understood in the realm of New 
Zealand public opinion. 
This chapter is not a textual analysis of NZCFS texts and their intrinsic links with politics and 
representation, rather, and more specifically, it examines the production and reception of the 
China imaginary in New Zealand. The narratives about China (both as a socio-political entity and 
a cultural symbol) served as a transnational inspiration. In this way it is as Hong Liu writes: ‘an 
exercise in going beyond the nation-state-centric historiography’ that has been the defining 
characteristic of Asian Studies324 and pointing to the need to study Sino-world relations from the 
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Indonesia’, Critical Asian Studies, 38, 3, September 2006, 179-210. See also Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the 
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angle of domestic ‘interest-group’ politics and its intertwining ambiguities with conventional 
diplomacy.325 
The focus of constructivism is generally on discourse, rather than ideas, belief systems, or 
ideology, because discourse can be witnessed and examined in terms of its effectiveness. 326 Yet 
the subjective nature of the constructivist approach suggests that what lies behind the discourse 
is itself crucial. The discourse that the NZCFS attempted to propagate, in an attempt to make the 
way of talking about China that its members engaged in hegemonic, was necessarily a product of 
a range of factors. Among these were matters of ideology, a contextualised reading of events 
taking place in the People’s Republic of China, the nature of the membership of the Society, and 
an interpretation of the receptiveness of New Zealand society to any particular message. These 
factors were themselves subject to shifts and changes. 
 
The Early Years 
In the early part of the decade, in the years immediately after ‘Liberation’ when New Zealand 
troops faced off against Chinese soldiers in Korea, the opprobrium from official circles for those 
who sought connection with the People’s Republic of China was particularly marked. Anne-
Marie Brady writes that the New Zealand government even participated in a campaign to 
discredit Rewi Alley after letters in New Zealand newspapers supporting Alley’s viewpoint on 
China and the Korean War far outweighed those opposing it. She says that editors of New 
Zealand’s major newspapers willingly participated in the campaign against Alley. The main paper 
in Alley’s home city of Christchurch, where support for him was strongest, likened his work for 
the Chinese to that of Goebbels, and called him ‘a Moscow agent on a propaganda mission’.327 
This government-instigated campaign, falling as it did on those already raised on a diet of anti-
communism, was highly successful in demonising both China and those who sought friendship 
with it.328 Margaret Garland, on her way to the Peking Peace Conference in 1952, recounted the 
following exchange: 
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A friend rang me up next day to ask me for lunch during the holidays and I told her I 
didn’t think I could because I was thinking of going to Peking. 
‘Peking! China! You ought to be ashamed of yourself.’ 
‘But it’s a Peace Conference.’ 
‘Peace Conference! Rubbish! I won’t discuss it. Absolute nonsense. Fellow-traveller, 
that’s what you are…I would have nothing to do with them. The Chinese communists 
have done horrible things.’ 
‘What have they done?’ 
‘I can’t remember just at the moment but I know they have.’329 
The situation meant travellers such as Garland were guarded in the enthusiasm they felt that they 
could express and conscious about how what they wrote would be interpreted back home. One 
way of overcoming this was to present things as if the positive elements they experienced were as 
much a surprise to the traveller as to the general population for whom the image was being 
constructed. 
He also repeated what I had heard said before, ‘We have no flies in China now’. I 
challenged this. 
‘It seems impossible,’ I said. ‘How could it be done? There were no flies to be seen, it’s 
true, but I simply can’t believe they have all been exterminated.’ 
‘It’s because everyone has been drawn into a really big campaign,’ he said. ‘It couldn’t be 
done, I’m quite sure, under anything except a People’s Government.’ 
This does seem extraordinary, but I can only say that it was, in my experience, absolutely 
true.330 
Looking back from the position in 1992, NZCFS president Bill Willmott noted the 
circumstances these pioneers faced: 
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Among [the early members] there were a few who had direct experience of China 
through their association with Rewi Alley and his projects, the Shandan Bailie School 
and the Gung Ho Industrial Collectives. The wide support these projects had enjoyed in 
New Zealand during the previous decade when CORSO was established had been 
seriously eroded by the anti-communist rhetoric and government policies of those dark 
days.331 
The first images that New Zealanders brought out of what they saw and described as ‘new’ China 
reflected then both their own support for this new society and an awareness of the incredulity 
that they knew their representations would find back home. For example, in her book Journey to 
New China, Margaret Garland went to an enormous effort to detail the machinations that proved 
that her visit to a practicing Chinese church was neither staged nor in anyway interfered with by 
the Chinese authorities. The book details her participation in the 1952 New Zealand delegation 
to the Beijing Peace Conference. These involved last minute arrangements and essentially 
‘dropping in’ on the service while it was in progress. 
As it was a Baptist church, there was no sign of any Christian symbol and I suddenly 
realised that the picture of Mao on the vestibule was rather an indication that it might be 
being used to teach a different doctrine. I therefore asked if we could see the Bible that 
usually was used for reading the scriptures. The minister sent one of his friends into 
another room and he returned in a moment with three fat bibles in Chinese. They had 
stamped on the edges in English, ‘Baptist Church, Canton’. I said to Miss Hsui, ‘Now we 
are convinced’. She said, ‘Do you want me to translate that? You did believe him before, 
surely?’ The way she said this satisfied me that she herself was quite sure that the 
minister was telling us the truth.332 
The images throughout the reports of these earliest trips are of a developing China now being 
able to feed its people, drawing a contrast with the situation under the Guomindang and pre-
liberation China. When Harold Kay asked Rewi Alley why those witnessing the May Day parade 
seemed so happy and so supportive of the new regime Alley responded: ‘before the liberation 
they were hungry, whereas now they are fed and clothed’.333 The images were also expressly 
designed to replace images propagated by those who had previously witnessed China. In doing so 
these travellers made themselves into the new experts on the PRC. Since changes in China had 
been so dramatic that you had to see the PRC first hand to be able to understand it, and since only 
those with a relationship with the new regime could witness the new China, the new visitors 
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ensured that those earlier images were to be regarded as out of date. They also presented those 
who had known pre-liberation China as no longer knowledgeable about the current situation:  
Not long before reaching Hangchow I noticed the first good metalled road since we started, with 
motor trucks on it. Here girls with white masks over noses and mouths were lined up in orderly 
rows, wearing blue and white uniform clothing and carrying glass-covered boxes containing fruit 
and cooked food. I had been warned by Jim Bertram of dirty conditions at railway stations and 
not to buy food however hungry I might be. He told me it would be offered for sale somewhat 
clamorously. He did not know conditions in New China.334 
Bertram was definitely sympathetic to the new regime, although not supportive of socialism, 
except for China. Despite this, the construction Garland adopts above is designed to disempower 
him – until he too had visited New China, which he did (a trip Garland was also on) in 1956. 
Barbara Spencer had spent two years at the Shandan Bailie School with Rewi Alley and published 
Desert Hospital in China shortly after her return to New Zealand. She also presented the PRC and 
its representatives as being fundamentally different from those before them. As the People’s 
Liberation Army forces ‘liberated’ the school she enthused: 
no one had ever seen soldiers like this in China before…in contrast to the terror and 
corruption under the Kuomintang regime, what [the Shandan residents] saw and learnt 
in the next weeks and months certainly convinced them and us, that these soldiers and 
officials were determined to do everything they could to give the people a chance to live 
and work together … in the struggle to rebuild their war-torn country.335 
In this construction, different from that told by other Shandan foreigners, everything finally 
looked rosy for the school, the teachers and the new society.336 It was however a construction 
entirely consistent with CPC and the PRC party-state’s historiography: before liberation China 
had been chaotic, dangerous and without hope, after liberation every aspect of China had been 
transformed.337 
Like others attempting to construct a positive discourse around the concept of a new China, the 
image Spencer created wasn’t merely one that represented positive content. It was also designed 
to overcome the scepticism of the New Zealander brought up on a constant diet of anti-
communism. She contains her enthusiasm and she presents her perspective as a powerful 
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statement from the authority that came from her personal experience. ‘I saw’ was impossible for 
detractors to dismiss. 
Even as China’s New Zealand friends enthusiastically threw themselves into the task of 
representing this new China, the image that they were presenting was already subject to change. 
The PRC’s short existence had already witnessed a series of sharp changes in both its internal 
situation and its international relations.338 This was particularly so in people-to-people relations, 
which in the Chinese model of proletarian internationalism were understood as the way to 
influence how the world saw China.339 The period 1949 to 1952 had been one of extreme 
tension, marked internally by a massive offensive against ‘rightists’ and socialism’s opponents and 
externally by support for insurrectionary movements in South and South-East Asia. Neutralists 
were forced to take sides for or against the revolution and the new regime. However, from 1952 
on there began a shift in China’s projected image towards a far softer line, encouraging greater 
cooperation with a more extensive group of allies. This was reflected in formal diplomatic 
activities. It was marked by improved relations with the outside world, especially after the 
Bandung and Geneva Conferences.340 Within the communist world, China appeared more and 
more as a supporter of the ‘national’ road to socialism. Internally, there was a brief period of 
ideological relaxation before and during the Hundred Flowers Campaign although it was soon to 
be followed by the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the road towards the Great Leap Forward.341  
It was in this context that a visit was made to China in the autumn of 1955 by two Labourers’ 
Union representatives, Te Uri Karaka (as president) and Harold Kay (South Auckland organiser). 
Karaka became the first Maori spokesman to travel officially in the People’s Republic of China.342 
Kay described their journey in articles published in the June, July and August issues of Challenge.  
In Harold Kay’s account some themes emerge that would dominate eyewitness reportage of the 
PRC for the next three decades. First, his writing makes a claim to authority through its first 
person narrative. It was entitled: ‘I Saw China’, giving it authority over all those who had not. 
Second, like many who would follow him, crossing the bridge from Hong Kong to Shenzhen 
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was characterised as a shift from ‘poverty stricken and chaotic Hong Kong’ to the order and 
progress witnessed in the People’s Republic. For Kay, ‘What we saw [in Hong Kong] made me 
for one pleased to know that we had New Zealand to come back to’. He recoiled at ‘poverty’, 
‘wages that didn’t amount to a living-wage’, and ‘child labour’.343 
I well remember, just prior to my leaving New Zealand, someone saying we should get 
the truth now – meaning of course, my trip to China. 
Another person said, ‘Don’t try to make comparisons by New Zealand standards’. I was 
genuinely worried at the time, as to what standard could be used, but this afternoon a 
yardstick was given me on my own side of the so-called Iron Curtain.344 
This emphasis on living standards and fair wages at this time is an important one and stands in 
contrast to the emphasis on the correct ideology that emerges with the Cultural Revolution 
period in the 1960s. The issue of wages equality was critical to the way that New Zealanders 
sympathetic to the PRC conceived of New China; for them the contrast between an Old China 
based on radical differences between wealth and status and the one they saw where there was a 
levelling of the outward manifestations of wealth and power. In this construction Hong Kong 
represented the Old China, still dominated by British imperialism. 
In addition, the message for those friendly with the new regime was deliberately and directly 
designed to counter the images that people would have had at home: 
Before I reached China I had heard the cry of ‘Police State’, and ‘Oppression of the 
people’, but in today’s demonstration there was not the slightest manifestation of either; 
no people could have demonstrated in such a spontaneous manner without their being 
happy and sincere.345 
Kay presented everything in terms so that the New Zealanders reading his account would be able 
to relate and understand the Chinese position: 
The Chinese people consider the question of Taiwan to be an internal affair and not the 
concern of any other country. 
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They view it on the same basis as if a foreign country occupied, say, Stewart Island. We 
in New Zealand would soon be saying; ‘We will liberate Stewart Island.’346 
And his writing is particularly conscious of the climate in New Zealand in which his words would 
be read: 
In closing this brief report on our visit to China, I would ask all who read it, when they 
read of adverse comments in our newspapers in respect to New China, that they look 
with a sympathetic understanding towards China.347 
Herbert Passin’s Chinese Cultural Diplomacy traces the links between the PRC’s domestic changes 
of the mid-1950s and the character of cultural exchange. In the initial period of 1949-1952, very 
few visitors were attracted or wooed ‘other than hardcore communists and fellow travellers’. 
From 1952, with the shift to a softer line, the political complexion of the visitors began to take 
on a more representative character.348 Reflecting this, in 1956 former Labour Party Member of 
Parliament Ormond Wilson led a group of academics, artists and others on a visit to the People’s 
Republic of China.349 The initial invitation had gone jointly to Wilson via the Labour Party and to 
Mason on behalf of the NZCFS. The group was diverse politically and occupationally. In part 
this was strategic, their findings would seem more compelling if those on the trip could not all be 
written off as ‘fellow travellers’.350 The diversity of the tour group also reflected the reality that 
there was a great range of people with an interest in China. It also was a sign of the PRC and 
CPC’s openness, at this time in terms of united front politics. This was echoed in the 
organisations that were part of the CPC’s united front activities in New Zealand. They were 
reaching out across the political spectrum, looking for all who might be potential allies in the 
campaign to normalise perceptions of, and relations with, the PRC. 
Until these changes in the late 1950s, although China was represented as desirous of peace, there 
was little other political content. China was represented as a society ‘getting on with resolving 
things in a Chinese way’ and that was good ‘for China’. It was certainly not projecting itself as 
having a revolution ripe for export.351 In fact the exporting was represented as going quite the 
other way. The rules of the New Zealand China Friendship Association had as its primary goal 
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‘the promotion of peace and friendship with the people of China’. The pamphlet produced to 
celebrate its formation called for ‘First Requirement: Recognition’ and argued that the ‘Fruits of 
Recognition’ would be both economic and cultural. In a theme to be explored again much later 
in the relationship between New Zealand and the PRC, the Society argued ‘[the] rising standard 
of living in so vast a market, with over 600 million consumers, means export potentialities which 
New Zealand cannot afford to ignore’.352 
Traditionally, China has been the source of great movements which have done much to 
enrich the culture of other countries and inspire their scholars, artists and scientists. 
Today China is experiencing a renaissance which could similarly act as a stimulus to New 
Zealand thought.353 
Two Chinese trade union representatives arrived in New Zealand early in June on a fortnight’s 
tour of New Zealand organised by the Labourers’ Union and the Society. When president Mason 
welcomed the visitors at a reception, he said: 
We are among the most recent of peoples: you are the most ancient… We are a small 
island: your land occupies the area of a continent. We have the population of a medium-
sized city: you alone are a quarter of the human race…]We have made but a small 
contribution to the stock of civilisation: you are the very fount and origin of civilisation. 
Your land has been ravaged by war and occupation. Ours is unscathed by any invader – 
but let us never forget that, if it had not been for the stubborn and terrible sacrifice of 
your people, nothing is more certain than that our land would too have been ravaged by 
attack and invasion.354 
Although the NZCFS was an organisation dominated by socialist sympathisers, its message was 
composed in such a way as to be attractive also to far more conservative listeners. This was 
consistent with Communist Party of China’s goals at this time. The Chinese had identified anti-
communism as a barrier to peaceful reconstruction of their new society.355 Their perspective at 
the time was to present their society as socialist – which was good for China but not for export – 
and therefore benign, nothing to be afraid of. One immediate goal that it was believed would 
hasten the move towards peace, or at least lessen the possibility of war, was to establish normal 
relations between China and other countries. New Zealand, seen as an independent member of 
the western alliance, was a key target. Accordingly, once the early part of the decade had seen 
branches of the society established, the consolidation of this base allowed for a vast upsurge in 
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people-to-people activity around a clear goal of getting the New Zealand government to 
recognise the People’s Republic of China. 
This was a real possibility. The Nash government had been elected with a promise of recognising 
the PRC. A secret submission to Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies in 1957 noted that 
the United States government was very concerned at ‘the possibility of recognition by the ‘New 
Zealand Socialist Government’, so much so that US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had 
asked British Foreign Minister Macmillan to speak personally with Nash about it. The position of 
the western alliance was that recognition would cause ‘the greatest Communist prestige victory in 
Asia since the takeover of the mainland’.356 
Passin details that the Chinese foreign service had identified three groupings of countries. In 
France and Japan, for example, even though formal diplomatic relations did not exist, there was a 
substantial body of public opinion very favourably disposed towards China. Here the Chinese 
pursued their vigorous programme of ‘people's diplomacy’, by going to ‘the people’ over the 
heads of their governments. In Japan, this programme had been spectacularly successful, in 
France less dramatically so, but equally substantial in ‘an important strata of opinion and politics’. 
At the opposite extreme was the United States, where there was neither official recognition nor 
any strong public sentiment favourable to Communist China. Countries such as Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada were believed to lie somewhere between these two extremes.357 
Shirley Barton described the NZCFS’s efforts thus: 
So the intrepid little China Friendship Association of 1952 set out to do battle with every 
means within its power: public meetings and panels of speakers, letters to the Prime 
Minister and MPs, newspapers and delegations urging recognition, film shows, 
exhibitions.358 
In October 1956 the NZCFS hosted the ‘history-making event’ of the visit of a Chinese Classical 
Theatre troupe. ‘These highly-talented and charming people won all hearts and delighted large 
audiences in the three main centres’. The group, including 90 members of the Beijing Opera 
Company, were hosted at mayoral receptions in Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland. At a 
reception given by the Auckland Chinese community, RAK Mason welcomed the visitors, saying: 
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‘Soon, we trust, through our door… will walk the accredited ambassador of New China. That 
will be a great day, but we shall still be needing you unofficial ambassadors’.359 
This combination of the images of a China for workers, which attracted many of the PRC’s 
supporters and a more depoliticised image that represented ‘Chinesesness’ rather than socialism 
allowed for multiple political purposes to be served. China’s informal diplomacy was trying to 
project itself beyond its acolytes, by drawing on the prestige of Chinese culture, and refuting the 
idea – being circulated by the KMT – that the Communists were destroying Chinese culture. In a 
depoliticised way such a ‘cultural turn’ would re-emerge in the reform period. For now though, 
pre-recognition, the export of Chinese culture had a particular political objective. 
T.L. MacDonald, New Zealand Minister of External Affairs, described the opera tour as one ‘for 
which the local communists had tried by every means to get some Governmental recognition’. 
He also noted that the NZCFS was having some success in their campaigns since the leader of 
the New Zealand Opposition was advocating recognition, and the government was under 
considerable pressure to liberalise trade restrictions. 360  William Ratcliff’s review of ‘Chinese 
Communist Cultural Diplomacy’ towards Latin America notes similar activities. An 85-member 
folk ensemble became the first large group of Chinese to travel in Latin America between August 
and October 1956. It toured Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. The group gave 58 live 
performances, to over 146,000 people and another million saw it on television. The group was 
accompanied by similar political activity to that in New Zealand, with the Bolivian parliament 
passing a resolution calling for the ensemble to visit that country. A large troupe of acrobats also 
toured Latin America in 1958 and another opera troupe in 1960.361 
In 1957, Chinese trade unionists came to New Zealand and a film crew went to China 
accompanied by Auckland branch president and poet R.A.K. Mason. Accompanying Mason were 
Irene Young and Mason’s wife Dorothea, ‘both experienced Secretaries’, and Ramai and Rudall 
Hayward, film makers. All belonged to the Society, and had made friends among the Classical 
Theatre Company.362 Like Kay, Mason was presented with a third world point of reference. 
Unwilling to fly he and his wife had travelled by boat. They landed in the Philippines. Mason 
described Cebu as ‘just a chaotic junk-heap of relieved misery’. Manila was: ‘Really beautiful in 
many respects, and some of the new suburbs – foreigners and wealthy Filipinos – have houses 
and grounds of magnificent modern designs… [but] the horrible huts are only round the 
corner…’. When they berthed on 10 September at Hong Kong: ‘we were politely met by Chinese 
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Travel Agency people and taken to our hotel. Luxury and poverty hand in hand everywhere’. 
Like others who would visit the PRC, Mason represents the short trip across the Shenzhen 
border as a crossing of supreme importance. As he wrote to Shirley Barton at the time: ‘We were 
liberated about midday yesterday after two days – two days too long – in … Hong Kong… Was I 
glad to be over that border. The change was noticeable at once’.363 
Mason wrote to Shirley Barton on 21 October: ‘The wonder and the glory of it all have been 
beyond belief. The Association watched over our stumbling footsteps like angels and the 
hospitality was overwhelming’.364 The group met Mao Zedong and other leaders at the official 
event on National Day, when Ramai Hayward presented Mao with a feather cloak. 
Then someone came over and took Ron and me over to where Chairman Mao was 
standing with Premier Chou En Lai and indicated I should present the cloak to Mao… 
Mao greeted me and I put the cloak on his shoulders and tied it. I said it was a gift from 
our Maori king of Aotearoa, a gift of goodwill to the leaders of China. I said ‘We are the 
smallest country in the world, giving this gift to the largest nation in the world’. He 
smiled and said, reassuringly, ‘The smallest is as great as the largest’… he wanted to 
know how the feathers were woven into it… Then Mao turned to Ron, and Ron, of 
course was most eloquent… They had a lovely conversation, two poets together, and 
they had an empathy straight away.365 
As discussed in the introduction, this image of the fusion of worker and intellectual was one with 
a lot of appeal to New Zealand educated males in this period and accordingly the image of Mao 
and Mason together, each as poet and working man, was a powerful one. 
Returning home, Mason drafted a review for talks to be given in Australia and New Zealand. It 
was consistent with what others had seen and would see and like their accounts, it was designed 
for maiximum effect at home. He did not know Chinese but they had met good friends who 
were bilingual, many experts spoke English, and ‘the interpreters were marvellous – guide, 
philosopher, and friend’. Moreover, they had the ‘evidence of their own eyes’. They had seen 
‘thousands of miles [of] farms kept like gardens [and] whole cities being remodelled’. Also there 
was: ‘No constraint put upon us… China open to us… Never locked rooms… I wandered up 
narrow crowded back streets late at night and opened wallet for smokes – contrast Cebu and 
Djakarta’. And: ‘Bewildering complexity, tumultuous appearance of life, incredible wealth of 
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individual expression – children in shoals, all so different’. And the ‘assumption that Western 
capitalism produces diversity, socialism makes for uniformity. Forget it for China’.366 
In a manner that was prescient of how students would take lessons for changing New Zealand 
from their trips to China in the 1970s, Mason discovered in China much more than that found by 
a tourist: 
It was an event not only in our personal lives but in the history of our country… We 
found new thoughts, new ideas about our own country beside what we learned about 
China. We had as it were a new vista – a new horizon of our own country as well. It gave 
us new hope of friendship among the peoples.367 
The Haywards’ films were accepted on a commercial circuit, shown in a Queen Street cinema 
and then in other parts of New Zealand. Copies were bought by the Department of Education 
for use in New Zealand schools. 
 
Opportunities Close-up 
From mid-1957 a reaction set in: the Anti-Rightist Campaign was followed by the Great Leap 
Forward. Within the Communist Bloc, following the Twentieth Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, where Nikita Khrushchev denounced former Soviet leader Joseph 
Stalin, China began to emerge as the great defender of orthodoxy against relaxation and 
‘revisionism’.368 The anti-rightist campaign undertaken in the PRC from the middle of 1957 
represented the end of the ‘opening up’ and expansion of United Front activities. There was a 
gradual deterioration and radicalisation domestically and this was reflected in international 
activities. China specialists, unless they were identifiable as markedly friendly to the regime, 
found it increasingly difficult to travel to China. China withdrew from several scholarly 
conferences and declared that it would not participate in UN conferences on the grounds that 
Taiwan was a member, although Chinese delegates participated in a UNESCO conference as late 
as July 1957.369 
                                                        
366 ‘Asclepius’, Poet Triumphant, 220. 
367 Barrowman argues that China ‘saved Mason’ and made him interested in writing again (Barrowman, Mason, 343). 
368 The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held during February 14 – 26, 1956. It is 
known especially for Khrushchev's ‘Secret Speech’, which denounced the ‘personality cult and dictatorship’ of Joseph 
Stalin. The speech shocked delegates to the Congress, as it dramatically reversed what had been understood about 
Stalin: that he was a wise, peaceful, and fair leader. After a month the speech was reported to the general public in the 
USSR, although translated copies mysteriously appeared in the west almost instantaneously. It was not officially 
published in full until 1989. Not everyone was ready to accept Khrushchev’s new line. Albanian Communist leader 
Enver Hoxha, for instance, condemned Khrushchev as revisionist. For others, like the CPNZ, it reduced the standing 
of the CPSU, opening up the space for labelling them as revisionist some years later (see Ron Smith, Working Class Son: 
my fight against capitalism and war, R.J.Smith, Wellington, 1994, 110-114). 
369 Passin, Chinese Cultural Diplomacy, 18. 
  99
By the second half of the decade, the image of the PRC was already subject to change. In New 
Zealand this meant a closing of ranks around a revolutionary programme. It didn’t just represent 
a more radicalised image of China in its presentations and newsletters, the organisation also 
changed its own operations. In October 1957, discussion at the Auckland executive meeting 
raised the question ‘are we controversial enough?’ and the committee resolved to organise a 
forum on communes.370 
The late 1950s were disappointing to those seeking recognition for China. The Nash government 
had promised to consider the question but partly due to the radicalisation of the PRC’s 
diplomatic activities, and partly because of external pressure, letters, petitions and delegations 
from the Society were to no avail.371 Despite this the NZCFS was to consolidate and continue its 
activities. While the CPNZ propagated the CPC’s position on ideological issues in particular vis a 
vis the Soviet Union, the NZCFS had tended to lend its own efforts on a more cultural front. 
Rewi Alley toured New Zealand in early 1960, speaking to more than sixty groups, in workplaces 
and homes as well as public meetings. There were as many as thirty separate meetings in 
Auckland alone. He spoke only from his own experience and in an interview with the New 
Zealand Listener he avoided questions on issues that he could claim he wasn’t knowledgeable 
about. The NZ Listener described this as his ‘soft pillow in which the harsh questions asked of 
China abroad are quietly and ever so politely smothered’. He also downplayed the significance of 
his role: 
I simply live there… and go about and write and do my best to bring understanding to 
people about China. I believe that what happens to one-third of the people of the world 
is certainly of interest and consequence to the other two-thirds.372 
China was still regarded in a mixed way by the general population. Members of the NZCFS 
wrote to the NZ Listener to complain that his interview on Radio New Zealand’s Point of View was 
a ‘fiasco’, conducted as it was by ‘people with an anti-China and anti-communist bias’. However, 
in the same issue of the NZ Listener another letter-writer supported the interviewers, suggesting 
that 
Indeed the freedom and tolerance enjoyed by Mr Alley both over the radio and in the 
Listener, are in marked contrast with the treatment that would be accorded in China to 
dissident intellectuals who endeavoured to praise American or British institutions.373 
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Stephen (later Sir Tipene) O’Regan writing for Victoria University College’s Salient reinforced this 
point-of-view. Although he wrote enthusiastically of the  ‘stimulating lecture’ Alley had given at 
the university, he noted ‘I would treat [Alley’s] approach with caution, and openly differ with him 
on some points. I am thankful that I can do this. I couldn’t in China’.374 
Later writers would claim that Alley’s visit was partly to shore up New Zealand support for the 
CPC in its ideological dispute with the CPSU but evidence for this position is rather lacking.375 
Rather than to radicalise the CPNZ, in fact Alley’s trip was part of an overture based on 
softening China’s image overseas. Alley’s job was to be a friendly face for China and to moderate 
the radicalised image that the media had been presenting. The CPNZ had direct links with the 
CPC and through Wilcox, in particular, closer links with the leading Chinese theoreticians. 
Although increasingly associated with the CPNZ Alley’s membership of the New Zealand Party 
was not explicit until years later. This was considerably after the CPNZ had its 1960 Conference 
and ‘stealthily adopted a Maoist programme’ and Maoist leadership. Although Alley’s reports of 
China’s development and his observations from his travels around the PRC were published in 
the People’s Voice and New Zealand Communist Review, these were not usually on the ideological 
questions at the centre of the CPC-CPSU ‘polemics’. For ideological questions there were direct 
links between the CPC and the CPNZ, direct exchange of materials and Hongqi (the CPC 
theoretical publication).376 
In the 1960s the Sino-Soviet split and increasing radicalisation of the self-image of the Chinese 
state meant that China, in a different sense from the traditional one, became once again the 
‘middle kingdom’ for a particular brand of communist. The Communist Party of New Zealand 
was the only leading communist party in the advanced capitalist world to view the ideological 
conflict with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in the same way as the CPC and 
the Albanian Labour Party (PLA). The links between the CPNZ and the NZCFS grew even 
stronger during this period, so too – by the end of the decade and amidst the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution – did the stridency of the NZCFS’s representation of China and its 
revolution. 
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As Chinese international policies became more militant, and Sino-Soviet differences more open, 
most aspects of people-to-people diplomacy reflected these changes. Guided tours became less 
frequent and the tone of the PRC’s publications became more belligerent. Although cultural 
diplomacy did not stop, it did decline in effectiveness. Ratcliff’s study of the Latin American 
situation claims that the Chinese were able to continue contacts with ‘moderates’ while 
‘simultaneously throwing increased support behind radical revolutionaries’, in part because the 
moderates ‘failed to perceive the changes in the Chinese position’. However he says that by the 
middle of the 1960s contacts with Latin Americans apart from those in revolutionary groups had 
considerably lessened and that ‘China’s image has been severely damaged among Latin American 
moderates’.377 
Despite this, by the 1960s the NZCFS was well established, with branches around the country. It 
was a genuinely national organisation. Yet, as the Communist Party of New Zealand grew in 
stature due to its position as China’s leading Western ally, the Society found its own contacts 
with the PRC reduced as the CPC-CPNZ relationship took over. 
The PRC was then pushing two lines at once through its people-to-people diplomatic activity. 
On the one hand, because of the Sino-Soviet split, the PRC promoted an accessible and 
moderate, not-to-be-feared image, as it sought friends from outside from the Communist Bloc 
that it was now largely estranged from. On the other hand, in meetings with the CPNZ and other 
radical leftists, it helped to consolidate support for its position and establish China as a red centre 
for world revolution. This was a process of revolutionary promotion internally amongst 
communist cadre, but externally preaching that nothing happening in China was frightening. The 
tour by Rewi Alley in 1960 served to promote the message of moderation. 
This difference between state and party is not well understood but is important for Marxist-
Leninists and states led by communist parties. In international affairs, examples of the PRC 
interacting with the state organs of a country while simultaneously supporting movements 
opposed to that country’s government abounded until the mid-1970s. 378  The case of the 
Philippines is one such illustration. Even as the PRC was normalising political and trade relations 
with the Philippines, the CPC stepped up its support for the Communist Party of the Philippines 
(CPP), which had been re-founded as a Maoist party in 1968. From 1970, CPP members received 
training in China, and in 1971, the Chinese provided 1400 M-14 rifles and 8000 rounds of 
ammunition to the CPP-led New People’s Army. Yet, contemporaneously, in September 1971, 
the first exploratory trade mission from the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines visited the 
People’s Republic of China and on 11 May 1972 Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos signed 
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an Executive Order which effectively opened trade relations with China and other socialist 
countries.379 
In this environment, the new national association adopted as one of its goals ‘To oppose and 
correct misrepresentation and misunderstanding of the policies and actions of the Chinese 
government and people’.380 ‘Not propaganda for China’, wrote Jack Ewen, ‘but all would agree 
that we couldn’t go wrong in publishing truth about China’.381 Jack Ewan was a crucial figure for 
the Society from the mid-1960s until his retirement as National President in 1989. He had been 
in the New Zealand Navy and had become interested in Chinese culture when his service had 
taken him to Singapore in the late 1930s. He joined the Communist Party of New Zealand in 
1941. He said that he ‘knew about the [Society] when it was formed in 1952’ but had been busy 
in his Party work at the time with Progressive Books, the CPNZ-associated bookstore in central 
Auckland. He had joined the Society by the time it became a national organisation in 1958 and 
met Alley when Alley was being sponsored by the Society on his tour in 1961. Ewan, then a 
school teacher, asked about the possibility of teaching in the PRC and Alley undertook to arrange 
it. Ewan taught at the Foreign Languages Institute in Beijing for a year in 1965 and travelled 
extensively throughout China during breaks. On his return to New Zealand he became newsletter 
editor and National Secretary of the Society after Barbara McEwan, who had held that office, 
died in a car accident in 1966.382 
Ewan’s involvement reflected a more overt CPNZ domination of the Society and a preparedness 
to engage on the PRC’s behalf to promote Chinese policies. Reflecting this change in line, the 
Society organised a forum for Professor Willis Airey to speak on the Sino-Indian Border 
Question and put out a booklet ‘explaining’ the Chinese position. It showed the film Joy in Tibet 
(on ‘the peaceful liberation of Tibet from feudalism’) to a meeting that included eighteen 
members of the local Chinese community.383 The films that the Society was getting out of China 
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reflected the increased domestic radicalisation in China. Films such as Inside Red China and Jiang 
Qing’s model revolutionary opera The White-Haired Girl were replacing The Wonders of China on 
the play-list. 
The radicalisation of diplomatic activities meant that virtually the only delegations invited to the 
PRC were from the CPNZ, although the entire leadership of the Party went to China, Vic Wilcox 
nine times between 1960 and 1972.384 Ron Smith went in 1963, on a delegation led by Bill 
McAra, then the editor of the People’s Voice. 
At that time, the sun shone out of our tiny New Zealand Party as far as the Chinese 
Party was concerned, and they couldn’t do enough for our delegation… We met Mao 
Tse Tung and many other top leaders.385 
Like so many others, for Smith the contrast between Hong Kong and the PRC exemplified the 
difference between colonialism and the liberation provided by socialism. For him the PRC 
represented an additional difference – the contrast with the new bourgeoisie that the CPNZ 
believed had taken over the CPSU. 
Hong Kong was the first culture shock, teeming with poverty-stricken humanity, 
sleeping and cooking and begging on the streets… [Comparing this with] watching the 
Party officials weeding their vegetable patches in the grounds of the Party Provincial 
HQ, added up to more culture shock.386 
The increased radicalisation of the period meant that trade too was politicised. It was no longer 
available as a carrot to help bring capitalists in New Zealand into a campaign seeking increased 
engagement with the PRC. Instead the question of trade was made subordinate to the political 
question of recognition, if it wanted more trade, the New Zealand government would have to 
recognise the PRC. Traders such as Victor Percival, Warren Freer and, in particular, Ron Howell 
were important elements in presenting as broad a pro-China front as possible in New Zealand.387 
The CPNZ and NZCFS sought to build on this. Smith met Chinese trade officials and put 
forward a case for a trade agreement that the CPNZ and other supportive organisations in New 
Zealand hoped to campaign for: ‘but I was soon put straight’. He was told: 
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In China, trade is by the State and officers running it are cadres of the state. So naturally 
we consider trade on the basis of the relations between the two countries. New Zealand 
has taken unfriendly actions against China in the United Nations. The Chiang Kai Shek 
‘Government’ was granted Embassy status in Wellington… Chinese officials had met 
Australian and Canadian officials but in New Zealand only trading companies… at 
present there are obstacles and the key lies with the New Zealand Government.388 
Smith’s confusion represented the dynamic between State and Party, between radicals and 
business-people, and since he was in China as a representative of the CPNZ – who had suggested 
he promote the trade idea – it also reflects that changes in China’s position was not necessarily 
quickly communicated to its New Zealand allies. When the PRC sought a broader set of friends 
people such as business-people would be attracted into the relationship, when it consolidated the 
distinction between ‘friend and enemy’ on ideological grounds then they would be frozen out. It 
is likely that is was exactly this process that led to Ron Howell’s replacement as President of the 
NZCFS for the Cultural Revolution period with the more radical Roy Evans. 
This setback in no way affected Smith’s impressions of the PRC improving the lives of its 
citizens and the success of socialism. His group went to a People’s Commune near Wuhan. They 
were told that before liberation about 70 percent of the crop went to the landlords and ‘if there 
was no rain for a month the peasants suffered drought; if it rained they suffered flood’. Under 
such a situation they were told that thousands starved to death or went begging. 
Then came Liberation, land reform, mutual aid teams, primary collectives, advanced 
collective, and finally communes…. Despite the 200 days of drought already that year, 
he said they had got a record crop and were able to help other communes whose crops 
had failed…389 
For Smith, the successes in no way meant that the PRC needed to do anything other than speed 
up the developments already taking place. He witnessed ‘an air of crisis, of a desperate struggle 
against natural and Soviet-made difficulties, a Yan’an spirit of determination to win through to 
full industrialisation and independence’.390 There was particular excitement in New Zealand at the 
rejection both of Soviet revisionism, which is explored in chapter 4, and the sense of China 
standing up against the Soviet behemoth. Reflecting that China neither stable or consolidated, 
from the middle of the 1960s the New Zealand side of the people-to-people diplomatic 
relationship was again to reflect the growing radicalism in the PRC. The forward to the photo 
exhibition that the NZCFS toured throughout New Zealand in 1966 is illustrative: 
                                                        
388 Smith, Working Class Son, 127-129. 
389 Smith, Working Class Son, 132. 
390 Smith, Working Class Son, 131. 
  105
Like other forms of new art, photography in China has developed step by step under the 
brilliant guidance of Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s revolutionary line… Guided by 
Chairman Mao’s Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art…Chinese photographers 
have engaged in this branch of art by …putting themselves in the midst of the three 
great revolutionary movements, namely, class struggle, the struggle for production and 
scientific experiment. The exhibits are an ode to the great victory of Chairman Mao’s 
revolutionary line, a reflection of some aspects of China’s socialist revolution and 
construction, and an expression of ardent love the Chinese people cherish for their great 
leader Chairman Mao.391 
The NZCFS propagated the Cultural Revolution Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC to 
members and many members read of enormous developments in democracy and volunteerism 
through their subscriptions to China Reconstructs and China Pictorial of the period. It imported 15 
mailbags of Mao’s Collected Works, to be sold through Progressive Books.392 It also produced two 
leaflets: China and World Peace and Our View of China. Both went through re-writing to appease 
more moderate members of the Society but would still have been considered radical documents 
had they been prepared a few years earlier – or even if they were produced today. In China and 
World Peace the Society described China as being desirous of world peace, but also representing a 
radical Marxist, even Maoist view of the causes of world war. 
China’s attitude to war is clear and uncomplicated. She believes that as long as 
superpower domination and rivalry exist, war is inevitable… The struggle for world 
domination is now concentrated on the opposing ambitions of the US and the Soviet 
Union… the United States, though still powerful and dangerous, has been weakened, 
while the Soviet Union… is following an aggressive policy, all the more dangerous and 
deceptive for being carried out in the name of socialism.393 
Our View of China was a dramatically different document from the 1957 Why China Matters to Us. 
Our View of China largely discounts the trade and high cultural elements of the relationship with 
China in favour of the political vision that revolutionary China represented. Emily Larsen was a 
member of the CPNZ and the NZCFS who went to China in 1967. Her reporting typified the 
representation of the politicised image of the PRC at the time. On her return she spoke to some 
secondary school students about what she had witnessed: 
                                                        
391 Archaeological Discoveries from the Cultural Revolution in China, Foreign Languages Press, 1966. 
392 Minutes of the National Council of the China Society, 13 November 1967, NZCFS Archive. 
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…after the schools were closed394 the Young Red Guard movement started…These 
young people had grown up in a new society which provided them with a much better 
standard of living and access to education, hence they did not have personal experience 
of the shocking conditions that existed before Liberation. So they decided to go on Long 
Marches throughout the countryside to learn first hand from the older people and the 
conditions of the past…They also learned that many rich people and big Landlords were 
making preparations to restore the old order, however these were only a minority of 
people as compared with the overwhelming majority who wanted to continue to build 
their Socialist Society… The Revolutionary Line led by Chairman Mao Tse Tung has the 
full and devoted support of the huge majority of the Chinese people.395 
 
1970-76: The Explosion of People-to-People Activity 
The early 1970s saw a thaw in the US-China relationship and achievement of the long-sought 
goal of the recognition of China by the New Zealand Government.396 It also saw the NZCFS 
transformed into a travel agency offering, for the most part, the only access for travellers wanting 
to visit a China emerging from the Cultural Revolution and ‘opening up’. As the Society still saw 
its prime role as carrying out its constitutional objective: ‘To oppose and correct 
misrepresentation and misunderstanding of the policies and actions of the Chinese government 
and people’, the tours were seen as one of a range of opportunities to reveal the truth of China. 
After New Zealand changed its official recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s 
Republic on 22 December 1972 and the world community began to engage with China in the 
                                                        
394 She had earlier spoken approvingly about how much ‘real education’ was able to take place once the schools were 
closed. 
395 Emily Larsen, ‘Diary of China Trip’, unpublished. Copy provided by daughter. NZCFS papers, NZCFS Archive. 
Emily Larsen went on to found the Hamilton Branch of the NZCFS. 
396 After tentative communications between the US and the PRC in 1970 and so-called ‘ping pong diplomacy’, United 
States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Bejing on 9 July 1971. Ping Pong Diplomacy refers to the exchange of 
ping pong players of the United States and People's Republic of China (PRC). The American table tennis team, in 
Japan for the 31st World Table Tennis Championship, received a surprise invitation from their Chinese colleagues for 
an all-expense paid visit to the People's Republic. Time Magazine called it ‘The ping heard round the world’. On April 
10, nine players, four officials, and two spouses stepped across a bridge from Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland. 
They were the first group of Americans allowed into China since the Communist takeover in 1949. The event marked 
a thaw in U.S.–China relations that paved the way to the visit to Beijing by President Richard Nixon in 1972. 
Subsequently the U.S. supported the admission of the PRC to the United Nations where it replaced the Republic of 
China on 25 October 1971. In February 1972, US President Nixon arrived in China where he signed the ‘Shanghai 
Communique’, formally normalising relations between the two countries and agreeing to a ‘one-China’ policy. New 
Zealand recognised the PRC on 22 December 1972. This followed the election of the Kirk Government, which had 
promised to do so in its election manifesto. According to Kirk’s private secretary Margaret Hayward there was 
somewhat of a race to recognise the PRC between New Zealand and Australia and New Zealand thought it was 
winning. She wrote in her ‘diary’ on 22 December that New Zealand was due to recognise the PRC that day. ‘While 
Australia has been publicly negotiating recognition through its Ambassador in Paris, New Zealand has been quietly 
working through its Ambassador to the United Nations, John Scott. New Zealand will beat Australia to the 
announcement of recognition, but only by a few hours’ (Margaret Hayward, Diary of the Kirk Years, Reed, Wellington, 
1981, 107). Australia had actually recognised the PRC the previous day (21 December). Canada, another country on 
which New Zealand closely models its international activities and itself very influenced by US thinking – recognised 
the PRC on 13 October 1970. 
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1970s, the work of the Society changed dramatically. Accordingly, so did its representation of 
China. The 1970s saw a large increase in contact between the Society and China, as tours and 
delegations mushroomed. China was not only a socialist utopia. It was also a utopia that 
increasingly, even for people outside of the Society, allowed lessons and other features of China’s 
revolution to be brought back with them to New Zealand. Yet by the end of the decade China’s 
retreat from both the Cultural Revolution and what was to be presented as the radicalism of the 
Gang of Four meant a new construction of China. 397  This was exaggerated by the CPNZ 
leadership rejecting China for Albania as its ideological centre and CPNZ cadre departing from 
the NZCFS.398 However, as a result of various resignations and expulsions from the CPNZ over 
the previous decade, including Vic Wilcox himself in 1978, some of the same people continued 
to ‘support’ China from a Marxist-Leninist ideological basis, albeit from alternative organisations 
than they had previously. The conflict between the new Marxist-Leninist formations and the 
CPNZ entered the Society’s activities over this period.399 
Formal recognition made the Society’s activities much easier to carry out. While the last years of 
the 1960s had seen China’s people-to-people activity slow, just as its state-to-state engagement 
had, the beginning of the 1970s saw an explosion of activity.400  Han Suyin toured New Zealand 
in 1970, speaking to large gatherings.401 Her trip was widely covered by journalists and she even 
appeared on television. Despite her supposed ‘independent’ status as a journalist and writer her 
presentation was very much China’s official perspective. It was also apparently very 
compelling.402 Rewi Alley toured again in 1971, taking advantage of a renewed interest in China 
as a result of its entry to the United Nations and its rapprochement with the United States. This 
time, instead of the accusations of the past and its accompanied media blackouts, he was publicly 
                                                        
397 As Alley wrote to the Society in his note to the 1977 Conference, ‘China in 1976 had a really tough year, losing so 
significant a proportion of her top leadership. The year ended, however, in a great victory for the people, in the 
unmasking of the counter-revolutionary ‘gang of four’ and their followers, so restoring to the people their 
revolutionary dynamism. They are pleased with the new leadership that has now emerged which now, step by step, 
proceeds to carry the struggle forward (Rewi Alley, ‘Conference Greeting’, New Zealand China News, May 1977, 1, 
NZCFS Archive). 
398 Bill Willmott was born in pre-Liberation China. He came to New Zealand in 1973 from Canada where he had been 
active in the Canadian Friendship Society. An academic whose research looked at overseas Chinese communities in 
South East Asia he quickly got involved in the NZCFS through its local branch. Apart from a brief hiatus (1993-1995) 
he was National President from 1989 until retiring in 2002. He reported that over half of the Christchurch Branch 
committee was unavailable for re-election in 1978 as they had, not necessarily openly, been members of the CPNZ. 
The party was no longer interested in pursuing its united front politics through the Society (Bill Willmott, interview, 
Christchurch, 22 July 2004.). 
399  This is discussed in more detail in chapter 4, which deals with the relationship of different New Zealand Marxist 
Leninist groups and their understanding of ‘China’. For the entry of the CPNZ debates into the NZCFS see chapter 6. 
400 The Cultural Revolution saw many embassies around the world closed from 1968 when criticism of Foreign 
Minister Chen Yi spread to suggestions that the diplomatic staff were out-of-touch with workers and peasants and that 
they should return to China to ‘learn from the masses’. They would start re-opening from 1971. See Barbara Barnouin 
and Yu Changgen, Chinese Foreign Policy During the Cultural Revolution, Keegan Paul International, London, 1997. 
401 Han Suyin was a prolific Belgian-Chinese author (nine novels, ten autobiographical works, seven volumes of 
history). She travelled to the PRC almost every year from 1956, and remained on close terms with the top leadership 
for over fifty years. Time Magazine described her as ‘a militant anti-imperialist [who] became an apologist for Mao’ (see 
 http://www.time.com/time/asia/2006/heroes/at_suyin.html). 
402 Jack Ewan in 2002, for example, still referred to the tours and said he ‘preferred the understanding of the Tibet 
situation that Han Suyin had presented’ to more contemporary representations (Ewan, interview). 
  108
feted and spoke to huge meetings up and down the country. The Hamilton branch of the 
NZCFS had just 50 members, yet 550 attended his public meeting there. Dunedin, with a 
membership of 35, also attracted 550 to hear him. This time the NZ Listener was fulsome in its 
praise: 
Public Meetings in Wellington and Auckland have drawn nearly 2000 to hear him… with 
the knowledge that he speaks for China on the public platform, he holds an audience 
spellbound…403. 
As a symbol of his and the embracing of China, Alley was awarded an Honorary Doctorate 
(D.Litt) from Victoria University of Wellington. 
In 1971 New Zealand had its own example of ‘ping-pong-diplomacy’ when the New Zealand 
table tennis team went to Beijing and the Chinese team visited in return.  Based on the notion of 
‘Friendship First, Competition Second’ the team of Chinese world championship contenders 
played close games with the much more lowly-ranked New Zealanders. The New Zealand 
number one Dianne Foggerty even beat her highly rated Chinese opponent in front of Foggerty’s 
Dunedin hometown crowd.404  As with the United States, the table tennis exchange was an 
indicator of much greater contact to come. In August 1971 a four-week study tour of China was 
organised by the New Zealand University Students’ Association under the auspices of the 
NZCFS. On their return they filled the pages of student magazines and daily newspapers with 
laudatory reports of what they had seen. Although of varying political standpoints, they all spoke 
in favour of recognising the PRC.405 
The Society’s first study tour took place the next year, in 1972. Later that same year there were 
tours by doctors and academics that broadened the involvement to those outside the NZCFS, 
although they were led by senior members of the Society. These early tours were organised for 
groups that were recognised as being influential in New Zealand society and who it was hoped 
would be similarly entranced by what they saw during their visit. These tours followed many that 
other friendship societies had already been undertaking. Australians, for example, had been 
conducting similar tours since 1963.406 
                                                        
403 Bruce Wallace, ‘At Home in Worlds Apart’, New Zealand Listener, 13 December 1971. 
404 Ken Wilkinson, Fifty Years Across the Table: A History of the New Zealand Table Tennis Association, 1934-1984, New 
Zealand Table Tennis Association, Wellington, 1984. Wilkinson notes that Foggerty was easily dispatched by the same 
Chinese opponent in all their other games and puts down her victory in Dunedin to a Chinese effort to make a good 
impression. 
405 New Zealand student engagement with China is explained in more detail in chapter 5. 
406 It has been an oft-repeated claim that New Zealand has some special relationship with the PRC, which some put 
down to the influence of Rewi Alley. See for example Lindsay Watt, New Zealand and China Towards 2000, Institute of 
Policy Studies, Wellngton, 1992, 17. Through the 1960s New Zealand and China were quite far apart. In the 1960s at 
the UN, including when it was on the Security Council in 1966, New Zealand promoted a ‘two-China’s’ position, at the 
behest of the United States (much as Albania was putting up the resolutions on behalf of the PRC promoting the 
ousting of the Republic of China). Even the Communist Party links, until 1961-1963, were not as strong as Australia’s. 
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While the tours were to become an increasingly important aspect of the Society’s activities but its 
primary goal was still being pursued with vigour. In 1971 it produced a six-sided pamphlet: New 
Zealand Should Recognise China: on the grounds of morality, realism and national interest.407 Presciently, it 
contained much the same arguments that new Labour Prime Minister Norman Kirk would use 
eighteen months later when he announced that this had been achieved. 
Recognition, when it came, seems to have been a surprise to the NZCFS. Just two weeks before 
it had issued a media release condemning the outgoing government’s refusal to budge from its 
position and declaring that: 
‘Taiwan’, that non-state, will continue to be ‘recognised’ as the government of all 
Chinese…Government policy, it seems, is to continue to pursue the sprat ‘Taiwan’ trade 
while ignoring the potentially much more promising prospect of trade with the Chinese 
People’s Republic.408 
If it came a surprise it certainly didn’t slow the Society down in ensuring that ‘recognition’ meant 
what the Society and the Chinese expected it to. In the aftermath of Kirk’s announcement, 
NZCFS President Roy Evans reported to the national executive that he and other officers had 
‘contested every indication of a ‘two-China’ policy by way of letters to various MPs, the then 
Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition’.409  The fundamental belief of Society members – 
that there was only one ‘true’ China and that it was the People’s Republic of China –meant that 
at the Annual General Meeting the year after recognition Evans reported ‘our most important 
[publication in 1973] was Taiwan by Rewi Alley’.410 The pamphlet clearly articulated the PRC’s 
position with respect to the last unclaimed province. That year more than 500 had been sold 
through newsagents and bookstores.411 
Recognition did not lead to a change in the role of the Society. Evans cautioned against 
‘[thinking] that our work is done. [It] is not so’. He went on to declare that it was interest in the 
politics of the PRC that set the NZCFS aside from groups such as the Netherlands Club or the 
Yugoslavia Society. ‘The striking difference between them and us is … that these other groups 
                                                                                                                                                              
Whereas most of the central leadership of the CPA had trained in China in the 1950s, New Zealand’s communists did 
not attend the Beijing-based party school. As detailed, New Zealand was very late, even amongst Western countries, to 
recognise the PRC. 
407 New Zealand Should Recognise China: On the Grounds of Morality, Realism and National Interest, pamphlet, NZCFS, 1971, 
NZCFS Archive. 
408  Media Release, ‘Recognise China!’, New Zealand China Society, December 1972, Jack Ewan papers, NZCFS 
Archives. Jack Ewan said that he had heard the announcement on the radio while driving, so clearly had not been 
briefed in advance of the official statement. 
409 Roy Evans, ‘National President’s Report’, 1972 National Council papers, Jack Ewan papers, NZCFS Archive. 
410 Roy Evans, National President’s Report, Biennial National Conference, NZCFS, June 1973, NZCFS Archives. 
411 Jack Ewan, ‘National Secretary (Organisational) Report’, Biennial Conference, June 1973, NZCFS Archive. 
  110
steer completely clear of politics… while we steer clear of party politics, the politics of China are 
of vital importance to our Society’.412 
For Evans, and for many of the members of the Society, understanding the politics of China 
meant understanding the role and significance of the CPC and Mao Zedong. The China that the 
Society supported was the one that had embarked on the socialist project that would ‘in its turn – 
build the new man’ and in this project was a lesson for New Zealand. The source for such 
enthusiasm was what members of the Society saw with their own eyes – and what they knew 
about New Zealand: 
…Those members of our Society who have visited China know – they know that this 
country of over 700 million people are enjoying a rapidly rising standard of living. They 
know that the Chinese have their priorities right. They also know that here in New 
Zealand we do not have our priorities right… under our private enterprise system… our 
priorities are completely haywire. There is something to learn from China. 
Now ‘recognition is a fact’, Evans declared that the Society’s new role was as a spokesperson for 
China: 
The point is that the news media here does not give China’s side of the case. That is 
where the China Society must step in. By making it our duty to help our own people to 
understand China’s policy and reasons for policy, we will be accepting the new role for 
our Society.413 
Hone Tuwhare’s trip to the PRC in 1973 reflected this political focus and the desire to ‘tell 
China’s side of the case’. It also reflected the CPNZ’s position on revolutionary subjectivity. 
Tuwhare went to China as part of a ‘Maori Workers’ delegation’ organised by the CPNZ and 
designed primarily to study ‘the situation of the ethnic groups in that country’. Tuwhare had not 
been a member of the CPNZ since 1956 but for this trip he claimed ‘anyone who was Maori, 
with a trade union sort of background’ was invited. Yet he rejoined the CPNZ in order to be 
included in the delegation. He would be expelled in 1978, accused of being associated with 
former CPNZ General Secretary Vic Wilcox.414 
For Tuwhare and his fellow travellers, China’s socialist project was essential for advancing the 
interests of ‘national minorities’. The CPNZ’s People’s Voice introduced what the delegation would 
be seeing 
                                                        
412 Roy Evans, National President’s Report, 1973. 
413 Roy Evans, National President’s Report, 1973. Emphasis in the original. 
414 Tuwhare’s explusion was ultimately about support for China. He was close to Vic Wilcox, Jack Ewan, and Don 
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chapter 7. 
  111
Under the old regime in China, the many minorities fared badly. Han chauvinism was 
fostered both under the Empire and the Kuomintang as a political weapon to keep the 
non-Han in subjection and to exploit them to the full. Only with Liberation did they 
come into their own and achieve full freedom and the right to settle their own affairs… 
the visiting Maoris should receive a vivid impression of the difference for minority 
peoples who once lived under a corrupt class system and now live in one where the 
socialist system insists on equal right for all.415 
For Tuwhare the trip ‘had a profound and lasting effect’. He wrote four poems capturing his 
images and impressions, subscribed to China Reconstructs and joined the Dunedin Branch of the 
NZCFS. In 1978, when he saw that Guo Moruo had died, he wrote to the Chinese ambassador 
paying tribute to the ‘proletarian fighter, eminent man of letters, Marxist historian, cultural 
worker and scholar’.416  
Accompanying Tuwhare to the PRC in 1973 were Ama Rauhihi, the Polynesian Panthers 
Minister of Culture and full time community worker, Tame Iti, then representing Maori protest 
group Nga Tamatoa, Willie Wilson, a timberworker and trade unionist and Timi Te Maipi, a 
miner and trade unionist from Huntley. The trip had a similar effect on each of them, in 
particular about what they had seen in China’s implications for New Zealand. On his return from 
China, Willie Wilson gave an interview to Salient: 
Before I went to China I never had this hard-line attitude. I thought that this society was 
a bit racist but not totally... After being to China and seeing how the minorities are 
treated, how they are permitted to organise and run their own affairs, I was convinced. . . 
Minorities in China today enjoy a far more fortunate existence than Maoris (sic) in 
NZ.417 
As in previous decades, propagating China’s policies relied a great deal on Chinese sources. Felix 
Greene’s film China, produced in the PRC, was shown to students at more than 100 schools.418 
The Society also distributed a sample of China Reconstructs to all secondary schools in the North 
Island and was delighted that 25% of them responded by taking out 1-3 year subscriptions.  
 
 
                                                        
415 ‘Maori visit China’, People’s Voice, 12 September 1973, 3. 
416 Janet Hunt, Tuwhare, Godwit, Auckland, 2000, 117-118. 
417 Willie Wilson interviewed by Roger Steele, ‘The Liberation of Minorities’, Salient, 8 July 1974, 4. 
418 Felix Greene was a British-American journalist. Born in England, Greene first visited China for the BBC in 1957. 
He later produced documentary films, including One Man's China, China, Tibet, Cuba va!, Vietnam!Vietnam! and Inside 
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The 1974 Seminar on China 
The Society also produced its own material, designed to consolidate its position and to reflect the 
knowledge its members had gleaned from their special relationship with the PRC and the eye-
witness experiences that this had allowed. On 30-31 March 1974 Joan Donley organised a two-
day ‘Seminar on China’. It featured speakers on trade, history, education, industry, literature, 
Rewi Alley, China’s foreign policy, medicine and the situation facing women and children. Every 
speaker had been on a tour to China. The seminar, and the resulting publication of the speeches, 
represented an attempt to consolidate the impact of the tours of the early 1970s.419   
Trade in China, claimed Ron Howell, who had been trading with China since the mid-1950s, was 
‘based on the principle of equality and reciprocity’. Furthermore ‘China is big and her trade is 
big’. He cited 1973 trade figures to back up this claim, pointing out that China’s total trade was 
some US$7 billion. While this seemed an impressive figure, this was around half New Zealand’s 
total trade figures for the same year.420 
Jim Wong, who had taught in China from 1960 to 1965, covered Chinese history. China was, 
Wong declared, ‘a socialist country in the Marxist-Leninist sense’ drawing a contrast to the 
‘revisionist’ Soviet Union. In a reference to the recent campaign in China, he damned Confucius, 
pointing out that ‘[Confucius’] teachings had little relevance to the vast majority of ordinary 
peasants’. In comparison China’s modern sage, Mao Zedong, was as one with ‘the masses of the 
Chinese people’. Wong’s recounting of modern China’s revolutionary history was the same as 
that of the CPC, drawing links from the Taiping rebellion to ‘Liberation’ and resulting in the 
projection of a 100-year continuous revolutionary movement.421 
Gordon Chandler and Dick Winn had seen China on the 1973 Academic Tour. They spoke on 
the issue of education in the PRC. For Chandler, China was ‘an enormous educational complex 
that didn’t separate life from learning’. Winn had ‘never seen such apparent total success in 
education’. On the success that had been achieved since the launch of the Cultural Revolution 
they were equally exuberant. Chandler explaining the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
(GPCR) was designed to ‘bring the people back to a total commitment to socialism and to break 
away from traditional values [that] weren’t relevant to China today’. Winn represented ‘political 
education’ as nothing more than ‘education in morals’ noting that it was much like the early 
teaching of the Christian church and that the outcome was, in marked contrast to some of the 
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stories coming out from China-watchers in Hong Kong, ‘no destruction, no vandalism, no 
mess’.422 
Positive images of the Cultural Revolution dominated many of the reports. Rex Barry underlined 
the importance of the GPCR, and not just for China. For him: 
The important thing [in industry]… was the continuing participation in ideological 
struggles such as the Cultural Revolution… If China should fail it would set back the 
revolution to free man from exploitation and the scourge of war.423 
Dr W I Glass, a doctor, saw the Cultural Revolution was needed ‘because some people had 
forgotten that the whole basis of medicine was to serve the people’.424 Roy Hollis, introduced as 
a leading member of the CPNZ, presented the background to China’s foreign policy. It was 
based, he explained, on ‘proletarian internationalism’ and differed ‘radically from that of the 
Soviet Union’. Reflecting China’s realignment internationally, there was little reference to the 
United States.425 
In the paper presented jointly by Kitty Hayward, who went to China on the NZUSA tour in 1971 
and Jocelyn Logan, a feminist factory worker who’d been on the 1972 NZCFS tour, ‘women in 
China are no longer regarded as inferior to men’. China’s traditional Confucian hierarchy was 
going the same way as feudalism and capitalism. While things were not yet perfect ‘socialism 
gives the base that makes it possible to struggle for equality’.426 
Each of the papers reflected a durable set of images and a coherent picture of China. All analyses 
are political, reflecting the Society’s belief that China ‘is about politics’ – and that those were not 
national politics but focussed on the ideological and political beliefs that were at the heart of the 
transformational project that the PRC represented to its friends in New Zealand: the search for 
the new person – a project based not such in China but of universal application. 
 
Factional Disputes at Home and Abroad 
Internecine squabbles in the CPNZ impacted on the Society through the 1970s. Early in 1975, 
National President Roy Evans had been expelled from the CPNZ along with his comrades from 
the South Auckland Branch (see next chapter for more details). He promptly attacked the Society 
as a ‘CPNZ front’, and was also vocally critical of other leaders of the Society, particularly those 
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of the Auckland Branch, and in the CPNZ.427 The charge was rejected and he was suspended and 
forced to step down from his role in the Society.428 Later, similar fights between the NZCFS and 
the CPNZ over Chinese policies would become very important. When the Society, on 
incorporation in 1977, adopted a goal to ‘Oppose and correct any tendency to misrepresentation 
and misunderstanding of the policies and actions of the Chinese government and people’ it 
cannot have known that the ‘misrepresentations’ would increasingly be made not from the anti-
communists of yesteryear but from the CPNZ itself. The ‘Theory of the Three Worlds’ that 
Deng Xiaoping had spoken of at the United Nations in 1974 would become an issue in 1978. As 
would the CPC’s understanding of the nature of imperialism, the relationship of that 
understanding to the situation in New Zealand and therefore the application of a two-stage 
revolution. This had been a background issue for a number of years. China’s ‘reform and 
opening up’ policies would also emerge as contentious issues, as indeed would Mao’s 
contribution to Marxism, China and humanity. 
In 1975 the important links between the CPNZ and the Society and how that reflected the 
political project of China was clear, although not uncomplicated. Joan Donley led the 1975 
women’s tour. She wrote that while ‘we witnessed the progress for women’s liberation in China’ 
the most important part of the trip was that ‘Many, involved in women’s issues in New Zealand 
did, I think, grasp [the] essential point… that the struggle for socialism is basic. Without that, 
women’s liberation is merely a dream’. As a result of the tour she felt that, given the appropriate 
follow-up, ‘more women would be drawn into the Party and cadre development would be 
stimulated’. For her, the only organisation correctly applying the lessons from China was the 
CPNZ and the only way the women who had been exposed to such ideas could contribute to 
changing New Zealand towards socialism was by following that Party’s line. She notes in the 
report a concern that some of the women’s groups that the women would return to were in the 
hands of revisionists429 and Trotskyists and that ‘only the Christchurch women’s group’ was 
‘open to following the line of the CPNZ’.430 
For many members of the Society ‘China’ was where Mao’s revolutionary project was taking 
place. Understandably, news of the deaths of senior comrades Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Mao 
Zedong himself, all in 1976, provoked much sadness. A Mao exhibition was organised at the 
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Branch, New Zealand China Society, May and June 1975, and Minutes of the National Council, New Zealand China 
Society, May 1975, Jack Ewan Papers, NZCFS Archive.  
428 Subsequently, the Auckland Branch chose to nominate, instead of Evans, former President Ron Howell to be 
National President. Evans, his wife and daughter were involved in setting up a Waitamata Branch of the Society, in 
part so as to be able to re-nominate Evans for National President, but the new branch was rejected on procedural 
grounds (NZCS National Council Minutes, May 1974, and Auckland Branch Minutes, May and June 1974, Jack Ewan 
Papers, NZCFS Archive). 
429 Such as the former CPNZ group based in Wellington ‘under the leadership of Rona Bailey’, now calling itself the 
Marxist-Leninist Organisation (MLO). 
430 Joan Donley, Report on Women’s Tour, November 1975, Joan Donley papers, NZCFS Archive. 
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Progressive Books store on Karangahape Road. Christchurch Branch President Bill Willmott 
wrote an editorial in the NZ Listener mourning Mao’s death. He cited Mao’s many contributions: 
supporting the underdog, fighting those who would restore privilege to China, and a ‘genius as 
leader and philosopher’. He wrote ‘The death of Mao Tse-tung is a loss, not only to the Chinese 
people who revere him, but also to all who believe that humanity will one day become human’.431 
The death of Mao and the fall of the Gang of Four would become a moment of critical re-
thinking in which questions about the truth in China would become critical. The positive image 
of China that had been built up in the early 1970s that the Society had had would quickly become 
associated with what would be called the ‘Gang of Four dictatorship’. The rethinking would 
come later though, and is explored in chapter 6. 
The 1976 Workers’ Tour travelled to China after the death of Mao and during the factional 
struggles that led to the arrest of the Gang of Four. Those on this tour saw events quite 
differently from reports by those not engaged in a friendship relationship with the PRC. They 
declared that claims of ‘unrest’, ‘chaos’ and ‘infighting’ were ‘completely at variance’ with what 
the group ‘witnessed first hand’. The group sided with those in China who had recognised and 
were fighting ‘the bourgeoisie right inside the Communist Party’ but expected victory: 
The Chinese people will not allow a return to the miseries of the old society…lively 
optimism is the result of popular determination to… stride forward along the road 
indicated by Chairman Mao.432 
This report epitomises the China and the NZCFS that existed in the middle of the 1970s. China 
in 1976 was about politics – and the Society saw its role to bring those politics and the political 
significance of the People’s Republic of China and its revolution to New Zealanders. In 1976, the 
Society saw its role as explaining the PRC to New Zealanders and its members studied and went 
on ‘study tours’ in order to understand China better. This experience enabled them to claim that 
they were the experts who could then discuss it in depth. Those who led the Society presented 
themselves as having an expertise about China that stretched far beyond what they had seen 
themselves, drawing extensively on official Chinese-produced materials in doing so. A feature of 
the tours of the time was access to senior Chinese officials, giving further authority to China’s 
friends’ claims to expertise. Supporting China included protesting in New Zealand and fighting 
for positions that would assist the PRC. It was the official China that they had a connection with. 
To be friendly with the PRC meant supporting and agreeing with the choices that the Chinese 
leaders had made, and accepting that those leaders were acting in the interests of the Chinese 
masses. 
                                                        
431 Bill Willmott, ‘Mao Zedong 1893-1976’, Guest Editorial, New Zealand Listener, September, 1976, 3. 
432 Don Franks, What We Saw, NZCFS (pamphlet), September 1976, NZCFS Archive. 
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Later in 1976 the political meaning of China was embodied in the debate over a visit by a softball 
team from the Republic of China (Taiwan). After unsuccessfully campaigning against the election 
of the National Government in the 1975 election, on the basis that National Party Leader Robert 
Muldoon wanted to re-establish links with Taiwan, there were many in the Society who 
attempted to continue to struggle against the new government. Although Muldoon himself 
visited China and seems to have become infatuated with Mao Zedong, there was still plenty of 
scope for political engagement.433 The NZCFS was mobilised ‘in view of the importance of the 
Taiwan question and the equivocal position taken by the New Zealand government’. In 1976 it 
arranged for the printing of 1000 additional copies of Rewi Alley’s 1972 publication Taiwan.434 
When, in August 1976, a softball team from Taiwan came to New Zealand to compete in an 
international competition, the NZCFS objected, including having a number of meetings with 
government ministers. They also threatened public protest at the venue. They called the issue of 
an invitation to the team as ‘interference in China’s internal affairs’.435 In the build-up to the 1975 
election it had accused the National Party of ‘trying to re-establish its old “two China” policy’. It 
also claimed that incoming Prime Minister Muldoon ‘did not understand the seriousness with 
which the Chinese Government views outside interference in its internal affairs’. 436  Even 
Muldoon’s subsequent visit to the PRC was discussed as Muldoon’s joining with the ‘dreadful 
anti-democratic company’ of US President Nixon and the Philippines’ Ferdinard Marcos, albeit 
simultaneously ‘proving the correctness of China’s foreign policy’.437 
This protest was not limited to the topic of China’s reunification or defence of the one-China 
policy. For the NZCFS the issue was one that permitted it to project the perspective on current 
affairs held by the majority of its members into the domestic political sphere. They opposed the 
election of the Muldoon-led government and the tournament presented an opportunity that 
permitted ongoing campaigning. In addition, the communist groups who dominated the NZCFS 
had an interpretation of New Zealand as being a ‘semi-colony’ of the United States. For them the 
decisive feature of the immediate struggle for socialism was to break the link with imperialism. 
They had represented the decision by the Kirk government to recognise the PRC in 1972 as 
‘Nixon changes mind… New Zealand government follows’.438 Now, as the US vacillated over 
                                                        
433 Muldoon was the last overseas leader to meet Mao before the latter’s death in September 1976. He travelled again 
to China in 1982 and when Li Peng visited New Zealand in 1986 Li paid a visit to the former Prime Minister, whose 
political party was in opposition and who was retired from politics. 
434 Minutes of the New Zealand China Society National Council, August 1976, NZCFS Archive. 
435 ‘Media Release’, New Zealand China Society, August 1976. Jack Ewan Papers. (1970s General). NZCFS Archive. 
436 ‘Media release’, New Zealand China Society, May 1975. Jack Ewan Papers. (1970s General). NZCFS Archive. 
437 ‘Muldoon Visit to China’, New Zealand China News, June 1976, 1-2. The ‘correctness’ referred to the separation of 
Party and State politics, that the fact Muldoon was Prime Minister was ‘the responsibility of New Zealanders’, and that 
Nixon ‘being forced’ to go to the PRC proved that the ‘US isolationist policies’ had failed. 
438 ‘Review of 1972’, New Zealand Communist Review, March 1973, 4. Note that recognition was presented as a success of 
the PRC and a retreat by the United States. This suited the representation of New Zealand as subordinate to the US, 
itself consistent with an idea that as a country dominated by imperialism, New Zealand had to go through a ‘two-stage’ 
revolution similar to that of the PRC. See chapter 4 for more discussion of this. 
  117
converting the Nixon visit into formal recognition, the China question again took on 
international significance. 
The NZCFS National Executive called upon members to protest at events involving the 
softballers. However, there was a split between the Society in general, and the Wellington 
Branch, which was located where the tournament would actually take place. To a large extent this 
was a manifestation of divisions between the branch in Wellington which was dominated by the 
Marxist Leninist Organisation (MLO) and the National Executive of the Society – especially the 
Auckland leadership, which was heavily influenced by the Communist Party of New Zealand.439 
In this situation the National Executive of the NZCFS had called for public protest but the 
Wellington Branch said it believed that the softballers themselves should not be the target since 
‘it is the New Zealand government which is the appropriate target for protest action’. In addition 
those in Wellington felt that the National Government had moved a long way from its pre-
election position which had been seen as threatening to the ‘one-China’ position. Further, 
representing the MLO’s strength in the student and anti-racism movements, they weren’t sure 
that they would actually be able to mobilise large numbers for a protest against the Taiwanese 
team. ‘It is recognised,’ they observed, ‘that a large number of members will probably be involved 
in the anti-apartheid groups’ protest against the South African team.’440 
The differences over strategy did not mean they did not support the line. The Wellington Branch 
organised a public meeting on ‘The Question of Taiwan’. At the meeting, the branch deputy 
chairperson Peter Franks gave an historical background to the relationship between Taiwan and 
the PRC and put ‘the Chinese Government’s position’. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
invited to outline the New Zealand government’s position. Franks’ presentation was 
subsequently produced as a leaflet and circulated to Society members nationwide.441 
China, then, was ‘political’ on a whole host of levels. It provided a political focus for activities by 
New Zealand political groups, who saw domestic value in a political engagement with the PRC. 
The political understanding of the PRC was seen as being explanatory of larger issues – in this 
case imperialism – so served wider political aims for people who saw themselves as political 
activists in New Zealand. Since the PRC was understood by its very nature to be a political entity, 
any discussion about the PRC permitted the exploration of political issues. Finally, a relationship 
with the PRC provided a locus for political differences between competing New Zealand-based 
political entities to be expressed, and for their common positions to be explored. 
                                                        
439 The Wellington Branch was led by Peter Franks, a leading cadre in the MLO. Other leading members were from 
the Wellington Branch of the CPNZ who had been expelled in 1972 but who hadn’t necessarily joined the MLO, such 
as Nancy Goddard and Alec Ostler. 
440 Nancy Goddard and Petre Franks, ‘Statement on the visit of the Taiwan Softball Team’, Wellington Branch 
Newsletter, 21 Jan 1976, Wellington Branch Papers, NZCFS Archive. 
441 Minutes of the National Council of the NZCS, 2 February 1976, NZCFS Archive. 
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However, with the death of Mao the image of China was to change, especially as with in the PRC 
there was an emergence of a critique of Mao’s policies and a complete repudiation of the Cultural 
Revolution. This process, and how it unfolded is explored at the beginning of chapter 6, the 
second chapter of this thesis that focuses on the imaginary of China promoted by the NZCFS. 
 
Conclusions 
This Chapter has addressed three periods of people-to-people contact between China and New 
Zealand. The first of these corresponds mostly with a period of the PRC’s ‘opening up’ between 
1952 and 1957. It is dominated by ideas about ‘peace’ and ‘culture’, and sees relations enabled on 
a broad basis between the PRC and its New Zealand supporters. The second period begins 
around the end of the 1950s and runs until the high point of the Cultural Revolution in 1969. 
This period saw most contact between New Zealanders and the PRC, and certainly virtually all 
travel from New Zealand to Mainland China, being conducted through communist party 
interlocutors. The third period is around the recognition of the PRC by the New Zealand 
government. It sees a new broadening of the people able to be involved in the relationship, yet 
simultaneously an increased radicalisation of the image of China and an increased use of this 
image for their own domestic purposes by the PRC’s allies in New Zealand. 
In the early 1950s, the dominant idea of the relationship between China and the outside world, 
including New Zealand was that of the pursuit of ‘peace’. China was represented as desiring 
peace, and the PRC’s supporters were drawn from, or were also active in the peace movement. 
Rewi Alley was a ‘peace worker’. The other members of the Society were trade unionists and 
communists, seeking to promote the alternative development model of socialism as represented 
by the PRC. The Society was formed out of these circumstances. China promoted itself through 
‘culture’ in an effort to obtain diplomatic recognition and is looked at as a third world model. 
‘Liberation’ was a vital marker of change, and Hong Kong was used as a symbol of colonialism, 
poverty and chaos to contrast with the image that visitors would see when they crossed the 
border at Shenzhen. Key events were the Korean War, the Hundred Flowers, Anti-Rightists, and 
Great Leap Forward that represented periods of widening and then tightening the range of 
people with whom the Chinese people-to-people organisations associated.  
From the closing down of the united front policies with the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957) and 
the Great Leap Forward (1957-60) the PRC changed who it attracted, who it worked with and 
the image it presented of itself. The image presented by the PRC became increasingly utopian 
and as a model for the world, most strikingly through the people’s communes and as a ‘red-
centre’ representing orthodox Marxism-Leninism in contrast with a Soviet Union that was 
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regressing into ‘revisionism’. The period saw the PRC isolated from the majority of the 
Communist bloc and looking for a broader range of state-to-state contacts. Rewi Alley’ tours to 
New Zealand served the role of attempting to present an unthreatening image to the New 
Zealand public. However that public was increasingly outside of those who were able to travel to 
the PRC. That privilege was reserved for members of the CPNZ, a Party that developed very 
close links with the CPC, culminating with its General Secretary Vic Wilcox being one of the 
most famous foreigners in China. This became even more so during the early period of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution. 
The 1970s was dominated by the event of diplomatic recognition, which dramatically changed 
the way that the public saw the PRC but even more importantly corresponded with a massive 
opening up of opportunities to witness the PRC first hand. Alley was seen differently in New 
Zealand but continued to play an important role of moderating what China meant to New 
Zealanders, not least because all the Society tour parties that went to the PRC through the 1970s 
would have an audience with him. The tours to the PRC created a multiplicity of experts about 
China and increased difficulty in establishing hegemony over the images that they presented. An 
increasing number of people got to travel to the PRC and became involved with the NZCFS, 
being drawn from groups influential in New Zealand society but not necessarily reflecting the 
class basis of the past. For those dominating the Society, their political engagement with the PRC 
became an opportunity for serving political movements and goals in New Zealand. The death of 
Mao saw the Society seeking to explain that what it was that Mao had represented was continuing 
in the PRC. 1976 ended up being complicated as a succession of contradictory lines were each 
presented as advancing the revolutionary tradition of the past. The production of culture was 
itself used to promote the politics of PRC society, rather than as a tool to achieve some other 
goal.
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Chapter 4: ‘China’ for New Zealand Communists. 
Many people around the world have believed in an alternative vision for humanity based in 
Marxism. Some New Zealanders did so through their grouping within the Communist party of 
New Zealand (CPNZ) which, in 1963, became the only ‘white’ party in an advanced capitalist 
country to take and maintain an ‘anti-Soviet’ and ‘pro-Chinese’ position. Although, there were 
only ever small numbers of people involved in the CPNZ this does not make the debates that it 
participated in on China irrelevant. One could regard its decision to follow Mao as remarkable 
and, given the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, strangely prescient. Further, given 
the smallness of the New Zealand political and cultural world, such people had more influence 
than their absolute numbers might suggest. 
The distinctiveness of the CPNZ’s position had a number of causal factors. New Zealanders 
lived in relative civil peace in the 1950s and 1960s and had little chance of seizing power 
themselves in a revolutionary struggle, but they believed in a more humane world than the one 
they inhabited, were troubled by global inequalities and saw in Chinese socialism a unique 
solution to these problems. Leftist Pakeha New Zealanders of this era enjoyed the global benefits 
of whiteness, but were strongly sympathetic to movement for racial equality. The idea that China 
might be a proponent of a fairer international order in which small poor countries would have a 
voice was therefore an animating concern for New Zealanders on the left. This might also help 
to account for the apparent strangeness of the CPC and the CPNZ being seen as peer parties in 
the 1960s and CPNZ leader Vic Wilcox sharing a platform with Mao Zedong. Sincere New 
Zealand communists saw no incongruity because they took Maoist international rhetoric at face 
value.  
In the main, Pakeha leftists did not see China as a cultural and racial other because they took 
seriously the idea of socialist solidarities being more important than other kinds of divides, such 
as nationalism. But equally, the importance of race politics in New Zealand meant that it was 
meaningful for them that the leading power in the global revolution was not located in the white-
dominated developed world. In a New Zealand where there was involvement of Maori in all 
spheres of political life and with the great arrival of Maori and Pacific workers into Auckland and 
other cities in the 1960s, New Zealand communists were aware of the race and class political 
nexus in a way they might not have been in Sydney or Melbourne. In New Zealand in the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s, Maoism seemed to have real power in the analysis of the local situation that 
they were in. 
New Zealanders sympathetic to Marxism-Leninism and to the espoused project of China’s 
leaders since 1949 have understood ‘China’ as, variously: a location of revolution; the site of a 
project in building socialism that could (or could not) be generalised from; a benefactor to the 
movement in New Zealand; an ideological centre; the source of correct interpretations of 
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Marxism-Leninism; and a resource or textbook for lessons on building the revolution and/or 
socialism in New Zealand. At the same time, ‘China’, for others, has meant the geographical 
entity: the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with all the encoding included in those words; a 
location of a particularly Chinese socialist project; the base of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC); the home of Mao Zedong; the home of Mao Zedong Thought; and the home of Maoism. 
The investigation of these images of China is necessarily linked both to the history of 
communism in New Zealand and to international developments, particularly those of which 
China has been at the centre. To a large extent the inner-party disputes in the communist 
movement in New Zealand, which have led to the formulation of new organisations and 
groupings, has reflected and been concurrent with, the international inter-party debate so the 
decision as to which groups to look at has been largely self-selecting. 
 
The Origins and Development of the CPNZ 
The history of what ‘China’ has represented for the small but, at times influential, communist 
movement in New Zealand is one naturally fraught by particularity and perspective. No one who 
has had any contact with Marxist debate would be surprised to hear that there has been division 
over what constitutes the correct line for New Zealand’s own trajectory towards socialism and 
over how other countries’ revolutions or projects to build socialism should be interpreted. To 
some extent the debates, if not the conclusions, have been mirrored throughout the world, 
specifically amongst those movements who profess a ‘national’ road to socialism. Yet New 
Zealand’s communist movement has also had particularities that are all its own. 
Differences and divisions among Marxist-Leninists in New Zealand have, for the most part, 
emerged because of differences in how they saw New Zealand and accordingly their 
understanding of the correct path towards revolution. In this respect, observers who characterise 
disputes such as the Sino-Soviet split manifesting itself around the world through the creation of 
‘pro-China’ and ‘pro-Soviet’ groups do a disservice to those engaged in the debates, who saw 
themselves as debating the issues which led to the CPC and the CPSU disagreeing, rather than 
following any other group’s decisions (see below). However, since they often themselves 
represented the parties or formations with different opinions as slavish followers of the rival 
camp it must have proved confusing for observers not au fait with the Marxist-Leninist tradition 
(as most commentators tended to be). 442  Yet, such is the nature of the universality and 
                                                        
442 The leading texts on this issue for forty years both characterised the internationalisation of the dispute in this way. 
See William Griffiths, The Sino-Soviet Rift, Analysed and Documented by William E. Griffith, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge, 1964 and Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1962. To a lesser extent, although he does look at the relationship to the Labour Party, so too did Bert Roth 
writing on the impact of the split on the New Zealand party, Herbert Roth, ‘Moscow, Peking and N.Z. Communists, 
Politics, IV, 2, Nov. 1969, 168-185). 
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particularities of the Marxist-Leninist project, that which is contained within each particular 
understanding about New Zealand, contingent and specific as it may be, is necessarily a 
representation about the People’s Republic of China. 
In keeping with the rest of this thesis, the focus here is on pro-China images – how and why they 
have been formed and how they have changed over time – amongst communist parties and 
communist organisations in New Zealand. ‘China’ has different meanings, even when those 
meanings are all intended as positive ones, and the formulation of a hegemonic understanding of 
‘China’ and the discourse around what it should constitute has been a contested one. 
Although there were groups and individuals outside the Communist Party of New Zealand 
(CPNZ), from its formation in 1921 until 1966, when the Socialist Unity Party (SUP) was 
formed, they were small and insignificant. Therefore, from the formation of the PRC until the 
launch of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), the CPNZ is the sole focus of this 
study. Of particular interest was the development of its line on the Sino-Soviet split, whereby the 
CPNZ became the only party in the western world to follow China and the Chinese leader Mao 
Zedong in criticising Khrushchev and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as ‘revisionist’. 
The SUP in the 1960s and 70s had little to say about China until the rapprochement between the 
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China in the late 1980s.443 Of more relevance was a 
split from the CPNZ shortly after the formation of the SUP. It was over the GPCR, with a group 
calling itself the ‘Revolutionary Committee of the CPNZ’ claiming that it was more in accord 
with China’s programme than the CPNZ itself. Through the 1970s a number of rival groups to 
the CPNZ were formed. To a large extent these grew from those who had been expelled from 
the CPNZ around this time but who did not see themselves as no longer being Marxist-Leninists 
simply because they were outside of the Party. These groups often had, or gradually developed, 
alternative representations of the PRC and the CPC in accordance with their local and 
organisational differences. 
Beginning in 1978, and through 1979, although it was not a smooth process, the CPNZ came to 
reject the current trajectory of the socialist project in the PRC, the leadership of the CPC and the 
Theory of the Three Worlds. It was engaged in sharp dialogue with rival groups who took up the 
mantle of pro-PRC activities in New Zealand. The positions that groups took reflected a number 
of different trajectories with respect to representations of the PRC, with some using Mao (or 
Mao Zedong Thought) to attack the current leadership, others seeking to defend the Chinese 
                                                        
443 This is more interesting because the CPSU was highly critical of the CPC through this period. Although the CPNZ 
regarded the SUP as ‘the Soviet Union Party’ (see Ron Smith, Working Class Son, R.J.Smith, Wellington, 2002, 137), the 
Soviet criticisms of the PRC did not make their way into the SUP’s literature, in part because the SUP’s claim to 
legitimacy in New Zealand was that it was in tune with New Zealand’s workers’ needs and not being driven by ultra-
leftism coming out of China. Monique Oomen wrote the main focus of the SUP was ‘the Party was seen as a means of 
achieving trade union objectives’. See Monique Ooman, ‘The Socialist Unity Party of New Zealand: a study of the 
incentives, ideology and organisation of a small communist party, MA thesis, University of Canterbury, 1981, 58. 
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revolution against the ‘capitalist roaders’ now leading the CPC, and others supporting the 
programme of socialist modernisation and the CPC leadership unconditionally. After rejecting 
China, the CPNZ was aligned to the Albanian Party of Labour (PLA), in 1994, it gave up even its 
name and become what its critics were increasingly accusing it, by adopting a Trotskyite 
programme.444 
Apart from these groups there were a number of others sympathetic to one of the possible 
Chinas identified above. Specifically there were the representations of China made by the 
Struggle group, the Preparatory Committee for the Formation of a Communist Party of New 
Zealand, the groups that merged to became the Workers’ Communist League (WCL), and the 
Red Flag Group. Struggle and the Preparatory Committee merged, and become the Organisation 
for Marxist Unity. Its publication (Struggle) continues. In the late 1980s the WCL disbanded, in 
1991 the Red Flag Group stopped functioning. In 1993, coincident to the CPNZ liquidating 
itself, a new formation – to some extent carrying on the tradition of a number of these groups – 
the Communist Party of Aotearoa (CPA), would be formed. The CPA began with a statement 
placing its own history in relation to these other formationsand in doing so claiming a 
relationship to these previous ideas about the PRC and about Mao Zedong. The CPA embraced 
‘Marxism-Leninism-Maoism’.445 
The CPNZ’s history began when eighteen delegates from Marxist study circles around the 
country met in Wellington over Easter 1921 and voted to form the Party and to affiliate to the 
Communist International. Small though the party was in size and influence, it faced constant 
opposition. A number of communists were arrested and jailed in the 1920s under the War 
Regulations Continuance Act, which prohibited printing or import of ‘seditious’ documents. In 
1924 the Labour Party expelled six Communist Party members and in 1925 resolved that the 
CPNZ would not be allowed to affiliate. Unlike the Communist Party of Australia the CPNZ 
was always engaged in an antagonistic relationship with the social democrats in the Labour 
Party.446 
In addition to its relationship to the Labour Party, another factor significant in the future 
decisions the CPNZ would make was a long tradition of ultra-leftism.447 In 1929 most of the 
party members working in the mining industry left, after the Central Committee ordered them to 
try to push for an export ban on coal in solidarity with striking miners in Australia. This was far 
                                                        
444 The CPNZ became the New Zealand branch of the Socialist Worker Organisation. See Communist Party of 
Aotearoa, ‘History of the Communist Party’, Red Flag, 1, 1, 1993, 4 for the criticism. 
445 Communist Party of Aotearoa, ‘History’, 6. 
446 Kerry Taylor, ‘Workers’ Vanguard or People’s Voice?: the communist party of New Zealand from origins to 1946’, 
PhD thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1994, 85-86. 
447 Lisa Sackson describes this as a ‘peculiarity on behalf of the CPNZ’ of ‘the pure, and puritanical, appeal of siding 
with the more left’ of any two positions on offer. See Lisa Sacksen, ‘Expressions of Resistance: Communist 
Organisations in Aotearoa/New Zealand from the 1960s to the 1990s’, New Historians Conference, 1-2 September 
2006, online at http://www.victoria.ac.nz/history/degrees/phd/New%20Historians%20Conference.pdf. 
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beyond the level of understanding of the rank and file union members. In 1931 the Central 
Committee opposed the Seamen’s Union’s placing of a ban on a low-wage Japanese ship. Instead, 
they unrealistically called for a general strike on the waterfront to achieve equal rates. This turned 
the Seamen’s leader into a bitter enemy of the party.448 
An assessment from the Communist International in 1933 summed up the party’s shortcomings: 
Up to the present, the practice of the Party shows that the Party chiefly limits its activity 
to a small circle of Communists and, standing apart from the struggle of the workers, 
criticises the reformists from afar.449 
While the party failed to maintain a foothold in the basic industries, the rapid growth of 
unemployment in the early 1930s gave the party a renewed chance to exercise effective mass 
leadership. The CPNZ, through the Unemployed Workers’ Movement, organised relief workers’ 
strikes, marches, demonstrations and deputations. Weak though the Party was, the Liberal 
government saw them as a major threat to their programme of wage cuts and labour camps for 
the unemployed. So fierce were the attacks on the Party that there were few months when one of 
its leaders was not in jail. In 1933 the whole Central Committee was jailed for six months. Yet the 
party grew strongly. In 1933 the monthly Red Worker became the Workers’ Weekly. By 1935 sales 
had risen to 7000 and party membership to 350.450 
According to the 1993 ‘History’ of Communism written by the Communist party of Aotearoa, 
the Party’s success simply renewed its ‘left-opportunist’ tendencies. The Party contested the 1935 
General Election with the slogan: ‘Neither Reaction nor Labour’, urging workers to cast invalid 
ballots labelled ‘Communist’ where no party candidates were standing. They were swept aside by 
a landslide for what most workers saw as a real socialist party. Electoral support collapsed, paper 
sales halved and a third of the party’s membership quit. The CPNZ reversed its policy in favour 
of a united front against fascism and recognised ‘that under present conditions the Labour 
Government represents a blow against the forces of reaction’.451 
Outside the electoral arena the Party threw itself into mass work against fascism. In 1936 they 
organised material aid for the Spanish Republic against the fascists and sent members, like Alex 
McClure and Tom Spiller, to join the International Brigades. In 1937 the Party organised a 
boycott of Japanese goods following Japan’s invasion of China. 452  Here was the first 
representation of China: as a victim of Japanese aggression. An understanding of the revolution 
led by the Communist Party of China would not come until later, despite the existence of a 
                                                        
448 Graeme Hunt, Black Prince: the biography of Finton Patrick Walsh, Penguin, Auckland, 2004, 101-104. 
449 Taylor,  ‘Workers’ Vanguard’, 100. 
450 Taylor, ‘Workers’ Vanguard’, 120. 
451 Communist Party of Aotearoa, ‘History’, 4. 
452 This was principally through the Movement Against War and Fascism. Note that Kerry Taylor believes that the 
Party was not as successful in this regard as other commentators have claimed. See Taylor, ‘Workers’ Vanguard’, 144-
145. 
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number of New Zealanders in China, such as Rewi Alley and Shirley Barton, who were 
associated with the CPC. 
In September 1939, the CPNZ came out in support of the Communist International’s line that 
the war between the British-French alliance and Germany was an imperialist war to be opposed. 
This was not a popular analysis in the climate of the time, but support continued to grow. On 30 
May 1940 the party’s weekly, now called the People’s Voice, was declared illegal, the editor 
imprisoned, and the party press smashed with sledgehammers and confiscated.453 
In 1941, when the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union, the character of the war changed to an all-out 
struggle between fascism and democracy and the party mobilised behind the war effort. In Print, 
edited by the poet RAK Mason, emerged as the unofficial paper, with circulation climbing to 
14,000, while party membership rocketed to 2,000 by the end of the war.454 In Print finally 
covered the Chinese revolution in May of 1945. Information for this was not sourced from the 
New Zealanders in China but came via the British Communist Party writer Arthur Clegg. His 
article ‘China’s Saviours’ noted the struggle of the CPC’s armies against the Japanese, identified 
them as the ‘main’ contributors to tying up Japanese troops and declared that despite this they 
got no aid from the Nationalist Government, Britain or the United States.455 
For the CPNZ, forming as it did in the period immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution and 
developing into a significant party during the war years, the prestige of the Soviet Union was 
great indeed. The success of the five year plans in transforming Russia into a modern nation, and 
then the exploits of the Red Army during World War II was followed very closely in New 
Zealand. The CPNZ saw the 'imperialists' as seeking to create the political conditions to launch a 
full-scale war against the Soviet Union. It pointed to various factors including McCarthyism in 
America, massive aid to Chiang Kai-shek, interference in Italian and French elections, the murder 
of Patrice Lumumba, among others. It saw the main problem in the world as imperialism and the 
Soviet Union as the bulwark against it. These years also saw the triumph of the revolution in 
China, embracing a fifth of the human race. The PRC was represented as an addition to the 
Soviet Union-led communist bloc, thus tipping the balance of power worldwide.456 
Ironically, given what would happen later, the CPNZ publications in the early 1950s carry very 
little content about China. That would change though with death of Stalin in 1953 and the 
subsequent denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev in 1956. This denunciation laid the foundation 
for the Sino-Soviet split, in which the small CPNZ would be an enthusiastic participant. 
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The Sino-Soviet Split 
In 1956, following Khrushchev’s revelations about Stalin, argument raged in the CPNZ on 
Stalinism and on the concepts of the dictatorship of the proletariat and democratic centralism. 
Sid Scott and others on the right of the Party resigned over these issues.457 The beginning of 
ideological debate originated at this time, although not over the same issues as the Scott faction 
split. Steve Hieatt was on the National Committee and spoke of the ‘division of the world into 
two camps: opportunism and the revolutionary wing’. There was, however, no rush to 
judgement: ‘it took a long time for our Party to analyse the issues, a matter of months if not 
years’.458 Flora Gould, who was on the Political Committee at this time, agreed. She said that by 
1963 the Party's position had been developed ‘over a long time at the National and Political 
Committee level’.459 
The issue was debated in ideological terms at the CPNZ’s National Conference held at Easter 
1960. However, the CPNZ’s national leadership had supported China-type views even earlier 
than this. The New Zealand Labour Review (NZLR) in February-March 1957 was full of anti-
revisionist material, which closely followed the launching of the ‘great polemic’ by the CPC. The 
articles included a reprint from the Peking Review: 'A Chinese Appraisal of Stalin' and 'Strategy and 
the Main Blow’ (against capitalism and the Labour Party) written by CPNZ leader Alex Ostler. 
The CPC was represented in these articles as reflecting an orthodox Marxist position. The next 
month, in its report in the NZLR of April 1957 on the 64-Party Declaration of 1957, the CPNZ 
Political Committee closely paralleled the Chinese party's position.460 
For New Zealand’s communists these views were classical Marxism-Leninism: the change from 
capitalism to socialism is necessarily a revolutionary change; whether or not the transformation is 
peaceful or not in any country depends on the historical conditions there and ultimately on the 
ruling class; peaceful coexistence of socialist and capitalist countries is a state of intense 
international class struggle where the socialist countries and the people of the world are hopefully 
strong enough to prevent the imperialist powers from starting war; the danger of war exists as 
long as imperialism lasts; there is a world crisis of social democracy as Labour parties strive to 
make capitalism work and save it from socialist revolution. 
Accompanying Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin, the CPSU promoted the ‘three peacefuls’, 
which ideologically constituted the Sino-Soviet split. These were: peaceful coexistence with US 
imperialism, peaceful competition between the capitalist and socialist camps, and a peaceful 
transition to socialism. From 1957 to 1963 the CPSU and CPC fought each other ideologically 
through a proxy war of words by criticising Albania and Yugoslavia respectively. In 1963 the 
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Chinese issued A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement. It was 
followed by a series of other documents setting out its differences with the Soviet party.461 
These polemics by the CPC with the CPSU leaders addressed other issues as well, such as the 
abrupt withdrawal of thousands of Soviet experts from China in 1960, and the support to India 
in its war with China in 1962. The Chinese understood these as attempts to make China toe the 
Soviet line. For the CPNZ it was also in these years that the Soviet Union started to consolidate 
relations within the Soviet camp, positioning itself as the economic centre while Eastern Europe 
and other countries would serve as the periphery, with ‘limited sovereignty’. There was a sense 
that the CPSU was no longer committed to the values of revolutionary equality.462 
Because its line reflected the CPNZ’s experiences, the CPC began to replace the CPSU as the 
party whose analysis the CPNZ would closely follow. The CPNZ’s history with respect to its 
relationship to social democracy and the Labour Party, its understanding of imperialism and its 
experiences at the hands of the state – under both Labour and Liberal governments – confirmed 
its understanding of orthodox Marxism-Leninism against what it would label as Soviet 
‘revisionism’. 463  There is no doubt that there were peculiar New Zealand factors too. The 
CPNZ’s independent streak and sense that the CPSU was trying to push it around, compared 
with a belief that the CPC was treating it as a fraternal and equal party were also significant.464 
The enormous losses and destruction of lives and property in the all-too-recent World War II 
had confirmed for party members the nature of imperialism. The delay in opening the second 
front, the British involvement in the civil war in Greece, the US assistance to Chiang Kaishek 
from 1945 to 1949 - for the CPNZ these activities all confirmed the nature of imperialism. The 
wars in Malaysia and Korea further identified for it the real face of imperialist powers.465 For the 
CPNZ, the ‘revisionist line’ of the CPSU was advocating a collaborative approach to imperialism. 
For them, the CPC upheld the orthodox Communist position. 
Most communist parties probably had little contact with the Chinese party and the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union had always been regarded as the centre or vanguard party, or even as a 
party with virtual directive powers over all of the others. For the CPNZ the ideological dispute 
was a challenge to this, and an assertion of the independence and equality of each separate Party. 
Some proof of the independence of the CPNZ was in Jack Manson's activity at the 1962 
Romanian Party Conference, where he refused to go along with the attacks on China and 
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Albania, despite enormous pressure. ‘This was because it went against everything that we'd learnt 
about how parties should relate to each other’.466 
But the developing drift away from adherence to the Soviet line had another influence too. The 
CPNZ got to be very close to the Chinese party not just by the independent adoption of a similar 
Marxist line: 
New Zealand, considering her tiny size, had an exceptional number of close links with 
the Chinese revolution. Foremost among these, of course, was Rewi Alley. Robyn Hyde, 
James Bertram and Christian missionary Kathleen Hall were others. In the postwar 
period, more links developed: CORSO aid, the Bailie school, the sending of New 
Zealand sheep to China, the many individuals and delegations visiting there.467 
Ron Smith's experience was typical of the members of the CPNZ: 
I [had] read a whole series of books on the Chinese Revolution - Agnes Smedley, Anna 
Louise Strong, James Bertram, Edger Snow, Epstein, The Scalpel and the Sword about Dr 
Norman Bethune, the Canadian doctor in China's revolution, accounts of the epic 
victories of the People's Liberation Army in 1948 and 1949, and reports of the mass 
movements on land reform and water conservation. Moreover, though I strongly backed 
the historic achievements of the USSR and its resistance to western imperialism, I was, 
of course, greatly perturbed as Stalin's crimes were revealed.468 
The more interaction that took place, the greater was the respect that the CPNZ leadership 
developed for what they saw as the CPC's efforts to adhere to Marxism, and correspondingly the 
less regard for the CPSU's line of peaceful transition, and what they saw as its under-estimation 
of imperialism. 469  To this general background of New Zealand contacts with the Chinese 
revolution was added the extraordinary relationship of Vic Wilcox with the Chinese leadership. 
At the 81-Party Conference in Moscow in 1960,  he talked with the Chinese delegation despite 
attempts by the Russians to prevent this, and he sided with them in the debate. On his way home 
from the meeting he stopped over in Beijing and attacked the Soviet Party in a speech there. 
Soon after, in 1961, he had the first of nine visits to China, meeting four times with Mao Zedong, 
six times with Zhou Enlai, and four times with Deng Xiaoping.470 
Wilcox’s trip in 1961 was as a member of a CPNZ delegation in part of investigate the CPC 
position on the dispute.471 Even before he went some aspects of the Sino-Soviet conflict were 
well known. However, its scale in terms of the breakdown of the relationship between the two 
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states was not really known publicly until November 1962, when the Soviet Union started 
making public attacks on China and Albania at congresses of European communist parties. 
Significantly, the Wellington district conferences of the Party in 1960, 1961 and 1962 had no 
references to the Sino-Soviet dispute in their reports or their discussions. Ron Smith reported 
that ‘The extent of the differences the issue generated inside the New Zealand party did not 
become clear to me until the national leadership started the pre-conference discussion at the 
beginning of 1963’.472 Yet Vic Wilcox's report to the National Conference in 1960 had included 
the following passage: 
how correct is the Chinese Party when it points out that the world Communist Parties 
should have no silly illusions about easy roads to socialism… Looseness in considering 
some formulations arising from the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet 
Union on this question did not aid our work.473 
Also at that Conference, social democratic leaning CPNZ president George Jackson, who would 
later leave the Party for the Soviet-aligned Socialist Unity Party, was replaced as president by 
Merv Williams. This change grew out of the ideological dispute that was working its way through 
the Party leadership.474  
Alongside the particular features of the New Zealand situation are important ideological 
questions, especially that related to the question of social-democracy. While some International 
Relations observers saw the Sino-Soviet dispute as one of inter-State conflict the parties involved 
were sure that the struggle was ideological. This was also true for the CPNZ who never saw its 
own position as one of supporting either the Soviet Union line or the Chinese line, it was simply 
a process of establishing an independent line on the world communist differences. The CPNZ's 
ability to see the dispute as completely ideological and see itself as 'independent' from the non-
ideological features that others were seeing as being involved may have reflected a particular 
privilege that the Party had. Limited in its power and geographically distant from most he places 
that the debate was playing itself out that CPNZ could treat the debate as - simply an ideological 
one. 
It was not, however, the case that this ideological position simply ‘fell from the sky’. In New 
Zealand, 1946-60 was a period of full employment with wartime shortages being gradually 
overcome. Yet there was a climate of intensifying Cold War and red-baiting. The government 
had smashed the most militant unions (Carpenters in 1948 - under the Labour Government, 
Watersiders in 1951). The Party was faced with telephone bugging and infiltration by police 
agents, and feared the possibility of being made illegal. 
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The consolidation of the Party's position on social democracy had become far earlier. The 
CPNZ, like most Communist Parties, saw the beginning of WWII as a war between British and 
German imperialists and accordingly opposed New Zealand's involvement (they would later 
support New Zealand's involvement in an anti-fascist united front after the invasion of the Soviet 
Union). New Zealand had a Labour government during these 1939-41 years, yet it seemed to 
them to behave just like the right-wing parties around the world (Menzies in Australia, Churchill 
in Britain) and employ the full force of the state against those opposed to the war. 
The most obvious formal sanction was arrest and imprisonment. Kerry Taylor cites Justice 
Department figures for 1940 that recorded 59 charges of subversion, of these 45 brought 
convictions, most frequently against communists. On 30 May 1940 police entered the People's 
Voice printery in Auckland just as the next issue was coming off the press. They proceeded to 
dismantle and then break up the printing machinery, literally smashing it with sledgehammers. In 
addition to this there were a number of cases of violence against CPNZ activists.475 
On a subjective level, it must have been virtually impossible for the leading figures in the CPNZ, 
who had been personally victimised by the Labour Government in power, to stomach the 'united 
front' line being promoted out of Moscow after 1956. More objectively, as they liked to see 
themselves, the actions confirmed the reactionary nature of 'social fascism'. Merv Williams, 
CPNZ President, wrote in 1962 of these pre-united front years that: 'New Zealand social 
democracy showed itself a faithful handmaiden of Capitalism. The state machinery was used 
against those who showed by their activity that they were opposed’.476 
Taylor’s thesis shows that the relationship between the CPNZ and the Labour Party had never 
been close. When he cites the CPNZ as adopting a 'sectarian' anti-Labour Party line in 1928 he 
wrote: 
The relationship between the Labour Party and the CPNZ, which had been problematic 
since the mid-1920s, continued to deteriorate ... it was a reflection of the Labour Party's 
move towards a less militant centrist political platform. The 1927 Labour Party 
Conference abandoned the long held policy of the nationalisation of land [the Labour 
Party of Great Britain still had this clause until the 1990s. This change by Labour 
provided space for an unequivocal party of the left more sharply distinct from the 
Labour Party. The CPNZ saw this as an opening and ... they began to more sharply 
attack the Labour Party.477 
In the immediate run-up to the decision by the CPNZ, from 1957-1960, there had been a Labour 
Government in office in New Zealand. This ‘reality’ of social democratic rule reminded 
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Communist Party members just what that means for the working-class interests the CPNZ was 
seeking to advance. For them, this period saw the Labour Govemment exposed as a lackey of the 
US internationally. The 'storm centres' of the world were erupting in anti-colonial struggle, and 
the period was an exciting time for anti-imperialists. Yet for them it was very clear whose side the 
Labour Party was on with respect to these anti-colonial struggles.  
Harry Schwartz observed that the varying alignments of Communist Parties in Eastern Europe 
towards the Sino-Soviet dispute can each be explained by considering the tactical needs of each 
Party in the light of the local political scene.478 The most plausible theory to account for the 
behaviour of the CPNZ is one that emerges from a consideration of the tactical or strategic 
situation. The CPNZ was small. In such a situation, their overriding consideration was to 
preserve a separate Party identity - to avoid being absorbed by Labour. This was accepted as the 
key to the dispute by both 'lines' within the CPNZ. As SUP founder Bill Anderson said, 'For me 
the final straw was when the Chinese delegate [to the 1963 General Conference] said to [Vic] 
Wilcox, “I see you are standing candidates against the Labour Party. That is good”'.479 Yet Alex 
Galbraith had put the position for the majority within the Party in the New Zealand Labour Review 
as far back as 1959.  
When comrades express themselves against the Party standing candidates at the General 
Elections, it means that they are striving to adapt Communism to the Labour Party. 
They may not be conscious of this, but that is fundamentally what it means. It would 
have this result if followed to its entirety - the ideological collapse of the Communist 
Party and an accession of strength to the purely reformist Labour Party. This means a 
strengthening and consolidation of capitalism, for the Labour Party is a bulwark of 
capitalism against the working class.480 
The key then to rejection of the 'revisionist' line can be seen in the climax to the CPNZ’s 1963 
discussion document that confirmed its commitment to Maoism: its discussion of social 
democracy, and in the expaneded and published report that followed the conference. The 
CPSU's overemphasis on peaceful transition 'is lulling revolutionary enthusiasm and is leading to 
acceptance old social democratic ideas in our own ranks';481 Krushchev's concept of peaceful 
coexistence 'opens many loopholes for social democratic revisionism to enter'; 482  'Yugoslav 
revisionist theory fundamentally goes right back.. .to social democracy'.483 
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The New Zealand Party had developed a very clear line with regard to social democracy. This 
drew from the CPNZ's long conflict with the Labour Party, its small size and therefore real 
threat of being swallowed if it had pursued a 'united front' approach, and longstanding Marxist-
Leninist analysis on the role of 'revisionism'. In the end, regardless of how anything else had 
played itself out, the CPNZ was always going to be committed to standing in opposition to the 
Labour Party. In the circumstances, that had it standing with China. 
 
The Sino-Soviet Dispute Comes to New Zealand 
In his report to the 1963 CPNZ National Conference, Wilcox wrote that he saw the Soviet party 
as dictating to all other parties. The CPSU was pushing a line that the great example of the Soviet 
Union, rather than the activities of the masses, would win the people to socialism, and that 
peaceful transition to socialism was not only desirable but possible and inevitable. It was 
fostering the idea of peaceful imperialism, and of making ‘grave mistakes’ affecting the struggle 
for peace, like putting nuclear weapons into Cuba, and signing the Partial Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty which legitimised the nuclear weapons of the Big Powers. The CPSU also implied that the 
Bomb changed the basic Marxist views on the social causes of war - that modern war grows out 
of imperialism. It was spreading ‘a lie’ that the CPC wanted socialism through a nuclear war. It 
was downplaying colonial liberation revolutions saying these are useless against the imperialists 
and their weapons and was blurring the fact that Social Democratic Parties are capitalist parties. 
Wilcox’s conclusion was that ‘the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is basically in a 
revisionist position’.484 
For the CPNZ, ‘China’ meant the CPC and it was to be defended: it was increasingly represented 
as reflecting Marxist-Leninist ‘orthodoxy’ against the CPSU’s ‘revisionism’. Yet at the 1963 
CPNZ conference there were differences around this position. Two delegates condemned 
Russia's stand-over tactics and state measures but said it was unwise to use the label 'revisionist'. 
For them China represented a freedom to take an independent line, but not necessarily the truth 
of that line. George Goddard thought the criticisms of the Soviet Party were too much 
ideological and not enough on their actions, like arming India against China. He defended the 
Chinese state but not necessarily the line.485 
His report consequently adopted, Vic Wilcox and the Maoist leadership of the CPNZ stepped up 
their anti-revisionist stance.486  A delegation went to Beijing for May Day. Vic Wilcox was Mao's 
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guest in Beijing for a week, where he signed a joint statement with him and gave an address to 
the Higher Party School, both strongly critical of the Soviet line. The New Zealand party 
opposed and helped to foil the Soviet party's attempt to organise a world conference of 
communist parties. It backed the Chinese delegates on the World Peace Council in refusing to 
pay tribute to President Kennedy after his assassination. In November it lauded the revolutionary 
lessons of the Bolshevik Revolution.487  
Vic Wilcox later authored a 3,000 word pamphlet, The New Zealand Party's Firm Stand, setting out 
the issues. To the CPNZ, the Soviet Union was increasingly regarded as an actual enemy, with 
the use of terms like 'Soviet Imperialism', 'a new form of state capitalism' and 'a new bourgeois 
class' to refer to CPSU.488 They also started to resurrect Stalin.489 Yet Bill Anderson and George 
Jackson, who sat on the National Committee, continued to get support from many trade union 
members for a pro-CPSU position. The Dunedin branch opposed the party line and was 
expelled. A section of the Christchurch Party resigned. Finally, in January 1966, the Auckland 
pro-CPSU faction resigned and with the others who had left formed a new party, the Socialist 
Unity Party.490 
In 1968 the CPNZ felt justified in its opposition to the Soviet Union when Russian tanks rolled 
into Czechoslovakia, ending the so-called 'Prague Spring', and it staged protests outside the 
Soviet Embassy. Later that year its national conference included only foreign delegates and letters 
of solidarity from parties that shared its line on 'Soviet revisionism'.491 By doing so it was the first 
party in the world to take the 'line struggle' in the world communist movement into the 
organisation of its own national conference.492 
When examining why 'other Parties got it wrong', the CPNZ would point to their ideological or 
political dependence on the Soviet party, developed over some years, and the practice of the 
CPSU in expecting unquestioning agreement with its line. 
It expected subordination of others to its baton. Instead of putting the thinking cap on, 
and really sweating to examine the international class struggle, the subjective and 
objective conditions faced by parties prevented this. It was far easier to rely upon the 
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reports of the CPSU for their lead. This easy way out does not help the training of 
members, who can think, investigate and study. When a crisis comes, they get 'lost’.493 
In contrast to the subordination it claimed was expected of pro-Soviet parties, (and it would 
claim was the position of the SUP), members of the CPNZ saw their lining up with the CPC not 
as support for the Chinese party, but rather as an ideological unity around a common 
understanding on the world situation and an application of Marxism-Leninism to that 
understanding. As Wilcox wrote, ‘There is no such thing as “Chinese Communism”. The mighty 
Communist Party of China is basing its programme of building a socialist China on Marxism-
Leninism’.494 However, following the massacre of communists in Indonesia in 1965, the CPNZ 
decided to create a secret parallel organisation within the party. Inner-party democracy was 
suspended. There were no conferences and no elections. The procedures by which a common 
understanding on ideological questions could be pursued became increasingly difficult to carry 
out.495 For the CPA, looking back in 1993, it would be this practice that ultimately tore the Party 
apart, ‘With an increasingly isolated leadership, party positions became increasingly erratic’.496 
China became more than a fraternal party in the struggle against revisionism. The CPNZ gained 
international attention because of its status in the dispute with the Soviet Union and a privileged 
standing amongst the pro-CPC parties.497 The CPC purchased thousands of copies of the People’s 
Voice and Communist Review, more than were sold in New Zealand, and thereby provided financial 
support to the small New Zealand party.498 The CPC’s line on everything was followed very 
closely with articles such as ‘Why It Is Vital To Study Mao Tse-tung’.499 As the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution unfolded the CPNZ seemed even to replace its understanding of the 
situation in New Zealand with that existing, or purported to exist, in China.500 
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In the late 1960s, in place of political work with miners, factory workers and on the waterfront, 
the leadership extolled anything ‘youth’ engaged in, from anti-war demonstrations to trivial 
issues, like the ‘liberation of Albert Park’. Trade union officials and trade union work was 
denounced as ‘bureaucratic’. In 1969 the party effectively denounced the whole Seaman’s Union, 
perhaps New Zealand’s most class-conscious, as sell-outs. In the early 1970s the People’s Voice 
featured ultra-left headlines such as ‘We ARE in revolutionary times HERE’ and ‘WHY BEG 
FOR WAGE INCREASES? Workers have the strength to seize what they want’.501 
There were splits under the impact of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as the CPNZ 
tried to respond to the rapidly changing situation in China.502 First, in 1968, a tiny group in 
Auckland was expelled for opposing participation in parliamentary elections and trade unions. 
They continued to operate under the name ‘the Revolutionary Committee of the CPNZ’. These 
were local representations of the CPC’s position that ‘revolution is the main trend’ and placed 
China’s interpretation about the world ahead of what even a highly subjective interpretation of 
the situation in New Zealand would have revealed.503 
In 1972 the CPNZ refused to take part in the elections because 
with revolution the main trend in the world today, with struggle for both immediate 
gains and revolutionary policy growing every day in New Zealand, it is apparent that all 
our forces must be used to strengthen these developments outside the parliamentary 
circus.504 
Any suggestion that the Labour Party was better than the governing National Party was ‘a step 
towards revisionism’. The CPNZ together with the Progressive Youth Movement, anarchists, 
and other militant groups promoted a ‘Radical Election Campaign’ – or REC (pronounced 
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‘wreck’) – with the object of disrupting political meetings. Their main slogan was ‘Parliament is a 
fraud, elections are a farce’. 505 
The CPNZ and its associated Progressive Youth Movement gave uncritical support to China and 
Albania.506  From 1970, the expelled Wellington District of the CPNZ also supported Chinese 
policies, and its members worked in the Wellington Branch of the NZCFS, whose national 
leadership in Auckland was closely linked with the CPNZ.507 According to Bert Roth’s annual 
survey of communist groups in New Zealand, when Rewi Alley visited his homeland in October 
1971 there was speculation that he had been sent to evaluate the rival communist groups, but he 
unhesitatingly supported the Wilcox leadership, and commended the part it had played in the 
inner-party struggle.508 
However as the 1970s went on, CPNZ publications began to give an increasing amount of space 
to material from Albania. Reporting after his return from the congress of Albanian trade unions 
as a CPNZ delegate in May 1972, B. J. Holmes mentioned that that he had sat next to a delegate 
from Ceylon ‘where thousands of young people were slaughtered by savage state forces’.509 The 
Chinese government had supported these ‘savage state forces’ and some commentators claimed 
to have seen signs of a growing estrangement between the CPNZ and China, and realignment 
towards Albania, because of alleged dissatisfaction with Mao’s rapprochement with the United 
States.510 
Yet in May Day greetings from the CPNZ to both China and Albania, the Communist Party of 
China was described as ‘the proletarian headquarters of the world’s revolutionary peoples’, and 
Mao as ‘the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our times’, providing ‘inspiration and guidance’ to New 
Zealand.511 The CPNZ welcomed US President Nixon’s visit to Beijing.512 When Ted Hill, of the 
Communist Party of Australia (Marxist Leninist), visited Auckland in August for discussions with 
the CPNZ, both parties ‘welcomed the growing development towards revolutionary struggle on 
both sides of the Tasman and stressed this can only be successful with the Marxist-Leninist-Mao 
Tse-tung revolutionary line and activity’.513 
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The close adherence to what seemed to it to be the appropriate way to follow the Chinese line 
meant the CPNZ sometimes stood in opposition to seemingly progressive mass movements in 
New Zealand.  When a widespread protest movement developed against French nuclear testing 
at Mururoa, the New Zealand Federation of Labour, in conjunction with Australian and Fijian 
trade unions, imposed a boycott of French aircraft, shipping, trade, and communications for the 
duration of the tests. The SUP, which wielded influence in the trade unions, gave its full support 
to the protests, while the CPNZ and the Wellington Marxist-Leninists denounced them as a 
manoeuvre inspired by the two super-powers whose main objective was “laying the ground for 
objections to testing and developing nuclear capability by the People’s Republic of China”.514 
The major international development of 1973 followed the December 1972 decision by the 
Labour government to recognise the People’s Republic of China. The exchange of ambassadors 
was followed by a stream of delegations, official and non-official, in both directions. The CPNZ 
could have expected to profit from this new-found interest in things Chinese, but it had to face 
the rivalry of the Wellington Marxist-Leninist Group, which dominated the Wellington branch of 
the NZCFS and influenced the composition of the official New Zealand university students’ 
delegation to China. Nevertheless, the Chinese leaders did not waver from their recognition of 
the CPNZ. Wilcox visited China in March together with Ron Wolf. They were guests of honour 
at a banquet put on by Zhou Enlai and other leaders. On the day before Zhou met the official 
mission of the New Zealand government.515 China had become an opportunity for reflected 
glory. Being close to China meant something locally and there was a contest for this status. 
Differences began to emerge in the way that the CPNZ saw New Zealand and these differences 
were at the heart of the matter for the party. In 1966 the CPNZ had confirmed its support for 
the Chinese position with respect to the ideological dispute with the CPSU. It also described 
New Zealand as a semi-colony and the anti-imperialist struggle as the first stage in the fight for a 
socialist revolution. This policy relied upon analysis of the ownership of the means of production 
in New Zealand. The CPNZ concluded that the vast majority of big businesses were foreign 
owned, and this ownership was moving from British to American institutions.516 
Yet in 1968 Ray Nunes, a leading figure in the Party, wrote an article in the New Zealand 
Communist Review (NZCR), the theoretical journal of the CPNZ,517 in which he described New 
Zealand as ‘fully capitalist’ and stated that the task facing the working class was therefore 
‘accomplishing the socialist revolution directly, not through an intermediate stage of a bourgeois 
or national democratic revolution’.518 This ideological struggle between a one-stage or a two-stage 
revolution can be seen to be at the heart of some of the splits, expulsions and divisions that 
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occurred during these years. At the centre of this debate was the nature of New Zealand society, 
yet the lines of the debate each contain images of China within them. 
In March 1974 the CPNZ announced the expulsion of Bill McAra, for a long time the foremost 
figure in the CPNZ next to Wilcox. The charges brought against him were ‘big-shotism, 
intrigues, self-interest, and refusal to practice democratic centralism’. However it was clear later 
that it was a result of a political difference over whether New Zealand is a junior imperialist 
partner of Britain and the United States, or whether it is itself a ‘neo-colony of imperialism’ (as 
maintained by McAra).519 For Bert Roth, long-time observer and commentator of communism in 
New Zealand, this question would dominate not just the party’s internal debates but also its 
relations with other parties with which it had formerly had close relations: 
On this question of imperialism the current policy of the CPNZ was at odds with that of 
its nearest ideological partner, the CPA (ML). In 1973 inner-party distribution of 
material that had been provided by the CPA (ML) was restricted by the CPNZ.520 
In October 1976 the CPNZ announced the expulsion of another of its leading members, Steve 
Hieatt, who had been a member for more than 35 years and had served on the National and 
Political Committees. Hieatt was denounced as a ‘capitalist roader’ and a ‘revisionist’ as well as an 
informer for the Security Intelligence Service.521 Hieatt and the party members who left with him 
formed the South Auckland Marxist-Leninist Group. They continued to support the CPC and 
claimed to have no political differences with the CPNZ. 
 
The Theory of the Three Worlds 
In his first appearance at the United Nations in April 1974, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping had 
drawn world-wide attention with his speech differentiating the three political forces in 
international politics. The subsequently famous ‘Three Worlds’ theory, though accredited to Mao 
Zedong by the Chinese leaders, was first most clearly presented by Deng in this UN speech.522 
The concept postulated that the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
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constituted the First World; the developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other 
regions together formed the Third World; and the developed countries between the two made up 
the Second World.523 China belonged to the Third World. This view of ‘the present situation in 
the world’ subsequently became standard rhetoric in China’s foreign policy statements. On 1 
November 1977 the newspaper Renmin Ribao published a lengthy document entitled ‘Chairman 
Mao’s theory of the differentiation of the Three Worlds is a major contribution to Marxism-
Leninism’ and vowed to uphold Mao’s revolutionary line in foreign policy.524 The document 
reaffirmed Mao’s Theory of the Three Worlds as first articulated by Deng three-and-a-half years 
earlier and stressed in particular the strategic dimension of the concept. 
Although the theory had its genesis with Mao, Deng’s version had considerable differences. The 
question of authorship was to have significant ramifications later. Chinese claims that the Theory 
had originated with Mao did not convince all China watchers, especially as China’s foreign policy 
seemed to drift away from support for revolution.525 The obtuse claims to its origin, for example 
not naming the person to whom it was first introduced, didn’t help.526 When Renmin Ribao first 
used he title ‘Mao Zedong’s Theory’ they made a claim as to Mao’s authorship but did not 
provide clarity. This came when the ‘whateverists’ were in power meant that anything anyone 
wanted to do needed a claim as to it having been authored by Mao.527 Hua Guofeng’s own 
authority depended on his claim to carrying Mao’s mantle and his proclamations almost 
invariably contained a reference to them being in accordance with Mao’s instructions. 
Central to the Theory of the Three Worlds concept was the united front strategy. The CPC, 
under Mao in the 1940s, persevered in a political line of ‘developing the progressive forces, 
winning over the middle forces, and isolating the diehard forces’. The anti-Chiang Kai-shek 
united front constituted workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. The last 
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two categories, although intended to be liquidated after the civil war, were regarded by Mao as 
essential elements of the coalition front. 528 
Mao’s division of China’s social and political forces in his united front strategy was first applied 
to the international situation in his conversation with American correspondent Anna Louise 
Strong in 1946.  Mao stated that United States ‘reactionaries’ were striving to dominate the world 
but that their world was halted by the Soviet Union, the ‘progressive’ socialist state and a 
‘defender of world peace’. The United States and the Soviet Union were separated by a vast zone 
which included many capitalist, colonial and semicolonial countries in Europe, Africa and Asia – 
including China. Before the United States had subjugated these ‘middle zone’ countries, Mao 
stressed, an attack on the Soviet Union was out of the question.529 Eighteen years later, Mao 
modified his view of the world order. Then he divided the middle forces into two categories: a 
first middle zone, comprising the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and a 
second middle zone made up of the developed countries from Western Europe plus Japan, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand.530 Mao’s two-middle zone concept was the forerunner of 
the Theory of the Three Worlds, the first middle zone became the Third World, the second 
middle zone became the Second World, and the two contending superpowers the First World. 
By 1974 the Soviet Union was being labelled as a ‘social imperialist’ state and had replaced the 
United States as the main threat to world peace. The essence of the Theory of the Three Worlds 
was now to unite the ‘progressive’ Third World states, to win over the ‘middle’ Second World 
and to isolate the two ‘reactionary’ superpowers. By identifying China as a member of the Third 
World that formed the strategic base of the united front, the CPC had assigned itself a leadership 
role in the forefront of ‘defence’ against superpower expansion. The Chinese leaders 
differentiated the world’s political forces to meet the PRC’s strategic requirements of the time, 
and these in turn were determined by Chinese perception and analysis of the overall situation in 
the global system. In essence, the Theory of the Three Worlds was a dynamic concept which 
could be modified and adapted to new situations by changing or shifting the composition of 
political forces in the ‘three worlds’.531 
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Herbert S. Yee identified three phases of development since the theory’s inception in 1974: first, 
asserting Mao’s revolutionary line in foreign policy; second, uniting all anti-Soviet forces 
including the United States; and third, emphasising a self-reliance strategy. Roughly the first 
phase lasted from 1974 to 1978, the second began in late 1978 and endured for slightly more 
than one year, and the third phase began to take shape in the wake of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.532 
In his 1974 UN speech, Deng Xiaoping declared that ‘history develops in struggle, and the world 
advances amidst turbulence… Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the 
people want revolution – this is the irresistible trend of history’. The Chinese leaders maintained 
through the rest of the decade that the PRC, being a communist state, would support ‘the 
revolutionary struggles of the communist parties of all countries’. 533  China also repeatedly 
pointed out, however, that revolution could not be exported and that all communist parties were 
independent and should make their own decisions. This ‘revolutionary’ basis was then reaffirmed 
as the official policy line in the 1977 publication on the Three Worlds. 
The change of government following the election defeat of the Labour Party in November 1975 
brought a sharp turn to the right in New Zealand politics. Muldoon proclaimed the USSR the 
main external threat to New Zealand, and the SUP the major enemy within. With China, on the 
other hand, the new government was anxious to establish friendly relations, so the New Zealand 
Prime Minister visited the PRC and praised Mao Zedong. The CPNZ no doubt found it 
embarrassing that Hua Guofeng urged the New Zealand Prime Minister to maintain the military 
alliance with the United States and Australia, but in line with Chinese policy, the CPNZ regarded 
the USSR not just as a country where capitalism has been restored but as an imperialist power – 
moreover, the ‘major world imperialism’ and the ‘major threat of world war’.534 In New Zealand, 
on the other hand, the party believes ‘whilst capitalism remains – an irreversible trend towards 
fascism with little or no possible return to bourgeois democracy’.535 The CPNZ maintained its 
unquestioning support for the Chinese leadership, sent messages of congratulations and 
condolence when appropriate, and denounced the ‘vile crimes’ of both Deng Xiaoping and the 
Gang of Four. 
Vic Wilcox was removed from all posts of responsibility in March 1977. This demotion was kept 
secret even from party members as the National Committee hoped to ‘solve the contradiction in 
a nonantagonistic manner’. 536  The decision was however, communicated to the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China. Rumours filtered back through visitors to China, 
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but the first hard news to those outside the central leadership of the party was an article entitled 
‘Unite all Marxist-Leninists in Oceania’, which appeared on 2 March 1978 in Vanguard, the organ 
of the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist). It stressed that support for Mao’s theory 
differentiating the three worlds was the touchstone of true Marxist-Leninists and denounced ‘all 
those who in the name of communism oppose the revolutionary essence of communism, either 
by silence, attempted suppression of comrades like comrade Wilcox, lies, slanders, intrigues and 
conspiracies’. 537  In reply the CPNZ claimed that Wilcox was ‘not suppressed’ but ‘under 
criticism’ over questions of principle ‘dating back over several years’ and totally unconnected 
with the Three Worlds Theory. As regards the latter, the party would resolve its attitude ‘in its 
own time’.538 
On 7 April Peking Review reprinted excerpts from the Vanguard article, a clear sign that it had 
Chinese approval.539 The CPNZ cabled a protest to Peking, which was ignored, and another 
Vanguard article commenting on New Zealand affairs followed on 27 April. At about this time 
the Chinese party cancelled its orders for the People’s Voice and the New Zealand Communist Review. 
Since such substantial quantities were involved, as speculated upon above, the CPNZ 
characterised this action as ‘a deliberate blow at the economics of the People’s Voice and hence at 
our Party’.540 
The CPNZ National Committee next issued a statement setting out its differences with the 
CPA(ML). As Bert Roth had correctly identified above, this came down to the nature of the New 
Zealand economy and in particular its relationship to imperialism: 
The basic contradiction in New Zealand, a developed capitalist country, is that between 
the working class and the capitalist class headed by the monopoly section. Consequently 
the working class faces a directly socialist revolution. Any attempt to insert an 
intermediate stage between capitalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat is 
opportunism and revisionism.541 
Although not yet stated, this was a rejection of the applicability of the programme of the Theory 
of the Three Worlds to the domestic situation in New Zealand. Whatever China continued to 
represent to the CPNZ, it was no longer the source of an analysis to be applied directly to New 
Zealand conditions. 
The great majority of members and all but two out of a dozen branches rallied around the party 
leadership.542 On 23 May Wilcox and three other members (one of them a member of the CPNZ 
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National Committee, another the national president of the New Zealand-China Friendship 
Society) announced the setting up of a Preparatory Committee for the Formation of a 
Communist Party of New Zealand (Marxist-Leninist).543 They stressed their support for the three 
worlds theory and for cooperation with the CPA(ML). On 24 June, in Auckland, they held an 
enlarged initial meeting of the committee but decided to postpone the setting up of a new party 
until they gained wider support.544 
The Preparatory Committee would soon merge with the Struggle group and Struggle became their 
theoretical journal. ‘China’ had a number of meanings for this new formation.545 At the heart of 
them, at this stage, was China as the place where Mao had developed his theories: 
Struggle was founded with a bias: that Mao Tsetung Thought is the highest development 
of Marxist-Leninism. It believes that every previous conclusion on whatever aspect of 
New Zealand life should be deeply studied in the light of Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Tsetung Thought; and in that light, be reaffirmed or modified and replaced.546 
While Struggle found it easy to nail Mao to its theoretical flagpole, following the positions taken 
by the CPC was more difficult. In 1976 Struggle welcomed the campaign against Deng Xiaoping 
as ‘shattering defeat for the Soviet revisionists and their vain hopes of a capitalist restoration in 
China’ but in early 1977 ‘warmly congratulate[d]’ the CPC on its decision to ‘restore Comrade 
Teng Hsiao-ping to all posts from which he had been unjustly removed’.547 
Such vacillations in position would have been shrugged away as insignificant even by China-
watching New Zealand communists.  It was the line rather than the personnel that was important 
and the line-struggle meant that sometimes the information coming out of China had been 
distorted. Yet other aspects of what China represented were of much greater significance. For the 
Struggle group, and later the Preparatory Committee, the Theory of the Three Worlds was 
understood as ‘a question central to the ideological struggle for the defence of Marxism-
Leninism’.548 
The CPNZ also held an extended plenum of its National Committee on 2-3 September and 
published the full text of the resolution adopted there with the title CPNZ’s Firm Stand Against the 
New Revisionism. The CPNZ convened a national conference and at it denounced the ‘three 
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worlds’ theory as incorrect and non-Marxist. 549  According to the Wilcox-led Preparatory 
Committee, the leadership of the CPNZ was now in the hands of an ‘Albanian Gang of 
Three’.550 
The CPNZ was rejecting China’s current political line, but in doing so, they continued to hold 
aloft a representation of a China from the not-too-distant past. For the CPNZ, the fault of the 
CPC’s current leadership was that they were changing the project from that which the CPNZ 
continued to support. Accordingly, they refused to completely support the Albanian Party’s 
criticisms of the CPC.551 While they rejected the Theory of the Three Worlds, this was because 
they believed it was not Maoist, not, as the Albanians were now claiming, because there was 
anything wrong with Mao. The CPNZ continued to hold onto the correctness of what it 
regarded as the trajectory of the Chinese revolution up until Mao’s death in 1976. 
The NZCFS, which used to be closely aligned with the CPNZ, was now viewed by the CPNZ as 
‘no longer a body for promoting friendship between the people of China and New Zealand but 
an agency for pushing China’s great power chauvinist policy centering on the theory of the three 
worlds’. The CPNZ saw ‘the petty-bourgeois elements who had collected in the China Society’ as 
the main base of support of Wilcox and his Preparatory Committee.552 Bert Roth’s report on 
communism in New Zealand for 1980 noted that, although in 1978 ‘the CPNZ broke with China 
and declared its support for Albania’ as ‘the socialist fatherland’. By the end of 1979 the Albanian 
link was ‘also severed’, and ‘the CPNZ is truly non-aligned’.553  
According to the CPNZ publication People’s Voice, the party’s national conference 
[gave a] resounding rebuff to the local followers of the new revisionist leaders of the 
Chinese party and all other revisionists and opportunists who have tried to disrupt and 
divert the CPNZ from its Marxist-Leninist line and make it collaborate with the class 
enemies of the New Zealand working people – the imperialists and social-imperialists 
who all collude and contend for world control and plunder.554 
There were now four Maoist groups operating in addition to the CPNZ: the Wellington-based 
Marxist Leninist Organisation (MLO), the Northern Communist Organisation (NCO), Struggle, 
and the Preparatory Committee for the Formation of a Communist Party of New Zealand 
(Marxist-Leninist). They held talks during 1979 aimed at establishing a combined party. All four 
agreed on a joint letter to the government and people of Kampuchea and on joint statements on 
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the ‘Chinese counterattack against Vietnam’s incursions on Chinese territory’ and on ‘Soviet 
social-imperialism’.555 
In November 1978 the CPNZ had hailed the ‘steadfastness, courage and resolution’ of the 
Albanian Party of Labour as ‘an example and inspiration for Marxist-Leninists everywhere’.556 
Yet just a year later Albania was no longer mentioned. The breach seemed to have been caused 
by Enver Hoxha’s characterisation of Mao Zedong as a longtime revisionist. Without mentioning 
Hoxha or Albania, an anonymous writer in the NZ Communist Review dismissed as subjective 
‘dogmatic assertions, unsupported by facts, that Mao was a lifelong revisionist who opened the 
Party to bourgeois factions and supported the bourgeoisie in the Party and state’.557 
The question of the correctness of the CPC position and line became a question of authenticity 
for the various groupings in New Zealand. For Struggle ‘all that Hua Guofeng and other current 
Chinese leaders are saying and doing is clearly totally in line with what Mao Tsetung set out’. 
They attacked the CPNZ which, they preciently predicted, would soon ‘attack mighty China, 
great bastion of socialism and world revolution’, and declared that ‘in 1979 it is a vital task of 
Marxist-Leninists to defend socialist China from the lying attacks made on it’.558 
Such disputes soon ventured beyond the pages of the groups’ publications. In March 1979, the 
CPNZ used the occasion of the visit of Chinese Vice-Premier Chen Muhua to stage 
demonstrations with participants carrying placards reading ‘Communist party of NZ condemns 
China’s invasion of Vietnam! Oppose US-China-Soviet imperialist wars!’559 The divisions in New 
Zealand were being replicated around the world. The Preparatory Committee published a list of 
‘fraternal parties’ – those who also offered support for the Theory of the Three Worlds. Its line, 
they declared 
will be based on the integration of the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought with the concrete conditions of the class struggle in New Zealand. 
This includes the study and application of the Theory of the Three Worlds [which 
provides] the strategy and tactics for the victory of the peoples.560 
In August 1979 a CPNZ delegation, consisting of Ray Nunes and Nat Gould, went to Albania to 
discuss ideological differences. After its return, the Political Committee adopted a pro-Mao 
resolution, and articles in the New Zealand Communist Review reflected this independent stand. In 
November 1979 the Communist Review began a two-part series entitled ‘What Mao Really Said’. 
The article was a veiled critique of the Albanians. ‘Let the critics of Mao try, if they can, to base 
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themselves on the facts of Mao’s struggle… on what he actually said, and not on misquotations or 
statements taken out of context’. The article attacked the current ‘Chinese revisionists’ but also 
‘another trend evident in some counties which is to declare that Mao was always a revisionist’. 
The article contained extracts of Mao’s works, linking notes and brief comment. Although the 
second part was included in the December issue in draft, the article was withdrawn at the last 
minute.561 In February 1980, a Central Committee meeting returned to the pro-Albanian line, 
which avered that Mao was not a Marxist-Leninist and the communist victory in China in 1949 
was not the result of a socialist but merely a bourgeois democratic revolution. The members of 
the delegation were both expelled. 
The CPNZ began 1979 in the unique position that it had been aligned first with the Soviet 
Union, then with China and since 1978 with Albania. The CPNZ maintained that Mao Zedong 
Thought was a dangerous form of revisionism that was ‘most harmful to the working class 
because it replaces the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism with a hodge-podge of idealism and 
pseudo-Marxism’. The Communist Party of China, the New Zealand party now revealed, ‘never 
treated the the CPNZ in the manner of a fraternal Party with correct internationalist attitudes 
and actions’. Albania, on the other hand, is recognised as a socialist country, in fact ‘the only 
socialist country remaining’, and the CPNZ therefore intends to ‘give particular weight to the 
opinions and views of the Albanian Party of Labour’.562 Nunes, Gould and other supporters of a 
Maoist or pro-Mao position left the CPNZ. This included the entire Wellington branch. 
During 1980 the pro-Chinese groups consolidated their forces in a series of mergers that reduced 
their number from five to two. The Wellington Marxist-Leninist Organisation and the Northern 
Communist Organisation combined in January to form the Workers Communist League, which 
in July absorbed the small Marxist-Leninist Workers Party.563 In February the groups around the 
theoretical journal Struggle joined the Preparatory Committee, which was led by Vic Wilcox. Four 
representatives of the Preparatory Committee visited China in March at the invitation of the 
CPC. 
On their return, the report of the Preparatory Committee delegation confirmed the correctness 
of their view. China was not selling out socialism, in fact ‘China is going in one direction only – it 
is getting redder again after a terrible setback’. ‘Their modernisation will be socialist 
modernisation. Their modernisation will strengthen socialism’.564 As with earlier commentary, 
their understanding of China was of universal significance and groups that failed to share that 
understanding were taking themselves out of the socialist movement. ‘China is the bulwark 
against world reaction and is in the forefront of building socialism… Those who do not 
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recognise this cannot today be regarded as Marxists’. Yet at the same time the Preparatory 
Committee was starting to introduce an anti-utopian perspective that hadn’t been obvious in 
much of its previous analysis. They declared that China’s decisions were based on ‘seeing China 
as it is … not as some might like it to be’.565 
Bert Roth’s annual summary of the state of the communist groups in New Zealand suggested 
that further consolidations of the pro-China groupings were unlikely. Noting that the aim of both 
the WCL and the Preparatory Committee was to establish a revolutionary party based on 
Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong-Thought, he observed that ‘while the PC is fully in accord with 
current Chinese policies, the WCL has some reservations concerning China’s foreign relations’. 
In addition, they had different views regarding the course of the revolution in New Zealand.566 
Under the work plans adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee 
in December 1978, ‘China made a ‘major adjustment of its foreign policy’. Accordingly the CPC 
‘corrected its Leftist principles’. Its targes to contacts broadened away from communist and left-
wing political parties to ‘all parties ready to have contacts with the CPC’.567 While the Workers’ 
Communist League welcomed this change and contact with the CPC despite having differences 
with the Preparatory Committee, which ‘held the China franchise’, for domestic reasons it did 
not wish to appear as a ‘China-line’ party. Increasingly left groups in New Zealand and around 
the world were becoming worried that the PRC was slowing support for revolutionary 
organisations in favour of parties in power.568   
1980 saw a further group being formed out of those expelled from the CPNZ. It was organised 
around Nat Gould, one of the delegation expelled over the Albanian report, and his wife, Flora 
Gould, a long time Political Committee representative.. Like the CPNZ, the Red Flag Group 
rejected the current Chinese leadership but their measure was not the Albanian criticisms of Mao 
but an adherence to a representation of an earlier China. They declared their support for 
‘Maoism’ and for the Gang of Four (which they referred to as the ‘Gang of Five’).569 
The Red Flag Group was part of an international grouping of parties that declared themselves 
‘Maoist’. Its statement of its formation and its criticism of the CPNZ was published in the 
journal of the Revolutionary Communist Party USA. It also condemned China’s ‘back to 
capitalism’. It condemned the break up of communes, support for the establishment of private 
businesses, and conspicuous consumption by CPC officials. There was a pro-China image within 
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these criticisms. All that was currently bad in China was because of the rejection of Mao and the 
Cultural Revolution which the Red Flag Group valorised. They also had support for a future 
China, declaring that ‘organised new forces inside of China’ were forming and would initiate a 
new process of revolution.570 
Mirroring the arguments between the CPNZ and the Preparatory Committee, and in particular 
the language of the latter, the Red Flag Group avowed that its position on China was of vital 
significance to New Zealand. They declared that ‘upholding the leadership of Mao and the 
Communist Party of China and the historic lessons of the Chinese revolution, means to defend 
the interests of the proletarian socialist revolution in New Zealand’. Mao and the Cultural 
Revolution were equated with the ‘orthodoxy’ of Marx and Lenin and the current leadership of 
the CPC was identified with ‘revisionism’.571 
As the CPC itself started to reject claims itself of universal aspects of its path to communism and 
declare its path as one of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ so too did its New Zealand allies 
tone down their rhetoric. Struggle suggested that 
So long as any of us indulge in agonising, viz over whether China is doing this or that 
wrong, we are diverted from our real tasks in our own country… The proper focus for 
New Zealand Marxists is New Zealand. The habit of foolishly idolising other countries’ 
socialist successes was never more than a substitute for lack of faith in the revolutionary 
potential of the still dormant New Zealand working class.572 
This lack of universal applicability of Chinese lessons went further and Struggle no longer carried a 
description of itself on its cover as applying Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.573 In a 
self-critical moment it noted that for some New Zealand Marxist-Leninists 
[the] tendency had been to rely on the particular ways of the Chinese Communist Party. 
And that made the ‘Cultural Revolution’ deadly for the CPNZ…Yet strangely, it helped 
us to think about integrating the general propositions with the concrete conditions of the 
New Zealand revolution.574 
Yet the Preparatory Committee still reported favourably about China. Its newspaper Advance 
reported in 1984 that ‘Socialist China’s production rose sharply again in the last financial year, in 
sharp contrast to the more or less stagnant economies of the capitalist world’.575 It still made a 
claim for the Marxist orthodoxy operating in China when it defended the introduction of the new 
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‘responsibility system’ in 1985 as reflecting wages based on Marx’s theory of ‘For each according 
to their work’ and equating China’s ‘socialist modernisation’ as equivalent to Lenin’s New 
Economic Programme.  With approval it recalled that ‘some “concessions”, towards capitalism, 
Lenin wrote, “need not frighten us”’. There was no doubt for them that China represented 
socialist practice. ‘Progressive people in New Zealand, as everywhere, take a lively interest in how 
socialism is faring where it is being built. Nowhere attracts such favourable interest as socialist 
China’. 576  Where there were criticisms, and the acknowledgment of problems in China the 
Preparatory Committee would still accept the official Chinese line on them. So although it noted 
that through the mid-1980s rampant corruption meant that China’s ‘outstanding reputation for 
integrity and honesty has been somewhat tarnished’ Advance was happy to report that 
‘achievements outweigh problems’.577 
In contrast, the Red Flag Group interpreted news of crime and corruption coming out of China 
as proof that China had rejected the socialist road. ‘True friends of the Chinese people’ they 
wrote, ‘will remember Mao’s China when honesty, incorruptibility and selflessness was a byword’. 
Their China, reflected in Mao’s teachings, was still universal, as ‘Mao’s contributions’, remained 
‘imperishable and a living guide to the future’. Instead of what they saw as a retreat to 
particularism, Red Flag declared its support for universalisms: ‘Without Marxism-Leninism-
Maoism there can be no revolutionary change, no socialist revolution’. This had application in 
New Zealand since ‘it is the duty of all true revolutionaries and progressive people to preserve 
and uphold Mao’s legacy and combat his detractors wherever they may be’.578 
The Preparatory Committee renamed itself the ‘Organisation for Marxist Unity’ and Struggle’s 
masthead was now ‘A Marxist approach to New Zealand problems – especially the need to break 
the domination of the multinationals’. Although there was no mention of Mao Zedong Thought, 
there was still a reference to a staged approach to revolution and the analysis had an unstated 
commitment to the Theory of the Three Worlds and the Chinese approach to revolution.579 This 
understated support for China became more open when the Tiananmen crisis exploded across 
the world’s media in May and June of 1989. The June issue of Struggle was produced as the 
students gathered but before the violence began. Struggle was full of hope for China and saw the 
students as representing ‘socialist democracy in action’. ‘Unlike 1981 in NZ, they are NOT being 
bashed by the police… Struggle hopes they will [advance] socialism, and socialist democracy, in 
China’.580 
Three months later, in its next issue, the publication tried to understand the events in terms of 
the Marxist theory of democracy and the state. They identified the protests as being supportive 
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of the revolution, by opposing ‘the return of pre-liberation social ills and crimes that have come 
with reform and opening up’. Yet the media coverage had not been accurate. ‘Enemies of 
socialism and the Murdoch press had used the opportunity to inflame the situation and attempt 
to discredit socialism’. In addition to this analysis they published a ‘Summary of Chinese accounts 
of Tiananmen’ and excerpts of an interview with Han Suyin declaring that ‘we cannot have 
judgment by media’.581 
At the same time, however, Struggle revealed that they had been expressing concerns about 
developments in China to their contacts there. For example, they ‘had been concerned that Beijing 
Review seemed at cross purposes with the basic truths of Marxism’ and had met with editorial 
staff to discuss this.582 Now, in the aftermath of Tiananmen, they were happy to report that they 
were ‘…very much as ease with reports examining weakness of ideological work as the internal 
cause of the students justifiable demands’. Yet events in China needed to be put into another 
context too:  
As for our own work in New Zealand, its thrust is for political achievements in New 
Zealand. Whatever may happen in a socialist country will not divert us from that. But 
the recent events in China should not be allowed to be used against socialism and as 
propaganda for capitalism.583 
For the Red Flag Group the issue was far easier to comprehend. The ‘Deng revisionists’ had 
exposed their colours. They lauded the demands of the ‘heroic students and workers’, declaring 
that the ‘massacre’ was the ‘product of twelve years of revisionist rule’ and that ‘the last word’ on 
the Chinese revolution would belong to workers and peasants ‘who will never forget Mao and his 
teachings’. ‘Revisionism’, they proclaimed, ‘has no future’.584 
The CPNZ also attacked the CPC as presiding over ‘fascist terror, with mass killings and witch-
hunts’. However its ideological position was also ennunciated. For the CPNZ, the ‘Chinese 
Ruling class, was the ‘imperialist descendents of the Maoist enemies of communism’. For the 
CPNZ, things that happened in the PRC were mostly seen as opportunities to distance itself 
from other left-wing parties. The article’s title was ‘SUP Support for Chinese Government’. It 
attacked the SUP over the latter’s support for China’s market socialism and suggestions there 
were ‘counter-revolutionary’ elements present amongst the demonstrators. The CPNZ also 
joined conservative groups in New Zealand in calling for the New Zealand government to 
bestow refugee status on all Chinese students who requested it.585 
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Perhaps it was because of the complexities involved in trying to understand activities in China, 
but Struggle’s editors claimed to be less interested in discussing them. ‘In our view’, they wrote, 
the practice of giving opinions on correctness of different parties or socialist states ‘is not helpful 
to creating unity within the New Zealand movement, nor is it based on respecting the efforts of 
the working class concerned to correct mistakes’.586  
Yet, in the very next issue they would do just that: 
Today, new China is in the first stage of building a modern socialist country, led by 
working class and based on the worker farmer alliance. The system of democratic 
centralism prevails within the state, Party and public institutions, providing the basis for 
the further development of socialist democracy.587 
In the early 1990s those who had consistently supported China since the mid-1960s became 
more equivocal about events there and those who claimed that their line was consistent with 
‘Mao Zedong Thought’ became quieter and quieter. However, in line with the improved relations 
between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China during the former’s last days, the 
‘revisionists’ of the Socialist Unity Party began to show an interest in China themselves. New 
Zealand Tribune reported favourably on a Labour Party delegation that went to China in 1991 
which reported that the ‘standard of health’ was ‘amazing’ as was the commitment amongst the 
young people ‘to do something for [their] country’. They also reported that China was not, as 
they’d been led to believe, ‘a one-party state’ and praised China’s ‘democratic’ features such as the 
multi-party system.588 
Through the early 1990s, the most significant coverage that Struggle gave to China-related themes 
was to acknowledge the centenary of Mao Zedong’s birth. He was recommended as ‘the most 
outstanding’ of the ‘many competent Marxists’ who emerged through the Chinese revolution.589 
This theme was covered again in the next issue and was accompanied by a reading list of 
suggested Mao writings. The list became a regular feature in the publication. Apart from this, 
there was criticism of the Dalai Lama to accompany his visit to New Zealand in 1991 and a short 
article noting the successes in the ‘building of socialism’ in 1992.590 
Struggle was increasingly silent about activities within China, especially during the period of Jiang 
Zemine.591 The publication’s answer to its worries about China was generally not to say anything. 
When it published an article critical of labour relations in the PRC and referred obliquely to ‘the 
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restoration of capitalism’, it drew a sharp response from a long-time subscriber.592 Instead it 
reverted to articles on China’s international activities, where China could be presented as 
different from other big powers. Sino-Latin American and Sino-African relations were feted as 
offering a superior choice to imperialist relations. While China wasn’t being talked about as a 
bastion of socialism and offering a path towards communism, it was still an alternative model to 
capitalism. The contrast to this was in articles that referred to the People’s Republic of China’s 
history – and the earlier the period being discussed, the clearer the line seemed to be able to be. 
It was left to the Socialist Party of Aotearoa (SPA), which had succeeded the Socialist Unity Party 
after the collapse of Eastern Europe, to be more upbeat about contemporary China. In fact its 
reports were almost the same as those as the beginning of this study. Its publication reported that 
‘socialist state[s] … are mostly building socialist market economies. China’s rapid development 
has been particularly marked’.593 Not only was China firmly in the socialist camp, it was providing 
a model to the rest. For the SPA, in 2003, ‘China’s socialist system proved itself, making giant 
strides in living standards and industry and reuniting Hong Kong and Macau with the 
motherland’.594 
 
Conclusions 
There were some particular features that go partly to explain why New Zealand communists were 
so attracted to a revolution that took place 10,000 kilometres away. Not the least of these was 
New Zealand’s own racial composition, and the country’s smallness in relation to the large 
imperialist powers. The fact that it was ‘a paradise of the second international’, meant that those 
with a radical Marxist ambition must have seemed less likely to succeed with those ambitions 
which made having a connection with one that seemed to embody their own aspirations even 
more attractive.595 
In addition, the CPNZ had a seies of peculiarly close connections to the Chinese recvolution. 
This was in part personal, through figures such as Rewi Alley and Shirley Barton, but also 
through Vic Wilcox’s elevation in international communist circles as a result of the CPNZ’s role 
given the position it took in the Sino-Soviet split. Ultimately though, what took the CPNZ into 
its intimate relationship with the CPC was ideological factros, in particular its understanding of 
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the role and nature of social democracy, itself born out of the long relationship the CPNZ had 
with the New Zealand Labour Party. 
This chapter though is less about the factors that took the CPNZ to China than the changing 
ways in which a changing PRC was represented in New Zealand communist discourse. The Party 
did not only have directly presented images of the PRC. Such is the interconnectiveness of the 
communist message that representations of domestic New Zealand conditions also involved 
features that can be interpreted as an ideological representation of the PRC. This was particularly 
so during the late 1960s when cultural revolution politics saw themselves being played out in 
New Zealand, and during the early and late 1970s when questions of the PRC’s international 
politics were tranplanted to New Zealand – with ultimately disasterous results for the unity of the 
CPNZ. 
For reasons detailed here, the CPNZ traveled a path that saw it grow increasingly close of the 
CPC. As it did so it transformed the image it had of itself. The parties grew together because of 
their shared belief in Marxist orthodoxy, the further united in the revolutionary transformative 
project of the cultural revolution – and although this was a Chinese project that the CPNZ could 
only truly cheer on from afar, it still had a profound influence on the CPNZ. 
The change in Chinese policies that followed the end of the Cultural Revolution and the death of 
Mao broke the links between the CPC and the CPNZ, although new parties were formed in New 
Zealand to maintain the links that had been forged from the late 1950s. Even for these parties 
though China was different; and for some their ongoing links were with the memory of Mao’s 
China rather than with the ongoing activities of Deng’s. It is no small irony that by the end of the 
period examined here, the only party seemingly committed to support for current Chinese 
politics was effectively the SUP - the one that broke with the CPNZ over the latter’s support for 
Mao’s revolution. 
In part these changes can be explained as resulting from the particular process of truth telling 
that the various communist groups engaged with about the PRC and New Zealand. Marxist truth 
has a deep commitment to accuracy, but what accuracy means is deeply influenced by ideological 
questions, in particular by the commitment to a socially transformative project that makes some 
truths important and others irrelevant. 
  154
Chapter 5: The Imagination of China by NZ Student Activists in the 1970s. 
This chapter focuses on the NZUSA Study Tours to China that took place primarily in the 1970s 
and the image of China that the participants on the tour projected on their return. The New 
Zealand University Students’ Association organised tours in 1971 and thereafter each year from 
1973 until 1978. After looking at student tours which pre-dated the NZUSA ones, I focus in 
particular on the student tours of 1971 and 1974. A close examination of these two tours, 
although separated by just three years, is revealing of a changing China. This is both in the way 
that the PRC represented itself and, drawing on Badiou, in the way the New Zealand students 
were subjectively positioned – that is became subjects – as they engaged with the PRC. I 
interviewed participants from across the student tours of the 1970s and collected data through a 
brief survey. In addition, for the two tours on which I focus, I organised reunions, (re)viewings 
of films that tour participants had shot on the tours, digitalised slide collections and transcribed 
diary accounts. 
These student tours were a distinctive kind of experience, different from the Cultural Revolution 
events they witnessed because they did not involve the struggle for power, but also different 
from ‘normal’ tourism.The kinds of subject-object relationships that are found in this kind of 
travel experience are different from those found in political events where people are part of an 
ongoing community, where they are related to durable relationships, rather than moments of 
intensity distinguished by their shortness. This does not negate the transformative importance of 
such travel, and may even heighten it. As identified in chapter 2, the predominent framework 
such travel has been examined within has been one of deception but the key issue here is not so 
much whether the students experienced a truth about China, but rather whether or not they 
experienced their own subjective realities differently as a result of their China experiences. As 
such it has a relationship with Orientalist travel in that it about the travelling subject rather than 
the world they are travelling in, but instead of based on differences it is based on the idea of a 
shared humanity in which the politically engaged traveller assumes an engagement with the 
society in which they are travelling. Yet this sense of participation is the illusion, they are always 
able to leave, and the realities of being a leftist, oppositional, student in New Zealand was very 
different from having an oppositional stance in the PRC when it was in the thralls of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
The student tours in 1971 and 1974 corresponded with two highly publicised accounts of other 
visits to the PRC. In May of 1971 representatives from the Committee of Concerned Asian 
Scholars (CCAS) travelled from the United States to the PRC. This trip resulted in the 
publication China! Inside the People’s Republic. 596  The CCAS tour left China a week before the 
NZUSA tour arrived. In 1974, as part of their engagement with Maoism, several Telquelians 
                                                        
596 Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, China! Inside the People’s Republic, Bantam, New York, 1972. 
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decided to arrange a trip to China.597 On the trip were Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, Marcelin 
Pleynet, Philippe Sollers, and Francois Wahl. The trip was organised in part by Maria-Antoinetta 
Macciocchi, an Italian Communist whose book De La Chine (On China) had sparked interest in 
the Cultural Revolution.598 Jacques Lacan, who had originally been scheduled to go with the 
group, pulled out at the last moment. The group left Paris on April 11 and returned on May 3, 
having spent three weeks travelling around China. The return to Paris produced a flurry of texts: 
not only Kristeva’s book About Chinese Women, but also articles by Barthes and Wahl in the Paris 
newspaper Le Monde, and a Tel quel special issue called ‘In China’.599 The texts by the members of 
the editorial committee (Sollers, Pleynet, and Kristeva) praised the Cultural Revolution as the 
future of Marxism, and named China the potential catalyst for world revolution. Barthes and 
Wahl were more reserved. Like the NZUSA tours, comparing the CCAS group’s report of the 
PRC with that of Tel Quel illustrates a changing China; the differences between 1971 and 1974 
over these two visits bears a remarkable correlation to the differences between the two NZUSA-
organised tours of the same years. 
The New Zealand students differ from the other groups in significant ways: the Tel Quel group 
seems to have been interested predominately in Mao’s China as an aesthetic and philisophical 
other. It is also fair to say that China was a fleeting intellectual fashion. The New Zealand 
students were activists, and rather than their point of reference being imaginative structures, 
signs, civilisational otherness, they were the student movement, trades unions and the protect 
activities they were involved with. For the most part they also differed from the CCAS scholars 
who were professional analysts of Asian societies. 
 
Utopia and Dystopia 
For those on the study tours throughout this period, China initially represented an unexplored 
'other', of which the tour participants had an overwhelmingly favourable impression.  As the 
tours – and China’s self-image – developed, this quickly progressed into a utopian revolutionary 
vision – in part, as the basis for the selection of the tour participants changed from 'selling' China 
to developing and consolidating student activists. Later, like other national representations of the 
'New Left Movement', New Zealand's 'Maoists' traded in their pro-China vision for solidarity on 
the basis of anti-revisionism and anti-Sovietism and began to look to less problematic loci for 
their utopian images. 
                                                        
597 ‘Telquelians’: those associated with the French avant-garde literary journal Tel Quel (‘As Is’). See Patrick Ffrench, The 
Time of Theory: A History of Tel Quel (1960-1983), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995. 
598 Maria-Antoinetta Macciocchi, De La Chine (‘From China’), published in English as Daily Life in Revolutionary China, 
Monthly Review Press, New York, 1973.  
599 Julia Kristeva, About Chinese Women, Boyars, London 1977. 
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By ‘utopian’ I am referring not just to a literary traditon that dates to More’s book of 1516 but to 
a notion which emerged from an exchange between Theodor Adorno and Ernst Bloch in the 
mid-1960s.600  Adorno declared ‘inwardly, everyone knows, whether they admit it or not, that 
things could be otherwise. People could live without hunger and probably without fear, but as 
free-beings’. Bloch did not dissent. For Perry Anderson, commenting on this exchange, ‘the spur 
to utopian longing came from the bare words heard in Mahogany: “something is missing”. They 
contained no promise of anything better, only a desire’.601 This sense of lack in what their own 
societies offerred increasingly inspired student interest in China. Yet while some saw their trips as 
discovery, others would reject the imperialist connotations of such an approach. 
This hope for something better – or noticing that the existing situation is not perfect – needs 
something more to become a utopian longing. Ian Buchanan, in commenting on the rich 
contribution of Fredric Jameson to the study of utopia, suggests that utopia requires 
performativity to come into being: 
The Utopian utterance performs Utopia even when and where it does not actually state 
it. So it is as a performative, the nature of which we are yet to specify, that Utopia is 
finally to be reckoned. But what kind of performative is it? Fortunately, the list of 
options is relatively short, and there is only one that fits the bill, and that is the act of 
promising. When you promise something you create an expectation, but do not fulfil it – 
except at a cost of extinguishing the promise itself, and that is their whole point.602 
For Buchanan utopia ‘takes the form of a promise, or a better promising-machine’, which he 
notes, quoting Derrida, owes its possibility to ‘the ordeal of undecidability’ [it does not deliver 
anything].603 This notion of the performance underpins the retreat from fascination with China in 
the late 1970s and the focus on the material notions of well-being in the first years of that 
decade. While the PRC seemed to be delivering better living standards, its performance in terms 
of creating the new person and transforming gender relations were harder to see in practice. 
Utopia has more substance than this, though. From his exhaustive study of literary utopias, 
Jameson notes that they have always come in two dimensions – existential and institutional. As 
Perry Anderson interprets: ‘visions of another human nature or an alternative civic order’ and 
historically four ‘commanding themes’: 
                                                        
600 Utopia, written by Sir Thomas More, depicts a fictional island with its own unique religion and customs. Sir Thomas 
More's work introduces readers into the concept of a perfect society with utopian, or perfect, ideas and beliefs. This 
timeless classic, originally written in 1516, was itself heavily influenced by Plato's Republic. Theordor Adorno and Ernst 
Bloch, published in Aesthetics and Politics: Debates Between Bloch, Lukacs, Brecht, Benjamin, Adorno, Verso, London, 1980. 
601 Perry Anderson, ‘The River of Time’, New Left Review, 26 March-April 2004, 75. His reference is to Bertolt Brecht’s 
parable of greed and indifference The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahogany (Arcade Publishing, New York, 1995). 
602 Ian Buchanan, ‘Metacommentary on Utopia, or Jameson’s dialectic of hope’, Utopian Studies, Spring 1998, 21. 
603 Buchanan, ‘Metacommentary’, 22. 
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First there was property – the topic More took from Plato, at the very origin of Western 
political thought. Then came work-play-art, conceived as a single continuum or 
interchange, from Schiller to Morris. After that arrived sexuality and its consequences: 
Diderot, Fourier and their decendents. Finally, nature as conquest or companion, 
Trotsky against Benjamin.604 
In particular, images such as those of being able to advance limitless aspirations merely through 
applying the correct ideology are clearly utopian, although not generally a feature of the Western 
utopian canon. This inability to clearly articulate what is or is not utopia is at the heart of the 
concept. Again returning to Jameson, Peter Fitting suggests that  
[the] most fruitful and troubling intervention lies in his proposal that the literary utopia 
should not be seen as the representation of an ideal society, but as a reflection on ‘our 
own incapacity to conceive [utopia] in the first place’. 605 
Yet if as Richard Rorty suggests, ‘Utopias are [simply] maps of the imagination… that offer 
directions to guide our projects of social engineering and personal transformation’ then it 
becomes easy to reconcile hope and utopia. For Rorty, ‘Hope, on the other hand, hold[s] a 
promise beyond reason and planning… I would prefer to use the word “utopia”, referring simply 
to a future in which some particular hopes are fulfilled’.606 
For the purpose of this examination I treat as utopian all imaginaries or reportage that deals with 
aspirations and hopes that at their heart are transformative – of human beings, societies or the 
environment. Those where such hope is unsatisfied or crushed, I treat as dystopian. In this I 
follow Anderson for whom dystopia is more than anti-utopia. Commenting on the ancient 
utopian theme of science, he notes that in modern utopian literature, instead of hope, science 
represents the nightmare ‘of technological domination: the corruption of what is most essentially 
human by malignant use of the powers of science’. Dystopia, then, is intimately connected to 
utopia, it is that in which there was hope proving otherwise.607 The shift from a utopia of hope, 
to one which requires performativity (that it largely failed), to a sense of the PRC as dystopia, 
overlays both the NZUSA and Tel Quelian shifts through this period. 
 
NZUSA Study Tours 
Since its founding on 1 October 1949 the PRC has engaged in what it refers to as 'people-to-
people diplomacy’, whereby quasi-official organisations have promoted China's national image 
                                                        
604 Perry Anderson, ‘The River of Time’, 71. 
605 Peter Fitting, ‘The Concept of Utopia in the Work of Fredric Jameson’, Utopian Studies, Spring 1998, 9. See Fredric 
Jameson, The Prison House of Language, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975, 230. 
606 Richard Rorty, ‘Hope and the Future’, Peace Review 14, 2, 2002, 149. 
607 Anderson, ‘The River of Time’, 73 
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through study tours exchanges and foreign language publications.  NZUSA's Study Tours to 
China were an example of this 'people-to-people' contact.  They were organised initially via the 
New Zealand China Friendship Society, although after New Zealand government recognition of 
the PRC in 1972 and due to particular political differences amongst New Zealand-based left-wing 
organisations, they were organised directly by NZUSA with the PRC embassy in Wellington.608 
The first NZ students to go on an organised ‘study tour’ actually went to China in 1967 and 
1968, through joining an Australasian contingent organised by the Australian Union of 
Students.609  The first of these was led by Stephen Fitzgerald.610 New Zealander Kent Pearson 
wrote two articles for the Dominion Sunday Star Times as a result of his time in China in 1967.  In 
an attempt to explain the Cultural Revolution in terms New Zealanders would understand he 
described the Red Guards as really very much ‘like Boy Scouts’ and the GPCR itself as ‘much like 
a jamboree’.611 
This trip was not arranged by NZUSA, although Pearson himself was in regular contact with 
then NZUSA President Ross Mountain612. Unlike subsequent tours the participants were neither 
briefed by NZUSA nor seen as representing NZ students. There were no criteria for selection 
and the application process was simply a case ‘filling out a form and agreeing to pay the 
money’.613 
Peter Woolley who went on the 1968 trip, like Pearson, had not come to his interest in the PRC 
through the radical politics that would dominate subsequent tours614. Yet, to a large extent, the 
features of the later tours were present in these earlier ones. Woolley’s own image of the PRC 
was undoubtedly utopian: 
                                                        
608 According to David Cuthbert, NZUSA President in 1971 and involved with selecting participants for subsequent 
tours as head of NZUSA’s tour company (Student Travel Bureau), NZUSA wanted to get away from the internal 
politics of the New Zealand China Society. He noted that the NZCFS was dominated by the Communist Party of New 
Zealand, although some branches – and increasingly NZUSA itself via the Workers Communist League – were 
influenced by Marxist-inspired groups outside of the CPNZ, or even who had been expelled from the CPNZ. A 
number of issues are themselves raised by the notion of 'guided tourism' a categorisation that these tours certainly fall 
under. It is an issue explored, albeit only briefly, in chapter 1. 
609 Note that although New Zealanders often regard their relationship with the PRC as being in advance of that of 
their cross-Tasman cousins, this preceding of NZ-China contacts by Australia-China ones was not unusual. It was not 
just student tours. China Society tours started in Australia before New Zealand, the Australian Government recognized 
China before New Zealand did, and Communist Party of Australia cadre were training in China through the 1950s and 
1960s with nothing comparative being offered to New Zealand members. Even Vic Wilcox’s very close contact with 
Mao Zedong was dwarfed by that of Ted Hill, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-
Leninist), whom Mao once referred to as a ‘very good friend’ in contrast to other foreigners who were simply ‘good 
friends’. 
610 He would later be the first Australian ambassador to the PRC, serving in Beijing from 1973 to 1976. 
611 Kent Pearson, ‘Red Guards More Like Boy Scouts’, Dominion Sunday Times, 7 May 1967, 11. 
612  Mountain was also very interested in international affairs. He ‘graduated’ from NZUSA to work for the 
International Union of Students and followed this with a long and illustrious career in human rights work for the 
United Nations. In 2003, he was a special representative to Iraq for UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and again to 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2004.  
613 Peter Woolley, interview, Auckland, 25 November 2003. 
614 He said he simply saw the advertisement and was interested in China through his study and as a place that not many 
others had got to go to. Since his flatmate was also interested, they decided to sign up. 
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I really thought in those days that they were engaged in a reconstruction of the country 
that could actually work. I was extremely sceptical about our way of life in New Zealand 
as it was a reflection of … materialistic values … I thought it lacked meaning and I 
thought that the Chinese were engaged in a project to reconstruct life for society as a 
whole … I didn’t see that there was a lot of meaning in the alienated life that people 
lived in their little nuclear families in New Zealand and … that [the Chinese] were 
attempting social change on a huge scale… they would evolve a different system that 
wouldn’t be so materialistic and would be more inclusive.615 
Even though he was not connected to groups seeking to change New Zealand society, like 
subsequent tour participants, Wooley still saw his opportunity to visit China in terms of wanting 
to change New Zealand. He hoped that ‘if it works there then it could work here. 616  Yet 
Woolley’s experience would not convince him of either the exportability or the success he sought 
for the China model. 
Like those on subsequent tours he took to wandering away from the official party in order to 
experience a ‘real China’ away from the ‘stage-managed experience’ of which he was part.617 On 
one such trip he met an English-speaking local who wouldn’t talk with him. ‘Timid rather than 
shy’, he felt. Another time he was (falsely) accused of insulting Mao Zedong. 618 Woolley, who 
would eventually become a senior lawyer with Hesketh Henry was horrified by the arbitrary 
nature of the accusation and an experience at complete variance with his sense of justice, in 
particular the tense and frightening atmosphere that dominated the proceedings. He left 
uncertain that the claimed aspirations of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which he 
largely supported, were likely to be achieved. 
I think one of the disappointing factors [was that] if … the process [I was looking for] 
was going on and I certainly left China not at all certain that it was, then there certainly 
wasn’t a lot of evidence that it was working… I think I was taken by that incident in the 
park when that guy who came up to us seemed scared… Maybe even if it was a 
revolution with high humanitarian values in mind then maybe the outcome of it was 
either highly uncertain or dysfunctional. 
                                                        
615 Woolley, interview. 1968 was perhaps the height of the Cultural Revolution. Woolley’s memory of his hope at the 
time reflects the imaginary of the mid-1970s, when campaigns of a similar intensity had returned to Chinese daily life. 
616 Woolley, interview. 
617 Woolley, interview. He noted his search for a China succeeding in its enormous social project was compromised by 
the strait-jacketed experience: ‘The fact that everything was so stage-managed made it seem that it wasn’t so’. 
618 The party had visited Mao’s childhood home in Shaoshan, itself a pilgrimage site for Chinese Red Guards, some of 
whom partially buried pictures of the Chairman in the ground. Woolley thinks he (or another tall blond white person) 
may have accidently stood on one of these while straining to see something their guides had been pointing out in the 
room. The intensity of the accusation had been increased by a discovery the previous evening of a Mao picture that 
had been defaced – by the drawing on it of a moustache. Woolley explained that he in fact had a great deal of respect 
for Mao and what he had achieved and indeed for the entire Chinese nation and had not been involved in either or 
these slights. In the end the Chinese said that they had ‘accepted his apology, and that the matter was closed’ (Woolley, 
interview). 
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Woolley’s story was not sought after in the same way as the students who followed him. In part 
this was because there was no NZUSA supporting the process by organising press conferences 
and getting NZPA accreditation for him and other tour participants, although the Australians 
weren’t feted either. In addition though, Woolley did not return immediately to New Zealand. He 
went directly from the tour to take a position in the Australian High Commission to Papua New 
Guinea.619 
Unlike subsequent tours there was virtually no coverage of these student trips. Pearson had two 
articles in the Dominion Sunday Times and John Christie, who would lead the 1974 Tour, 
remembered attending a talk by Ray Caird, Woolley’s flatmate companion on the 1968 trip, at the 
University of Canterbury Students’ Association in the early 1970s. It seems remarkable, but  there 
was very little coverage of the Cultural Revolution in the New Zealand student press at all. Of 
the millions of Chinese students swarming out to the countryside and assembling in Tian’anmen 
Square the papers were silent.  At Victoria, the campus with the most developed political 
consciousness of any in NZ, this was in part because the student paper Salient was controlled by 
Trotskyists who provided readers with extensive coverage of US student activity, and of the 
resistance to American and New Zealand involvement in Vietnam620 but no apparent interest in 
the ‘deformed worker state’ of the People’s Republic of China.621 
In fact the only coverage of these earlier trips was in the context of the NZUSA-organised trips 
beginning: 
New Zealand students most recently visited the PRC in 1968 when four NZrs (sic) were 
part of a forty-strong party organised by the Australian Union of Students. The PRC was 
undergoing a Cultural Revolution at that time, but equally important, so far as student 
visits were concerned, some members of the Australasian party made uncomplimentary 
comments about Chairman Mao Tsetung, in the hearing of their Chinese hosts. As a 
result, invitations ceased forthwith.622 
 
                                                        
619 Perhaps as another indication of the changes that took place so quickly at this time he reported that another of the 
students on his tour turned up in Port Moresby asking if she, ‘and her friend’, could meet with him. ‘Are you working 
for ASIO [Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation]?’ he asked. ‘Yes’ she admitted. They went to dinner, the 
‘friend’ asked if Woolley had come to PNG with any ‘revolutionary intentions’ and his denial appears to have been 
accepted. At least he reported that he heard no more about it (all from Woolley, interview). Somewhat in contrast Pat 
McCabe, who went on the 1974 NZUSA Tour to China and had been involved in progressive student activities was 
recruited to Foreign Affairs in New Zealand and immediately went onto the China desk – as a recognition that by 
going on the tour he had direct and useful experience with the PRC. 
620 According to Richard Sharpe, who went on the 1971 tour (and then subsequently to Taiwan), the general context in 
1971 was: ‘The Vietnam war was on. We had been subject to ballot for Compulsory Military Service on our 20th 
birthdays, and there had been the fear that we, like the Australian conscripts, might be sent to Vietnam. The majority 
of students were against the Vietnam War. Students were politically active’. This coverage was important as many 
students came to have an interest in China through campaigning against the war in Vietnam and then saw in China a 
home for their ant-imperialist beliefs (Sharpe, interview, Wellington, 15 November 2004). 
621 Bill Logan, formerly a member of the Young Nationals but by 1968 a leader with the Trotskyite ‘Spartacist League’, 
was editor of Salient. 
622 ‘Trip to China’, Salient, 24, 12, 16 June 1971, 1. 
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China Fades Away 
The NZUSA tours, which started in 1971 and were annual from 1973 to 1978, eventually petered 
out due to a combination of lack of interest by New Zealand students and changes in the practice 
of China's people-to-people diplomacy.  In addition, links with the revolutionary movement in 
the Philippines were developed by the radical groups that dominated student activities in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Subsequently, despite the continued dominance of the New Zealand 
student movement by avowedly pro-China groups, New Zealand students were to replace the 
PRC as their symbolic touchstone long before the events of May and June 1989.623 
1978 was the last tour.  This seems to have been because of a lack of interest on both sides.  The 
tours became increasingly expensive as Chinese subsidies were withdrawn. In addition, the tours 
were under-subscribed in 1977 and 1978, meaning that there was no opportunity to 'select' the 
most appropriate delegates. This also meant that the tour parties had too many non-
revolutionaries (ie ‘ordinary students’) to enable the previous aim of consolidating the politics of 
‘progressives’ towards the radical left. Yet those with an overtly anti-Chinese disposition would 
still have been outside the published criteria of being open to learn about China. In addition the 
conflict between China and Vietnam shattered the image of China for many of those who had 
come to an interest in China via opposition to the Vietnam War, despite the efforts of the 
NZCFS. Students, and ex-students, given their identification with opposition to the War, were 
particularly succeptible to this sense of loss. There was also clearly declining interest on the China 
side.  It seems that foreign students had run their course as leading participants in supporting 
China's revolution, and that included the promotion of it to the outside world.  The early 1980s 
would see a new vehicle emerge:  the 'prominent person's tour'. 
However, for an inspirational model New Zealand radical students were drifting away from the 
practice of socialism in the PRC towards the promise offered by the revolutionary movement in 
places such as the Philippines, untarnished as they were by the compromises that might be 
required in the exercise of state power. For tours that would consolidate New Zealand student 
activists towards a radical position, the countryside of Central Luzon was replacing Dazhai and 
the Northwest Textile Factory Number 1 near Xian. 
…people going off to [New People’s Army] areas, so-called ‘Red Tourism’. I guess they 
were looking for a revolution in that same way as, what would they do now, Nepal I 
guess. It’s always more exciting to get involved with people who are waging a war of 
                                                        
623 Students who had been on these tours in fact reported that quite a number participated in demonstrations against 
the Chinese state’s activities in Tiananmen square on June 4, 1989 – albeit with ‘great reluctance’ and with a sense of 
betrayal (George Rosenberg, interview, 20 December 2003, Stubbs, interview, Wellington, 18 November 2003). 
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liberation than the nuts and bolts of making the drains work, etc. They were looking to 
find something more romantic.624  
There was another problem for the New Zealand student groups. Try as they might to interact 
with the Chinese it was the Communist Party of New Zealand that held the Chinese ‘franchise’. 
When the Mao-inspired groups that dominated the student scene discovered that there was a 
living revolution in the Philippines, they could associate with it also meant that they did not need 
to manage the relationship with the CPNZ in order to advance it. 
The Philippines was easy to associate with and incredibly exciting. It was closer to us 
than Nicaragua. More importantly it was ours – we had the franchise and were not 
competing with anyone else for that…625 
So from 1980 to 1986 there is virtually no coverage in student media about China – despite that 
this was a period when the Workers' Communist League (WCL) dominated the NZ student-
activist landscape, and student newspapers.  The WCL officially described itself as pro-Mao 
Zedong Thought.  However one insider admitted that they didn't really understand what was 
going on in China and that rather than ‘shitting on an old friend’ they just kept silent.626  But they 
became increasingly distant from the PRC and when student activists of the same political 
tradition visited the PRC in 1986 they were far more sceptical of what they saw.  In addition, they 
felt no overwhelming desire to share their experiences with the rest of the student community.627 
 
The 1971 NZUSA Trip 
That was very much different from the situation in 1971 when, after negotiations between 
NZUSA and the China Friendship Society, word came that ‘20 visas had been approved’ for a 
delegation of New Zealand students to travel to the PRC.628 This was a hugely significant trip.  
At the time very few New Zealanders had been to the PRC, other than Communist Party 
members and China Society 'fellow travellers'.  The trip was seen as an opportunity for New 
Zealanders to get an objective image of the PRC, and would, according to then NZUSA 
                                                        
624 Murray Horton, interview. 
625 Robert Reid, interview. 
626 Former WCL cadre, interview, Wellington, 2004. 
627 Bruce Cronin, e-Interview, 2006. Cronin was involved with the Workers’ Communist League although this was 
about to disband when he was selected to be an NZUSA representative on a New Zealand youth delegation to Beijing. 
He did not expect to see socialism in practice, although was impressed with some of what he saw. He wrote a report 
for NZUSA but not for widespread distribution to the student media. Coverage of the trip in student papers focussed 
on a dispute within the delegation on the situation of women in New Zealand society, with the non-NZUSA delegates 
objecting to the suggestion that there was widespread sexism and violence against women in New Zealand. Amidst 
this, there was very little comment about China at all. 
628 This construction of the communication to NZUSA was strikingly similar to that reported by the Committee of 
Concerned Asian Scholars: ‘pick up your visa in two days, prepare to travel in two weeks’ (see Inside the People’s Republic, 
7). 
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President David Cuthbert, ‘change the way that New Zealanders saw China’.629 Cuthbert argued 
that it was a way of ‘promoting the “truth about China” in a way that was going to have more 
credibility amongst ordinary people than CPNZ or NZCFS tours could do’.630 
The Chinese themselves argued that it was the students themselves, rather than the audience that 
awaited them on their return were their selected targets: 
During the tour, when we asked the guides why the Chinese Government had invited a 
group of students [rather than another sector of society] as the first delegation from NZ 
to visit China, they said that it was because China was a young country which was 
developing rapidly, and that they thought that our age group would understand best 
what they were trying to do. They noted that it would be a good investment in future 
relationships with New Zealand through our lives.631 
The process from the announcement of the trip to its departure was significant news in New 
Zealand, with editorials in daily newspapers commenting on it and condemnation in conservative 
publications such as New Zealand Tablet. 
The findings that will be brought back to New Zealand by the 20-strong delegation the 
New Zealand University Students Association is sending to Communist China are a 
foregone conclusion. 
They will return spouting the praises of Chairman Mao and … signal an acceleration of 
the drive to get New Zealand and Peking into each other’s arms. 632 
When announced, the composition of the group was also not without some criticism. A Political 
Science lecturer from the University of Otago, Stuart Greif, complained that none of his students 
who were studying contemporary China at MA level were chosen. He objected that the tour 
party was made of just ‘student leaders’ and selected precisely because they didn’t know about 
China.633 Tablet had picked up on these criticisms:  
… applicants were vetted to see that those who were favourably disposed to China got 
the nod… students who knew something about China from their studies were passed 
over…634 
                                                        
629 NZUSA media release, quoted in ‘Forgone Conclusion’, New Zealand Tablet, XCVIII, 27, 7 July 1971, 2. 
630 David Cuthbert, interview, Wellington, 3 November 2003. 
631 Richard Sharpe, response to survey. 
632 An article in New Zealand Tablet claimed that the students would be pre-selected to present a laudatory account of 
their time and the society they visited and that the offer to visit a communist country should have been refused. It also 
described the NZCFS as ‘a communist front group’ and said that ‘the NZUSA has already come out strongly for Red 
China’. See ‘Foregone conclusion’, New Zealand Tablet, 2. 
633 Stuart Greif, Letter to the editor, Otago Daily Times, NZUSA records, Beaglehole Room, Victoria University of 
Wellington. 
634 ‘Foregone conclusion’, New Zealand Tablet, 2. 
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Yet others were selected who satisfied Greif’s criteria, most obviously Graeme Clarke, who had 
just completed an honours degree in Asian Studies and Phillip Morrison, a masters student in 
Geography, whose research was on agricultural development and had already undertaken 
fieldwork in Malaysia that would serve as a useful comparison. In addition, the tour party 
included Ah Fo Wong, a Malaysian student who spoke Mandarin, Cantonese and Shanghaiese, as 
well as local Chinese dialects.635 As NZUSA President Cuthbert pointed out, although around a 
quarter of the delegation were student leaders this was because the delegation was representing 
New Zealand students and this would have been an expectation on the part of the Chinese 
hosts.636 
The selectors, despite limited time, chose what they regarded as a 'balanced' tour party, 
representing each campus and a variety of political perspectives.637  There was a clear agenda to 
ensure that their findings would not be written off as those of the already converted. 
People were chosen because they had access to speaking and writing about experiences. 
But there was a real cross-section of views. Perhaps as proof of this, the party had a big 
negotiation amongst ourselves about going to the Great Wall. One faction believed that 
going to the Great Wall was frivolous, it would be being tourists. Other faction said 
we’re here, let’s see it. Not all went. Don’t know what Chinese made of it.638 
For selector David Cuthbert the balance meant ‘credibility within the student movement and 
credibility amongst general society at large’. The context that he saw the students operating in 
was that the trip was certain to get a lot of exposure and accordingly one of the considerations 
was that people were articulate and credible, that they were ‘coming from a different range of 
viewpoints’ since ‘if they had a coherence then they would have been able to have been written 
off’. 639  Another selector, Jack Shallcrass, said that the panel were not looking for people 
necessarily ‘sympathetic to China’, but those that were ‘open to the possibilities that China 
had’.640 For David Caygill, the tour deputy leader, these aims were achieved: 
I didn’t get the sense that any were sceptical, they were impressed, grateful for the 
opportunity. All were interested in how the Chinese organised their economy, in what 
                                                        
635 Interview, Ah Fo Wong, Melbourne, 5 July 2005. Graeme Clarke reported that Ah Fo could communicate with 
local people somewhat better even than their official translators, who were all from Beijing (Graeme Clarke, interview, 
Wellington, 7 November 2003). 
636 None were actually NZUSA office holders or employees as there was NZUSA policy restricting their participation 
in overseas delegations. 
637 There were however fifteen men and just three women. Tour leader Grocott’s report to NZUSA subsequent to the 
tour calls for more geographical balance but lends no attention to the question of gender participation. See Paul 
Grocott, Report to the NZUSA National Executive on the NZUSA China Delegation, NZUSA Box 51, Beaglehole 
Room, VUW. 
638 David Caygill, interview, Wellington, 21 November 2003. 
639 Interview Cuthbert. 
640 Jack Shallcrass, interview, Wellington, 20 November 2003. Shallcrass was a senior lecturer at the Wellington College 
of Education. Known as someone with left-wing sympathies he was included as someone both sympathetic to the 
PRC and who would also lend some academic credibility to the exercise. 
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running a commune meant. What we captured though was at a human level. The people 
and the nature of their lives more than about communism. I had no sense that some 
were keener on what they saw than others.641 
As the first delegation to represent students to the PRC, the participants clearly saw their role as 
an important one. Their diary accounts are testament to their desire to note everything that they 
were told and the reportage that they produced on their return and testament to their desire to 
faithfully represent China’s views to the world.642 
The delegates were wide-eyed and imagined themselves entering into the unknown.643  Their 
impressions consist of overwhelmingly positive images of China and were interspersed with 
comments as to how strange they were themselves regarded, especially those drawn from the NZ 
radical political scene with their afros and straggly beards. While some observations directly 
remark on what was lacking in New Zealand society, such as the that noted by Kitty Hayward 
that the Chinese were ‘just involved…totally involved, and we aren’t. That’s just it… They had a 
future which is something… out of fashion in our society, I think. You live for today’.644 Others 
dealt with more concrete aspirations, ‘the idea of dealing with poverty through redistribution of 
resources was quite appealing’.645 
Graeme Clarke admitted that his recollection was able to be presented more coherently now than 
it would have been then but insisted that the impression was unchanged by the passage of time: 
My image of it was as a poor third world country where people had got rid of 
imperialism and had taken over control of economic development and were making 
tremendous advances economically and were daring to think about new ways of 
organising society and trying to grapple with problems of socialism that they hadn’t got 
to grips with in the Soviet Union.646 
This notion that China represented ‘socialism’, and a better form of socialism than that of the 
Soviet Union, was a recurring theme. So too was the notion that China was different from New 
Zealand, such as that embodied in Clarke’s ‘a poor third world country’ above, and that the 
choices China had made were right for it, but not necessarily of any further application. 
the Chinese are not interested in the export of the Chinese Revolution… and the reason 
is very straight-forward and simple. The Chinese revolution is a Chinese revolution and 
                                                        
641 Caygill, interview. 
642 I had made available to me the diaries of Graeme Clarke, John Robson and David Caygill. They are strikingly 
similar to one another. The articles that the delegates wrote on their return are mostly collected in the NZUSA 
archives, VUW library. In addition David Caygill made a copy of the New Zealand newspaper articles he had collected 
relating to the trip. 
643 David Caygill and Richard Sharpe echoed Peter Woolley’s comment that friends had expressed concern to them 
that if they went to China they might not be permitted to leave (Caygill, interview, Sharpe, interview). 
644 Bob Wellington, ‘China Through Students’ Eyes’, published in Salient, 5 July 1972, 7. 
645 Phillip Morrison, interview, Wellington, 5 November 2003. 
646 Graeme Clarke, interview. 
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it will not have application in India or Indo-China or in New Zealand… Their model is 
totally applicable only to the Chinese situation and the emphatic way I am presenting 
this is simply the emphatic way it was presented to us.647 
For a number of the tour party the highlight was their visit to Dazhai.648 They understood it as 
the epitome of self-reliance and over-coming adversity. In contrast to common suggestions that 
the students were shown the best and told that the rest of the country was all like that, Phillip 
Morrison said that they were ‘very conscious that Dazhai was unusual and was being held up as 
an icon’. They were aware that for the Chinese as well as them, Dazhai’s importance was 
symbolic. 
[It was]… well known that what was happening in Dazhai was not what was happening 
all over China. In fact people from Dazhai travelled all over China to promote what they 
were doing and to some extent we were part of that too.649 
In addition the students were aware that part of their mission, and the context they were part of, 
was to do with dispelling what they understood as myths about the PRC. For Graeme Clarke a 
key feature of this was that 
I was able to go out with Ah Fo Wong and talk with people and that made a tremendous 
impression. We were able to go out. One of the things you used to read about in New 
Zealand was that during the Cultural Revolution there were bodies floating down the 
Yangtse river. So the first night we went out, in Guangzhou, we found a group of kids 
sitting there and we asked them about it. They ended up giving us a copy of the Little 
Red Book and we talked about these things. So just from the point of view of being able 
to challenge the bullshit that we were being told in New Zealand it was important that 
we were able to get out and talk to ordinary people.650  
What this exchange seems to suggest, in the face of the known violence in Guangdong during 
the Cultural Revolution, was that Clarke is perfectly sincere in his belief and the fact that his 
engagement involved children, with a presumption of innocence that involves, lends itself to 
suggesting his sincerity is well-placed. His description may not be historically accurate but is an 
accurate depiction of his knowledge of that particular moment on the tour. 
                                                        
647 Paul Grocott, interviewed in ‘China Through Student Eyes’. 
648 Dazhai is the name of a mountainous North China village of several hundred farmers in Xiyang, Shanxi. In 1964, 
Mao Zedong published his statement, ‘Learn from Dazhai in agriculture’ and set up Dazhai as a national agricultural 
model. Daily, some 20,000 visitors passed through Dazhai to study this model of self-reliance. See Xin-An Lu, ‘Dazhai: 
Imagistic Rhetoric as a Cultural Instrument’, American Communication Journal, 5,1, Fall 2001. For the New Zealand 
students the importance of Dazhai was most dramatically represented in the film shot on the tour by Piri Sciascia. Of 
the 31 minutes of film, some 11 minutes, around a third of the total, is of their time in Dazhai. “I was fascinated by it”, 
he recalled. 
649 Phillip Morrison, interview. 
650 Graeme Clarke, interview. 
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Caygill too referred to their ability to use Wong to test their interpreters work and to 
independently investigate questions of their own choosing. For him this was crucial to their 
ability to come back and speak with authority and to be convincing in their account. ‘It would 
have been much harder to do that without Wong having been with us’.651 Paul Grocott, who led 
the tour, made this same point in his report, accompanied by a recommendation that preferrably 
three Chinese speakers be included in a tour party of twenty people.652 This recommendation was 
not pursued. 
In his interview, Caygill dwelt on the question of being able to convince New Zealanders as to 
the veracity of the delegation’s findings at some length. He was sure that even without a 
knowledge of Chinese, simply  by being there and witnessing the body language and being able to 
gauge what was happening alongside the words that made up conversations he was part of, he 
could be sure that they were getting at the truth. 
I remember at one place we asked about divorce.  It took some time for the question to 
be made clear by our translators. ‘Divorce’. Was a pause, not because he didn’t want to 
answer, but because clearly it was difficult to answer. Eventually it came. ‘Yes’… a 
pause… ‘a divorce, we had one of those’. The answer really was that divorce didn’t 
happen very often, that a couple couldn’t easily just split up, and that they would be 
counselled by the rest of the group. That was a really interesting exchange. It didn’t 
matter that it took place in a foreign language, I watched it happen, and when I got back 
to New Zealand I was able to translate or relay that incident for its reality.653 
In China the students met with Guo Moruo who NZUSA claimed, with the removal of Liu 
Shaoqi, was nominally the leader of the Chinese state.654 A number of the participants were 
accredited by the New Zealand Press Association while in China. They were briefed and 
debriefed by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and gave a full day press conference on their return.  
Two of the delegates each recalled undertaking as many as sixty public meetings on their 
experiences in China. Piri Sciascia showed his super-8 film on dozens of occasions, and Phillip 
Morrison prepared his slide set as an educational resource for the Department of Education. 
NZUSA President David Cuthbert understood where the tour stood in relation to bigger issues: 
The context was also about taking into account the way that world events were moving. 
I had been to a presentation at a school by someone who had been on a China 
Friendship Tour and they were saying positive things about China. What they were 
                                                        
651 David Caygill, interview. 
652 Paul Grocott, Report on the NZUSA China Delegation. 
653 David Caygill, interview. 
654 Although this may have been how the students understood things to be, it was not the case. Guo was the equivalent 
of Speaker of the House of Representatives so certainly a senior leading figure, albeit of a body which had little real 
authority in China, certainly at that time. Liu Shaoqi had been formally replaced in an acting capacity with Dong Biwu 
and Song Qingling sharing the position – so they were the nominal heads of the Chinese State.  
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putting across, it was so at odds with what the popular media was putting out that it 
seemed to me that a group of well-informed and by-and-large articulate young New 
Zealanders would have real influence on the way that New Zealanders understood these 
questions. I think it fuelled the support for recognition that was already there in the 
Labour Party and the non-SUP dominated Labour movement. So it was part of the shift 
in history.655 
The recognition question was not the only contextual issue with respect to New Zealand-China 
relations. There were important individuals involved too. Not only Rewi Alley, whom the 
students met, but the man who was the most well-known New Zealander in China at the time, 
Vic Wilcox. Wilcox was head of the Communist Party of New Zealand whose paper, the People’s 
Voice, was the only English language newspaper available in China through much of the ‘Cultural 
Revolution Decade’.656 
On a number of occasions, it was assumed that we knew who Vic Wilcox was – who 
stood beside Chairman Mao representing New Zealand solidarity on the dais for the 
October 1st National Day parades. I had never heard of him, but soon learnt that he was 
the head of the New Zealand Communist Party. Some Chinese clearly thought that he 
was a famous person in New Zealand.657 
The students, however, were engaged in changing the contact that China had with New 
Zealanders – from those with Communist Party links to a more broadly representative group of 
New Zealanders. 
The delegation was told the ‘Cultural Revolution was over’ and it was talked about as having 
been, that is in the past tense, a huge success.658  This is consistent with the report above, 
announcing the tour, which contrasted 1971 with 1968, since ‘the PRC was undergoing a Cultural 
Revolution at that time’. The next tour, two years later, was told that they were in the middle of 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, as were subsequent tour parties until 1976, when the 
tour took place whilst the anti-Deng Xiaoping campaign was at its height. Certainly 1971 saw a 
                                                        
655 David Cuthbert, interview. 
656 As virtually the only western communist party supporting the CPC’s line with respect to the polemic against the 
CPSU, the CPNZ were accorded a number of privileges, one was that some 15,000 copies of the People’s Voice were 
purchased for sale in China each week – far more than were sold in New Zealand. According to Robert Reid ‘the joke 
going around the non-CPNZ left scene in New Zealand at the time was that the People’s Voice was that reason that 
people in China’s English was so bad’. 
657 Richard Sharpe, interview. 
658 Chinese material from the time, and the account of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, see below, talk of 
the start of the GPCR as in the past tense but not necessarily the event itself as having been completed, although also 
of the need for ‘more Cultural Revolutions in the future’. China! Inside the People’s Republic notes the Cultural Revolution 
as ‘winding down’. There are different end dates for the Cultural Revolution. The Nith Party Congress proclaimed the 
Cultural Revolution finished in 1969 (See Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After, Free Press 1986, 365 and 397). The 
fall of the Lin Biao led to a revival of Cultural Revolution rhetoric, especially when the Gang of Four were in charge, 
which probably accounts for what was being told to the participants in the later tour. The notion that the Cultural 
Revolution lasted for ten years was something constructed by the post-Mao leadership. 
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China that was engaged, albeit temporarily, in more moderate mobilisation activities than it had 
during 1966-68 and would see again later in the decade. 
Two students came home and wrote introductory textbooks for secondary school students 
studying China. Stuart Hadfield’s one for geography students proclaimed that 
in 1949 the exhausted, ill-fed and disillusioned people refused to support the corrupt rule 
of Chiang Kai-shek any longer…The peasants welcomed [the Communists] as liberators; 
Chiang fled to Taiwan and in 1949 the People’s Republic of China was formed.659 
Although mostly guarded in its language, it reports on the Great Leap Forward, communes and 
the Cultural Revolution in terms only of their stated objectives and as if those objectives had all 
been accomplished. On the pamphlet’s last page Hadfield wrote ‘political meetings are one of the 
main driving forces in the Chinese economy’ and that Mao’s goal is not just to create prosperity 
but a new society ‘first in China and then in the rest of the world… [the] remoulding of man is 
one of the most fundamental and important aims in the New China’.660 
There was no tour in 1972.  Although given internal policy debates in the PRC at this time it is 
really impossible to speculate as to why, NZUSA officials took the view that the absence of 
invitations was due to the outrage that folowed the visit to Taiwan by two of the 1971 delegation 
members, Richard Sharpe and David Caygill. They chose to visit Taiwan along with others, 
including future Labour Primie Minister Michael Moore and Rosemary Young.661 The Chinese 
did object, and NZUSA passed a resolution declaring Caygill, then a member of the NZUSA 
national executive by virtue of being President of the University of Canterbury Students' 
Association, a 'non-person' whose name was to never again be mentioned at an NZUSA meeting.  
They needn't have been quite so concerned.  Caygill and Sharpe were both far more impressed 
with what they had seen on the mainland than America's 'floating aircraft carrier' and were quite 
turned off by the Taiwanese propaganda in part because of the contrast to the ‘management’ that 
they had experienced in the PRC. 
Caygill believed in the one-China policy and as far as he was concerned he was simply going to 
‘another part of China’ and that the two would eventually re-unite. Significantly for him, aside 
from the propaganda that they were fed when he talked to ‘ordinary people’:  
                                                        
659 Stuart Hadfield, ‘China’, Looking At Asian Geography: Revolution, Evolution and Progress, Department of Education, 
Wellington, 1972, 32. 
660 Hadfield, ‘China’, 48. 
661 Sharpe reported that he wasn’t initially asked but Cora Davies pulled out after some pressure was placed on her to 
do so. Sharpe was President of the University of Canterbury Engineering Society and seems to have been regarded by 
some of his peers as quite conservative, although he disputes this (Sharpe, interview). However, the Taiwanese 
organisers must have thought he would have been sympathetic to their anti-communist message. Until a few months 
earlier, Caygill had been a member of the Young Nationals, Michael Moore, although in the Labour Party, was 
regarded as conservative. Rosemary Young was the daughter of Bill Young, a National Party Cabinet Minister at the 
time (Caygill, interview). 
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[they] talked in terms of material possessions, not in terms of freeing oppression. So I 
was interested in disparity in standards of living [between Taiwan and what I had seen 
on the mainland] and my sense was, from looking at the economic figures, what struck 
me was that the standards of living were not that different.662 
Sharpe saw the two tours as being linked. He wrote that: 
The open aim of the visit was to counter the publicity the student delegation to China 
had received in New Zealand… We were taken to an event for the World Anti-
Communist Youth League… and were individually introduced as honoured guests to the 
40,000 strong crowd to huge acclamation... I think we were all very embarrassed at this 
con job, and the political motivation for our trip was becoming clear.663 
On another occasion the New Zealanders were taken to a government agency charged with 
monitoring the PRC and shown films supposedly taken six months before, roughly the same 
time as the delegation to the PRC had also been there. These films showed terrible human rights 
on the mainland. Sharpe recalls being shown a movie of ‘children in a cage’ on a pedalled tri-
shaw in Shanghai. 
I think officials around us had tears in their eyes. I scoffed at this, explaining that I had 
been there 6 months before, and that I had seen these common, normal modes of 
transport for children going to school.664 
For these two, the only ones to have visited both Taiwan and the PRC, the experience on the 
mainland far outshone that on the island. As Sharpe recounted: 
The Taiwan ambassador [kept trying] to convince me with statistics that life in Taiwan 
was much better than in China. Typical statistics were the number of TVs per 1000 
people. He didn't seem to be able to understand that I considered such indicators 
completely irrelevant. [He] clearly did not get his value for money from the investment 
in me. Inadvertently, everything on the Taiwan trip reinforced my enthusiasm for what I 
had seen in China.665 
Caygill too mocked the Taiwanese as being blinkered by their ideological outlook through a 
revealing anecdote: 
As I was waiting to collect my baggage I tried to make small-talk with my young woman 
interpreter and mentioned I had been in the PRC six-months earlier. She asked what it 
                                                        
662 Caygill, interview. 
663 Sharpe, interview. 
664 Sharpe, interview. 
665 Sharpe, interview. 
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had been like and I remarked that the people had seemed happy. ‘I can’t believe that!’ 
she declared.666 
This story was included in a feature article by Caygill published in the Christchurch Press, and 
accompanying a double-page photo-essay. In another article, Caygill wrote that ‘Taiwan [is] still 
unable to accept realities’, noting that the initiatives being implemented by those in authority in 
the PRC were popular there.667 
The points that both Sharpe and Caygill make about material conditions is interesting in the 
context, as it fits with a broader opposition to consumerism that also existed in this period 
amongst people influence by the politics of the 1960s. New Zealanders inspired by Maoist China 
tended to be rather puritan in their views of consumption. In addition the propaganda of the 
Taiwan authorities at this time tended to stress order and discipline and restrictions on freedom – 
points unlikely to appeal to left-wing New Zealanders. There was also a lot of information 
available regarding the violence of the security services that were US client states and much less 
knowledge of the Chinese system. 
 
The 1974 Tours 
In 1971 and 1973 there had been a lot of conflict amongst the members of the tour parties 
themselves, between those who regarded themselves as activists and those who were ‘tourists’. In 
part as a result of this, 1974 the group was essentially all activists. As with subsequent years this 
also meant that there would be less of a regional balance as it was dominated by students from 
Victoria University of Wellington, the centre of student activism. In addition, it had been 
identifed that one of the features of the first two tours had been the under-representation of 
women. As the PRC increasingly represented itself as having ‘answered’ ‘the woman question’ 
participation by women increased. The under-representation by women in the 1973 tour had 
been identified as a reason for that group not bonding very well. The 1974 tour, in marked 
contrast to the 1971 one, included 13 women and 7 men.668 
The focus on who got to be part of the tour shifting away from ‘student representatives’ towards 
those who reflected the ‘student movement’ didn’t mean that there was less conflict on the tours. 
The focus on activism meant that at another level, there was even more conflict: 
                                                        
666 Caygill, interview. 
667 David Caygill, ‘Taiwan Unable to Accept Realities’, Dominion, 9 May 1972, 5. Caygill’s point is accurate, the PRC 
regime did have domestic popularity, it was also successful diplomatically with a number of states switching their 
support way from the ROC to the PRC around this time. 
668 Christine Dann provided this explanation for the increased number of women on the 1974 tour, however those on 
the 1973 tour I spoke with didn’t recall any conflict (Christine Dann, interview, Wellington, 19 November 2003; 
Murray Horton, interview, Christchurch, 23 May 2004). The male/female breakdown for the 1971, 1973 and 1974 
tours was 15/5, 12/8 and 7/13.  
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I think I was chosen to be leader because of left-wing sectarian politics basically. There 
were three groups who were rivals, the Wellington group who had been expelled from 
the Communist party, the Auckland group who were aligned to the Communist party 
and Trotskyists up and down the country.669 
Students applied on the basis of how many left-wing activities they had been involved in. These 
included the October Club, the Socialist Club, the Progressive Youth Movement, The Paper 
collective, the Committee on Vietnam, the Feminist Collective, or the Tenants’ Collective. Some, 
who were not selected, objected subsequently that some activities were valued over other ones. 
This was especially true for applicants from Victoria University (VUW) from where around half 
the applicants were drawn.670 In truth, those complaining were involved in the same activities as 
those who went, but there were so many applicants from VUW that the positions were heavily 
contested. Students from other campuses were selected for reasons of geographical balance 
despite being, on the face of it, less compelling cases for inclusion. In addition, there were 
complaints that people who were not ‘proper’ students were chosen to go. It was true that some 
tour members had enrolled in a single paper in order to be eligible. Clare Donovan was a 
Teachers’ College student and not a member of NZUSA. A compounding accusation of 
impropriety was that she was married to the previous year’s NZUSA President, David Cuthbert. 
Cuthbert, who had himself gone to China in 1973, was involved in the selection process by virtue 
of being head of the Student Travel Service.671 In addition, the promotion of women, given the 
patriarchial nature of much of the left movement, meant that some men felt that they were 
overlooked for younger, less experienced, women.672 
What students took on tour reflected more than just an increasingly active student movement in 
New Zealand. The students drew on anti-Vietnam War activities and the second-wave feminists 
                                                        
669 John Christie, interview, Christchurch, 23 May 2004. 
670 Robert Reid moved from Lincoln to Victoria, ostensibly to study sociology as it wasn’t offered at either Otago or 
Lincoln and a student needed to justify not studying at their local university to qualify for a bursary. In reality it was 
because Wellington was ‘more politically active’– and not bourgeois parliamentary politics. Reid, who had established 
an organisation to campaign against compulsory military service and a national secondary schools’ students’ 
organisation while resident in Dunedin, had been elected International Vice President of NZUSA. The position didn’t 
require being located in Wellington but that was ‘where things were happening’ (Robert Reid, interview, Wellington, 13 
January 2004). Mike Law, who had been President of the Auckland University Students’ Association also shifted to 
Wellington to continue his political activities, most noticeably with the organization to Halt All Racist Tours (HART). 
671 In contrast to these accusations, the evidence clearly shows that Cuthbert behaved appropriately in all respects in 
the appointment process. He was not directly or indirectly involved in Donovan’s selection. She was a leader in various 
movements, a very competent writer and a forceful personality in her own right. In addition NZUSA had approved a 
policy that it should include Teachers’ College students in its activities in general and, until the Student Teachers’ 
Organisation could organize its own tour – which it did in 1976 – in the China Tours in particular. 
672 The applications are available in the NZUSA archives, Beaglehole Room, VUW. Neil Pearce was one who made 
this complaint. He was involved in many of the groups with which those who were chosen were also involved 
(although not the Marxist-Leninist Organisation) and never got to go. He was particularly put out that, by his 
reckoning, some ‘non-students’ went in his stead. Terry Auld was enrolled for a single paper. He was the ideological 
leader of the Wellington Marxist-Leninist Organisation (MLO – which would later become the Workers’ Communist 
League). MiLO, as it was known, was widely regarded as dominating NZUSA at the time. In his favour as a candidate, 
Auld edited The Paper and played an important role in many of the student-dominated groups that made up the New 
Left and from which the other applicants were applying. 
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amongst them were newly emboldend by a tour by Australian feminist Germane Greer. They 
also took with them what the PRC meant in this context. 
The China that I was shown, the China that I saw, was very political. It was part of the 
same political trip that I was on. It was also strangely intimate. The language that was 
used was full of political slogans. It was clear for [we communists] that the bourgeoisie 
had taken over the Soviet Union: why hadn’t the same forces, as a result of the cultural 
drag, taken over in China? It’s not an uncommon position now that ideology permeates 
every single thing that you do. This was part of the currency of the Chinese revolution 
and it explained a lot for us about feminism. The idea that the personal is political. It was 
a China in struggle against bourgeois ideology that I went to see.673 
Michael Dutton makes a similar point: for enthusiasts for the Chinese revolution it is the 
politicisation of everything that is critical, as this is translated into a critique of power relations in 
all aspects of life.674 There may have a mistranslation here. For foreigners the seemlingly highly 
charged atmosphere of the campaigns against Lin Biao and Confucius were the tail of the Maoist 
project, and were to be followed by what Wang Hui regards as China’s deradicalisation, and the 
consolidation of the party-state. Yet what the slogans meant in their Chinese context may have 
been less important for the New Zealand student radicals than their potential to incite a radical 
project at home. It is not then that the students had a total misreading of China. There is a 
misreading but it is not total. Something of what was going on was grasped but the messages 
about ‘politics’ that the students read into the Criticise Confucius and Lin Biao Campaign were 
different than the Chinese audience. For those challenging attempts to depoliticise power 
relations, Maoism stands as one of the most powerful rhetorical invocations of the centrality of 
politics. Yet for many Chinese people in the 1970s the politicisation of everything was 
exhausting. 
It was as activists that Tel quel were also drawn to China. Their main published response to the 
trip, the autumn 1974 issue titled ‘In China’, has a total of five articles, two unsigned, three signed 
by Phillipe Sollers on their time in the PRC. These articles all express a sense of China’s 
continuing relevance and importance to the desired revolution. Beginning with an unsigned 
editorial whose final line asks, ‘ARE YOU GOING TO REVOLT? YES OR NO?’ Tel quel 
stresses the Maoist obligation: ‘The study of Mao is in this case the number one imperative’. In 
one of these essays, titled ‘La Chine sans Confucius’ (China without Confucius), Sollers writes: 
                                                        
673 Angela Belich, interview, Wellington, 10 November 2003. 
674 Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics, 308-309. 
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‘From my point of view, I would say that the religious and idealistic worldview that has always 
been that of all exploiters currently has only one serious enemy: China’. 675 
In order to 'prepare' delegates appropriately for the NZUSA tour a compulsory weekend 
workshop was introduced.  The delegation about to go was briefed by past delegates on the 
vagaries and correctness of the current campaigns and watched Chinese propaganda films. 
The delegation was still chosen from far more applicants than there were places, but since the 
message was different, those chosen were also different from those previously selected. 
Recognition was achieved. China did not necessarily need to be explained in a way that ordinary 
people could understand – although there was certainly still space for those whose jobs or 
contacts meant that they could gain wide exposure for their findings.676 Instead of ‘leaders’ of the 
formal students’ organisations and a ‘balance’ of political perspectives, the tour party was drawn 
from the student movement, that is to say activists, with little concern for including conservative 
perspectives. Intending delegates' applications were mostly about how they wanted to 'view 
socialism in action' and 'to be able to draw upon the lessons of China in order to advance the 
struggle for socialism in New Zealand'. Activists understood a different China; China was an 
alternative, a mirror in which to find New Zealand’s faults. The ideological features were crucial, 
and instead of jotting hundreds of pages regarding production levels and every word they were 
told they wrote about how the adventure that they were on made them feel. 
Reflecting this change in the context in which the tours took place, the representation of China 
as a utopian revolutionary project became more and more exaggerated.  While some presented 
articles for mainstream publications and wrote them to accommodate the audience, the student 
publications, themselves convinced of the revolutionary potential of New Zealand students, were 
unabashed in their enthusiasm. Badiou might identify recognition as a ‘truth event’ – it changed 
the way that the PRC could then be seen, and in doing so it also changed the subject-students 
and their image of China. This imaginary of the PRC, and importantly its representation, no 
longer needed to be filtered in order to achieve what was considered to be the particularised 
greater need. 
In an overall sense, the 1974 students were incredibly sympathetic to what they saw. In addition, 
they believed they were witnessing something really significant. As David Buxton wrote, 
‘Whatever one’s attitude towards China, no-one can deny that what is occurring is a social 
experiment, a historical movement of profound importance’.677 The constantly made positive 
                                                        
675 Unsigned editorial, ‘In China’, Tel quel, Autumn 1974, 3, Philippe Sollers, ‘La Chine sans Confucius’, in ‘In China’, 
Tel quell, Autumn, 1974, 14. 
676 The 1974 tour party included Christine Kraus, a student who moon-lighted as a journalist for the Dominion Sunday 
Times, and Neil Rennie, a Massey student who was also a staff writer for NZ Farmer magazine. 
677 David Buxton, ‘Industry: Fighting Bureaucracy’, Salient, October, 1975, 12. 
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comparisons to New Zealand. Christine Dann, for example, was excited about what she saw in 
Chinese schools: 
What I liked was that the practical stuff they were teaching had an economic value; 
compared with the useless art and crafty stuff that New Zealand kids make... The 
practical really was practical, and useful.678 
This reflected a change in how China was understood generally. Tel quel’s sense was that  fear and 
repression motivated Europe’s lack of interest in China. In response, as Eric Hayot notes ‘Tel quel 
again and again offers China as the only alternative – ideological, political, sexual, poetic – to 
Western thought and civilisation’.679 
Although undoubtedly not mindful of one another, the 1974 New Zealand student tourists and 
Tel Quel represent their interest in China’s Cultural Revolution remarkably similarly. As Rey 
Chow has noted, writing on Kristeva’s About Chinese Women, this was typical of a certain moment 
in Western intellectual history: 
The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as 
a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist… Typically, the Maoist is a cultural 
critic who lives in a capitalist society but who is fed up with capitalism – a cultural critic, 
in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own 
undertaking… What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an 
identification with a valorisation of that which she is not/does not have.680 
Rejecting entirely Grocott’s line that what was happening in China was of significance for China 
alone, virtually all student accounts from the 1974 tour contained a New Zealand ‘tail’. After 
enthusing about what they saw in the PRC, a deprecating comment about New Zealand would 
follow. 
The Chinese have a sense of purpose – everybody knows what they are doing – they’re 
building a strong socialist China. And if sacrifices of individual desires are necessary to 
achieve this end, this is quite a reasonable price to pay. New Zealand as a country, has I 
feel largely lost a sense of purpose; most of the trees are cut down and replaced with 
grass, and its difficult to work up much spirit of self-sacrifice over acquiring a second 
colour TV or car…681 
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At the heart of what excited these young people was the sense of purpose, the vitality, the sense 
that an ideology they themselves were attracted to could provide answers to life’s questions 
(‘Ideology is terribly important’) and the sense that they were privileged to be connected and 
caught up with something exciting: ‘Not only is the Chinese factory worker part of a national 
movement, he is a part of a major social experiment in international importance’.682 
Regardless of the particularity of the activity that the students reported on, a dominant theme 
came through – that the project being implemented in the PRC existed as an alternative to 
capitalist society in New Zealand (and in other capitalist countries that the bourgeois leaders at 
home looked to for their inspiration). 
The clinics I visited were not reserved, as in Hong Kong or America, for those who were 
able to pay the substantial fee demanded. They were for everybody… Everyone I saw 
was well clothed…I found the atmosphere a happy one… A sense of purpose and 
contentment… There is a feeling of unity – everyone’s contribution is valuable and their 
skill needed to build a better China. A China that benefits the Chinese people not the 
British, American or Australian investor as in New Zealand.683 
This was an emerging way of situating the Chinese revolution. Prior to the 1974 tour the 
comparison was not with New Zealand or the West. Compare the above with this typical 
example, written by Geoff Mason, a 1973 tour participant. It is also about health care but the 
referent is pre-Liberation China and the ‘non-West’: 
Before Liberation in 1949 China was racked with famine and disease… Today the 
Chinese eat well and stay healthy, while in most other Asian countries the available 
health care remains as wretched as ever… [Because] in 1949 a People’s Government 
took power.684 
To some extent, the audience being written for would determine the depiction of not just how 
utopian the PRC would be presented but also how New Zealand society would be deprecated. In 
the quasi-Maoist publication The Paper, for example, Terry Auld wrote: 
In Fengsheng the people say they are the masters of their country, and they act on that 
mastery. For someone from New Zealand, where real power lies with the handful of 
capitalists and where democracy is more illusory than real, what is most striking in China 
is the genuine freedom and control over their lives which the people enjoy. Everywhere 
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in China there is a concerted effort to involve the people in running society, just as they 
do in Fengsheng.685 
In the same publication, Auld showed that even without expressly making the comparison with 
New Zealand, a commentary on New Zealand society could still be obvious in its implication. 
Discussing air raid tunnels they had been shown, he wrote, ‘The tunnels were built on the 
principle of self-reliance by mobilising [the masses] to dig them voluntarily, without pay and in 
their spare time’.686 For other tourists and writers, just what China offered was made crystal clear: 
‘The trip [has] caused me to question those values in our own society that I had previously 
accepted without thinking. For those disillusioned seeking a viable alternative, I recommend the 
Chinese example’.687 
Note that while utopian in their projection of China and what they had witnessed there, the 
students did not necessarily embrace the PRC’s own utopian claims where they did not make 
sense to them – or where they could not be translated in such a way so as to make sense to a 
reader. For example, while reporting on Chinese medicine such as operations using acupuncture 
as an anaesthetic with some astonishment, there was no replicating of claims that were 
considered really incredible. For example, although the students visited schools for deaf mutes, it 
was only in China Reconstructs that ideology was claimed as a solution to physical disability: 
Thanks to our great leader Chairman Mao... Today deaf-mutes regain their speaking 
power...and work under the guidance of Mao Tsetung Thought… [S]ome so-called 
‘authorities’… had simply pronounced this disease ‘incurable’… [yet] the road of the 
revolution is long and the search for truth endless.688  
Although they did not report on such fantastical representation, being presented with such ideas 
did not necessarily detract from the image that the students obtained, or from their experience.689 
They were simply put aside and they concentrated on the ideas that did seem to make sense. As 
Murray Horton noted, ‘We were there to learn’.690 The willingness of New Zealand sympathisers 
to put aside these aspects and to concentrate on what made sense to them may have led them to 
overlook things that might otherwise have pointed to dysfunction in the system. 
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The twin themes that the students were being exposed to: that China was undertaking a path 
towards providing people with fulfilment in their lives – in contrast to life at home – and that 
there was something here that it was exciting to be connected with resonated again and again: 
What impresses me as a young person, like nearly everyone else who has visited China, is 
the tremendous drive to achieve a common goal which gives people meaning for their 
lives – something worthwhile and important that they can strive for.… There is always 
the danger of their revolution being nullified, negated. So the journey of transition is 
exciting, dangerous; people consciously creating history.691 
At the core of the image being propagated by the PRC at this time was the idea that the 
Revolution was creating a new person. The ‘New Socialist Man’ (shehuizhuyi xin ren) was a 
frequently invoked concept. New socialist men (and women) refer to those who work hard for 
the interests of the people, put the interests of the masses before their own, defend the honour 
of the socialist motherland, and dedicate themselves to the future of the socialist project. The 
student study tourists naturally picked up on this idea too. 692 
This utopian person was presented in a number of consistent forms. Crucially, from 1974 on, the 
Chinese traits of selflessness were valorised in comparison to those of New Zealanders: 
China is rather like a cold shower – invigorating, but at the same time a fair sort of shock 
to the system. The trouble is that everybody is so good. Everybody works hard, puts the 
community good above individual desires, exercises daily, studies hard, stays virginal 
until marriage – in fact everything that we decadent, individualistic, selfish bourgeois 
Kiwis are not.693 
Again, the Puritanism of New Zealanders who were enthusiastic about China is clear. Indeed, the 
valorised idea of the Chinese person was extended to all, including children, where the inculcated 
values of working for one-another and self-reliance were able to overcome material 
disadvantages: 
We went to a school and arrived just as they were taking their break. Within five minutes 
the kids had arranged themselves into four basketball teams – two lots of two teams... 
The court was beaten earth, rickety poles, no nets and a spongy old ball. I go to Kaiapoi 
High School in Christchurch and they have an asphalt court, with perfectly painted lines, 
a beautiful ball. They come out for the break. They argue… kick the ball about, half-way 
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through the break they still haven’t started a game… what is wrong with them? And the 
kids are fat!694 
Prior to 1974 these ideas of the ‘New Man’ had already been present. They had been part of the 
CPC’s political discourse for decades. The idea was presented to the 1971 tour party too, 
although it does not appear in the writing they did immediately on their return. In 1973 though, 
looking back on his trip and keenly aware of developments in the PRC, Graeme Clarke wrote on 
the topic. The differences are still clear. Note how his reference is solely Chinese: there is no 
representation of universality of the alternative of China. Instead the referent is for Chinese 
choosing between alternatives in their own history, in particular a lesson from their own 
revolution. 695 
The Chinese are … trying to change their ideology, their internalised values, from that of 
a fatalistic and oppressed person to those of a guerrilla fighter from Yenan. This 
movement was called the Cultural Revolution; it culminated with the victory of Mao’s 
line and a return to the guerrilla ethic. 
The continuity of the revolution is easily discerned. In fact the Chinese admit to trying to 
live by them and to ‘re-mould their world outlook’ so that they become internalised 
values.696 
Although clearly intended as generally informative and even of universal interest, the idea of 
universal applicability is not expressed, keeping Clarke’s account within the ideological 
constraints that directly reflect his experiences from his tour in 1971. 
As noted already, one of the features of the 1974 tour, in contrast to its predecessors, was the 
presence of women. This was reflected not only in how the group worked but also in the 
representations that the group as a whole made on their return. The women on the tour, who 
understood themselves as representing a developing feminist movement in New Zealand, were 
greatly moved by the position of Chinese women. In 1971, in marked contrast, there was no 
discussion about Chinese women as a group and the extent to which the revolution had touched 
their lives. In 1974 it permeates throughout the accounts. The women, when gathered together in 
a reunion in 2004, recounted being struck, in particular, by the image of female Chinese militia 
wielding guns. There were differences in how this was now interpreted, and the position of 
Chinese women in general, reflecting in part how the tour participants’ lives had diverged since 
their experiences in the PRC thirty years earlier.697 
                                                        
694 Christine Dann, interview. 
695 He had become an enthusiastic participant in the New Zealand China Friendship Society, as well as being drawn 
into other ‘left of Labour’ political activities, Clarke, Interview, Wellington, date. 
696 Graeme Clarke, ‘China: Nothing Could Hold the People Back’, Salient, July 5, 1973, 4-6. 
697 Lisa Sacksen, Angela Belich, Christine Dann, Moira-Clare Donovan, collective interview, Wellington, date, 2004. 
  180
As it was for the New Zealanders, the question of women was central to Tel quel’s interest in the 
PRC, and to what they found there. In ‘Quelques theses’ (A few theses), Sollers writes that the 
first question of the petit-bourgeois is always, ‘What about sexual life in China?’ As in all other 
aspects of life, women in China represent an ‘other’ system, have an ‘other’ relation to sexuality 
and culture to that of western women (Kristeva’s later two articles confirm this reading). For 
Sollers, Chinese women, like the rest of China, work best as a challenge to Western thinking. 
Although the women recounted that their hopes and expectations were that China had ‘solved 
the women question’, their recounting of the position of women in China immediately on their 
return was quite muted: 
One specific example I remember was at a factory, when we asked one worker what 
changes the anti-Confucian campaign had made for him personally, and he said, ‘Before 
I criticised Confucius, I would do housework willingly when my wife asked me to do so. 
But now I realise I must take my share of organising and initiating the housework.’ 
Thus, although we saw many small things that represented an inequality (and the 
Chinese freely admit that there is not yet sexual equality), the important thing to examine 
is that there is progressive movement and what achievements the women’s movement is 
maintaining, within the framework of the continuing socialist revolution.698 
Yet the representation that China was better than New Zealand, and that reporting on the trip 
was an opportunity to criticise New Zealand society, still comes through: 
What we saw was women who had been liberated and were being treated with respect by 
their colleagues. We saw women who were doctors and professors. We saw them being 
further ahead than New Zealand in terms of opportunity. In terms of variety of 
employment and pay levels they were ahead of New Zealand. Women were able to 
breast-feed at work, so that was miles ahead of New Zealand.699 
When it was published, Kristeva’s About Chinese Women was taken as a major document of 
theoretical feminism.700 In it, she attempts through an analysis of the conditions of Chinese 
women to discover and describe an economy of gender and power wholly other from the 
Western psyche. Thirty years later it has become the exemplar of a particular kind of bad 
relationship to one’s cultural other. This is in part due to an essay by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
‘French Feminism in an International Frame’, which finds in Kristeva’s confrontation the 
expression of a typically self-centred western interest in the face of the rest of the world. Spivak 
says that Kristeva’s concern with her own identity in the face of the cultural other typifies a 
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certain kind of western interest in the east: ‘In spite of their occasional interest in touching the 
other of the East… their repeated question is self-centred: if we are not what official history and 
philosophy say that we are, who then are we (not), how are we (not)’.701 
If women went from New Zealand hoping to find out about themselves then for some what they 
found was disappointing. For at least one, it was the place of women in the PRC that began the 
questioning that would eventually lead them away from Marxism: 
I went to China because I thought that it had solved ‘the woman question’, I thought it 
would be wonderful. But I remember talking to a woman about who made the evening 
meal. She told me that everything was equal and it was whoever was home first, but I 
asked who that tended to be and she said that it was her. And then I established that 
meant that she left the field earlier and therefore got fewer work points. And then I saw 
that breaking rocks, which was a job that men did, got more work points than the work 
that women did. And I thought, ‘this is not equal’ and I found that very disappointing.702 
In addition to the expectations not being met, the achievement of some of the demands that 
women were fighting for in New Zealand were not seen as being so rosy when they were seen in 
practice: 
In many cases [the treatment of women] was good. On the other hand, another place we 
went to was a textile factory and it was awful. They went on about how the women were 
liberated and provided with childcare and able to work but I couldn’t help feeling it 
would have been nicer to have been at home with the kids – if they’d been able to afford 
that, and they couldn’t because they needed everyone to work.703 
As a group of students, it was natural that a focus of the tours would be on education in China, 
especially as their reporting back would be to a student audience. This was particularly true given 
that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had impacted so dramatically upon education and 
young people. The projections, consistent with what the material produced by the Chinese Party-
state was saying about its achievements, were enthusiastic – but they were also consistent with 
the changing representations that have been established above. In 1974 China was presented as 
an alternative utopia, with New Zealand as the point of comparison. An article by Terry Auld in 
Salient made that explicit. It was entitled ‘Chinese Education: Compare this to our system’ and 
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simultaneously lauded what had happened in the PRC and criticised the system, and lecturers in 
particular, in New Zealand: 
Once the Cultural Revolution reached education tremendous changes 
occurred…Teaching methods have been drastically reformed… With teachers now 
realising that their purpose was to serve the people… Moreover, ‘through the campaign 
to criticise Lin Piao and Confucius, students are criticising the theory of the “absolute 
authority of the teacher”’… Unlike the practice in New Zealand universities, teachers are 
expected to be intelligible in China…  
First by combining theory with practice… the Chinese education system has destroyed 
the abstract education which we receive and which Chinese students used to receive… 
China is producing a young generation which is dedicated to serving the interests of the 
overwhelming majority of society instead of selfish individual interests...704 
In 1971, in contrast to this and consistent with what I have shown elsewhere, the marker for the 
success of the PRC was pre-liberation China, or at least pre-Cultural Revolution China: 
If Tsinghua University is at all typical of the post-Cultural Revolution University in 
China, there is every reason to hope that China has forever abolished the risk of creating 
a new class of privileged bureaucrats, who by their education reach standards of living, 
and positions of power unattainable to the ordinary worker or peasant in that society.705 
Note too the power of the experiential in dispelling any reservations regarding what was going on 
in the People’s Republic of China. As Christine Kraus wrote in the Sunday Times: ‘If we did have 
the occasional flicker of doubt about methods we saw in China, it was largely dispelled by these 
groups of happy and energetic kids…’. As we have seen, this requirement to justify the 
interpretations that the students were coming to was less of a feature in the 1974 tour than the 
1971 one, as the students tended to be speaking to a more receptive audience – or at least they 
were less concerned in winning over doubters. This article, however, was in a mainstream 
newspaper rather than a student or left-wing publication, so was appropriately ‘pitched’ with that 
context in mind.706 
Education, the question of women, and the ‘new person’ created under socialism could all have 
been expected as themes. Yet how these were discussed represented significant changes from to 
the dominant themes of the 1971 tour which focussed elsewhere – most significantly on food 
production and self-reliance. There was another issue that dominated not just the images of the 
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PRC but indeed how the PRC was understood – theatre. Consistent with this, Hayot identifies 
theatre as a vitally important theme in examination of Tel quel’s experiences in the PRC. 
In 1971, although they encountered Chinese revolutionary theatre, the students did not write 
about it except to laud the capabilities of child performers. Rosenberg recalled that they had 
attended a theatre and the crowd had applauded them, and how someone had turned around to 
them and warned them not to believe what they were shown, ‘I chose to ignore him’, but it was 
these ancillary events that attracted attention at this stage. In 1971 China’s utopian location was 
Dazhai, and producing material abundance; in 1974 it was Xiaojinzhuang, and creating a new 
person infused not just with selflessness but also with revolutionary culture. The utopian belief 
about conquering nature was being replaced by the emancipatory potential of theatre.707 
Chinese theatre was understood enthusiastically and as saying something about New Zealand 
theatre: 
The enthusiasm, the conviction and the absolute finesse of Chinese revolutionary drama 
makes us only too painfully aware of the absence of lifeblood in our own professional 
theatre.708 
What it spoke to was not just theatre, though, for art reflected society: 
Anyone who has spent a few months in London, as I have done, cannot but realise that 
the plays in its theatres are dominated by negative characters: sadists, decadents, lunatics, 
swindlers, gangsters, murderers, neurotic intellectuals and homosexuals.  
The general reasons for the differences between bourgeois drama and Chinese drama are 
not difficult to find. All artistic works are ideological products of the human brain 
reflecting a given society. Bourgeois art reflects the life, psychology and morals of the 
bourgeois class, whether in a capitalist or socialist society…709 
For activists, what was happening in Chinese theatre was informative of the complete turning 
over of society that was needed in New Zealand: 
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Peking Opera is no longer about princes and concubines – now it concerns itself with 
portraying the working people of China. Its audience being the working people of China, 
there is a shared experience between actor and audience… 
What is happening in Chinese theatre is of relevance to New Zealand theatre because the 
Chinese have asked of their art ‘For whom?’ Most New Zealand theatre people haven’t 
got round to doing this yet. But of even greater importance is the movement afoot that 
is asking of the whole society ‘For whom?’ The two countries are poles apart but this 
question is valid in both.710 
 
Conclusions 
Although enthusiastic, the representations of the PRC from the 1971 NZUSA Study Tour were 
not utopian. They were moderated to fit within the role that the delegation was charged with and 
took upon itself. The students gained enormous amounts of publicity for their venture and they 
faithfully represented the material they were given in China back to their New Zealand audiences. 
The representations took into account the context that the messages were being presented into, 
in particular that many New Zealanders had little or only inaccurate images of the PRC.711 
The students were by no means entirely uniform in their assessments. Grocott obliquely criticised 
some when his report referred to ‘two groups’ amongst the delegation ‘some who had come to 
look and some who had come to learn’. But these differences did not emerge in the reporting 
back to the New Zealand public. 712 
On the whole the delegates across the political spectrum understood ‘China’ as ‘socialist’. For the 
most part they reported back that socialism was good for China. While some thought that 
socialism might be good for New Zealand their representation of that point of view was muted. 
Instead they noted China’s pragmatic achievements and that whatever China was doing it seemed 
to be working. 
For some though, who tended to be the most radical of the delegation to begin with, the trip 
proved dystopic. Tim Groser, who noted his fond recall of the trip as occurring ‘during [his] 
radical activist days’, had looked forward to witnessing a China ‘engaged in a radical and historic 
exercise to refashion society away from self-centred profit-seeking behaviour and opposition to 
interventionist expansionist foreign policy’. Instead he said his  
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preconceptions were reversed by the trip. I left China with an intuitive understanding that 
this was a deeply repressive society more in tune with George Orwell’s Animal Farm and 
fascism than my preconceived idealism.713 
George Rosenberg, also part of the Afro-wearing radical faction, had a similar experience. For 
Groser and Rosenberg, China also stood for socialism and their rejection of China also meant a 
rejection of socialism. For Groser this was a drift right-wards towards neo-liberalism, for 
Rosenberg a rejection of party politics. As noted above in Clare Donovan’s account, for some of 
the students the 1974 trip to China, although reported upon very favourably, left nagging doubts 
in the utopian imaginary that would eventually take them away from interest in the model 
presented by the PRC. 
This was true also for Tel quel. The Fall 1974 ‘In China’ issue was to prove the high-water mark of 
Tel quel’s interest in China and Maoism. As time passed, political China faded from Tel quel’s table 
of contents. In the winter 1976 issue, the following note appeared on the journal’s last page, 
under the heading ‘About “Maoism”’: 
Information continues to appear, here and there, on Tel quel’s ‘Maoism’. Let’s make it 
clear that if Tel quel did, for a time, attempt to affect opinions about China… it cannot 
but continue to do the same today. For a while, in fact, our journal has been the object 
of attacks by the ‘real Maoists’. We cheerfully grant them the title. The events currently 
in progress in Beijing can only open the most hesitant eyes to what one must call the 
‘Marxist structure’, whose sordid manipulations of power and information can now be 
verified... Myths must be finished with; all myths.714 
This conflation of the Soviet Union and China reflected a rejection of the Chinese political 
project in its entirety, since it was an imagining of China in opposition to the Soviet Union which 
had drawn Tel quel to China in the first place. In fact Tel quel was to reject not only China but 
politics altogether, embarking on a search for aesthetic utopia and by the early 1980s finding that 
in the United States. According to Peter Dews, disillusionment with China led to ‘political 
pluralism’, an enthusiastic treble-issue on the United States, where, we learn, ‘the state is free of 
repressive structures’. In 1978, the discovery that Christianity and literature (ideally combined in 
Solzhenitsyn) are the true bastions against totalitarianism and the ‘political view of the world’. ‘In 
many respects’, Dews writes, ‘Tel quel is now a reactionary publication (Philippe Sollers, its editor, 
has announced to Le Monde that “capitalism is ten times less repressive than socialism”), or at 
least one that “has no enemies on the right”’.715 
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Although Tel quel lost interest in the political project represented by the PRC they did not lose 
interest in the idea of transforming society – even if it was to take a completely different 
trajectory. In this respect they again reflected the New Zealand student tourists of the 1974 
generation and are in contrast with those from 1971. From the 1971 tour, George Rosenberg and 
Tim Groser both reported that since for their group China represented applied socialism that as 
they lost interest in China they also lost interest in radical politics. In contrast, the 1974 tourists 
Malcolm Lewthwaite and Clare Donovan turned to other opportunities for transformational 
politics when they began to lose interest in China, both embracing Christianity. 
As I look back I can see how naïve and unsophisticated I was… these guys have the 
correct objectives of social justice – but they are not radical enough… the only really 
deeply satisfying description of [alienation’s] causes is that offered by the Judaeo-
Christina theology. I continue with a deep impulse for social reform… Real compassion 
and genuine concern and action springs from the power, love of life and people that 
Jesus Christ continues to bring716 
These positions were not universal. For Angela Belich, for example, China no longer standing for 
what she had been drawn to made little difference to her political standpoint. She was still 
interested in the same things; they were simply no longer represented by China: 
If you come to things from the political understanding that I have, you don’t actually 
become disillusioned with the country. The interest is with the politics and they 
continue, just no longer represented by the country. One of the reasons I stopped going 
to China Society meetings was that people like George and Nancy were with China no 
matter what.717 
Others simply rearranged their expectations, keeping faith with the PRC by no longer demanding 
so much from it. This became an emerging theme later in the 1970s: 
A point which we were constantly reminded of by the people we spoke to, was that China is not 
a perfect society and it is too idealist to expect that changes such as complete abolition of exams, 
should constructively advance the revolution.718 
In part these re-appraisements of self simply reflected the politics that the individuals developed 
– or the way that they sought to explain their current positions in terms of the past. Stephen 
Franks, for example, came under criticism during the battle for leader of the ACT party for 
having been to Mao’s China in the 1970s. ‘He must have been a Maoist’ wrote one pro-Rodney 
                                                        
716 Malcolm Lewthwaite, letter to John Christie, papers on 1974 Reunion, NZUSA Papers, Beaglehole Room, VUW. 
Clare Donovan similarly said, ‘I was searching for social justice, I still am. Maoism did not deliver it. Now I am a born-
again Christian, still looking for the same thing I was back then’ (Donovan, interview). 
717 Angela Belich, interview. 
718 Rod Prosser, ‘Education for Self-Reliance’, Salient, 29 August 1977, 11. 
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Hide blogger. Although Franks was involved in the Committee on Vietnam, and had been an 
‘idealistic member of Young Labour’719 he was never very close to the hard-left groups who 
dominated anti-Vietnam War activities. In fact, an attempt to consolidate his politics was 
undoubtedly why he was selected to go on the tour. On his own website, somewhat post-facto he 
explained it thus: 
I realised during a long trip through Mao Tse Tung’s China in 1976, that the people were 
terrified, that Mao’s ideology, writing and poetry were every bit as war glorifying and 
imperialistic as say Rudyard Kipling’s. Rewi Alley, with whom I spent many hours in 
Beijing, was scrabbling to believe his life work was worthwhile. I and my anti-Vietnam 
war friends had scoffed at the Readers’ Digest view of communism, as Yankee 
propaganda. Finding it true made me sceptical, rather than immediately right wing.720 
Karl du Fresne wrote an article in 2008 that amounts to a celebratory biography of former left-
wingers who have, in du Fresne’s eyes ‘seen the light’. With respect to Franks he writes that the 
trip to China ‘…marked the start of a radical political conversion that saw Stephen (who has now 
shifted to the National Party) become a champion of free enterprise and hands-off 
government’.721 
To a large extent, the 1971 NZUSA tour was almost exactly like like that of the CCAS and their 
accounts are strikingly similar to that in China! Inside the People’s Republic – even though their 
starting point was far less informed.722 In particular the NZUSA delegates filled their notebooks 
with detailed notes as to the production of each factory they visited, absolutely certain that this 
thing they were engaging in was incredibly significant. As Sharpe said, ‘I still have my detailed 
diary of the visit, pedantically written every night. I knew at the time it was important to do 
this’.723 
Academic Stephen Fitzgerald, who had himself led one of the Australian universty student tours 
to China in 1968, reviewed the CCAS publication. In his review he noted that since the US State 
                                                        
719  Karl du Fresne, ‘Left or Right, the Goal’s the Same’, Nelson Daily Mail, 23 July 2008. Accessed at 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/nelsonmail/4628300a23815.html. 
720 http://www.stephenfranks.co.nz/?page_id=5. Last accessed 11 January 2008. Note that the remarkable similarity 
between Franks and Groser’s re-remembered accounts of their experiences, which each stand in stark contrast to other 
accounts they made. Groser, in an email, ‘fondly remembered the trip… which was during [his] revolutionary socialist 
days’, (personal communication). Franks told Marian Hobbs that ‘Riverside wasn’t a real commune, he had been to a 
real commune in Mao’s China in the 1970s’, (recalled from Wellington candidates forum, Wellington Town Hall, 
October 2005). The sense from both of these earlier accounts was not of an event that they had been disturbed by but 
as an exciting moment in what were then their young lives. 
721 Karl du Fresne, ‘Left or Right, the Goal’s the Same’. Note that this is very close to Tim Groser’s account of his 
post-trip transformation, reflecting perhaps that Groser and Franks are now both members of the same political party 
and provided with the same advice on managing such issues in the media. 
722 The CCAS delegation were all academics or senior students of Chinese or China Studies, most were fluent in at 
least one Chinese language. Both of these factors were only true for a minority of the NZUSA delegation. The tours 
traversed the same path, over the same time frame. For example, they both visited Northwest Textile Factory Number 
1 near Xian. 
723 Sharpe, interview. David Caygill, George Rosenberg, Graeme Clarke and John Robson all made the same point. At 
one stage they considered producing a publication based on these collected notes (albeit each almost word-for-word 
similar to each other) but this did not develop beyond the conceptual stage. 
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Department refused passports to those Americans wishing to visit China, there had been virtually 
no U.S. eye-witness accounts of the People’s Republic for decades. Therefore, he contended, it is 
‘probably important for Sino-American relations that there should be this cathartic outpouring’. 
Yet he condemned the poor writing and the way it consisted of essentially parroting what the 
visitors had been told. He added that there would surely be some ‘relief’ when there were 
sufficient accounts available to enable the publishers to discern between them on the basis that 
some reports were ‘distinguished by excellence of writing or unusually penetrating insights’.724 
This mirrors the New Zealand accounts and the apparent desire to publish the ‘impartial 
accounts’ that the students prepared. Virtually everything they wrote or otherwise presented for 
publication was printed, in full, on the basis that it was all, by virtue of its newness, interesting. 
Caygill, for example, recounted how the Christchurch Press published a two-page spread of his ‘not 
great’ photographs.725 
The two tours followed the same itinerary and duration. What Fitzgerald notes as an ‘episode of 
a kind which foreigners had not previously witnessed or experienced – for example, a visit to a 
“May Seventh Cadre School” where Chinese bureaucrats go for self-examination, reform and 
physical labour’ – was common to them both. In addition, Fitzgerald notes as an interesting 
aspect of the CCAS publication  the way that ‘the authors have made a concerted and largely 
successful effort to … weav[e] their own observations into a broader context of recent Chinese 
history and the politics of China under Mao’. The NZUSA party do exactly the same in their 
diaries, which are verbatim notes of the material offered by their hosts. The broader context was 
a feature of the presentation that the delegations received. They would not simply be told that a 
factory had increased its output, that achievement would be related to the particular campaigns 
and political movements that had run in conjunction with the changing figures. This was 
explained, most likely with some justification, as having been a causal relationship. So what 
Fitzgerald regards as a matter of the style of the writers was simply a reflection of substance of 
the story that the tourists to the PRC were being told at that time. 
Finally, there is what Fitzgerald calls ‘the point of view’. 
The authors are of that generation of Chinese scholars which finds it perfectly natural to 
accept Chinese Communist points of view as having their own validity, and Chinese 
explanations of what is going on in China. Their view is sympathetic to the Chinese 
Government, and they present a pretty strong case.726 
It is pretty clear that the NZUSA delegation saw their role similarly. They went to China to find 
out how the Chinese saw China and then to represent that back to the New Zealand public. 
                                                        
724 Stephen FitzGerald, Review (untitled), Pacific Affairs, 46, 1, Spring, 1973, 126-128. 
725 Caygill, interview. Clarke interview. 
726 Fitzgerald, Review, 126. 
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Their accounts are very matter-of-fact and, for the most part, simply consist of repetition of what 
they were told. In this respect the 1971 accounts have a similar feature to what Fitzgerald notes, 
as did Salient, about China!: 
The serious weakness of the book, however, is that it is dull, sometimes boring… 
Anyone can recount the statistics, the history of political struggles, the change in 
economic circumstances and the social revolution.727 
Similarly, for the most part, the NZUSA delegation struggled to express the state of mind of the 
Chinese people and the way in which this is reflected in Chinese society. They saw a mood of 
confidence, security and purpose and a sense of freedom, dignity and happiness. But they merely 
cite that such existed without transmitting a real sense of it. Where it is revealed it is in interview 
and anecdote, not in the articles they themselves penned, as if when putting their remembrances 
to paper they were weighed down with the historical responsibility of their mission. 
After recognition was achieved the purpose of the tours changed slightly. Gone was the desire to 
select ‘leaders’ of students’ associations in order to give the delegation authority, although leaders 
of the student movement (who wouldn’t necessarily hold official positions in students’ 
associations) were definitely still selected. There was no longer the same need for presenting a 
'balanced' view about China.  The selection criteria still included the capacity to get material 
about China published but NZUSA was clearly more interested in promoting revolutionary 
images of China and choosing participants accordingly.  This was especially true from the 
campuses where there were a large number of applications, and where the activist movement was 
strong, since there was still an attempt to get representatives from throughout the country. 
In addition, there was the model represented by first tour participant Graeme Clarke, later to be 
International Vice President of NZUSA.  Clarke had had an academic interest in the PRC 
although also a sympathy for its revolution before he went there. Through the committed activist 
contacts he made on the tour, on his return he was drawn deeply into their political activities and 
became a solid 'left of Labour' political activist himself.  Each tour from now on would include 
others who might be similarly 'recruited' into the struggle at home. 
If the desire was to consolidate my politics then it was incredibly successful. I don’t 
know where I would have ended up if I hadn’t gone but I came back with incredible 
support for Marxist thinkers like Mao and Zhou and tremendous sense of support for 
their revolution.728 
                                                        
727 Fitzgerald, Review, 127. 
728 Henry Stubbs, interview, Wellington, 18 November 2003. Stubbs had come to prominence in student activities as a 
right-leaning law student who opposed a proposal by the executive of the Victoria University of Wellington Students’ 
Association to send $20,000 in relief funds to Vietnam. The process radicalised him and he ended up supporting the 
resolution that he had organised a meeting to oppose. After the trip to China he became very close politically to those 
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There was also significantly less interest from the broader New Zealand population in the 
NZUSA tours. When recognition was granted the particular purpose of the 1971 delegation was 
achieved. In addition NZCFS tours started going to the PRC in 1972, and explaining the PRC to 
people who were broadly supportive could be done in that way. The left-groups who dominated 
the students’ organisations were not just sympathetic to the PRC’s aims from the relationship, 
they had their own goals729 and the PRC was a means to their ends, not an end in itself 
                                                                                                                                                              
who had instigated the Vietnam resolution, became a bus driver, headed the Tramways Union and went on to a career 
as a trade unionist. 
729 David Cuthbert claimed that one reason for the NZUSA tours was to ‘get ourselves separated from the internal 
machinations of the China Society and its reflections of splits and expulsions from the CPNZ’. They believed that 
freeing the tours from the CPNZ also meant that those groups dominating student activism could pursue their own 
goals from a relationship with the PRC (Cuthbert, interview). 
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Chapter 6: NZCFS 1976-2002: Keeping Up With a Changing China. 
This chapter traces the important changes in the NZCFS as it sought to maintain a fidelity to a 
China that changed fundamentally from the immediate post-Mao period until the Society 
celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2002. In 1977, it became incorporated and changed its name 
from the New Zealand China Society to the New Zealand China Friendship Society.730 Yet of 
this change in its organisational form Society members saw no great significance. It was simply a 
cosmetic name change that was forced upon them by their desire to limit the financial risk to 
members of their ever-expanding business of organising tours to China. In contrast, it was 
external changes, specifically changes in the politics and activities of the People’s Republic of 
China, which would force real change on the Society through the next quarter century. 
The most obvious of these changes in China is the enormous growth of the market economy, 
together with a much more extensive set of interchanges between Chinese people and people 
from other countries in this era, including a much larger number of New Zealanders living in 
China. From the late 1980s onwards there was also a substantial community of New Zealanders 
born or raised in the PRC. The NZCFS had significantly less claim to be the most knowledgeable 
about China, especially since their claim to such was based on experiential factors. Further, there 
was an overall shift on the part of the CPC from an emphasis on revolutionary culture to an 
emphasis on national culture, and on nationalism. 
In the years immediately after 1976, tours were running at four or five a year and they were the 
main source for instructing particular individuals about China. The images they collected on 
these tours would then be propagated to the wider New Zealand population. A feature of the 
tours of the time was access to senior Chinese officials and in Rewi Alley an acknowledged 
expert interpreter of the PRC. This access gave further authority to Society members’ claims to 
expertise. The activities of supporting China included engaging in public activities in New 
Zealand that would assist the PRC. It was the official China that the NZCFS had a connection 
with. To be friendly with the PRC meant supporting and agreeing with the choices that the 
Chinese leaders had made, and accepting that those leaders were acting in the interests of the 
Chinese masses. 
Three decades later, what the People’s Republic of China meant for the New Zealand China 
Friendship Society had been completely transformed, and with this the Society itself was 
transformed. By 2002, China had all but completely ceased to reflect a politicised image, and for 
many members their interest in China was ‘cultural’. Reflecting this, the Society had 
constitutionally changed its goal of correcting misstatements about China and at times would 
even claim to not have a position on contemporary Chinese affairs at all. Instead of taking 
                                                        
730 It was not allowed to incorporate under the name New Zealand China Society (NZCS) as the Registrar thought the 
name too close to the New Zealand Chinese Association (NZCA), and that organisation would not give its permission. 
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direction, inspiration and income from China, the Society raised funds for aid work there and 
provided expert assistance in different fields. Its travel business competed with other tourist 
operations and was basically a commercial one. Those who presented at NZCFS meetings were 
increasingly representing the PRC from a very limited engagement with China. Primarily this was 
through having been on short tours or having had brief teaching experience. ‘Experts’ who spoke 
at Society meetings, with very few exceptions, tended to be from outside the Society. 
In the 1970s, sympathetic New Zealanders went to China to see a place that was ‘ahead’: where 
one went to see the future. After the modernisation narrative replaced the revolutionary one, 
China came to be considered ‘behind’, since the parameters were material and the measures were 
in terms of technology. In part this is a reflection of the way that the PRC is identified more with 
long-term historical continuities, rather than abrupt social change. Increasingly then, the accuracy 
of a view about China is assessed on how much of the language and culture the commentator 
knows. In the 1970s such knowledge was less important since what was happening in China was 
simply the application of a universal (Marxist) project. Particularly since the 1990s, people with 
thoughtful insights into Chinese realities, but without the ‘expertise’ can be dismissed as 
amateurs. The professionalization of knowledge about China during this period saw the NZCFS 
shift from being the experts about China to being amateurs. 
The NZCFS had been organising study tours to the People’s Republic of China since 1972 
although the first ‘delegation’ effectively represented the then embryonic China Society in 1952. 
For ordinary New Zealanders, there was no other way to get to the PRC.731 The parties were 
mostly, although not exclusively, political sympathisers and were given comprehensive briefings 
as to what to expect and how they should behave before they left New Zealand. 732 The tours 
were supported by the Chinese authorities and internal costs were discounted by the China 
International Travel Service that acted as hosts. In 1976 the tour cost $1300 per person.733 
Yet the Study Tours were not simply for ‘ordinary’ New Zealanders. As well as for members of 
the Society, who of course were self-selecting, they were organised for particular sub-sections of 
New Zealand society for whom it was thought an engagement with China would be of some use. 
Groups who were influential in attracting others to the cause of friendship (and revolution) were 
targeted. This focus fluctuated, reflecting in New Zealand the groups kinds of understood as 
being at the centre of the political processes underway in the PRC. In 1976, at the height of 
questions about education in China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, there were five tours 
                                                        
731 There were other avenues: for Members of Parliament, government officials etc. Although NZUSA ran a Study 
Tour for students this was really an off-shoot of the NZCFS ones. Barbara Spencer led a tour in 1977. In her account, 
although she herself was a member of the Society, she notes that the Society’s tours were the ‘only way to get to 
China’. See Barbara Spencer, China 30 Years On, B. Spencer, Whangarei, 1979, 83. 
732 ‘How to behave’ did not extend to having to support or to be uncritical. In fact the Chinese hosts were very keen to 
hear criticisms of how things were presented or how people from western backgrounds understood the PRC. See the 
brief discussion about this in chapter 1. 
733 Tour advertisement, enclosed as an insert with New Zealand China News, Feb 1976. NZCFS Archive. 
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organised for the following year, each of around 20 people: two tours for members, one for 
teachers, one for high school students and one for ‘Maori Women Teachers’.734 
For many of those involved in the Society, priority was given to the lessons that China presented 
for changing New Zealand, rather than merely ‘friendship with China’. The leader of the 
Society’s autumn tour reported back: 
Much of the writings of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tsetung became reality for some of 
our members, when they were confronted with the concrete conditions of the building 
of a Socialist Society.735 
The analytical lens for viewing China then was Marxism and the relationship one of tutelage – 
New Zealanders learning about Marxism, in practice, from Chinese. Further, these New 
Zealanders were learning in order to better understand their own society in terms of the universal 
truths of Marxism, and to be encouraged to work to change New Zealand society along the path 
charted by the CPC. 
The Society’s tours not only helped develop the revolution in New Zealand, they were also big 
business. The Society reported that its virtually exclusive travel agency rights to China meant that 
the two years ended 31 March 1977 had seen more than $200,000 flow through its books, with 
some $20,000 in surplus that was able to subsidise other operations.736 The Annual General 
Meeting agreed to incorporate the Society. Previous resistance to this move was overcome by the 
reality that the Society’s officers needed protection given the increasing amount of money 
involved.737 
A reduction in Chinese financial support was accompanied by a recognition of the fact that 
demand could sustain an increase in price. This meant that despite the absence of inflation in 
China the cost of the tours increased rapidly. In 1977 there were four tours: two for members 
and one each for teachers and workers. They cost participants approximately $1700 per person 
($8600 in 2002 dollars). 
The increase in price would change the type of person who went on the tours. Increasingly they 
were drawn from middle-class backgrounds and as the numbers grew they were also increasingly 
drawn from further afield from the Society, and accordingly less schooled in the Society’s 
understandings of what China meant. For tax reasons, all of those who went on the tours became 
members of the Society, and a large proportion remained members. The changed nature of tour 
                                                        
734 Jack Ewan, Report of the National Secretary to the 1975 National Conference of the New Zelaand China Society. 
Ewan Papers, (1970s General), NZCFS Archive. 
735 ‘Report on the Society Tour 1976’, National Council Papers, September 1976, NZCFS Archive. 
736  ‘Annual Report’, 1977, included in the papers of the 1977 National Conference, Jack Ewan papers, NZCFS 
Archive. 
737 National President Ron Howell said he ‘was opposed but now supported. It has become necessary’. Previous 
opposition in the Society had been driven by the requirement to provide ‘the State’ with a membership list. See 
minutes of the NZCS National Conference, June 1977. NZCFS Archive. 
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party members, more middle class, less drawn from left-wing organisations, would accordingly 
also change the composition of the membership of the Society and the nature of the Society 
itself. 
 
Following Events in the PRC 
NZCFS activities closely followed what was happening in China. The branch newsletters were at 
the forefront of keeping members up-to-date with events and reminding them of how much 
could be learned from the experiment taking place there. Reflecting the interest in Chinese 
politics and the Society’s support of the cultural revolution, in January 1976 the Society issued a 
statement of ‘Condolences’ on the death of Kang Sheng and lauding his contribution to the 
Chinese revolution including to the GPCR.738 Contrasting the relationship between bourgeois art 
and revolutionary art, members were advised about a display of Chinese ‘crafts’ visiting New 
Zealand and sponsored by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The crafts had been 
produced in China ‘for the pleasure of the ordinary masses of the people’.739 Often, over a range 
of categories, China was presented as superior to New Zealand. While post oil shock inflation 
ravaged the New Zealand economy it was reported that there was no inflation in China and in 
March Hone Tuwhare spoke to the Wellington Branch on ‘National Minorities in China and 
New Zealand’, noting the achievements that China had made with respect to national minorities 
and criticising race relations in New Zealand.740 
For the PRC, 1976 was a year of enormous political turbulence. Acting President Zhu De, 
Premier Zhou Enlai and Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong all died. A campaign against 
the ‘number one capitalist roader’ Vice-President Deng Xiaoping was launched. Then the Gang 
of Four, including Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, was exposed as attempting to organise a coup and they 
were all arrested. By the end of the year the criticisms of Deng had been repudiated and he was 
returned to power.741  
The Society closely followed the events and offered its support to the dominant line as each 
succeeded the last. In May a number of the branches reprinted an article condemning the 
                                                        
738 Kang Sheng had been involved with the Communist Party of China since the early days of the Party. He was trained 
in Moscow in the 1930s and subsequently became head of the PRC's security and intelligence apparatus. When he died 
he was probably one of the most important four or five people in China. He was subsequently accused, along with the 
Gang of Four, of being responsible for persecutions during the Cultural Revolution and was posthumously expelled 
from the CPC in 1980. The 1976 mention in the NZCFS newsletter was the last mention of him in any Society 
publication. 
739 ‘Chinese Crafts’, Wellington Branch Newsletter 14 Feb 1976, 1, Wellington Branch papers, NZCFS Archive. 
740 ‘Hone Tuwhare on National Minorities in China’, Wellington Branch Newsletter, 14 March 1976, 1, Wellington 
Branch papers, NZCFS Archive. Tuwhare had visited the PRC in 1973 as part of a Maori Workers’ Delegation 
organised by the CPNZ. His visit is detailed in chapter 3. 
741 See Jonathon Spence, The Search for Modern China, Norton, New York, 1991, 609-619. 
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‘Counter-revolutionary Political Incident at Tiananmen Square’ from Xinhua. 742  This article 
reflected the line of what would come to be known as the Gang of Four. In November branch 
newsletters published a speech from Beijing Mayor Wu De, in which he called for a campaign to 
‘thoroughly expose the anti-party clique (Gang of Four)… continue to criticise Deng Xiaoping 
and repulse right deviationist attempt to reverse correct verdicts, consolidate and develop the 
victories of the great proletarian cultural revolution…’.743 Yet within a year the solid support the 
Society had shown to the Cultural Revolution and those who headed it was to be turned on its 
head. The new line was revealed in Rewi Alley’s message to the Biennial National Conference in 
1977: 
[1976] ended with a great victory for the people, in the unmasking of the counter-
revolutionary ‘Gang of Four’ and their followers, so restoring to the people their 
revolutionary dynamism and making them more and more determined to carry their lead 
forward.744 
For the Society’s activists the various outcomes of the political struggles had no detrimental 
effect on the overall image of China. In September 1976 the Workers’ Tour and the NZUSA 
Student Tour had both been in China. The Workers’ tour included Don Franks, younger brother 
of Wellington Branch Chairperson Peter. On his return he wrote a pamphlet titled ‘As We Saw 
It’ which was reproduced in the Society’s publication New Zealand China News. Despite everything 
going on, Don Franks reported, ‘We were able to see… that the Chinese people had set their 
hearts on maintaining China’s political colour’, commending in particular how when they had 
observed students engaged in an anti-Gang of Four protest – framed as ‘wanting to see the 
revolution continue’. When the students had been approached by police officers the officers had 
unfurled their own banner to join in the protest – which was reported as having been much to 
the shock of a North American observer.745 However, for those on the periphery of the Society – 
or at least to Party-based connections to China’s revolution – events in China were harder to 
comprehend. Audrey Young was a student teacher and went on the 1976 Student Study Tour. 
Her experience was in contrast to Franks’ optimism that each change in direction of the Chinese 
leadership represented the correct one. She said that being in China during the ‘Criticise Deng 
Xiaoping’ campaign and then hearing he had come to power almost as her tour landed back in 
                                                        
742  ‘Counter-revolutionary Political Incident at Tiananmen Square’, Wellington Branch Newsletter, May 1976, 2, 
Wellington Branch papers, NZCFS Archive. Xinhua is the New China News Agency, the Chinese equivalent of Agence 
France-Press or the British Broadcasting Corporation. All are officially commercial businesses, in reportage officially 
independent of the government, but subject to considerable oversight through the way that they are structured and 
funded. 
743 ‘Counter-revolutionary Political Incident at Tiananmen Square’, Wellington Branch Newsletter, November, 1976, 3. 
Wellington Branch papers. NZCFS Archive. 
744 Rewi Alley letter to NZCFS. Inwards correspondence. Jack Ewan papers, 1970s. NZCFS Archive. 
745 Don Franks, ‘As We Saw It’, New Zealand China News, New Zealand China Society, November 1976, 3. 
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New Zealand had been impossible to reconcile, and she had drifted away from involvement with 
the NZCFS.746 
As the official Chinese line changed towards the repudiation of all things that could be associated 
with the Gang of Four the Society followed suit. Early 1977, as part of the post-Mao authorities 
campaign against of Gang of Four, saw the screening of The East is Red, and Red Detachment of 
Women. The East is Red had been banned since 1966. The Red Detatchment of Women existed as two 
films, one made in 1961 and another reworked as part of the yangbanxi or ‘eight model works, 
under the sponsorship of Jiang Qing. NZCFS was showing the earlier one. Although most 
Society members in New Zealand would have simply thought they were seeing a movie, the 
screening of these two films was in fact part of the break with the cultural revolution. In 
Wellington however the connection was made in the newsletter. The advertisement for the 
screening of the films in Wellington carried the statement that ‘the showing of such a fine film 
was suppressed by the Gang of Four, they barred the broad masses… from seeing this film’.747 
Reflecting the political nature of the time, speakers at NZCFS meetings had to prove through 
their political credentials that they could speak with authority on ‘People’s China’. When Ted 
Bull, President of the Australian China Friendship Society, visited he spoke not just as a ‘friend 
of China’ but as someone with ‘a lifetime of valuable experience in the day-to-day working class 
movement behind him’.748 
The late 1970s were also complicated in terms of the internal politics of the Society because of 
the influence of divisions that occurred with the CPNZ. The splits in the communist movement 
in New Zealand meant that there were now a series of organisations alongside the CPNZ that 
were supportive of China but otherwise engaged in ideological conflict with one another. 
Ultimately, those Marxist-Leninists who stayed with the Society would leave the CPNZ. Some, 
such as the mostly Wellington-based members of the Marxist Leninist Organisation, were already 
outside of it. New parties (or more correctly, pre-parties) formed around this time. They included 
the Struggle group and the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of a CPNZ (Marxist-
Leninist). Alec Ostler and Ray Gough, long time members of the Society, were in the former. 
Jack Ewan, National President of the Society, and former CPNZ General Secretary Vic Wilcox, 
were in the latter. Ewan and Wilcox had been expelled from the CPNZ in 1978.749 Later that year 
the CPNZ would withdraw from the Society altogether causing havoc at branch level as many 
                                                        
746 Audrey Young, personal communication, 26 October 2003. 
747 ‘The East is Red: A Song and Dance Pageant’, Wellington Branch newsletter, 9 May 1977, 1. 
748 ‘Monthly Meeting Speaker: Ted Bull’, Christchurch Branch newsletter, March 1977, Willmott papers, NZCFS 
Archive. 
749 These machinations of the CPNZ and its various off-shots are explained, so some extent, in chapter 4. 
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long-serving committee members, also members of the Party, made themselves unavailable for 
re-election.750 
These divisions in the late 1970s were around a range of matters, but, as detailed in chapter four, 
were principally organised around a debate regarding the significance of the Theory of the Three 
Worlds. The NZCFS had lengthy discussions about whether to and how to promote the Theory. 
This culminated in 1977 when the Society, over National President Jack Ewan’s signature, issued 
a statement supporting the Theory of the Three Worlds and called upon members to study it as 
‘it tells the truth about the world at present’.751 The Auckland Branch, which included Ewan but 
was dominated by the CPNZ (the CPNZ was at the time withholding judgement on the Theory), 
criticised the decision to promote it.752 In the end, the National Executive had only agreed to 
include the material about the Theory, which had been written by CPNZ and Society member 
Joan Donley, in its newsletter if it was published with a covering note from the President. In the 
note NZCFS President Jack Ewan made his position clear. The Theory meant China’s 
identification with the third world, and this was simply a continuation of the China with which 
they had always been friends: 
Herself a product of revolution, China identifies with those forces in the world that 
oppose imperialism and colonialism… she offers a fraternal hand to those who seek to 
break with colonial rule.753 
The Society subsequently arranged for a workshop, held as part of its National Conference, on 
how to achieve ‘The Popularisation of China’s Foreign Policy, Including “Chairman Mao’s 
Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds”’. The report of the workshop noted that 
there was considerable debate about China’s foreign policy, the Gang of Four and the Theory of 
the Three Worlds, although it reported that some of the confusion was manufactured, 
some people have been confused by the nonsense of the capitalist press which calls the 
present Chinese leadership ‘moderates’ and the disgraced ‘gang of four’ ‘radicals’.754 
The workshop report acknowledged that there was much work to do. However, even in the 
branches that were dominated by a conservative climate it was decided that there was room for a 
‘gradual slow-but-sure approach to the popularisation of China’s foreign policies’. All members 
had a responsibility to study China’s foreign policy and to be ‘well-informed as to the situation’ 
                                                        
750 Bill Willmott reported that in 1977 over half of the Christchurch Branch executive made themselves unavailable and 
a very inexperienced committee was elected. Since he had relatively recently arrived from Canada he had had no idea 
what was going on. Willmott, interview Christchurch, 22 May 2004. 
751 ‘Introduction’ to NZCFS pamphlet ‘The Theory of the Three Worlds’. Wellington Branch papers, NZCFS Archive. 
752 The criticism was not just over the Theory itself. Some in the communist movement who supported the Theory of 
the Three Worlds, believed that as it was a contribution to Marxist-Leninist Theory, it should be the Party’s job to 
promote it. The NZCFS’s job, they believed, was to support the PRC itself in the things it did (albeit they may have 
been based in an application of the Theory (Don Ross, interview, Whangarei, 17 April 2003). 
753 NZCFS pamphlet ‘The Theory of the Three Worlds’, Wellington Branch papers, NZCFS Archive.  
754 ‘Report on promoting “The Theory of the Three Worlds”’. 
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and, as Jack Ewan was reported to have ‘correctly’ pointed out, ‘The Theory of the Three Worlds 
must be discussed. It is a clear statement of the present situation in the world’.755 
For the most part, the Society consolidated around China’s new line, represented it as a 
continuation of Mao’s, and rejected the Gang of Four’s ‘ultraleftism’. In particular the fall of the 
Gang of Four had little influence. Even Flora and Nat Gould, who would establish the pro-Gang 
of Four ‘Red Flag Group’ in 1981, left with the CPNZ in 1978 and only seem to have publicly 
promoted a pro-GPCR and Gang of Four position after they were expelled from the CPNZ – 
for criticising Albania – in 1979. The CPNZ itself followed the Albanian line, at this time not 
supportive of the cultural revolution and soon to evolve into a rejection of Mao altogether. 
Although, as reported below, Graeme Clarke said that in 1980 Jock Hoe had made pro-cultural 
revolution comments, Hoe had long drifted away from the Society by this stage and had lived 
outside of New Zealand for much of the intervening period. 
Despite the differences within the Society and the withdrawal of members of the CPNZ, the 
NZCFS remained very political in its work, even with respect to questions that were not 
immediately about China. It called upon members to oppose the Security Intelligence Service 
Bill.756 On 1 January 1977 it issued a statement calling for the ‘broadest international front to 
smash the two superpowers’ hegemonism and war policies’.757 
The Society’s efforts had become very much focussed on ‘explaining’ China to New Zealanders. 
With the CPNZ now openly opposed to China’s current policies this task had become one of 
defending China from both anti-communists and those it described as ultra-leftists (who were 
mostly former members).758 Its activities in this regard included the leaflet ‘China and the Nuclear 
Question’, and undertaking 81 screenings of its various films, to a total audience of over 3000. 
Learner in China, Willis Airey’s biography of Rewi Alley was reprinted to celebrate the Society’s 
25th anniversary.759 Increasing debate over China’s foreign policy (especially vis-a-vis the USSR’s 
foreign policy) resulted in the distribution of a pamphlet titled ‘Background to China’s Foreign 
Policy’ by Terry Auld and Alick Shaw.760 
                                                        
755 ‘Report on promoting “The Theory of the Three Worlds”’. 
756 This was partly on the grounds that the SIS had been caught bugging the home of former National President (and 
CPNZ member) Ron Howell. The Minister in charge of the SIS (Prime Minister Rob Muldoon) refused to confirm or 
deny whether or not being a member of the Society was grounds for being considered a security threat to New 
Zealand. Minutes of NZCFS National Executive Meeting, 1 November 1978, Jack Ewan papers, NZCFS Archive. 
757 Report on Branch AGM’, Wellington Branch Newsletter, 4 January 1977. 
758 In turn would CPNZ describe the Society as being a home for petit-bourgeois Chinese nationalists.  See CPNZ’s 
Firm Stand Against the New Revionism, In Print, Auckland, 1978, 6. 
759 National President’s Report to the NZCFS National Conference, June 1980, Jack Ewan Papers, (1980s General), 
NZCFS Archives. 
760 Terry Auld and Alick Shaw, Background to China’s foreign policy today, Wellington Branch New Zealand China Society, 
Wellington, 1976. The publication consisted of two papers presented at a public meeting held by the Wellington 
Branch of the New Zealand China Society on 23 March 1976: ‘The struggle between the two superpowers’ by Terry 
Auld and ‘Never seek hegemony’ by Alick Shaw. 
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At its Annual General Meeting in 1977 the Society (now formerly the NZCFS Incorporated) 
adopted as its first goal ‘To foster interest in and promote the study of China, its history, culture, 
political and social structure past and present’. This replaced the goal of recognition, which had 
been achieved. ‘Goal (c)’ now read: ‘To oppose and correct misrepresentation and 
misunderstanding of the policies and actions of the Chinese Government and people’.761 
These changes were intended to respond to changes in the New Zealand situation, and to cement 
the centrality of politics to the life of the Society, as that was central to how members saw their 
organisation. NZCFS members saw their organisation as simply continuing what it had been 
doing, and that China was unchanged. As Jack Ewan’s report to the National Conference noted 
‘Hua Guofeng is carrying forward the political line of Mao and, in particular… exposing and 
defeating the attempts of the Gang of Four to subvert the work of Comrade Mao’.762 However, 
changes in China would have enormous impact on the Society. China was changing dramatically 
as its resurrected leadership looked towards ‘modernisation’ and ‘opening up’. Over the next 25 
years these changes would not just affect the image of China that the Society represented, but all 
aspects of the operations of the NZCFS. 
 
Friendship of a New Type 
Accompanying the modernisation process at the end of the 1970s, there was a reconsideration of 
all of the activities led by the Communist Party of China, and naturally this extended into the 
people-to-people activities.763 The International Section of the CPC would call its new practices 
‘new-type inter-party relations’.764 Their activities meant that they chose now to interact with 
‘various political parties… proceeding from state strategic interests, instead of ‘supporting 
Leftists and combating revisionism’.765 The activities that the New Zealand China Friendship 
Society was engaged in with the PRC, through Youxie would also be affected by these changes.766 
China’s interest in foreign exchange, in part to contribute to its modernisation drive, had led to 
an increase in the numbers of tours. This meant that more and more New Zealanders were 
                                                        
761 Minutes of the Annual General Meeting, NZCFS National Conference, Auckland, 14-15 May 1977, Jack Ewan 
papers, (1970s General), NZCFS Archive. 
762 ‘National President’s Report to the NZCFS National Conference’, Auckland, 14-15 May 1977, Jack Ewan papers, 
(1970s General), NZCFS Archive. 
763 This is consistent with the periodisation process discussed in chapter 1. The CPC refers to the process as ‘To fit in 
with the developing domestic and international situation, China made a major adjustment of its foreign policy’, see 
Communist Party of China, CPC Seeks New Relations with Foreign Political Parties, New Star Publishers, Beijing, 1998, 2. 
764 CPC, CPC Seeks New Relations, 2. 
765 CPC, CPC Seek New Relations, 3. Note the consistency with Wang Hui’s analysis that the CPC and PRC state became 
rigidified (Wang Hui, ‘Depoliticised Politics, From East to West’, New Left Review, 41, September-October 2006, 29). 
766 While current Youxie representatives spoke freely of the current relationship between themselves and foreign 
groups, and dated the start of these activities to the end of the 1970s/beginning of the 1980s, they would not talk of 
the period before then, merely to assert that what they were doing now was correct. However, retired former Youxie 
workers I talked to made a distinct link between changes in people-to-people practices and changes in the ideological 
outlook of the leading organs of the CPC. 
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having direct contact with China and they did not necessarily share the values of longer-standing 
members of the Society. Accordingly, NZCFS’s opening up of China to all and sundry created a 
problem with ‘letting in the flies’.767 The Society could less and less maintain a consolidated 
ideological line supporting China revolutionary trajectory. Some of these new study tour 
participants thought China should adopt bourgeois democratic practices,768 were enamoured by 
the Dalai Lama and questioned the Chinese Government’s position on Tibet,769 were critical of 
‘backwardness’ in China and attributed this to socialist planning,770 or even felt that ‘the people 
were terrified, [and] that Mao’s ideology, writing and poetry were every bit as war glorifying and 
imperialistic as say Rudyard Kipling’s’.771 Yet they often joined the Society after their experience 
of travelling to the PRC. 
In addition, the careful screening of who could be an expert on China was also becoming harder 
to control. A number of New Zealanders were now going to work in China, answering China’s 
call for ‘foreign experts’, a call that increasingly put ‘expertise’ ahead of an ideological connection 
with the Chinese revolution.772 The first New Zealanders to go and work in post-liberation China 
were those with political ties to left movements such as the CPNZ. Over time , however, such 
political ties became less significant.773 Jock Hoe, who taught history in Shanghai, had been 
involved with the Society for many years so fitted the earlier requirements. When Graeme Clarke 
visited Hoe in 1980, Hoe was still defending the Cultural Revolution.774 Other observers have 
considered that the fact that some foreigners became too politically engaged, especially from the 
                                                        
767 Deng Xiaoping would use the term later to refer to China’s reform process giving greater access to foreign ideas 
and that some bad things would come in with the good things. See Jonathon Spence, The Search for Modern China, 
Norton, New York, 1990, 696. 
768 John Meldrum, NZCFS Tours Committee Report, September 2008, NZCFS Archive. 
769 Yvonne Brown, a member of the Society’s Teachers’ Tour in 1976, personal communication, Hokitika, Christmas, 
2003. 
770 Tom Mills, NZCFS Tours Committee Chairperson, personal communication, June 2008. 
771 Stephen Franks. See http://www.stephenfranks.co.nz/?page_id=5. 
772 This, in accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s famous quote that ‘It doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white so long as 
it catches mice’, meant that as long as people were native speakers of English they could teach in China, regardless of 
their views of the type of society the Communist Party of China was seeking to build, or the methods it used. 
773 Examples of the politically engaged foreigners to go to the PRC were Jack Ewan or the Lake family. Ewan has been 
discussed above. Doug Lake was trained as a journalist and worked for the Christchurch Star-Sun. He joined the army in 
1940 and became at one time a clerk to General Freyberg. After being demobbed, he joined the Department of 
External Affairs and was posted to the New Zealand embassy in Moscow. He served as a typist, then, after learning 
Russian, was appointed to the Diplomatic Staff. He served in Moscow till 1949. He was criticised in the Department 
for being overly sympathetic to the Soviet Union and left External Affairs in 1954. He and his wife Ruth, who met 
while both were working for the legation in Moscow, then got involved in various left causes such as the Wellington 
branch of the Communist Party, and the Society for Closer Relations with Russia. After working in the Parliamentary 
Press gallery the Lakes went to Peking in 1962. Doug and Ruth both worked in the Foreign Languages Institute, 
‘polishing’ English language publications. Their daughters went to school in China and were ‘Red Guards’ during the 
early years of the Cultural Revolution. On returning to New Zealand in 1969 Doug Lake became active in the NZCFS. 
Sally became a leader in the Wellington branch of the Progressive Youth Movement (Murray Horton, interview with 
Doug and Sarah (Sally) Lake, transcript supplied by Horton, the article was published in Canta, in 1972 when Horton 
was Canta editor).  
774 Graeme Clarke, interview, Wellington, 7 November 2003. Clarke met Hoe in Shanghai, on Clarke’s second trip to 
China (he had been on the first NZUSA trip to China in 1971). 
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left of the political spectrum, was a factor in the later preference for those who were ‘simply 
teachers’.775 
As the seventies became the 1980s people only recently connected with Chinese friendship were 
invited to China to teach. Gwen Ryan was much less political than her predecessors, although 
sympathetic, but at the first NZCFS meeting that she attended, she was invited to teach in China. 
Don and Lorna Simpson, are another example. They had not even been members of the Society 
when they started to explore the possibility of teaching in China. They became interested in 
China through participating in a commercial (not an NZCFS) tour in 1976. Mary and Vincent 
Gray fitted the new mould. He was a scientist, she a language teacher.776 
The concept of what constituted a ‘friend of China’ can be seen to have changed from the highly 
political concept of friendship at the heart of Michael Dutton’s analysis as introduced in chapter 
1. For Dutton a politics of commitment constitutes a binary divide between friend and enemy 
and is a key element in the revolutionary period. Post-Mao, friendship has become an apolitical 
form of any connection between two people. ‘Friend’ is the same word but is contextually 
completely different. 
In 1978 and 1979, the NZCFS’s objective to ‘correct misrepresentations about China’ was tested 
by the conflict with Vietnam and the tension this created for those members active in anti-
Vietnam War activities.777 This was especially true since many of the Society’s student members, 
who dominated branches such as that in Wellington, had been drawn to China because of its 
symbolic status in anti-imperialist discourse. Throughout 1978 the Society produced and re-
produced Chinese material criticising Vietnam. The PRC Government ‘Statement on Vietnam 
                                                        
775 See Anne-Marie Brady Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic of China, Rowman & 
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and was also offered a visiting professorship in the Foreign Languages Department. They too joined the NZCFS on 
their return, Mary becoming National President in 1994-1996 and Vincent serving on the Wellington Branch 
committee for many years. (These stories are all contained in Tom Newnham’s New Zealand Women in China, Graphic 
Publications, Auckland, 1995). 
777 On February 15, 1979 the PRC publicly announced its intention to strike at Vietnam and PRC snipers killed a 
Vietnamese soldier that they claimed had violated the Chinese-Vietnam border. Some 200,000 Chinese troops 
subsequently invaded the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and occupied about forty kilometres of Vietnamese territory, 
as far south as the city of Lang Son. They then claimed the gate to Hanoi was open, declared their punitive mission 
achieved, and withdrew. The reason cited for the counter strike was the mistreatment of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese 
minority and the Vietnamese occupation of the Spratly Islands. Western observers put the attack down to the 
Vietnamese invasion of the Democratic People’s Republic of Kampuchea, regarded as China’s ally. See Zhang 
Xiaoming ‘China's 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment’, China Quarterly, 184, December 2005, 851-874. 
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Expelling Chinese Residents’ was reproduced in Branch Newsletters in May. The National 
President’s article ‘Support for China’s Just Stand’ was published in early June. Yet the fact that 
many NZCFS members had positive images of Vietnam meant that the pronouncements needed 
to be guarded. The Society call was for ‘continued friendship’ and for the Vietnamese 
government to ‘take responsibility for unwarranted measures’.778 Note that the Sino-Vietnamese 
conflict was explained in terms of national politics rather than ideological ones, reflecting the 
post-Mao depoliticisation process. It was precisely this that prompted Benedict Anderson’s 
interest in exploring the large global politics of the nation and nationalism (instead of simply 
class). 
The following year the Society admitted it had lost members over the issue.779 At first it defended 
China from what it identified as encircling Soviet hegemonism and then its publicity became 
more aggressive. It produced a pamphlet written by Wellington Branch Chairman Peter Franks 
entitled Why Did China and Vietnam Go To War? ‘History’, the Franks pamphlet claimed, ‘and the 
response of the world’s peoples will show solid justification for China’s counter-attack against 
Vietnamese border incursions over a long period’.780 The pamphlet was essentially a verbatim 
transcription of a conversation Franks had had with PRC Foreign Affairs officials while on the 
NZCFS leaders’ tour the previous year.781 
As always the Society closely followed events – even the language – that was topical in China. In 
July 1978, Peter Franks revisited the publishing of the New China Review article ‘Counter 
Revolutionary Political Incident at Tiananmen Square’ in mid-1976. He said that he had now 
‘come to the conclusion’ that the earlier article was ‘a pack of lies’. This was a ‘negative example’, 
he wrote, ‘to prove the correctness of China’s current strategy to “Seek Truth from Facts”’.782 
The ‘pragmatic’ approach of the PRC’s new leaders to China’s particularities also infused the 
reports of the Society’s leaders returning from a ‘Leaders Tour’ that same year. Crucially, so too 
did the claim to legitimacy of the new leadership in representing any ‘new’ policies as being a 
continuation of the old: 
Ideologues abroad may find China less exciting today than in those heady days of the 
Cultural Revolution when all authority was being challenged and the emergence of 
socialist consciousness on a grand scale seemed imminent. A visit today will convince 
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780 Peter Franks, Why Did China and Vietnam Go To War? New Zealand China Friendship Society, Auckland, 1979. The 
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(such as that of Mao Zedong – although the particular words were actually attributed to Mao). 
  203
them that the Chinese are still on the revolutionary road that began with the Long 
March, even if that road is a little longer and more winding than they thought it would 
be a decade ago. In its unique approach to economic development, China continues to 
provide a challenging model to the Third World, and in its patterns of social organisation 
it challenges us all.783 
At the same time the Society recognised that some of the people who used to be entralled with 
the People’s Republic no longer were. Peter Franks Chairman’s Report to the Wellington Branch 
for the 1978 year referred to this in some depth: 
It is a fact that there are quite a lot of people these days who have had some sort of 
involvement in China friendship activities who think that China has deviated from 
Chairman Mao’s principles and is now on the capitalist path. This is something our 
Society has to face up to and try to deal with… There is one weekly newspaper which 
devotes much of its time these days to spreading outright lies and distortions about the 
situation in China. I’m not referring to the newspaper ‘Truth’ but to the ‘People’s 
Voice’.784 
The May to June programme of the Society was dominated by discussion and explanation of the 
new Chinese programme of the Four Modernisations. Jack Ewan’s Presidential address to the 
Annual General Meeting covered the ‘importance of the Four Modernisations and the Theory of 
the differentiation of the Three Worlds’, while acknowledging that the policies ‘have led to 
debate within and without the society’. Admitting that there was debate was not intended to open 
the possibility of the Society rejecting the Chinese position. Ewan’s intention was to manage the 
debate and to make sure that the official position was discussed until it was understood by 
everyone: 
I believe we are on the surest ground when we aim to encompass all who are interested 
in being genuine friends with China, on whatever basis… If some of our friends are 
uncertain or confused about events in China, shouldn’t this be an opportunity for a 
branch meeting, a study group, an article?785 
The Society endorsed the opening-up strategy through its activities. The 1979 ‘China Week’ in 
Wellington exemplified the approach. It offered ‘as varied a programme as possible’ and included 
kite flying and a Chinese cooking demonstration, alongside discussion on the Four 
                                                        
783 Bill Willmott, ‘Professor Bill Willmott’s Report’, Wellington Branch Newsletter, 1 August 1978, 2. It is reproduced 
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Modernisations and a screening of the movie based on the revolutionary opera The East is Red.786 
Tours also reflected this search for those with eclectic interests in China. Alongside the study 
tours offered in 1980 for members, teachers and students, there was one for those interested in 
China’s arts and crafts. Tours were now double the 1977 price at $2600.787 
While the Society was attempting to draw in new members, and mould them to the Society’s 
perspective on China, for existing members it was important that it was still the same ‘China’.  In 
November 1979 the Society’s branch newsletters reproduced an interview with Chinese Premier 
Hua Guofeng which emphasised the continuing tradition and thought of Mao Zedong in current 
practices. The review of activities in 1979 noted that there had been meetings on ‘China’s self-
defensive counter-attack’ and that the Society had come to recognise that the Four 
Modernisations should be understood as a ‘New Long March’. Yet the Society was suffering 
from the loss of Vietnam War activists and the increasing cost of its tours. It was forced to 
cancel one of two planned teachers’ tours and the spring members’ tour due to lack of demand. 
In addition to the political problems the Society had lost its ‘monopoly’. Commercial companies 
were now offering tours alongside the NZCFS ones, reducing the Society’s potential customers 
and meaning that not all visitors to the PRC could be managed and led according to its 
objectives.788 
In 1980 the Society supported and joined the PRC’s condemnation of Soviet Union’s invasion of 
Afghanistan. Although this meant supporting the Western boycott of the Moscow Olympics, it 
was straightforward compared with attempting to be consistent with both its previously taken 
positions and the current Chinese line on other issues.789 Remembering the Cultural Revolution, 
for example, was becoming more and more complicated. Although just a short time earlier it had 
been noting the Cultural Revolution as a good thing, in July it noted, in accordance with the 
contemporary official line, its opposition to the ‘effect… on Chinese workers of the policies of 
the Gang of Four’. The following month it would begin its move towards a complete rejection of 
the GPCR when it reproduced an article from Beijing Review which used the construction ‘ten 
years of disaster’ to describe the years from 1966 to 1976.790 
Increasingly the Society was finding itself defending the international activities of the PRC from 
New Zealanders who would previously have been supportive of the Society. In April it published 
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an article refuting ‘the rumour’ that China was trading with South Korea and South Africa.791 On 
the eve of the 1981 Springbok Tour to New Zealand, with many of the student members who 
had been attracted to friendship with the PRC over the previous decade involved as leaders in 
the anti-tour movement, the latter was of particular significance. 
Yet while this position argued that China remained a bastion of anti-imperialist internationalism, 
other issues on which the Society reported reflected a drift from the Society’s roots. For instance, 
in May it reported on ‘Further Economic Advancements: A break with Leftist Thinking’ and in 
the same issue a ‘Reassessment of Confucius and Confucianism’.792 
The reassessment of Confucius was part of a process of stressing the historical continuities 
between the PRC and previous Chinese regimes. In part this was a return to some of the 
diplomatic debates with the Taiwan authorities about who represented ‘China’ but was also an 
assertion of nationalism, which has always had a claim to continuity and antiquity. Further 
though, the reassessment of Confucius was part of a process of promoting ‘culture’ instead of 
‘politics’. Since it is harder to define a cultural rather than a political fact, culture is further from 
the domain of true and false. In fact culture is often used to problematise facts and truth. Culture 
then is a neutral ground for framing international exchange, and for depoliticising it. 
Wang Hui argues that the reappraisal of the Cultural Revolution meant the end of politics in the 
People’s Republic of China. He argues that discussions about the 1960s and early 1970s (the 
‘Cultural Revolution decade’) in China, have ‘a unique characteristic: complete silence’. Also, 
since the Cultural Revolution there has seen a backlash against the concept of ‘revolution’. The 
entire decade has been consigned to oblivion. Wang emphasises two points necessary to an 
understanding of politics: 1) politics depends on the establishment of political subjectivity; and 2) 
politics consists of a struggle over who has the right to rule, and over whom. Just as the 
depoliticization of politics makes politics more independent of what political subjectivity 
establishes, so the disappearance of ‘revolution’ robs society of the very concept of ‘class’. Under 
Deng’s pragmatism, debates about political ideology disappeared and an experimentalism 
emphasizing trial-and-error reforms emerged as the mainstream. ‘Politics’ was thus depoliticised 
and became about technical aspects of ruling.793 
The Society increasingly picked up on a depoliticised vision of the PRC. It promoted the 
‘Resolution on CPC History’ and made copies of it available for sale, thereby participating in the 
condemnation of the period it had previously celebrated. Increasingly, discussion about activities 
in the PRC revolved around ‘seeking truth from facts’. Discussion on the matters that had 
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dominated NZCFS interest in the People’s Republic of China of yesteryear became conspicuous 
by their absence. The 1981 ‘China Week’ reflected the new line. The movies on offer were ‘The 
Battle of Shanghai’, from the 1938 Japanese War which helpfully avoided any discussion about 
China since then, and ‘The Ancient City of Xian’. Those interested in China were invited not to 
discuss the commune system or China’s industrial or medical advances, but to attend a workshop 
on ‘Chinese Brush Painting’. 
While the Society continued to report that China had no inflation and the price of international 
air travel was falling, the price of the tours the Society ran was $3070 for 1982.794 They had more 
than doubled in price in five years.795 In part this reflected the PRC’s hope that tours would 
become a source of foreign exchange rather than a mechanism to subsidise the travel of pilgrims 
visiting in order to study and learn from the Chinese social model. In line with reforms that 
would soon sweep New Zealand, Chinese host organisations such as the China International 
Travel Service and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries 
(known as CPAFFC or Youxie) were expected now to produce a commercial return on certain of 
their activities.796 
Participants on the tours the Society organised were changing along the same lines. In 1982 the 
Society organised the first of a a new type tour. It was led by Victoria University of Wellington 
academic James Bertram, who had played little role in the Society since the mid-1960s, and was 
comprised of a group of participants called variously ‘special’, ‘important’ and ‘prominent’.797 
They included Radio New Zealand journalist Sharon Crosbie, Race Relations Conciliator Hiwi 
Tauroa and Rod Alley, Rewi’s nephew but selected for his role as a VUW academic. The call for 
this new type of tour had come from the Chinese organisations the Society was paired with. The 
rejection of the mass line in the PRC was being played out in the NZCFS-organised tours.798 
Reports that China seemed to be embracing ‘market capitalism’, for example through articles 
extolling China’s progress by noting the increase in availability of consumer goods and home 
appliances, saw increased criticism of China from those who formerly claimed friendship with 
it.799 Now, however, the responses defending China were more from groups with party-to-party 
                                                        
794 Tours Report to the NZCFS National Executive, 15 September 1982, Jack Ewan papers, NZCFS Archive. 
795 Cost of tours 1972 to 1983: 1972, 1300; 1973, 1000; 1974, 1091; 1975, 1200; 1976, 1100; 1977, 1700; 1978, 1750; 
1979, 1900; 1980, 2300; 1981, 2560; 1982, 3070; 1983, 3098 (in 1975, the workers’ tour was only $700. It’s not clear if 
this was subsidised by the Society or the host). 
796 Crook, interview. 
797 Note that the different names allowed for differences within the Society to be ignored. Those who believed in 
‘community’ could call it a Community Leaders Tour, those who were into elite politics cold refer to it as a ‘Prominent 
Person’s Tour’. Those involved with the Society were reflecting an increasingly eclectic image of the PRC in an eclectic 
image of the NZCFS. 
798 ‘Youxie have asked us to put together a tour of “prominent people”, for 1982’, National Executive minutes, 10 
August 1981, Jack Ewan papers, NZCFS Archive. 
799 This criticism came most noticeably by the Red Flag Group (see Red Flag August 1981, 5 and February 1983, 12, 11 
‘this is the road back to capitalism and exploitation’). This organisation condemned the ‘restoration of capitalism in 
China’.  It was dominated by former CPNZ leaders Flora and Nat Gould. Flora Gould attended the foundation 
meeting of the NZCFS and Rewi Alley stayed with the Goulds when in Auckland on his trips in 1960 and 1963 and 
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links with the CPC than from the NZCFS itself. The Preparatory Committee undertook a tour 
and published China is Not Selling Out Socialism: the Report of a Delegation that Investigated this Question 
in 1982. Peter Franks, Chairman of the Society’s Wellington Branch wrote a two-part report for 
Unity, the theoretical magazine of the Wellington Marxist Leninist Organisation. In it he also 
defended the Chinese ‘determination to turn their country into a great, powerful, modern 
socialist nation’ and criticised the ‘pompous resolutions of the “Communist” Party of New 
Zealand’ for suggesting China was on ‘the capitalist road’.800 
The introduction given to NZCFS tour participants continued to strongly endorse China as being 
on the socialist path. The Society’s Helpful Information for Study Tours noted that 
Since these tours of China are essentially study tours, background reading is important. 
Modern China is a socialist country in the Marxist-Leninist sense under the leadership of 
the Communist Party of China and following the late Mao Tsetung’s teachings…. 
Furthermore… some reading of Mao’s Theory of the Three Worlds will certainly be of 
value.801 
Despite this determined construction, the withdrawal of CPNZ cadre from the Society and the 
ever-expanding participation in the NZCFS tours led to a more politically diverse membership 
throughout the 1980s. China began to shift from a political centre to one that represented far 
more eclectic interests. The Society began to campaign for a New Zealand–China Council to 
coordinate the activities of all groups connected to the PRC, as had been set up in Australia. 
Increasingly, its material referred to cooperative activities with the New Zealand–China Trade 
Association.802 The Society had ceased to see itself as able to preserve an image of China through 
its own unique relationship and increasingly saw its link with the PRC as just one of the many 
possible and fruitful connections that could be made. 
It wasn’t just over the tours and image of China that the NZCFS had lost the ‘China monopoly’. 
When Zhao Ziyang became the highest ranking representative from the PRC to visit New 
Zealand, the Society was left out completely from his official (or unofficial) schedule. The 
Wellington Newsletter noted that ‘As the Premier’s programme will be very full, our Society will 
not be able to meet him personally’. But they organised an airport welcome regardless, displaying 
                                                                                                                                                              
had written a poem to them, Rewi Alley, ‘For Flora and Nat’, in Snow Over the Pines, NZCFS and Progressive Books, 
Auckland, 1977. 
800 China is Not Selling Out Socialism, Preparatory Committee for the Formation of a Communist Party of New Zealand 
(Marxist Leninist). The Preparatory Committee delegation included NZCFS President Jack Ewan. Peter Franks, 
‘Socialist China’, Unity, August and September 1982.   See Michel Chossudovsky, Towards Capitalist Restoration: Chinese 
Socialism After Mao, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1986 for a detailed analysis of changes in China reflecting the 
perspective that China was no longer socialist. This was being widely circulated by groups such as the CPNZ and Red 
Flag Group in New Zealand. See chapter 5 for more detailed discussion of these contesting perspectives from this 
period. 
801 Briefing to participants on NZCFS China Tours, NZCFS, Auckland, 1980, 3 and 4. 
802 NZCTA set up in 1981 by Victor Percival. See Bruce Kohn, Kiwi Patherfinder: Opening Mao’s China to the West, 
Grantham Books, London, 2008 and the NZCTA website http://www.nzcta.co.nz/english/about/#ourhistory. 
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their banner calling for friendship between the people of China and New Zealand as Zhao was 
rushed between plane and limousine.803 
Two years later the National Secretary would admit, while trying to present a positive spin on the 
situation: 
There are so many VIPs and delegations from China these days that the Society seldom 
has any contact with them. Gone are the days when the NZ-China Society was the only 
organisation to host and entertain and see to the needs and, at times, even the security of 
Chinese guests. However, perhaps this position is really a measure of our success, for 
today, the NZ Government, Education Institutions, Sports bodies and business firms 
play host to many many Chinese visitors and we have become pioneers in the 
achievement of friendship between NZ and China.804 
A decade later the relationship between the visiting Chinese and the Society would have changed 
further. While important guests would meet with government officials, the Society had been 
turned into dinner companions for visiting lower-ranked officials from China who wanted to 
meet real New Zealanders amidst what they had actually come to New Zealand for: 
from time to time the Society… hosts groups of Chinese businessmen and other visitors 
from China… they appreciate the company of New Zealanders and it is an opportunity 
for us to speak with them… perhaps YOU would care to join us.805 
 
Further Changes in the 1980s 
Since Liberation, the PRC’s aid activity had been feted by the Society as an example of the same 
internationalism in which members felt that they themselves were engaged. In 1978 the Society 
purchased a copy of the film Freedom Railway, which tells the story of China’s aid in the 
construction of the Zambian-Tanzania railway, and screened it throughout the country. The PRC 
and its allies have always held the railway up as an example of people-to-people aid, and also as a 
contrast to aid practices founded in relations based on imperialist, colonial and ‘first-world-
charitable’ relations.806 
In 1984, the Society reported on the donation of sewing machines to Tanzania by the Chinese 
Women’s Federation as a continuation of the programme of aid that had built the Zambian-
Tanzanian railway.807 Such contributions had their precedent, in donations by New Zealanders to 
                                                        
803 Branch News’, Wellington Branch newsletter, 16 March 1983, 1. 
804 Nancy Goddard, ‘Visitors From China’, Wellington Branch Newsletter, 6 November 1986, 2. 
805 ‘Dine With Visiting Delegations’, Wellington Branch Newsletter, 14 November 1996, 1. 
806 See P.K. Sircar, ‘The Great Uhuru (Freedom) Railway: China's Link to Africa’, China Report, 2, 1978, 15-24. 
807 ‘Sewing Machines for Tanzania’, Wellington Branch Newsletter, 14 September 1984, 2. 
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Alley’s Gung Ho project and CORSO as well as support by the New Zealand government in the 
pre-war years. However it was inconsistent with the situation in the intervening years. For thrity-
five years since the founding of the PRC, the NZCFS projected a situation where first world 
New Zealand could take hope and inspiration from the Chinese model and learn about ‘correct’ 
relations between states. Under this construction, the third world – but socialist – People’s 
Republic of China needed nothing from first world – and capitalist – New Zealand. But at the 
end of 1985 it was reporting on China’s own request for aid, as a fund was established to solicit 
money from abroad to help rebuild the ‘Great Wall’. Soon enough the Society had its own aid 
project, collecting funds to re-establish Rewi Alley’s school at Shandan. In 1987 the Society sent 
an entire container to Shandan filled with material donated by members and the Society 
contributed an English teacher to the school (the Society selected a teacher and paid for their 
travel from New Zealand to Shandan. The New Zealand government paid the salary of the 
teacher through the New Zealand overseas aid budget).808 
Reflecting the cultural China the Society that it was now engaged with, 1985 saw the Society its 
first Chinese New Year banquets. Such ‘Chinese’ traditions hadn’t been important elements of 
the PRC that the NZCFS related to before now. This ‘cultural turn’ was also reflected in the 
Society’s organised film evenings. The East is Red and Red Detachment of Women had been replaced 
as representative of the PRC by films about Chinese children in the performing arts, the training 
of a champion wushu practitioner and a cartoon of a ‘traditional’ story. Later in 1985, the films 
were ‘Diary of the Chinese Dancer’ and a look at painter Li Keran. A further film was on 
miniature sculpture. The films were now provided by the Chinese embassy, accordingly this 
change towards ‘culture’ reflected the PRC’s official discourse about itself. 809 
In 1985 three of six tours were cancelled and there were frantic calls in the branch newsletters 
saying that others would also need more applicants in order to go ahead.810 However, in March a 
second tour representing the new target for China’s United Front work did go to China. 
Officially it was a ‘Community Leaders Delegation’, but internally it was referred to as a 
delegation of ‘Well Known Personages’.811 Nominations included ‘prominent people’ such as 
Maori Women’s Welfare League President Mira Szasy, judge Peter Mahon, former politician Sir 
James Henare, and educator Jack Shallcrass. Others were chosen for the links they might bring, 
not to trade unions but to more established elite organisations: Angus McLeod from the Council 
of Churches; Laurie Salas from the National Council of Women; and Idi Tawhiwhirangi, a senior 
policy adviser with the Department of Maori Affairs and a leader in the Kohunga Reo 
movement. 
                                                        
808 ‘Shandan Project Huge Success’, Christchurch Branch Newsletter, March 1985, 1, NZCFS Archive. 
809 ‘Branch Film Evening’, Wellington Branch Newsletter, May 1985, 2, Wellington Branch papers, NZCFS Archive. 
810 ‘News on Tours’, Wellington Branch Newsletter, 30 July 1985, 2. Wellington Branch papers, NZCFS Archive. 
811 ‘Community Leaders Delegation Chosen’, New Zealand China News, 14 March, 1985, 1. 
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The tours for paying members of the Society were no longer targeted towards members of 
popular groupings and were no longer called ‘Study Tours’. In 1986, instead of a Spring 
Members’ Tour, the Society advertised a ‘Springtime Tour’. The other tours on offer were called 
‘Hunan Landscapes’ and the ‘Shandong Special’. All tours included Beijing, Shanghai and Xian 
and the participants were tourists. In 1987 the NZCFS gave up organising the tours itself and 
joined forces with Thomas Cook Travel to offer commercial tours. They offered ten tours in 
1987. These were now designed for the public and reflected a characterisation of China as exotic 
with no political elements. Tours had titles reflecting this, such as ‘China Splendours’, ‘The Great 
China Explorer’ and ‘China Highlights’. Demand was greatly over-estimated. In 1987 three were 
cancelled and in 1988 the National Secretary reported in May that only twenty-one of the two 
hundred places had been sold. Only three tours went ahead.812 
Despite these developments, the Society still sought to explain China and in 1985 the link 
between contemporary China and the revolutionary past was still being drawn. National 
President Jack Ewan’s annual report testified that the Society needed ‘… to do more to educate 
our members and the public at large on China and its present day policies’. The China they 
needed to educate the public about was ‘a developing socialist country pursuing an independent 
foreign policy’. As proof of the steadfast path China travelled Ewan noted an article from China 
Daily ‘Making Money Must Not Be the Ultimate Goal’ which compared values under the West’s 
capitalism and China’s socialism.813 
Yet the NZCFS’s China was changing and the aspirations of the past now needed to be tempered 
by Chinese ‘realities’. At first this was seen as a continuation of the socialist path – albeit noting 
that the ‘Chinese Road to Socialism’ was not necessarily orthodox or for replication, as had been 
previously stated. In early 1986 the NZCFS reproduced a statement from the Beijing Review in 
which it was claimed that in China ‘[t]rue revolutionary vision has replaced super-revolutionary 
grandiloquence. The spirit of seeking truth from facts… is gaining ground. In this lies our hope 
for the future’. Yet within a few months there was a recognition that China’s politics had 
changed significantly. In particular, the Beijing authorities had repudiated the tradition of mass 
movements, associating them with the cultural revolution and reflecting Wang Hui’s analysis of a 
depolicisation process. The NZCFS Wellington Branch Newsletter published an article from 
China Daily explaining that political campaigns were no longer a feature of Chinese daily life: 
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It’s understandable that people abroad misunderstand what we are doing. From lack of 
accurate information about things going on now, they are likely to judge things by past 
experience about China’s political campaigns!814 
In the mid-1980s, China’s internal politics became less comprehensible or even palatable, for 
China’s ‘old foreign friends’ in the political nature of that term. The focus turned instead to the 
PRC’s foreign policies, within a framework of a China acting as a bulwalk against ‘US 
imperialism’, and which were thereby easier to understand. This was the reverse of the position at 
the end of the 1970s. Allies of China’s socialist project could point in 1978 – without (much) fear 
of contradiction – to internal policies; while debate raged over foreign policy – such as the 
Theory of the Three Worlds and foreign relations – such as that with Vietnam. Even then, the 
Chinese government pronouncements chosen to be exposed were those that would attract most 
sympathy from New Zealanders. Those in the Society who still saw it as having New Zealand 
political objectives were closer to mainstream New Zealand political values than they had been. 
The PRC’s condemnation of South African apartheid and criticism of the super powers over the 
nuclear question gained exposure. A Beijing Review article lauding New Zealand’s estrangement 
from the United States over nuclear ship visits and the breakdown of ANZUS was also reprinted 
in the Society’s newsletters.815 
Sister cities are a globalised system of exchanges, involving links between civic authorities, 
experts and business leaders. In general the growth of sister city arrangements seems to have 
followed the outbreak of peace, as a way of promoting links between formerly conflicting people, 
for example one of the first in Europe after World War Two was between Coventry and Dresden 
as an act of peace on reconciliation as formerly heavily bombed cities. The movement for sister 
cities was accelerated after the American sister cities program was initiated in 1956 by President 
Dwight Eisenhower. Since 1967 the process is supported by the organisation Sister Cities 
International (SCI). 
The first sister-city agreement between a New Zealand and Chinese city was between Hastings 
and Guilin. The relationship developed entirely outside of the Society and came into being after a 
research scientist who had worked in Guangxi province, Dr Don McKenzie, identified a number 
of common areas of interest between the two cities, including horticulture and their rural-urban 
mix. The Hastings City Council took up the suggestion to establish a sister-city relationship, and 
                                                        
814 Beijing Review 6 Jan (published in New Zealand China News, 25 February 1985), Jack Ewan’s report to May 1985 
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815 ‘Australia and New Show Independence’, Wellington Branch Newsletter, 11 September 1986, 3. from Beijing Review 
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approached the Chinese Embassy in Wellington in October 1978. The Hastings-Guilin sister-city 
protocol was signed on March 4, 1981.816 
The NZCFS took up the idea of sister-cities, as it looked increasingly for projects that could 
engage a broad cross-section of New Zealanders, but increasingly elite New Zealanders, with the 
PRC. The focus was no doubt helped by the fact that the organisation it dealt with in China, the 
Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, was also made responsible 
for sister-cities. Youxie wanted to ‘make more foreign friends’, but not necessarily the friends The 
PRC used to have. Sister-cities reflected the new linkages that China was seeking: ‘One good way 
to promote economic ties is through sister-cities’. 817  In the early 1980s the NZCFS helped 
persuade the Wellington City Council to investigate a sister city relationship and a Wellington-
Xiamen agreement was signed in 1987. The Chinese authorities had suggested Xiamen as a 
partner because there were similarities between the two cities (as ports) and Xiamen had recently 
become a Special Economic Zone in China. 
As well as sister-city linkages, the Chinese hosts increasingly put their resources into the new 
arrangement of ‘Prominent Persons’ Tours’. Like the student tours of the 1970s, prominent 
persons need only pay for the international airfare, all internal costs were met by the CPAFFC. 
Wellington sister-city delegations were accorded ‘full red-carpet treatment’. The initial delegation 
included Allan Levett, a former Vice-Chair of the Wellington Branch but now an educational 
consultant. He had been included in the latter capacity rather than the former.818 However, a 
subsequent delegation included the then NZCFS National Secretary Nancy Goddard, as a 
member of a kapa haka group.819 
In late 1987 Rewi Alley died and with his death the Society lost its principal interpreter of the 
People’s Republic of China.820 Alley had been crucial to the Society’s navigation through changes 
in Chinese politics, particularly since the 1970s. If he was in Beijing, then all tours would visit him 
for a discussion on contemporary affairs. In addition, he was in regular correspondence with the 
national leadership, often penning an open letter to Society members on crucial events, or to sum 
up a turbulent period. Although memorial meetings through 1988 brought the Society together 
with renewed focus, Alley’s death left the NZCFS at a considerable disadvantage when the 
cataclysmic events of 1989 needed interpretation. For the decade would be dominated, so far as 
                                                        
816  In China sister-cities are referred to as ‘friendship cities’, since in Chinese, relationships between sisters are 
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‘Friendship Cities Bear Fruits’, Voice of Friendship, 1988, 16. 
817 ‘Sister-cities’, China Daily, 27 April 1994. 
818 Personal communication, 13 May 2008. 
819 Report by Nancy Goddard published in the Wellington Branch Newsletter (which she edited), October 1986. 
820 See chapter 7. 
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China watchers were concerned, by the events which took place in Tiananmen Square in May 
and June of 1989. 
 
Tiananmen Square, 4 June 1989. 
Tiananmen was a watershed for the Society. In the lead up to the events of early morning on 
June 4th, it sent a letter to the ambassador. Noting that ‘the situation is extremely complicated and 
that our information comes primarily through Western news sources’, the Society did not want to 
comment. ‘Rather’ it wrote ‘we would wish to express our warm and fraternal feelings of 
sympathy and support for all concerned in the negotiation to achieve a settlement’. 821  Yet 
immediately after troops moved into the square, the Society issued a media release declaring that 
it was ‘shocked by the brutal suppression of the demonstration’ and ‘support[ed] the New 
Zealand government’s condemnation of the army’s actions in Beijing and its opposition to such 
violent repression’.822 
The events in Beijing would change the nature of the Society dramatically. In a letter by the 
newly elected President to all members, Bill Willmott declared that the ‘events… have brought 
agony and anxiety to many of our friends in China and also to our own members’. The NZCFS 
national conference had been taking place the very same weekend, at the University of Auckland. 
University staff and students from the Chinese department had been closely following events and 
a group had even marched upon the conference – where they were admitted. Willmott reported 
that the conference ‘necessarily became focussed on this question, reinforced by the arrival of 
about forty Chinese students…’.823 The students asked the Society once ‘the brutality of the 
events became inescapable…’ to ‘follow our consciences in making public our opposition to the 
repression…’. 824 The situation was further complicated by the existence of a delegation from the 
Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries at the conference. They 
were themselves getting mixed messages from home. At first Youxie cadres had attended the 
rallies in Tiananmen Square and joined calls for an end to corruption and a rebirth of socialist 
practice. They were conspicuously silent in the immediate aftermath and returned quickly to 
China.825 
                                                        
821 Jack Ewan, NZCFS National President, ‘Letter to Chinese Ambassador’, 20 May 1989, Jack Ewan papers. NZCFS 
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The decision to condemn the Chinese government was contested. At least two members of the 
Society’s ‘old guard’ felt that the Society was giving too much weight to Western news sources – 
and their anti-communist bias – and too little to the official Chinese view. They also considered 
the decision to have been rushed. 
Which benefits from haste – truth or falsehood and rumour? I think truth has suffered. 
Surely such serious allegations demand careful and comprehensive gathering of facts, 
before making a decision condemning a government enjoying the support of the 
majority of the people – the people we are committed to building friendship with.826 
The majority view, however, prevailed and it meant a fundamental shift in the Society’s 
relationship with the PRC, in particular its officials. In his letter to members of the Society, 
Willmott set this out: 
For me, being a friend of China has meant that I always gave the Chinese government 
the benefit of the doubt. So often in the past we were confronted with …slanderous 
propaganda in our media that we had to resist… In this case… I also assume that the 
CIA and other foreign agents were directly involved in fermenting trouble. It would be a 
first if they weren’t! Furthermore, the press reports… have probably been one-sided, 
since the Western press is not generally favourable to China. But even with these 
reservations, it is impossible for us to escape the fact that the present leaders… 
suppressed militarily a demonstration that had wide support… it seems unlikely that the 
current leaders can remain in power unless they continue to rely on military 
repression.827 
Those in the Society who continued to prefer the official view of the Chinese authorities pointed 
to United States intelligence agencies and Taiwanese influences amongst the protesters, and 
distorted coverage by the Western media.828  Yet despite this, and despite also the Society’s 
history of engagement with Chinese government authorities, its official view is that Tiananmen 
was ‘a disaster’.829 
                                                        
826 Letter from a member ‘at large’ (most likely Ray Gough from Papatoetoe – the South Auckland Branch of the 
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As Willmott noted, ‘this places our Society in a difficult position’. At least partly due to the work 
of the Society, those friendly towards China could point to ‘a situation of growing cordiality 
between the Chinese government and our own’. Even more importantly, those Society members 
whose left-wing views meant that they opposed New Zealand government actions, or even the 
capitalist nature of New Zealand society, had ‘been able to offer our full and friendly support to 
officials from China as the representatives of a basically popular government’ [in contrast to their 
own]. This situation was now over. For the majority of the NZCFS, as represented by the new 
President, ‘our friendship with the Chinese people separates us rather than unites us with Chinese 
officialdom’. Willmott expressed hope that the Society could continue in its work and that 
members would ‘continue to express your friendship with the Chinese people by supporting our 
Society with your membership and doing what you can to further its aims’.830 
The implications for the Society were significant. While the Society’s view had always been that 
the government and the people of China were as one, and that friendship with the Chinese 
people meant support for its government, it no longer held that position. It began to play down 
its constitutional role of ‘seeking to explain the policies and actions of the Chinese government’. 
The report from the conference not only confirmed ‘our Society’s shock and sadness and deep 
concern over the violent events in Beijing’, it also announced a transformation of the relationship 
the Society had formerly had with the political entity of the PRC. Now, it claimed, as if it had 
always been the case, ‘Our friendship is for the people of China, not for any particular grouping’. 
This new depiction came out of an opposition to the Chinese government revealed in the same 
report where it declared ‘now is surely a time when the people of China need our sympathy and 
support more than ever’.831 
The Society did circulate material from Youxie that explained Tiananmen as the putting down of 
‘counter-revolutionary elements’. In August it published ‘CPAFFC’s Open Letter to Foreign 
Friends and Friendly Organisations’ in the New Zealand China News. This described the 
Tiananmen incident as a ‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’ and argued that the government’s 
actions had been those it was ‘compelled to take… in conformity with the fundamental interests 
of the Chinese people’. Youxie pleaded that ‘our friends will draw just conclusions from a good 
understanding of facts.’ ‘True friendship’, they said, ‘manifests itself in times of adversity’ and 
they hoped that ‘long-standing mutual trust… will be maintained and continue to develop, and 
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the sincere friendship between the Chinese people and the peoples of other countries will further 
grow’.832 But the appeal to historic ties was by no means enough for the Society.833 
Many members resigned and President Bill Willmott claimed subsequently that if the NZCFS 
had not condemned the Chinese government action then it would have been ‘the end of the 
Society’.834 Some of those who left had been important contributors to branch and national 
activity. David Wilkie, a Wellington member, had ‘organised the sales table for many years’. The 
branch newsletter had noted his growing contribution over the past decade. In addition he had 
initiated a project to restore Rewi Alley’s cottage in Moeawatea. He resigned almost immediately 
upon seeing the news coverage and walked away from the Society and anything to do with China. 
There was no opprobrium from those left in the Society, only understanding, with the 
Wellington Branch Secretary commenting ‘we hope that he will rejoin us one day’.835 
In the aftermath of June 4, the Society cancelled the tours that it had planned for later that year. 
Even in 1990 it also delayed another tour until after a delegation made up of the Society’s 
leadership could investigate the situation. The report from that delegation showed increased 
scepticism about the image that the Chinese hosts showed them: ‘we were not so naïve as to 
believe that we could get beyond superficial impressions’ and ‘most of us were uneasy and 
dubious about the official version’. Divisions within the touring party reflected the debate that 
had taken place earlier but the new leadership of president Bill Willmott won out over that 
represented by former president Jack Ewan. The report, penned by Willmott, declared ‘we do not 
serve our aims by simply acting as a mouthpiece for official statements from China or refusing to 
express critical opinions’. The divisions over Tiananmen went deep and the solution was to 
depoliticise the Society altogether. According to Willmott, the NZCFS now had ‘no official 
“line” on China’.836 
If the principal purpose of the leader’s tour was to investigate the truth about Tiananmen, an 
important secondary motive was to ensure that the Society’s commercial tours could go ahead. 
The tours were vitally important financially to the organisation. The Society had reserves 
reflecting the accumulated surpluses of tours when the NZCFS held the ‘China franchise’, but 
without the return from each year’s tour that would be quickly eroded. Members of the NZCFS 
and members of the public were assured: ‘on the surface China appears stable and normal, 
                                                        
832 ‘CPAFFC’s Open Letter to Foreign Friends and Friendly Organisations’, New Zealand China News, August 1989, 3. 
833 Note though that organisations whose connection with China was with the Marxist-Leninist project represented by 
the PRC circulated far more Chinese material than the Society. See chapter 4 for more detail. In addition NZCTA 
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835 ‘Sad News’, Wellington Branch Newsletter, 9 November 1989, 2. 
836 Bill Willmott, ‘Report on the Leadership Delegation to China, May 4-18 1990’, Auckland Branch Newsletter, July 
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entirely safe for tourism’. China returning to ‘normal’ was not necessarily the China that many of 
the members had joined the Society to be in contact with. They had sought an otherness to New 
Zealand, be it politically in the past or more recently in terms of cultural exoticism. But 
‘normality’ reflected official Chinese discourse. In his speech to a Society function to 
commemorate National Day in 1990, the Chinese ambassador Ni Zhengjian spoke of ‘the many 
achievements and favourable developments in present-day China where the political and 
economic situation is daily growing more stable’.837 
The 1990s saw the NZCFS looking for a new sort of identity and, as a consequence, to construct 
a new understanding of China. To a large degree, forced by the fallout from Tiananmen, it 
dropped its constitutional aim to ‘correct misrepresentation …of the policies and actions of the 
Chinese Government’. Its basic aims were rewritten as: 
(1) To promote friendship, understanding and goodwill between the peoples of 
China and New Zealand by promoting visits and exchange of ideas, information, culture 
and trade between the two countries. 
(2) To foster interest in and promote the study of China, its history, culture, 
political and social structures past and present. 
(3) To reaffirm the historical significance of the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China.838 
The latter clause was included as a demand by the long-standing and left-leaning members of the 
Society. They wanted the Society to continue to stand for socialist values and a reference to the 
revolution and establishment of the People’s Republic permitted this to happen.839 
Articles distributed to members reflected the Society’s desire to avoid political issues and thereby 
be seen as defenders of China’s politics and reflecting the uncertainty over politics were overaken 
by the force of China’s economic development – what was increasingly drawing many new 
members to an interest in China. Increasingly the principal contact with the Chinese embassy was 
with its ‘Cultural Section’. Throughout early 1990 the Society’s offerings to members reflected 
this desire. There were films or presentations on ‘Food and Night Markets’, as a way of 
understanding ‘China Today’, and explanations and demonstrations of Qingtian Stone Carving 
and performances by Chinese Acrobats. Other meetings publicised ‘Papercuts’, Chinese cooking, 
and films were shown on a farmer’s saloon (or agricultural market) and on minority peoples such 
as ‘Ding and Culture’ – not to challenge how Maori were treated in New Zealand, but as an 
                                                        
837 ‘Ambassador’s Message’, Auckland Branch Newsletter, October, 1990. 
838 The report on the meeting is contained in a full report in New Zealand China News, July 1991, 1. The constitutional 
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  218
exhibition of exoticism.840 Articles from China Daily that were reprinted in New Zealand China 
News and local newsletters reflected this change too. They tended to cover the items on which 
the embassy had material, on, or were about the (beautiful) environment, and features people 
might want to visit in China – such as a coin museum. 
Even so, the Society had to respind further to the question of its political past when in 1991 a 
rival organisation to the NZCFS emerged, promoting itself as a ‘non-political’ opportunity to 
engage with the PRC. The New Zealand China Friendship Association was founded by Pierre 
Beautrais and James Stubbs (using the alias Jack Saunders).841 Beautrais and Stubb’s organised a 
delegation to several Chinese cities and the NZCFS was horrified to hear that ‘they were hosted 
by officials, a number of whom were misled into believing that the party has been sponsored by 
our organisation’.842 Following representations by the Society addressing its ‘misrepresentation’, 
the NZCFA agreed to refer to itself as the ‘NZ China Friendship’ Sub-Committee of Vision 20-
20. In its exchanges with this rival group, the leadership of the NZCFS made the point that they 
too were ‘non-political’.843 
Tours were also affected by the new, non-political environment and the retreat from Tiananmen. 
Thomas Cook were undertaking their own, no longer sure that a link with the Society was 
necessarily commercial beneficial to them. The Society’s tours were targeted to members and 
were reduced to two or three per year. In 1991 they visited cities that had sister-city relationships 
with New Zealand, and a Silk Road Tour. In addition, in conjunction with the Australia China 
Friendship Society (ACFS), ‘New Cultural Tours to China’ were offered. They involved study at a 
Chinese university, and covered painting, calligraphy or Tai Chi, alongside Chinese language. A 
major event for the Society was hosting the tour of a couple of Gansu sculptors.844 
Despite all these changes, there was still pressure for even more change. The report from the 
National Council in July 1990 claimed that the original objectives of the NZCFS ‘have been 
achieved’ and that it needed to ‘change to meet the new conditions’. The pursuit of more sister-
city relationships ‘should be the focus for the future’.845 The Society still looked to remember 
Rewi Alley through aid projects based at the location of his school in Shandan and to maintain a 
                                                        
840 Wellington Branch newsletters 28 March and 9 May 1990. The films were made available to other branches, so were 
shown in other centres too. 
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sense of socialism, the Society was looking at help for co-operatives, as the International 
Committee for Chinese Industrial Co-operatives (ICCIC – or Indusco) was re-established.846 A 
new hero emerged too, one without any complications of having represented China to the West 
or said things that Society members no longer believed about the PRC.847 Nurse Kathleen Hall, 
who had worked in northern China during the 1920s and 30s, was ‘Dr Bethune’s Angel’.848  
For decades, left-wing New Zealanders had been fascinated about a China they had seen as a 
model of a better way of organising society. Yet the seemingly neo-liberal policies being adopted 
in the PRC in the 1980s were exactly the policies that the majority of left-wing members would 
have opposed in New Zealand. Instead, the break-up of China’s State-Owned Enterprises was 
reported favourably as an ‘important feature’ of China’s modernisation in the New Zealand China 
News.849 Students, who had joined the Society in large numbers during the 1970s and early 1980s 
and had campaigned extensively against business control over the curriculum in New Zealand 
would have been horrified to hear that education reform in China was designed to make Chinese 
students ‘more job-ready’.850 A branch newsletter reprinted an article from the China Daily which 
claimed that ‘Today, China can step up its economic reforms by adopting “capitalist measures”… 
It is worthwhile to open the window and let in fresh air, though some flies will come in as well? 
Yes, it is worthwhile’.851 
Increasingly the Society presented itself as being open to members who had diverse ideas about 
the PRC. In 1978, then-President Jack Ewan had also spoken about diverse opinions, suggesting 
that they should be elicited and be the subject of discussion, so that the Society’s views could be 
understood by all its members. Now though, diversity was presented to mean that all who 
wanted to join the Society could do so, without fear that their ideas would be challenged. All 
those with an opinion about China, whatever it might be, were welcome in the Society. So in 
1992, when the Society celebrated forty years of relations with the PRC, Bill Willmott wrote: 
As a Society, we have no set position on issues in China, but encourage discussion on all 
aspects of its development. Our aims are to foster interest in China, to promote mutual 
understanding, and to appreciate the historical importance of the Chinese revolution. We 
try to give material expression to the positive feelings of many New Zealanders towards 
China. We welcome as members everyone who shares our aims.852 
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The retreat from defending and explaining the PRC led to an absence of belief in a single truth 
and its replacement with a position that within the Society where almost where all beliefs about 
the PRC were accepted as subjective and equally valid. The PRC’s earlier history as a 
revolutionary state claimed to have a truth about humankind as a whole made the problem of 
truth a vital component of understanding it. In the new era the NZCFS this was downplayed and 
replaced by attracting a variety of people who were simply interested in the country. Individual 
people who had taught, or even simply been on a tour, had become the new (albeit amateur) 
experts on China. They were experts based simply ontheir own experience. Gone were the 
meetings where a Society leader would be asked to construct an account of a political matter 
affecting contemporary China and attempt to ‘explain it’. Instead, Society members were invited 
to provide ‘entertaining and perceptive accounts of living, travelling and business experiences in 
China’.853 Speakers Mary and Vincent Gray even spoke at a Wellington branch meeting on their 
trip to Iran and Europe. 
In fact, the mid-1990s were dominated not by the Society celebrating the things happening in the 
PRC as a model for New Zealand, but condemning the PRC for being inconsistent with New 
Zealand’s progressive values. This was exemplified by the question of the testing of nuclear 
weapons. In 1973, claiming solidarity with the PRC, the various small communist groups that had 
dominated the NZCFS had supported France’s nuclear testing. China’s nuclear tests in the 1990s 
drew a sharply different response, in part because the Society didn’t want to be seen as out-of-
step with common New Zealand values, and in particular because it desperately did not want to 
be seen as a spokesperson for the Chinese authorities and the regime responsible for the disaster 
of Tiananmen. In 1994 it issued an official letter of protest, and reported in its national 
newsletter that China’s tests had led to cancellations of magazine subscriptions.854 
The difference of opinion with the official Chinese position was a difficult matter for the Society. 
The letter put the quandary to the Chinese ambassador: 
As members of a Society dedicated to friendship with China and as New Zealanders 
dedicated to helping the world towards a nuclear-free policy, we find ourselves in an 
embarrassing and distressing situation.855 
There were two obvious answers to the problem. The Society could ‘understand’ the reasons for 
the tests or China could stop doing them. The Society made its position clear. ‘We believe China 
should immediately terminate its testing programme’. The Ambassador’s reply reflected the pre-
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1989 relationship: ‘We hope that China’s stand on this issue could be understood by our New 
Zealand friends’. China believed, he said, in a ‘comprehensive test-ban treaty’ and that ‘… once 
this… enters into force, China will stop nuclear tests’.856 Although unconvinced, the Society did 
appreciate the need for communication. Later that year, space in branch newsletters was given 
over to a full page explanation by the Ambassador.857 
 
Return to the PRC 
The entire process would be repeated in 1996, but when that year saw the emergence of a new 
issue, human rights, the Society threw itself into explaining Chinese realities and the truth about 
China. In March the national publication noted that ‘Members will have been aware of… 
allegations of cruelty’ in Chinese orphanages and ‘… they will have read the reply… from the 
Embassy…. The national secretary has full statements… replying to those attacks…’. 858  In 
addition the Society’s publications reprinted an article from China Daily in which ‘US adoptive 
parents have challenged reports in the Western media about the so-called abuse of children in 
Chinese orphanages’.859 
There was a similar response when Sukhi Turner, the Mayor of Dunedin, ‘refused an invitation to 
visit China because of China’s government record on human rights’.860 The Society’s response 
was consistent with its approach to dealing with criticisms of the PRC in the 1970s. Professor Bill 
Willmott, a past President, penned an article entitled ‘Human Rights in China’ where he 
explained ‘Evidence must be put into context’. ‘Given’, he noted, the ‘… stage of 
industrialisation… China’s performance is impressive’. Weighing China’s ‘social and economic 
rights’ against Britain’s, during its industrial revolution, Willmott drew a favourable comparison. 
The development of women’s rights, he stated, ‘has been remarkable’ and ‘impressive progress’ is 
being made with respect to ‘even individual freedoms’. The article reminded readers that China 
had suffered greatly at the hands of Western imperialism and had an anti-democratic history in 
part as a response to this. It was not quite the same representation as before though, whereby 
New Zealanders could learn from what was happening in the PRC. For Willmott in 1996, China 
needed to change to be more consistent with New Zealanders’ values and the Society could help. 
‘Progress can be best fostered by contact… the NZCFS [is] firmly committed to such a 
programme’.861 In this analysis, human rights had come, by the 1990s, to be interpreted through 
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the paradigm of industrial modernisation, thus replacing the Maoist idea that there was an 
alternative to the feudalism-capitalism-socialism trajectory. 
Albeit with this significant difference, Willmott’s defence of the People’s Republic of China still 
signalled a return to being celebratory about China. The 1996 National Day celebrations 
welcomed news from the ambassador that in China ‘corruption was being checked as officials 
hand in gifts’.862 This was accompanied by a reminder to members that in pre-liberation China 
corruption was endemic and that the formation of the PRC had brought about a ‘New Society’.  
The previous month, in contrast to the increasing belief that New Zealand students were self-
centred, NZCFS members were told that China’s youth were different, and that they were 
responding to China’s problems by taking them into their own hands. An article from China Daily 
was reprinted in branch newsletters, it reported that students in Beijing were spending their free 
time ‘school[ing] migrants on legal rights, the market-orientated economy and related 
technology’.863 
In this reorganisation of the NZCFS there were both similarities and differences with the Society 
of previous eras. In activities that mirrored the commemoration of the death of Mao Zedong, the 
Society’s publications ran extensive material on the death of Deng Xiaoping. His death, Society 
President Willmott wrote, was a loss ‘not only to the Chinese people but also to the peoples of 
the whole world who have relations with a modern, stable, strong and prosperous China, of 
which Deng has been a main architect’.864 Deng, though, was remembered for what he had done 
for China, not any inspiration he might have provided to the world, and while Deng was lauded 
for having built a ‘modern’ China there was no mention of his involvement with the utopian 
ideals that had dominated discourse about China under Mao. 
Society members engaging in a political defence of China made a return, as was reflected in the 
letter by a member challenging the dominant media representation of a local crime story. While 
the ‘Chinese horticultural scientist’s attempt to smuggle apple tree cuttings out of NZ was 
unacceptable… on the other hand, China has had many invaluable plant materials smuggled or 
taken out [of China]’.865 This was a political defence of the PRC, but a different one than the 
Society once engaged in – not least because its referent to western crimes was not those against 
the PRC but against some timeless ‘China’. The smuggling of plant materials from China referred 
to silk worms and tea, from around 300AD and the early nineteenth century respectively. In 
addition, this was a defence of a Chinese person, rather than the PRC, the person rather than the 
project embodying the object of support. 
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This incident shows the extreme sensitivity to China’s external image that animates the discussion 
of these questions. Crimes committed by nationals from other states are not generally regarded as 
indications of the moral worth of those societies as a whole in the same way. It tallies though 
with the increased concern about national prestige that emerged so strongly in the aftermath of 
the Belgrade bombing. 
Reflecting these more muted political times, New Zealand China News became a biannual 
publication, replaced by a ‘National Notebook’ emailed out by the national President.866 The 
Society’s heroes reflected these changes too. The centenary of old hero Rewi Alley’s birth was 
recalled with a tour ‘in the footsteps of Rewi Alley’ and a public campaign to have a postage 
stamp produced in his honour. Money was raised towards the restoration of his rooms in Beijing, 
to serve as a memory of his contributions to the PRC. The Kathleen Hall memorial activities 
reflected more the new Society. The New Zealand Government was approached to fund the 
establishment of a clinic in her former base at Songjiazhuang, Hebei. A scholarship, for a nursing 
student who did community nursing in New Zealand, was created to help keep her memory alive.  
In 1998, coordinated by North Island Vice-President Jeremy Dwyer, the Society undertook a 
major survey of its members’ views of the NZCFS. This revealed that for most members the 
constitutional relevance of the historical founding of the PRC should be played down. In 
contrast to political engagement and interest, the main reasons for membership were direct 
contact with China, friendship, branch activity and sister-city relations. The key services members 
wanted to see were regular newsletters, education and information on China – in particular on its 
culture. They wanted regular meetings, social activities and opportunities for visits. In a change 
from the historic understanding of the Society as being connected with China (the political entity 
of the PRC) rather than things Chinese, members also saw a greater need to incorporate New 
Zealand Chinese residents.867 
The survey revealed conflict about many of these points, often manifested in differences between 
those who had been members for a number of years and those who were newer members. While 
a handful of members said they had joined because of support for the ‘Communist experiment’, 
for others a point of dissatisfaction was the promotion of ‘Chinese propaganda’ on Tibet and 
Taiwan through the Society. Another noted that the ‘overtly political activities’ were hurting the 
Society.868 
Despite this, or to convince members of the utility of political engagement with China, the 
Society was to speak out even more on issues in defence of the PRC over the next few years. In 
May 1999 it wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade objecting to his granting 
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diplomatic immunity to trade representatives from Taiwan because it ‘violates NZ’s one-China 
policy’.869 More controversially, later that year the President wrote again to the Minister after the 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia by NATO planes. The ‘bombing’, he wrote, 
which caused ‘the death of Chinese diplomatic staff… is a flagrant disregard of international 
diplomatic convention that deeply disturbs the members of this Society’. Although the link 
between the PRC and the NZCFS was clearly the catalyst for the complaint, the letter referenced 
the more politicised Society from the past. ‘We urge you to publicly condemn this act in the 
strongest possible terms…’ and to ‘call upon [New Zealand’s Western allies] to… stop the illegal 
bombing of Yugoslavia forthwith’.870 
The letter was controversial within the Society. But the matter of the NATO bombing of the 
Chinese Consulate in Belgrade was even more so. For a number of years the Auckland branch 
had been holding a ‘Mandarin Corner’ where Chinese speakers and those wanting to learn 
Chinese could gather socially. At one of these events the local Chinese spontaneously decided to 
march upon the United States Consulate. The NZCFS Auckland branch members, and their 
banner, went along in support. A report to the National Executive meeting the next month 
reversed the judgement on the bombing itself and ‘deplored the presence of the Society’s banner 
at a protest outside the Auckland US Consulate against the inadvertent bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade’. It was agreed that ‘branches could protest on matters affecting China, but 
there was feeling that opinions on the NATO action in Yugoslavia… were outside the concern 
of the Society’.871 
While not wanting to be seen as a spokesperson for the Chinese Government, the Society 
continued to propagate, at least internally, certain positions that were both close to the official 
Chinese position and different from the dominant understanding outside of China. For example, 
during the National President’s tour of branches, in early 2002, members were invited to 
understand that the Falun Gong issue was a lot more complicated than they might have been led 
to believe. Bill Willmott’s National Notebook the year before had informed readers that: 
Falun Dafa has been outlawed because it as a strong secret organisation… Falun Dafa 
members have demonstrated regularly in Tiananmen Square, culminating in five of them 
setting themselves alight and one dying. 
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Remember the Japanese cult with a ‘gentle and benign Buddhist leader’ who told his 
followers to release gas in the Tokyo underground?872 
In other meetings he informed members that behind the ‘Taiwan’ issue was United States 
imperialist designs against China.873 In Wellington branch meetings the Chinese Ambassador 
Chen Mingming was often in attendance, often ‘clarifying' statements made by speakers. In 2002 
and 2003 he handed over an annual cheque, on behalf of the Chinese Government, to assist the 
Society in its activities. 
 
Conclusion 
The soul-searching and self-reflection of the previous decade had enabled the Society in the 
2000s to be free to construct its own relationship with the PRC. It meant a multi-faceted NZCFS 
flexible enough to accommodate its different members’ tastes. In 2002 the Society organised 
teachers to go to China, had speakers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asia 2000, the 
Chinese Embassy and members talking of their own experiences with the PRC – and not just as 
travellers. It was active in the promotion of Chinese language through films and discussion 
groups that brought native speakers and New Zealanders learning Mandarin together. It had 
educational sessions that explained China and Chinese government policies, such as those with 
regard to population control and the question of Taiwan. It organised a major tour of by a 
Confucian scholar who was advertised as revealing ‘the truth about Confucius’.874 This ‘truth’ was 
about a timeless contribution to Chinese culture. Of the anti-Confucius campaigns of the 1970s 
there was no mention. There was likely very little continuity of membership from those who had 
supported those campaigns, albeit from afar, and the current membership – in particular the 
leadership – of the NZCFS.  
In 2002 the Society commemorated its 50th anniversary and the same soul-searching took place 
again, as it had each time the Society reflected on its past. This time, however, it found itself 
confident about where it stood. It had strong links with the CPAFFC, the New Zealand 
Government, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Chinese Embassy. It worked with sister-cities 
where they existed, and worked for more relationships between local and Chinese municipalities 
where they did not. It undertook tours to China for both tourists – ‘Majestic  China’ – and those 
with a deeper connection to the Society’s work – ‘Remembering Kathleen Hall’. It had it links 
with the Bailie School in Shandan and used that as a link to the promotion of cooperatives. That 
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year it also embarked on a ‘major new thrust for the Society’, poverty alleviation aid and 
development work in Guangxi province, one of China’s poorest. A strategic planning process led 
by South Island Vice-President Eric Livingstone found the Society focussed and in good heart.875 
For members of the Society, the People’s Republic of China in 1976 was about politics – and 
bringing those politics and the political significance of the Chinese revolution to New Zealand. 
China was a place from which New Zealanders could take inspiration, but also money – the 
financial security of the organisation was in part ensured through a monopoly of access to China 
and sometimes subsidised tours. China represented a lesson and model for those New 
Zealanders connected to it. The Society saw its role as explaining China to New Zealanders and 
its members studied China and went on ‘study tours’ to China in order to understand it better. 
They then constituted the experts who could discuss it in depth. Activities supporting China 
included protesting and fighting for positions that would assist the PRC, and it was the official 
China with which they had a connection. To be friendly with the PRC meant supporting and 
agreeing with the choices that the Chinese leaders had made, and accepting that those leaders 
were acting in the interests of the Chinese masses. 
Three decades later, what the People’s Republic of China meant for the New Zealand China 
Friendship Society had been transformed. While these changes to a small extent reflected 
changes in New Zealand, overwhelmingly the New Zealand Society was running to catch up and 
adjusting its message and activities with changes in the PRC. By the turn of the millennium, 
China had all but completely ceased to reflect a politicised image. For many members their 
interest in China was now ‘cultural’. Reflecting this, the Society had constitutionally changed its 
goal of correcting misstatements about China and at times even claimed to not have a position 
on contemporary Chinese affairs at all. Instead of taking from the PRC, including its laudatory 
attempts at self-reliance, the Society raised funds for aid work in poorer parts of China and 
provided expert assistance in different fields. Its travel business was competing with other tourist 
operations and was essentially commercial, although drawing on links made through its 
friendship relationships. Those who presented at NZCFS meetings were increasingly talking of 
their own limited engagement with China, through short tours or brief teaching experience: the 
‘experts’, with very few exceptions, tended to be from outside the Society. The members were 
drawn from different parts of the New Zealand community than before. The Society’s desire to 
maintain its fidelity to a China that had changed so much had led to its own remodelling; it was a 
different sort of person attracted to the truths about China that the NZCFS currently believed in, 
and accordingly a different Society. 
  
                                                        
875 ‘Report on the NZCFS Strategic Planning Process’, August 2002, Bill Willmott papers, NZCFS Archives. 
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Chapter 7: Re-remembering the Heroes of the New Zealand–China relationship. 
In this chapter I will to use the representations of two of the founders of the people-to-people 
relationship between New Zealand and China in order to explore the ways in which groups in 
New Zealand give authority to their heroes. This notion is an important one, in particular for the 
NZCFS and it is not uncommon in this: often, an important aspect of the transmission of the 
tales of travellers is the construction of the image that is given to the travellers themselves.876 
This notion suggests that the relationship to heroes give voracity to the Society’s history, or can 
be regarded as ‘truth’, at least in part through how the hero themself is remembered.877 This is 
exaggerated because of the significant claim the NZCFS makes for its own legitimacy by an 
appeal to its own history.878 
While there were a reasonably large number of New Zealanders engaged in propagating 
narratives about 1930s and 40s China, for the Friendship Society there were two central 
characters for whom the construction of their own biography can be explored in this manner: 
Rewi Alley and Kathleen Hall. Their connection to a pre-Liberation narrative has been a 
continuing reference point as China’s revolutionary trajectory went through its changes over the 
subsequent period. 
Much has been written about Rewi Alley, his formative years, and the sixty years he spent in 
China from 1927 until his death there in 1987. Kathleen Hall has attracted less attention than 
Alley, but even these treatments are book length and rather more substantial than the space 
permitted in this chapter. The focus of this chapter is to re-examine Alley in relationship to the 
NZCFS and the CPNZ, his role in helping to shape their images of the PRC and their role in 
shaping the image of him. My particular interest in Hall is in her emergence as a ‘hero’ for the 
NZCFS in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in part as an alternative to Alley. As a result of this 
focus, despite the fact that Alley was a prolific letter-writer and this was an important way by 
which he propagated his thoughts, I have focussed almost exclusively on published material: for 
the NZCFS, national and branch newsletters and New Zealand China News, for the CPNZ, the 
People’s Voice and the New Zealand Communist Review. An additional feature of my focus is how 
these heroes have been understood at particular moments in time and the relationship of that 
understanding to the ideas explored in the other chapters of this work. 
                                                        
876 Witness to this is the prominence given to Alley and Hall by the Society and its efforts to present the NZCFS’s 
current activities in the light of its history – as represented by the two figures (see www.nzchinasociety.org.nz). For a 
general treatment, see Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997, 223-230. 
877 Tim Kendall, Ways of Seeing China: from Yellow Peril to Shangrila, Curtin University Press, Freemantle, 2005. See 
especially chapter 3, ‘Travelling to Mao’s Republic’, 91. 
878 For example the Society’s website reads ‘The New Zealand China Friendship Society has had fifty years experience 
working with China. This has given us strong connections and good contacts’. 
 www.nzchinasociety.org.nz/chinasociety.html. Accessed 1 Feb 2009. 
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Although my focus is on the on-going representations of Alley, and later Hall, after the 
formation of the PRC, a key feature of their authority is their activities in China prior to the 
formation of the People’s Republic. These activities are represented in different ways in texts 
designed for New Zealanders and for Chinese texts, even those from the same era, each designed 
to give credibility – in a culturally and politically subjective way – to their subject. It is not only 
these contested accounts by biographers, and the changing accounts through the publications of 
the organisations linked to Alley, that have produced differences in the representation of him. 
There is also a question of representing the historical account in terms of the intended audience 
and what that audience is assumed to know and assumed to think. There can be important 
differences in how representations are transmitted according to their intended audience.  
Rewi Alley was an important figure in the Society’s pre-history and, to a large extent, the Society 
was formed in order to continue the support that left-wing New Zealanders had been offering 
him in the civil war period. Kathleen Hall, although involved in the early work of the Society was 
not, at this stage, also remembered as someone who had been active in China and contributed to 
the success of the founding of the People’s Republic. Since the focus of the Society was on peace 
work, Alley was seen as a person who was working for peace, and for telling the world about 
developments in China. Through the 1960s, as the NZCFS and Chinese society became 
increasingly politicised Alley was too, his credentials as a communist coming to the fore, and he 
was utilised to shore up support for the CPNZ in its struggle against other communist groups in 
New Zealand. When the New Zealand government recognised the PRC, Alley’s role broadened, 
and he became someone that all New Zealanders would connect with as part of their connection 
with China. In the late 1970s as the formerly China-supporting groups splintered, Alley was a 
useful point of left-wing continuity, and Alley’s work was represented as constituting a link 
showing the continuation of the socialist project. In the late 1980s, this search for continuity 
became harder to fathom and Kathleen Hall emerged as another hero for the Society whose 
memory was not cluttered by the twists and turns that Alley had, by necessity, been engaged in. 
Alley’s image became depoliticised and stood alongside Hall and someone who represented 
support for China, rather than for a revolutionary project to transform humanity. 
The NZCFS official account of Rewi Alley’s pre-Liberation activities in China is designed to 
speak to New Zealand conditions and accordingly presents him in a way that that is likely to 
resonate with contemporary New Zealand readers. The NZCFS website account of Alley’s life 
reveals him as a war hero, through his activities in France during the first great European war, 
who went to China. In China he saw the terrible conditions facing the Chinese and identified 
with their struggles. Alley’s response included working on flood relief, supporting the Chinese in 
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the fight against Japan, founding a school – which continues today – and helping to found the 
Indusco movement, which took place throughout unoccupied China.879 
The over-whelming image is of Alley as a great international charity worker in much the same 
mould as Edmund Hillary. He was engaged in the same sorts of activities as Hillary. They both 
witnessed suffering and then contributed advanced western understanding to solve the problems. 
This is in the same manner as those charitable activities often promoted on television. As with 
such charities, there is no discussion as to what societal issues might have caused the suffering 
and no suggestion that changes to the way society is organised might be the way towards ending 
the need for such charity. This is a neutered representation of Alley and a new one. The 
distinction between Hillary and Alley would be clear to the early left-wing supporters of Alley’s 
projects. Alley was political, his projects were designed to change the existing order, and Hillary 
was not, his projects worked within the existing order, and some might say perpetuated it.880 
Alley is identified as a war hero through referencing the Great War, rather than his engagement 
in supporting China’s war effort, although this is important for other reasons. His support for 
‘China’ is represented as support for some unified ‘Chinese’ cause, carefully glossing over the 
divisions in China at the time and minimising his relationship to the Communist Party and 
Marxism-Leninism. Pointedly the Gung Ho Indusco movement, which he is often referred to in 
New Zealand material as having initiated, is noted to have operated in areas controlled both by 
the CPC and the KMT. Alley then, is seen as existing as some sort of bridge between Chinese, 
and the differences between them are not explored, since New Zealanders in the 1990s were 
understood to not be interested in them anyway. He is represented as being practically engaged in 
solutions to the problems that the Chinese found themselves in, without exploring how those 
problems might have emerged. His image is ultimately that of an educator and charity worker – 
one who stood aside from the ideological and political discussions in China and got on with 
helping out as he could. 
In China, for similar domestic reasons, Rewi Alley is remembered somewhat differently. He is a 
‘social activist and internationalist’ whose activities in Shanghai revealed to him the oppression of 
the working class by imperialists and the KMT. In addition, through his engagement in flood 
                                                        
879 Indusco, or the International Committee for Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, was a project established to develop 
village-level industrialisation in China. The small and mobile factories were designed to produce materials which could 
support the Chinese war effort following the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Eastern seaboard – where 
China’s heavy industry was otherwise almost exclusively based. It is often referred to as Gung Ho (for the derivation of 
the term see Afred Moe, ‘Gung Ho’, American Speech, 42, 1, 1967, 19-30). Alley was the chairman of the committee and 
heavily engaged in publicising its work internationally. Later he transferred his efforts into the related activity of 
developing schools to produce technicians who could staff the collectives – first at Shuangshipu (Shaanxi) and then at 
Shandan (Gansu). These schools were called ‘Bailie Schools’ after the American missionary Joseph Bailie, had 
enlightened ideas on education, and whom Alley had met in Shanghai. In accordance with Bailie’s ideas, the timetable 
allowed for ‘half-work, half-study’. 
880 For an extensive discussion on questions of such aid, and the non-government organisations who promote it, see 
James Petras, ‘A Marxist Critique of Post-Marxists’, Links, 9, November 1997–February 1998, 1. Petras argues, for 
example, that ‘NGOs foster a new type of cultural and economic colonialism and dependency’. 
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relief work he saw the miserable life of Chinese peasants under the landlordism of the GMD.881 
In contrast to New Zealand material, in Chinese material Alley is connected directly with the 
official Chinese revolutionary tradition, in particular through being personally associated with 
other foreigners who have been adopted into the revolution, themselves through appropriate 
association with Chinese. This emerges out of a practice of the distrust of outsiders, foreigners in 
particular, until they have proved themselves. This has been a feature of the revolutionary 
tradition of the PRC.882 
Alley’s involvement in Gung Ho is represented as a way by which he could support the war 
effort and stand against ‘Japanese aggression’.883 Until very recently, when there has been a 
revising of the degree of involvement in the anti-Japanese war by the KMT, this was understood 
as being the sole preserve of the CPC and its armies.884 Thus, supporting the war effort is 
understood as meaning supporting the CPC and its activities. 
The CPC’s claim for political legitimacy in the present is intimately linked to the representation 
that ‘without the Communist Party of China there would be no New China’. Part of the founding 
myth of ‘New China’ is that China without the CPC would be subject to foreign domination and 
would never have thrown off the yoke of European and Japanese imperialism. The struggle 
between the CPC and the KMT fits into this narrative by connecting the CPC with the Chinese 
people and the KMT with the interests of imperialists and in its failure to oppose Japanese 
aggression. In the struggle between the CPC and the KMT there was no middle ground and 
foreigners (and foreign governments) that tried to steer such a ‘middle course’ were simply dupes 
of the GMD and in cahoots with foreign powers.885 
To fit in with the PRC’s revolutionary historiography, the representation of Alley has to conform 
to a particular image and construction. Part of this relates to what was happening in China and to 
its understanding in an authoritative version of Chinese history. China has a tradition of 
authoritative history – that is to say, a deliberately constructed version of history to serve present 
purposes. As Mao put it, to ‘use the past to serve the present’.886 
                                                        
881 The representations of Alley in China are taken from the entry for Alley in the Friends of China Directory, Friends of 
China Research Foundation, Beijing, 1996. The entry is in Chinese (translated by Mei Sun and Alistair Shaw, 1998). 
The directory was written around the same time as the material that appears on the NZCFS website, yet, since it is in 
Chinese, it has been written for a Chinese audience. It represents a Chinese mirror to the people who, in New Zealand, 
would be interested in foreigners in China. As such it represents a point of comparison for the representations of Alley 
and Hall to New Zealand and to Chinese. 
882 There is a link here to Michael Dutton’s friend/enemy dichotomy, see also Ralph Crozier, Koxinga and Chinese 
Nationalism: History, Myth and the Hero, Cambridge, Harvard University, 1977, 1-3. 
883 Officially, what is known in the West as ‘World War Two’ is called ‘The War of Resistance Against Japanese 
Aggression’ in the PRC. 
884 See Joseph W. Esherick, ‘Ten Theses on the Chinese Revolution’, Modern China, 21, 1995, 45. Esherick claims that 
scholarship supportive of the CPC ‘painted its rival as a dialectical opposite’ but argues that in fact there were 
significant unities and continuities between the GMD and the CPC. 
885 See Esherick, ‘Ten Theses’, for a critique of this. 
886 This is addressed in each of the chapters in Jonathan Unger (ed), Using the Past to Serve the Present: Historiography and 
Politics in Contemporary China, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York,1993. In particular see Geremie Barmé, ‘History for the 
  231
In the official discourse of Communist Party history there was no ‘Chinese’ army or ‘Chinese’ 
people to be working with. There were Chinese resisting Japanese aggression, the CPC, or 
Chinese collaborating or acquiescing in Japanese control over China, the KMT. Alley’s 
revolutionary credentials, the personal activities on which he was able to make claims to stay in 
China after Liberation, depended on him having recognised that the CPC was to be supported 
and the KMT to be opposed very early on.887 
In addition, Alley is not an independent foreigner, he is linked to China’s revolution through 
appropriate connections. He knew Song Qingling, the widow of Sun Yatsen, father of the 
Chinese revolution, and herself the first Vice-President of the PRC. In addition he is connected 
with Edgar and Peg Snow, and Agnes Smedley, who had already been legitimated in the eyes of 
China’s revolutionary discourse because of Edgar Snow’s Red Star Over China and Smedley’s 
journalism from the period. The combination of Song, Snow and Smedley, for those Chinese 
familiar with the subject, confirms that Alley was connected to the progressive foreigners 
supporting the revolution and a member of the ‘Marxist-Leninist Study Group’.888 
Kathleen Hall is the other New Zealand hero whose memory is feted by the NZCFS since the 
1990s and for whom there is an entry in the Friends of China Directory. In 1922 the Anglican 
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel accepted Hall to undertake missionary work in China. 
After a number of years in Beijing, she asked to be shifted to smaller cities. In 1934 she set up 
her own cottage hospital in the mountain village of Songjiazhuang, Hebei. 
For the NZCFS, Kathleen Hall is understood as being a nurse who became acquainted with 
deplorable conditions in China, dealt with hundreds of casualties, passed medicines to the 
Chinese army, was caught by the Japanese and sent back to New Zealand. She tried to return to 
the front-line but got sick travelling back to Songjiazhuang so returned to New Zealand.889 
This conforms to popular New Zealand imagery. She is valued for her self-sacrifice and concern 
for the poor and her missionary connection gets downplayed. Her lack of strong connection to 
socialism means that she cannot, in the way that Alley can, get tarred with a claim that she was 
blind to the human suffering that seems to have gone along with state socialism. She is a heroic 
figure – as is proven by her attempt to return to Songjiazhuang after being sent away by the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Masses’, 260, where he writes that ‘Every policy shift in recent Chinese history has involved the rehabilitation, re-
evaluation and revision of history and historical figures’. 
887 Note that there has been some moderation in recent years with regard to the KMT not resisting Japan, no doubt in 
order to strengthen ties with the unificationist lobby in Taiwan. 
888 The Marxist-Leninist Study Group was established by Hans (or Heinz) Shppe, a Polish communist. Its members 
would include American writer Agnes Smedley, and Dr. George Hatem. Anne-Marie Brady claims that Alley was not a 
member of this group but merely of a non-Marxist ‘political study group’, citing Ruth Weiss who claimed to be in the 
group and Maud Russell’s diary note he had been a member of her discussion group, which was a different one. 
However, all sources refer to Hatem as being in the group and Hatem says that Alley was a member and in fact Alley 
introduced Hatem to Marxism. See Edgar A. Porter, The People’s Doctor, Hawaii University Press, Honolulu, 1997, 101-
102. 
889 All from the entry on the NZCFS website www.nzchinasociety.org.nz/kathleenhall. 
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Japanese. Being captured by the Japanese is a reminder that New Zealand was at war with Japan, 
so she was also seen as supporting the New Zealand war effort. In fact Tom Newnham, who 
brought the story of Kathleen Hall to the world, represents her as a New Zealand war hero 
whose activities in North China helped to tie up Japanese forces and prevent those troops from 
being involved in the intended invasion of New Zealand.890 
Like Alley, Hall’s support for ‘the Chinese war effort’ is represented as support for some unified 
‘Chinese’ cause, again glossing over the divisions in China at the time. There is no reference to 
the ideological questions that were dominating the local Chinese scene and were definitely a 
motivator for Norman Bethune with whom she participated in her activities.891 
In contrast, in China, when Hall’s story began to be popularised, her representation focussed on 
other features. In it she ‘used her own salary to pay for medicines’, she saw the ‘corruption of the 
Guomindang government and the hope provided by communists’. She was connected with 
Norman Bethune. She built a transport line to ‘transport medical supplies to the 8th Route Army’. 
She became exhausted treating the sick and wounded and yet persisted. She was eventually 
removed from China.892  
Like Alley, in China’s revolutionary historiography Hall’s representation has to conform to a 
particular image and construction. In the Chinese story, Hall doesn’t have a distant and charitable 
approach to the suffering of the Chinese, she recognises that it is the corruption of the 
Guomindang government that is holding the Chinese people back. Further, she sees clearly that 
China’s hope lies with the Communist Party. As with Alley, Hall’s support for China is revealed 
through her participation in the war effort. Since this war effort is understood as being the sole 
preserve of the CPC and its armies, supporting the war effort meant supporting the CPC and its 
activities. Hall’s participation in China’s struggle towards Liberation is also linked to China’s 
revolution through appropriate connections. In particular, Hall is connected to China’s 
revolution through Norman Bethune. Not only did they meet but Bethune described Hall as ‘an 
angel’ who agreed to help him. In the Chinese language material this constituted a ‘turning point’ 
in Hall’s life – where she realised that to make a difference one needed to take a stand and a side.  
The PRC sources seek to play up her connection with the CPC and Bethune and her opposition 
to the KMT in the same way that the New Zealand depictions of Alley want to play down his 
connections with socialism. Given that the Chinese language accounts are drawn from English 
language materials, Hall’s CPC connections – in particular to a figure as important as Bethune – 
would be amplified. 
                                                        
890 Tom Newnham, He Mingqing: the life of Kathleen Hall, New World Press/Graphic Publications, Beijing, 1992, 3. 
891 All from http://nzchinasociety.org.nz/kathleen.html. Accessed 23 March 2009. 
892 From a translation (Sun Mei and Alistair Shaw) of the entry for Kathleen Hall in Friends of China Directory. 
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In addition, Hall knew and is detailed as having worked in conjunction with Song Qingling, a 
much loved figure in CPC and PRC history. Song symbolised an unbroken connection between 
the 1911 revolution that ended the last dynasty and the realisation of the modernist and anti-
feudal goals the CPC saw itself as embodying. But Song was more than this. She was the leader 
of the Revolutionary Committee of the Guomindang. Since she was not a member of the CPC 
she represented a non-communist connection with the PRC. As Hall was not also a communist, 
her connection with the revolution has needed to be presented similarly. 
Despite the heroism and fortitude that Kathleen Hall showed in the PRC, particularly through 
her engagement with Dr. Norman Bethune in the late 1930s, she was only ‘discovered’ by the 
New Zealand China Friendship Society in the late 1980s and her story was not used in any 
practical way, until the early 1990s. For the Society and the Communist Party of New Zealand, 
from the founding of the PRC in 1949 until the early 1990s, the focus was on Rewi Alley. Alley’s 
image, though, has not been constant, just as the image that he was responsible for promoting 
about the PRC has also not been constant. 
 
Alley for the NZCFS and the CPNZ 
Rewi Alley was already famous in New Zealand when the PRC was founded in 1949. His exploits 
with Indusco and in establishing the Bailie School in Shandan had received widespread coverage 
in the New Zealand media.893 He was warmly regarded as ‘that man the Chinese affectionately 
call Tall Nose, the Work-Together man’.894 NGO and government money had gone to support 
the projects with which he was involved.895 Additionally, he had built up a network of supporters 
amongst those who had donated money and those who had worked with him in China and then 
returned to New Zealand.896 
One of the few to write about Alley at this time was Barbara Spencer, who went with her 
husband to staff the medical clinic at Shandan. In her account of three years at the school, July 
1947 to mid-1950, she described meeting ‘this famous New Zealander’.897 She characterised him 
as: 
                                                        
893 Shandan is the town (population around 200,000) in Gansu province, where Alley helped to establish a Bailie 
School. He was acting headmaster of the school in 1949. In the local area ‘Shan’ is pronounced ‘San’ so this is how it is 
often spelt, although Shandan (山丹, Shāndān) is correct. 
894 Phillip Mathews, ‘Rewi Alley’, Challenge, 1 August 1948, 3. 
895 Support was primarily through CORSO. Don Ross recalls donating to Alley’s work through a collection at primary 
school in the mid-1930s (personal communication, 15 March 2005). 
896 See the discussion in Chapter 3 around the formation of the NZCFS. 
897 Barbara Spencer, Desert Hospital in China, The Anchor Press, London, 1953, 11. 
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A man with a dynamic and forceful personality, it was due to his untiring energy and 
sincere love for the Chinese people that the co-operative movement has been such an 
outstanding success.898 
Spencer’s account of Alley’s time in China from 1927-1947 suggests that, in general, the 
representation of Alley’s life prior to Liberation was already well-established. 899  Spencer 
recounted Alley enlisting in the Australia-New Zealand Army Corps, being wounded and 
invalided back to New Zealand. She reported that he then spent several years on a sheep station, 
before working his way to China where he became Chief Factory Inspector for the Shanghai 
Municipal Council. According to Spencer this was transformative for Alley. He was: 
Appalled at the terrible conditions in the factories, and the maltreated child slave-labour, 
he became determined to better their living and working conditions. The answer, he felt, 
lay in the industrialisation of the backward areas, with simple village industries worked 
and controlled by the country people themselves.900 
In Spencer’s account of Alley there is no mention whatsoever of Marxism or Marxism-Leninism 
and Alley’s connection with this ideology. In addition, and mirrored much later, Alley’s activities 
are represented as being based in a united Chinese opposition to Japanese aggression. As Spencer 
described it, after the invasion: 
Through these grim and bitter years [Alley’s Indusco movement] provided a great 
amount of the equipment needed by the Chinese army. ‘Gung Ho’ – ‘Work Together’ – 
was the co-operative motto, a cry which became famous throughout Free China.901 
In Spencer’s account, Alley worked with his colleagues to develop the Bailie schools in order to 
overcome a deficiency amongst the Chinese. When Alley went with Joseph Needham to Shandan 
he noticed that the local people were ‘dreadfully poor, socially and mentally isolated, and were 
hopelessly apathetic. Here, he decided, was the ideal place for a co-operative training school’.902 
As it was in reach of Japanese bombers, it was decided to move the Shuangshipu Bailie School to 
Shandan in the winter of 1944. The school principal was the ‘gallant and far-sighted Englishman’ 
George Hogg.903 The school was just getting on its feet when Hogg died of tetanus. Rewi became 
acting headmaster, and took over the care of the four boys Hogg had adopted. Spencer’s Alley is 
reflective of a time when foreigners believed they had the answers to China’s problems.904 
                                                        
898 Spencer, Desert Hospital, 21. 
899 See below for discussion about the contested elements in this account of Alley’s pre-liberation time in China. 
900 Spencer, Desert Hospital, 21. 
901 Spencer, Desert Hospital, 22. 
902 Spencer, Desert Hospital, 23. 
903 Spencer, Desert Hospital, 23. 
904 To the extent that Spencer’s book was partly designed to promote continued support for the aid and development 
projects Alley had been involved in setting up in pre-Liberation China, this makes some sense. Indeed, after the 
founding of the PRC, some of the Chinese teachers criticised Alley and the other foreign teachers for setting 
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Following this introduction, Spencer makes only one other mention of Alley during the three 
years that she and her husband spent at Shandan.905 
The link between Alley’s image and the successes he had achieved in China in the 1930s and 
1940s was important for those wanting to be friends with what they would refer to as ‘New 
China’. The NZCFS was formed out of the relationships Alley and others had already developed 
through his, and related, activities in China. Alley’s supporters were quickly recruited into actively 
supporting New China. Alley and Shirley Barton, who had been working for CORSO alongside 
Alley, wrote to their New Zealand supporters suggesting that the way to continue their assistance 
was to fight for political recognition of the new Chinese regime by way of a friendship 
organisation. Alley wrote to one such sponsor: 
the best way for friends overseas to help the Chinese people is to put all their efforts 
into maintaining and furthering of these friendly relations… may I venture to suggest 
that your group form the nucleus of a New Zealand China Friendship Association, with 
which I should feel honoured to keep in contact and give any help in my power.906 
Among the key early members of the Society were a number who had direct experience of China 
through their association with Rewi Alley and his projects, such as Shirley Barton, the Spencers, 
Max Wilkinson, and Courtney Archer. People who may have been neutral at best shifted quickly 
to believing that the communists were the best alternative in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It 
was a short step from there for many from a practical concern for the lives of poor people to 
belief in the need for, and support of, a comprehensive revolution. 
Alley was an important link for those wanting to be friends with the PRC. His status and the 
standing of his activities were quickly tested when New Zealand troops faced off against Chinese 
soldiers in Korea. His support was seriously eroded by government policies.907 The New Zealand 
government even participated in a campaign to discredit Alley and editors of New Zealand’s 
major newspapers, reflecting an anti-communist era, willingly participated in the campaign.908 
In addition to the fame that had accompanied coverage of his pre-Liberation activities, Alley was 
a prolific letter-writer engaged in regular correspondence with groups that had been established 
to support his work, as well as with a variety of individuals. This would continue after the 
establishment of the PRC and until his death.909 As he had promised, when the NZCFS was 
                                                                                                                                                              
themselves apart as superior. Alley always rejected this, expressing his belief and commitment to the idea that the hope 
for China lay in the capacity of the Chinese people to liberate themselves. 
905 This is of Alley taking the British Ambassador and his wife around the school (Spencer, Desert Hospital, 113). For 
the most part Spencer’s writing is of her interactions with the local Chinese and that work was clearly independent of 
Alley. 
906 Alley to Wolfgang Rosenberg, (Rewi Alley Aid Group), 1 August 1952, Barton papers, Alexander Turnbull Library. 
907 Bill Willmott NZCFS 40 Years On, NZCFS pamphlet, 1992. NZCFS Archive. 
908 Anne-Marie Brady documents this from MFAT archives. See Brady, Myth, 66. 
909 There is a reference to his letter-writing from China to ‘many members of the Society’ in New Zealand China News, 
March 1985, 1, when Alley had been in China for just under 60 years. 
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established, Alley continued his contact with a number of individuals who were members of the 
Society. He contributed regularly to the Society’s newsletters. He also wrote a general greeting to 
members of the Society for the biennial National Conference and on the occasion of the PRC’s 
‘National Day’ on the 1st of October.910 At times these letters would be very important in the 
interpretation of the changing nature of the PRC. 
In addition, Alley made speaking trips to New Zealand in 1960, 1965, 1971 and 1973 where he 
met hundreds of New Zealand supporters. Thousands attended meetings where he spoke and 
still more heard his explanations of China’s recent history through the media. Each of these trips 
had a more supportive reception by way of media coverage than the previous one. In 1960 and 
1965 his supporters spoke of a ‘media blackout’ or when journalists did cover his tour, 
complained of the antagonistic nature of the coverage.911 In 1971, when he was awarded an 
Honorary Degree from Victoria University of Wellington the Listener reported ‘Public 
meetings… have drawn nearly 2000 to hear him… with the knowledge he speaks of China… he 
holds an audience spellbound’.912 In this respect, Alley’s public image for New Zealanders was 
closely related to official images of the PRC by the New Zealand government.913 
Another important role that Alley had was his meeting of virtually every visitor from New 
Zealand to the PRC through to the end of the 1970s. This was whether the visitors were peace 
activists, trade unionists, part of a Society delegation or with the CPNZ – although given the 
intermingling of those groups this is not very surprising. The practice of meeting visitors was 
established in the 1950s and is detailed in the accounts of Margaret (Peggy) Garland (1952), 
Harold Kay (1955), James Bertram (1956) and RAK Mason (1957). His joining with visitors, 
whatever the rubric they were visiting China, would become a time-honoured practice until when 
visitors to the PRC simply became too numerous. 
In her book-length account of her trip to the Peking Peace Conference in 1952, Margaret 
Garland was much briefer than Barbara Spencer in detailing Alley’s place in China’s 
contemporary history. She provides an update of the period since 1949 but does not contradict 
the earlier description in any way. For her, Alley’s longevity is important, so too his service: 
‘[Alley] has lived and worked in China for 25 years. He went to China after fighting and being 
twice wounded in the first World War’. But other formative elements from his New Zealand 
experience are ignored. In China his contribution is also condensed: 
                                                        
910 The PRC’s ‘National Day’ commemorates the founding of the PRC on 1 October (1949). In Taiwan, 10 October is 
celebrated as ‘China’s National Day’ representing the founding of the Republic of China at the fall of the Qing 
Dynasty. The existence of these twin ‘National’ days was a cause of conflict within the Chinese community in New 
Zealand. In 1973 the national gathering of the Chinese community, comprising mostly sports events, was shifted to 
Easter in part to avoid this conflict. 
911 ‘On his last visit the news media almost completely ignored him – except for a brief hostile radio session’, ‘Rewi 
Alley is Back!’, People’s Voice, 27 October 1971, 1. 
912 Bruce Wallace, ‘At Home in Worlds Apart’, New Zealand Listener, 13 December 1971. 
913 Brady notes close monitoring of Alley by New Zealand’s Department of Foreign Affairs  (later Ministry) and 
various efforts to control his effect on New Zealand popular opinion (Brady, Myth, especially 62-66). 
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He was chief factory inspector in Shanghai for eleven years and he worked, too, on 
immigration and flood control. He has made a study of the Chinese language and history 
and he is familiar with village life. His main work up to the time I met him had been in 
the Chinese Industrial Co-operatives with which his name will always be linked and for a 
time he had been headmaster of the Sandan Bailie School. 
Alley is acknowledged as ‘one of New Zealand’s famous men’ and on a personal level: 
he impressed me as being a friendly man without a trace of personal vanity. His manner 
was often retiring and always quiet though he could be and often was scathing and 
impatient. He was obviously a man with no illusions and no nonsense; I thought he 
hated stupidity even more than he hated cruelty and he had seen plenty of both.914 
A key function for Alley in hosting New Zealanders was the interpretation, alternative translation 
and perception of expertise about China that he was able to bring to his conversations with the 
visitors. An example of this is where Garland describes that when Alley accompanying her tour 
party to an acrobatic performance: 
[He] told me how the lives of these people had altered in the last three years. I could see 
that he was greatly moved… because of his memories and the drama he was 
witnessing...915 
In 1952, Alley was still warming to his role of interpreting the PRC to foreigners and coming to 
grips with what they would know and how to present things: 
He has a way of [speaking] in an irritated tone of voice, as if you are an awful fool for 
not knowing… he would mutter to me not to be so damn stupid, but usually when he 
heard the answers that were given and saw the reaction of the other delegates and 
myself, he would apologise and tell me he was out of touch with the world outside China 
and didn’t realise how new it all was to us.916 
Alley’s new role was exemplified in Harold Kay’s reportage from 1955. When Kay asked Rewi 
Alley why those witnessing the May Day parade seemed so happy and so supportive of the new 
regime, Alley responded: ‘before the Liberation they were hungry, whereas now they are fed and 
clothed’.917 As discussed in chapter 3, this was an important part of the representation of New 
China. 
Although Alley was well-remembered in New Zealand for his earlier work, the new status of 
China in the political consciousness had dramatically changed this. As James Bertram wrote: 
                                                        
914 Margaret Garland, Journey to New China, Caxton Press, Christchurch, 1954, 82. 
915 Garland, Journey, 98. 
916 Garland, Journey, 50. 
917 Harold Kay, ‘May Day in Peking’, Challenge, June 1955, p.10. 
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I still got an occasional postcard from Rewi Alley, the remarkable New Zealander who 
had built up such a reputation during the war years by his work in organising Chinese 
Industrial Co-operatives. But across those barriers of the Cold War no one seemed to 
speak the same language. I didn’t like the tone of Rewi’s books about the New China; 
everything was black and white, all the key issues seemed over-simplified.918 
Bertram put this to Alley himself: 
When are you coming back to New Zealand? 
When I can – you know how I’d like to make the trip. But I’m an untouchable these 
days. 
You’re a great New Zealander, it’s those violent books you write. Why do you have to 
get so angry?919 
When RAK Mason went to China in 1957, among the other things he wanted to achieve was to 
begin work on a biography of Alley. It was a project that he would never complete and his work 
on it was eventually surpassed by that of Willis Airey.920 Mason was one with whom Alley was in 
regular correspondence with, and the Mason-edited publication of the Labourers’ Union 
publication Challenge, was one outlet where Alley’s work and his views were propagated, even 
when it was hard to get Alley’s writing on China published. As Shirley Barton wrote, Alley’s 
name was ‘banned on the air’ in the Cold War of the 1950s.921 
Yet Alley was far from the only source of information for New Zealanders supportive of the 
PRC in the 1950s. Shirley Barton returned to China in 1953 and spoke of her experiences. The 
People’s Voice covered one of her meetings under the headline ‘She Has Seen Two China’s – Old 
and New’ and noted her connection to Alley. Barton reported on the ‘miracles’ she had seen. 
New China, she said, had ‘abolished flood and famine… wiped out exploitation of women… 
ensured rights of children… granted complete equality between Han and minority peoples… 
[and] eliminated epidemics’.922 In addition there was regular a interchange of visitors and Chinese 
publications were widely available in New Zealand. 
The People’s Voice also carried a special supplement on the Asia-Pacific Peace Conference. One 
article focussed on the conference resolution against the germ warfare that the Chinese claimed 
the Americans were undertaking in Korea. Another consisted of a photograph of ‘New 
                                                        
918 James Bertram, Return to China, Heinemann, London, 1957, 12. 
919 Bertram, Return to China, 157. Bertram also disassociated himself from the Society, ‘a small struggling body with 
inevitable left-wing connections’ (16), and was a barrier to establishing a branch of the Society in Wellington (NZCFA 
Minutes, September 1956, Ewan papers, NZCFS Archive), although when one was eventually established he did 
become Chairman. 
920 Airey was Professor of History at the University of Auckland and President of the New Zealand Peace Council. 
921 Brady, Myth, 66. 
922 ‘She Has Seen Two China’s’, People’s Voice, 22 July 1953, 3. 
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Zealanders Rita Smith and Shirley Barton (with Rewi Alley seated out on the left)’.923 Smith and 
Barton were both members of the CPNZ but there is no reference to Alley being connected to 
the Party. 
Instead, as appears to be the case right up until his trip to New Zealand in 1970, Alley is most 
commonly represented as being outside of the Party and belonging instead to the whole nation. 
He was described as ‘New Zealand’s famous son’ and represented as sharing some of the goals of 
the CPNZ.  Even the CPNZ’s possession of Alley’s words is explained as he ‘issued the 
following statement… on the eve of the peace conference’.924 Alley in fact appears little in the 
CPNZ’s publications until the mid-1960s, despite the Party’s fascination with the Chinese 
revolution and increasing contact between the Party leadership and the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China. 
The first article by Alley appeared in the New Zealand Labour Review in March 1956. Entitled ‘The 
Portuguese on the Coast of China’, it was a history of Portuguese imperialism. It was followed 
three months later by ‘Sunday Afternoon in Sandan’, which had been written in 1954. Articles in 
the Labour Review did not often carry a by-line but Alley’s always did. These articles had been 
preceded, the previous year, by one of Alley’s colleagues at Shandan, Max Wilkinson. Wilkinson’s 
father had been a founding member of the CPNZ. Instead of presenting Wilkinson by using his 
father’s heritage, he was introduced as ‘the writer is a young New Zealander who went to China 
some years ago with New Zealand sheep for Rewi Alley’s famous school at Sandan’.925 Alley’s 
fame gave authority to some articles but was far from overused in this respect. More commonly, 
articles that focussed on issues the Party was campaigning on were sourced from other foreigners 
in China or from translations from CPC material. In 1956 the CPNZ did not publish anything 
from Alley in its newspaper, the People’s Voice, but rather a number of articles from other 
foreigners resident in the PRC (Ted Baker, Michael Shapiro and Ralph Winnington).926 However, 
in July 1957, a large feature announced ‘Rewi Alley May Be Coming Here’, proclaiming that ‘if 
funds can be raised Mr Rewi Alley (the New Zealander whose work in China has made him 
famous) will be guest of honour at the 1958 opening of the new Oriental Arts Hall at Canterbury 
Museum’.927 
Alley, at this time, although most likely a member of the CPNZ, was not directly associated with 
it.928 Instead, eye-witness accounts from China are from others who were able to be open about 
                                                        
923 ‘27 Scientists and Doctors Denounce Germ War’, People’s Voice (Special Supplement), 3 December 1952, 3. 
924 ‘To Hopeful Youth, Peace is Life Itself’, People’s Voice, 1 October 1952, 3. 
925 ‘Nomadic Peoples in the New China’, NewZealand Labour Review, May 1955, 28. 
926 Ted Baker was a British Trade Unionist based with the All China Federation of Trade Unions. Michael Shapiro 
lived and worked in China from 1950 until his death in 1986. He was attached to the Xinhua News Agency. Ralph 
Winnington was the Beijing-based correspondent for the Daily Worker, the publication of the American Communist 
Party. 
927 ‘Rewi Alley May Be Coming Here’, People’s Voice, 4 July 1956, 3. 
928 Jan McLeod said it was ‘most likely’ that Alley had been a member of the CPNZ since the 1940s although ‘it had 
not been expedient for people to know that’ for much of that time. McLeod, who lived in Beijing 1964–1967 where 
  240
their membership of communist parties. These included Vic Wilcox, the General Secretary of the 
New Zealand party, on communes, industry and child welfare, Alan Whittington for the Daily 
Worker on Tibet and the Great Leap Forward, and Pip Alley, who was introduced to readers as 
‘brother of the famous Rewi Alley’. Rewi Alley is reported about from a distance, most often with 
articles that had been published elsewhere, such as his speech to the Stockholm Peace 
Conference.929 
Alley was still influential, however, particularly on the NZCFS. Their records show numerous 
visitors to the PRC, all of whom met with Alley. In addition Mason and Barton were now 
National President and National Secretary and they were both in regular contact with him. 
Although Alley does not appear in the CPNZ material produced for public consumption, his 
work increasingly appeared in the New Zealand Labour Review, the theoretical journal which was 
produced internally for the Party. This material, freed from the requirements of the United Front 
to tone down its stridency, was consistent with the CPNZ’s increased radicalisation around this 
period. 930  Incidentally, reflecting the non-communist aspect of pro-China people-to-people 
activities at this time, 1958 also saw the first reference of the pre-liberation activities of Kathleen 
Hall. This noted that she delivered ‘an extremely interesting lecture on her China experience, 
1922 – 1940’.931 
There were no articles by Alley in the New Zealand Labour Review in 1960, nor in its renamed 
successor the New Zealand Communist Review in 1961. This reflected Alley’s role with respect to the 
PRC’s attempts to build support amongst the non-aligned, and this being a feature of his trip 
‘home’ in 1960. However, Alley’s authority was invoked when the PRC was involved in a series 
of fierce polemics around reports of famine at the end of the Great Leap Forward. Alley’s 
authority amongst supporters in both the Society and the Party meant that he was able to be 
influential. 
There is a lot of pure, unadulterated bilge written in the Western press about China… 
Finally, perhaps, they come about to believing it, because it is said so often and with 
such incredible patronising authority. 
Of all that is written, that which seeks to discredit China by saying that now famine 
stalks the land… becomes the most monotonous, so that even I am stirred, despite the 
                                                                                                                                                              
she interacted closely with Alley, was the daughter of CPNZ leader and long-time People’s Voice editor Hugh McLeod 
(Jan McLeod, hone interview, 13 March 2009). 
929 Vic Wilcox, ‘Eye-witness in China’, People’s Voice, 16 Dec 1959, 7. Alan Whittington, ‘News from Tibet’ and ‘China’s 
little furnaces light the way’, People’s Voice, 16 December 1959, 7 and 8 December 1958, 7. P.J. Alley, ‘An Engineer in 
China’, People’s Voice, 4 June 1958, 4. ‘Rewi Alley’s Speech to the Stockholm Peace Conference’, People’s Voice, 3 
September 1958, 4. 
930 See for example ‘History of Taiwan’, New Zealand Labour Review, Vol XIV, 4, April 1960 in which Alley argues that 
Taiwan was ‘occupied by the American monopoly regime’. This combination of a radical Party, a softer line from the 
Society, and Alley’s relation to it, is discussed in chapter 1. 
931 Tom Newnham, Fifty Years of Friendship; A Short History of the NZ China Friendship Society, Graphic Publications, 
Auckland, 2002, 9.  
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summer heat, to sit down and pound out a few thoughts on the typewriter about it all, 
just for the record and to get it out of my system.932 
Alley’s representation of the situation in 1962 was exactly the same as Keith Buchanan’s, which is 
discussed in chapter 2. This is that there was no famine and that China’s reforms over the past 
decade had turned what could have potentially been a disaster into a triumph of socialist 
development, in particular the commune system. He noted that China’s history had always seen 
long cycles of flood and drought. ‘Without communes’, he wrote, there would have been 
‘millions dead’.933 Instead 
The way China has dealt with its grain problem actually is the epic of our age, a triumph 
in organisation, in self-sacrifice, the whole country coming out of the ordeal 
immeasurably stronger than they entered it… This year, in Peking, I have never seen so 
plentiful a supply of vegetables, nor so many varieties. The same goes for other urban 
centres I have visited.934 
Although we know now that there was a famine it seems most likely that Alley did not know at 
the time and certainly the CPC leadership would have had an interest in keeping such 
information from him. As discussed in chapter 2, many non-commuist experts at the time also 
believed that the stories of the famine were false. 
Apart from this engagement over contemporary China, for the most part Alley’s contributions 
from afar continued to have a sense of distance from New Zealand and the CPNZ. The material 
that was published largely consisted of speeches, or material he had published elsewhere. It 
reflected his role as a peace worker and internationalist, for example his speech at the Tokyo 
Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, and a widely published report on his trip to 
Cuba in Spring 1962. In Cuba he had met a former US army general and the discussion between 
them led to a short ‘History of the Mexican War’. He travelled to Korea in summer of 1964 and 
Hanoi, in November of that year.935 
However, as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) began, Alley’s role as an 
interpreter and chronicler of developments in the PRC was again pressed into service. There was 
still a measure of publishing material that was for general distribution, such as his speech to the 
Afro-Asian Writers’ Conference, yet this too had changed. In particular, it had increased in its 
stridency to reflect the times and, like the CPNZ with whom Alley was increasingly openly 
                                                        
932 Rewi Alley, ‘China and the Food Problem’, New Zealand Communist Review, September,1962, 13. 
933 Alley, ‘Food Problem’, 13. 
934 Alley, ‘Food Problem’, 16-17. 
935 Rewi Alley, ‘Cuba in Spring’, New Zealand Communist Review, 1962, 29. Alley, ‘Speech as Tokyo Conference Against 
A- and H-bombs’, New Zealand Communist Review, November 1962, 24. Alley, ‘History of the Mexican War’, New Zealand 
Communist Review, March 1964, 23. Alley, ‘Korea in Summer’, New Zealand Communist Review, October 1964, 42. Alley, 
‘The Vietnamese People Will Be Victorious’, New Zealand Communist Review, January-February 1965, 26. 
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associated, placed the Chinese revolution at the centre of world revolutionary activity and 
labelled the Soviet Union as ‘revisionist’. 
We must resolutely join in the battle against revisionism which is so indivisible a part of 
the structure of our common enemy… In this struggle the Chinese people, under the 
leadership of Mao Tse-tung, are fighting steadfastly in the vanguard of the revolution.936 
Increasingly Alley’s articles spoke directly to the New Zealand readers of CPNZ material. In a 
series on the importance and influence of Mao Zedong Thought, he noted that ‘I pick up a New 
Zealand newspaper and find several quotations from [Mao]’. 937  He also joined in the Party 
leadership’s polemics against rival communist groupings 
In New Zealand, revisionists… [led] away members of New Zealand Communist Party 
and tried to overthrow its leadership. By setting up a pro-revisionist party called the 
‘Socialist Unity Party’, which engages in scurrilous attacks on China… Against all these 
plots and counter-plots there stands the great solid fact of the existence of Revolutionary 
China, burning with the power of the thought of Mao Tse-tung, raising high a banner 
for all peoples who look for a real way out to follow.938 
The Party began to leverage Alley’s connection to the Chinese leadership to give it status in these 
disputes for working class leadership. An article on the Cultural Revolution, which had been 
criticised by the Socialist Unity Party, was accompanied on the front page of the People’s Voice by 
a large photograph, the caption to which read, ‘Chairman Mao Tse-tung of China shakes hands 
with the famous New Zealander, Rewi Alley, at a recent conference of Afro-Asian writers’.939 
Alley was still not the only China correspondent for the CPNZ – although with a number of 
other members in the PRC it no longer had need for material from journalists from outside the 
Party. Unlike Alley, now openly associated with the CPNZ and for whom there was considerable 
benefit for both the Party and Alley in such an explicit relationship, other articles tended to 
obscure the identity of the author.940 Articles were listed as ‘from our Peking Correspondent’ or 
                                                        
936 Rewi Alley, ‘Speech to Writers’ Conference’, New Zealand Communist Review, September 1966, 18-25. 
937 ‘Influence of Mao Tse-tung’s Thought’, August 1966, New Zealand Communist Review, 20. ‘On the Thinking of Mao 
Tse-tung’, New Zealand Communist Review, June 1967, 44. The quote is from the latter, 46. 
938 ‘Oceania – A Report’, New Zealand Communist Review, August 1967, 37 (48). 
939 ‘Cultural Revolution means new leap forward’, People’s Voice, 21 June 1967, 1. 
940 There were anti-foreigner aspects to each of the campaigns designed to shift the revolution leftwards and Alley 
came under criticism in each of them (see Julia Strauss, ‘In Search of PRC History’, in ‘The History of the PRC (1949-
1976)’, China Quarterly, July 2007, 1-15, for discussion of the serial nature of the CPC’s campaigns since 1949). In the 
1960s however, Alley was able to point to his membership of the CPNZ and the CPNZ’s role as perhaps the CPC’s 
most reliable ally in criticising revisionism. Alley wrote to his brother Pip that ‘Vic Wilcox’s support has been essential’ 
(Letter Rewi Alley to Pip Alley, 26 November 1968, Box 4, Alley papers, ATL). Apart from Alley and Wilcox, most 
material, especially in the People’s Voice, is anonymous. Even in the Communist Review articles were often accompanied 
only by initials, although some can be worked out such as D.R. (Don Ross), A.O. (Alec Ostler) and H.M. (Hugh 
McLeod). The CPNZ believed that there would eventually be a crackdown on membership of the Party and that 
preparation for this was best served by having just a small number of known cadres, such as Wilcox, with others for 
whom the exact nature of their relationship with the Party was blurred. This also facilitated their United Front work in 
the face of anti-communism, including that in the NZCFS. 
  243
‘By a New Zealander Working in Peking’.941 In 1969 a two-part series entitled ‘What is really 
going on in China today?’ described the writer obliquely as someone who ‘has been living 
through the Chinese Cultural Revolution since it started’.942 
The other correspondents’ representation of the Cultural Revolution was often more enthusiastic 
than Alley’s: 
This spirit of ‘We can learn what we did not know’… is a potent creative force… This is 
one basic way China’s young graduates use Mao Tse-tung’s thought to tackle every 
problem and solve it, to unite theory and practice, generating inexhaustible energy...943 
Alley’s articles tended to have a longer view, such as ‘Ex-landlords gloating until revolution hit 
them’, and, in particular, were reportage rather than the analysis his contemporaries engaged in. 
Alley travelled throughout China, and wrote on what he saw. His practice was to interview 
people and to report their words, rather than to insert his own. In this way the stronger 
revolutionary words appearing in New Zealand publications tended to be by Alley’s fellow New 
Zealanders in Beijing, or from the mouths of those whom Alley interviewed.944 This would be 
useful later when Alley wanted to have distance from what would later be considered as some the 
extremes of the Cultural Revolution period. However, he never repudiated the sense of optimism 
or China’s need to overcome bureaucratic barriers put in place by those ‘following the Liu Shaoqi 
line’, which were features of the 1966-1969 period.945 
In addition to naming Alley, the CPNZ gave him a particular status through the description 
accompanying his by-line, such as ‘the Famous New Zealander who has worked in China since 
1926’.946 These words accompanying his articles would themselves go through changes over the 
next decade. In 1969, he was described as ‘a well-known New Zealander living in Peking [who] 
meets many Chinese people’.947 In 1971 the People’s Voice had dropped ‘famous’ and ‘well-known’ 
and Alley had become ‘the New Zealander who has worked in China for 45 years’.948 By the end 
of 1972 his articles were simply annotated ‘by Rewi Alley’.949 
                                                        
941 ‘Victories of the working class cultural revolution’, People’s Voice, 8 March 1968, 7, ‘”Instant Experts” or ”Norman 
Bethunes”’, People’s Voice, 3 May 1968, 3. 
942 ‘What is really going on in China today?’, People’s Voice, February 8 and 15, 1967, each on 7. 
943 ‘Instant Experts’, (‘by a New Zealander resident in Peking’), People’s Voice, 3 May 1968, 3. 
944 Compare Alley’s muted ‘people overthrow cruel oppression and build socialism’ (People’s Voice, 17 December 1968 
7) with its sense on an ongoing project, with ‘our China correspondent’ who triumphantly claimed that ‘workers 
prosper in socialist China while the capitalist world is in crisis’ (People’s Voice, 31 January 1969, 4). For the revolutionary 
slogans emanating from the interviewees, see below. 
945 Geoff Chapple writes that ‘in choosing between the radical line of Mao and the pragmatic line of Liu Shaoqi, it is 
clear that Alley preferred the radical line’. Geoff Chapple, Rewi Alley of China, Hodder and Stoughton, Auckland, 1980, 
203. 
946 See for example the description under ‘Ex-landlords gloating until revolution hit them’ People’s Voice, 7 February 
1968, 7. Note that although Alley left New Zealand in 1926 on his way to China he arrived in China in April 1927. 
947 Alley, ‘Rewi Alley reports on Chinese people’s progress’, People’s Voice, 25 March 1969, 6. 
948 Alley, ‘Remarkable progress in Santung mountainside’, People’s Voice, 10 February 1971, 6. 
949 Alley, ‘Newsletter from China’, People’s Voice, 13 September 1972, 1. 
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Although Alley’s name was prominently displayed in the People’s Voice from the mid-1960s, it was 
not until his trip to New Zealand in 1971 that the People’s Voice actually named Alley as a 
communist and as a member of the CPNZ. In October 1971, the paper claimed Alley as the 
‘notable New Zealand communist’ declaring that he had ‘[thrown] his lot in with Communist 
revolutionary forces and later become a member of the Communist Party of New Zealand’.950 
During this trip, when he arrived at Wellington airport he was greeted  
by members of the Wellington Branch of the CPNZ… [When he] posed with local 
communists… [this] attracted the attention of other travellers who explained to one 
another, ‘That’s Rewi Alley’. Few people in New Zealand do not know the name and 
deeds of this famous communist.951 
In a report looking back on his trip Alley was quoted predicating a comment with ‘as a member 
of the NZCP…’ and even in the publication of the NZCFS Alley was reported as saying that he 
had come to New Zealand to meet with ‘his comrades from the N.Z. Communist Party of which 
he is proud to be a member…’.952 Alley had by this time been reported in a manner consistent 
with the Party leadership’s position on a range of issues for decades and had commented 
favourably on the CPNZ’s internal affairs, for some time. Most recently, in 1970, he had 
‘commend[ed] the New Zealand Marxist-Leninists… fighting for the correct line against those 
who would destroy revolutionary working class theory and organisation’.953 This was despite the 
fact that those just expelled – in particular the former Wellington District of the CPNZ, 
including some old friends of Alley’s such as the Baileys and the Goddards – continued to 
uphold the same position on China as the CPNZ and were actively engaged in supporting the 
PRC through the NZCFS.954 In reporting about his life in China the CPNZ also reflected its own 
depiction of the trajectory of China’s recent history: 
For 40 years and more, Rewi Alley has, sometimes at risk of his life, recorded faithfully 
events, conditions, life and character developing under feudalism, capitalism, phoney 
socialism and now the society led by Mao Tse-tung, the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our 
era.955 
The trip in 1971 was an opportunity to showcase Alley as a member of the CPNZ and as a 
‘symbol of proletarian internationalism’ and was in marked contrast to the absence of any 
coverage of Alley in the communist literature of ten years earlier. His meetings with university 
students, Polynesian students and his ‘warm welcome in Wellington’ were all reported in the 
                                                        
950 ‘Rewi Alley is back home’, People’s Voice, 27 October 1971, 1. 
951 ‘Rewi Alley greeted in Wellington’, People’s Voice, 24 November 1971, 5. 
952 Jim Wong, ‘In New Zealand with Rewi Alley’, New Zealand China News, April 1972, 2. 
953 ‘Rewi Alley commends New Zealand Marxist-Leninists against revisionists’, People’s Voice, 11 November 1970, 6.  
954 See chapter 4 for details as to what lay behind these divisions. 
955 ‘Review of Rewi Alley’s “Upsurge”’, People’s Voice, April 23, 1969, 4. 
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People’s Voice.956 So too was his visit to the offices of the People’s Voice itself, and his meeting with 
Vic Wilcox and the rest of the CPNZ leadership.957 His ‘speaking for China’ was not restricted to 
explaining the successes of the Cultural Revolution. In a contribution to the debate between New 
Zealand’s increasingly fractured and contentious Marxist-Leninist organisations, he was reported 
as saying that the ‘outstanding role of the NZCP and the leadership of Comrade Vic Wilcox 
[was] well-recognised and highly appreciated in Peking’.958 
Representations of Alley were also a key aspect of the NZCFS’s publications during the Cultural 
Revolution period. There were four principle features to this. First, the statements from China 
for the National Conference and on the occasion of China’s National Day were collective, being 
from ‘All the NZers in China’.959 For 1966-69 these were Alley, Arthur and Fi Jackson-Thomas, 
Doug and Ruth Lake and Jim Wong. By 1969 the others had each returned to New Zealand and 
the practice was no more. Second, the enthusiastic accounts of the Cultural Revolution: ‘All have 
firm confidence in the outcome of the Cultural Revolution’,960 ‘China is a great unity… making 
giant strides… under the leadership of Mao Tsetung…. We see about us tremendous enthusiasm 
and confidence… new achievements… the road ahead is bright’,961 and 
The People’s Cultural Revolution is pushing socialist construction forward at a great 
speed and with tremendous force…. Going from strength-to-strength… In contrast to 
rising prices in New Zealand… the prices are stable… The thought of Mao Tse-Tung 
now penetrating into… the entire hinterland.962 
Alongside these joint accounts about the situation in the PRC, are the representations of Alley 
himself through the reviews of his publications. In 1970, 1971 and 1972 his work was proclaimed 
in the NZCFS newsletter as ‘understandable to ordinary people… A further contribution by one 
who has devoted his life uncompromisingly to the people of China and the world’. This notion 
that Alley was ‘ordinary’ was an important part of Alley’s image in New Zealand, although often 
accompanied by his status as ‘famous’.963 
                                                        
956  ‘Polynesian students hear Rewi Alley’, People’s Voice, 8 March 1972, 5. ‘Rewi Alley gets warm welcome in 
Wellington’, 1 December 1972, 5. 
957 ‘Rewi Alley visits People’s Voice’, People’s Voice, 10 November 1972, 1. 
958 ‘Rewi Alley looks back on New Zealand holiday’, People’s Voice, 22 March 1972, 5. See chapter 4 for some discussion 
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959 Emphasis in the original. Rewi Alley, Arthur and Fi Jackson-Thomas, Doug and Ruth Lake, Jim Wong, Newsletter of 
the New Zealand China Society, NZCS, October 1968, 1. Joan Donley papers, NZCFS Archive. 
960  Editorial Comment, Newsletter of the New Zealand China Society, October 1968, 1. Joan Donley papers, NZCFS 
Archive. Emphasis in the original. 
961 Rewi Alley, Arthur and Fi Jackson-Thomas, Doug and Ruth Lake, Jim Wong, ‘Message to NZCS’, Newsletter of the 
New Zealand China Society, NZCS, October 1968, p.2. Joan Donley papers, NZCFS Archive. 
962 Rewi Alley, Arthur and Fi Jackson-Thomas, Jim Wong, ‘Greetings to the Biennial New Zealand China Society 
Conference’, Newsletter of the New Zealand China Society, NZCS, 7 March 1969, 4-5. Joan Donley papers, NZCFS 
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963 ‘New Book by Rewi Alley’, Newsletter of the New Zealand China Society, NZCFS, April 1972, 2. Joan Donley papers, 
NZCFS Archive. See also, ‘Rewi Alley’s book a must’, June 1970, and ‘Good Reading’, December 1977. The 
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Finally, the representations about China in material from the Society and the CPNZ are conflated 
in this period. China is represented consistently to members of the Society and members of the 
Party as a place of rapid socialist progress where the correct application of the thoughts of Mao 
Zedong were enabling all obstacles to be overcome. At the same time Alley’s messages to the 
Society reminded members of their particular role in ‘correcting misrepresentations’ about China, 
which was somewhat in contrast to the CPNZ’s role of promoting its ideological correctness. In 
1968, along with his fellow New Zealanders resident in Beijing, he wrote of ‘the Society’s great 
role in presenting a more accurate picture of events in China than is available in the daily press in 
New Zealand’.964 After recognition was achieved he commended the Society on its role. Before, 
he said 
to praise anything Chinese was almost to lable oneself as a subversive. Today that has 
changed… the work of the New Zealand China Society, and the return of visitors from 
China, who have told of what they have seen, have been major factors in this welcome 
change.965 
Further, the setting up of proper diplomatic representation should overcome, he thought, ‘the 
evil winds… which did much to distort what is being done in China today and minimise its 
significance for the people of New Zealand’.966 The Society’s own reports referred to Alley’s role 
in this activity: 
Upon return, all the tour members recall the wonderful evening with Rewi Alley as one 
of the highlights of their trip… There is no doubt you are recognised as the ‘Learner in 
China’ par excellence. Your articles… are a mine of information and we learn a great 
deal from them.967 
After recognition, Alley’s published articles lost much of their political invective. Increasingly the 
articles consisted of ‘snapshots’ of Chinese life, often amongst minority people. While these 
might include lines such as ‘an inspiration to all interested in race relations’, or a brigade that is 
‘now looked up to as… a county going ahead full-steam with the times’, they are lacking in 
detailed political content such as the significance to that region of the most recent political 
campaign.968 
Again, however, there was a propaganda crisis and Alley was pressed into service to ‘explain’ how 
the changes after Mao’s death in fact constituted a return to the revolutionary ethos of Mao 
                                                        
964 ‘Message to the New Zealand China Society’, NZCS Newsletter, October 1968. Joan Donley papers. NZCFS 
Archives. 
965 ‘Rewi Alley’s Farewell Message’, NZCS Newsletter, April 1972. Joan Donley papers. NZCFS Archives. 
966 Untitled, NZCS Newsletter, June/July 1973, 1. Joan Donley papers. NZCFS Archives. 
967 ‘A Red Letter Day’, New Zealand China News, December 1977, 2. 
968 Examples of such reprotage by Alley are ‘A Korean Brigade’, New Zealand China News, December 1974, 6 and ‘The 
“Sheh” People’, New Zealand China News, March 1975, . 
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himself. Alley’s comments on the Gang of Four were important for representing their over-
throw as a continuation of the revolutionary line in China. 
This came through his statements directly to the Society: 
The people turned and smiled at each other… stood and said ‘Enough!’ for there had 
risen a small gang of ruthless oppressors, claiming the whole revolution for their 
own…969 
It was also evident in his reportage from his travels: 
Later things went well until 1974 when the Gang of Four sent in troublemakers to bring 
chaos… Naturally everyone was overjoyed when news came that the gang’s leaders in 
Peking had been removed from positions they had usurped.970 
Finally, the same message was conveyed in his other publications which went both directly to 
members who bought them and were reviewed in the Society’s publications. Molly Elliot, the 
editor of New Zealand China News, wrote that his poem ‘Thoughts in the New Year 1977’, ‘voices 
China’s belief in, disillusionment with and discrediting of the Gang of Four, now dismissed and 
despised’.971 The representation of Alley employed to give authority to this position drew on his 
nature as someone who ‘told it like it was’. Elliot’s review of Alley’s poetry collection A Freshening 
Breeze claimed it was ‘Blunt and devoid of the sesquipedalian sonorities of much modern 
verse’.972 
 
Alley’s Break with the CPNZ 
In March 1978 Alley was quoted in the People’s Voice as describing the PRC as ‘Where workers 
rule’.973 However, two months later, the CPNZ would announce that it had been ‘Strengthened 
by removal of a small group of splitters’, expelling a number of cadre who were personal friends 
of Alley and supporters of the CPC’s ideological position. It claimed that Vic Wilcox, Don Ross, 
Joyce and Jack Ewan, amongst others, had ‘failed in [their] sly… attempt to impose upon the 
Party Hill’s revisionist line of two-stage revolution and collaboration with the local capitalist 
class’.974 
                                                        
969 ‘China and the Clear Road Forward’, New Zealand China News, December 1976, 1. 
970 ‘Some Shantung Brigades’, New Zealand China News, June 1977, 5. 
971 ‘Good Reading’, New Zealand China News, December 1977, 9. 
972 Molly Elliot, ‘Rewi Alley’s Two Books’, New Zealand China News, 9. 
973 ‘Newsletter from China’, People’s Voice, March 20, 1978, 2. 
974 ‘CP Strengthened by removal of a small group of splitters’, People’s Voice, June 12 1978, 1. ‘Hill’ refers to Ted Hill, 
leader of the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist), who, like Wilcox, was highly regarded by the CPC and 
whose party saw that the CPC’s ideological depictions of the correct way towards revolution as directly applicable to 
Australia. Its disputes with the CPNZ were over the ‘two-stage revolution’: first national independence, then socialism; 
rather than ‘one-stage’, directly to socialism; and ‘the Theory of the Three Worlds’ which is discussed in chapter 4. The 
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Alley’s reports from China were no longer carried in the People’s Voice. Instead the Society’s 
publication became the vehicle to put forward his position regarding the restoration of the PRC’s 
to its revolutionary trajectory 
Now the around 900 million people of China have come back to the way forward which 
the revolution planned for them. They take it with new spirit, new enthusiasm.975 
The CPNZ became increasingly disillusioned with the PRC, eventually even the revolutionary 
heritage of Mao Zedong, and more members were expelled for not agreeing with this. including 
Hugh McLeod and Nat Gould.976 The Society’s newsletter not only defended the PRC and ‘Mao 
Zedong Thought’ but also provided a platform for criticising the CPNZ’s current leadership. In 
December 1978 Alley wrote that it was 
Curious that there could be any calling themselves progressive who just refuse to 
understand that Marxism must develop as realities change situations, and that the 
conception of three worlds so well supplements, but, of course, does not replace the idea 
of class struggle, which in China continues unabated…977 
He would formally break with the CPNZ himself in 1980.978 Brady claims that Alley’s split with 
the CPNZ shows Alley’s commitment to Marxism-Leninism to have been a ‘façade’, since, ‘as a 
good Marxist-Leninist’, he should have supported his Party against the CPC.979 This point is a 
weak one, Alley’s main link was with the CPC and if the CPNZ had broken with it then he could 
hardly stay in the latter. There is no conflict in being a Marxist and not being a member of the 
CPNZ. Further, the company he kept by leaving the CPNZ (Wilcox, McLeod, Ostler, Ross, 
Ewan, amongst others), had, like Alley, a strong Marxist-Leninist heritage. Their commitment to 
Marxism-Leninism as a way of interpreting the world, in order to change it, was both long-
standing and would not cease, even as their involvement shifted into new formations.980 In 
addition, Alley’s links with the NZCFS remained very strong. 
As always, Alley was not the only reporter from the PRC. In 1979, when there was controversy 
over the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. It also came from the Society’s leadership, in particular from 
                                                                                                                                                              
‘two-stage’ revolution meant building a united front against imperialism, which might include progressive capitalists 
also opposed to foreign (primarily US and UK) capital’s domination of the local economy. 
975 ‘Message from Rewi Alley in Peking’, New Zealand China News, Sept. 1978. 3. 
976 Both were officially expelled for not following Party discipline. McLeod for refusing to follow the CPNZ’s line 
attacking the CPC’s current policies, Gould for not agreeing with the CPNZ’s joining with the Albanian Party of 
Labour’s in attacking Mao’s heritage as a Marxist-Leninist (Jan McLeod, interview; Flora Gould, interview, Auckland, 9 
July 2002). 
977 ‘Rewi Alley writes’, New Zealand China News, Dec. 1978, 2 
978 This was reported in the People’s Voice as ‘Rewi Alley gives the game away’, People’s Voice, 12 May 1980, 1. 
979 Brady, Myth, 94. 
980 Marx wrote, ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it’, 
Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, 1888. It is available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm.  For the new formations that Wilcox, and 
others, moved into see chapter 4. 
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Wellington Branch Chairperson Peter Franks.981 Alley travelled to the Vietnamese border and 
wrote about Vietnamese refugees now living in Guangxi province.982 While this work dwells on 
the mistreatment of Vietnamese with Chinese heritage, Vietnam’s repudiation of China’s support 
for it during the war against American occupation, and even some Vietnamese war heroes now 
living in China, it is silent on the actual conflict, neither exploring its underlying causes nor 
promoting the PRC’s claims of victory.983 
In the early 1980s, Alley was recognised as a model of internationalism by Deng Xiaoping-led 
China and he received honours from Chinese authorities.984 The Society sought recognition from 
the New Zealand government too, as Alley moved into his mid-eighties, calling on members to 
come up with ‘practical and immediate steps to further honour Rewi Alley’.985 The New Zealand 
Prime Minister Robert Muldoon refused to countenance such an award. He further refused to 
meet Alley in private during prime ministerial trips to the PRC, or to be photographed with him. 
For members of the NZCFS, these activities reminded members of the ongoing political 
significance of China.986 With the election of the Labour government in 1984 things changed. 
Alley initiated a project to re-establish the Bailie School at Shandan. This project gave the Society 
a chance to re-promote Alley, to talk again of China as an alternative development model. It was 
also, as it turned out, an opportunity to criticise New Zealand capitalists.987 In 1985 Alley was 
awarded a Queen’s Service Medal for services to the New Zealand China relationship. 
Labour in recommending Alley for the QSM was echoing its tradition of active engagement with 
the PRC begun under the Kirk government. Ironically, in much the same way that the PRC 
looked to Alley to remind its left-wing New Zealand supporters of its continuity with its earlier 
incantations, the radically deregulatory Labour Government might have been looking to affirm 
its own working class activist history through making the connection with Alley as well. 
Alley initiated the school project and made an appeal to his supporters around the world to ‘set 
up a new Bailie School… [operating on a] half-study, half-work manner’.988 The Society was 
highly enthusiastic, and its support included promoting competition between branches as to 
which could contribute the most. Jack Ewan’s message at first tied the project to the Society’s 
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through the NZCFS’ by way of this piblication and other interventions, at some cost to themselves in the New 
Zealand progressive movement (‘Report on WCL delegation to China’, December 1982, internal League document, 
personal possession). 
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985 Jack Ewan, ‘President’s Report to National Conference’, June 1985, Jack Ewan Papers, NZCFS Archive. 
986 Brady, Myth, 94. 
987 In ‘China Traders Slow to Respond’, the Society reported that New Zealand businesses had sold $286 million worth 
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988 Rewi Alley, ‘A New Bailie School’, New Zealand China News, September, 1. 
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twin goals of remembering Alley and using Alley’s name to express support for the current 
direction of China’s development: ‘No project could express more aptly our admiration for Rewi 
and his work and at the same time contribute positively towards China’s massive efforts for 
modernisation’. The project was promoted exclusively by the Society as a ‘Rewi Alley Appeal’ 
with members being stimulated to ‘add your bit to this great gesture of goodwill to Rewi Alley 
and New Zealand China friendship’.989 
Alley had less exposure in the New Zealand China News through the 1980s, with most of the 
published material being reproduced from Chinese magazines. However, he was still highly 
regarded and his contribution warmly remembered. In 1984 the Christchurch Branch republished 
Han Suyin’s ‘Remembering Rewi Alley’, which had been written on the occasion of his receiving 
his D.Litt from Victoria University of Wellington in 1972 and first published in New Argot in 
1974. In it she wrote: 
Here was a man who really knew… [He has an] extraordinary quality to make people 
understand… [and] has integrated himself to the cause he believes in and the people 
among whom he lives.990 
March 1985 saw the Society claim that Alley’s QSM enhanced the award by giving one to ‘such a 
worthy recipient’. Amidst the ‘heartfelt congratulations’ was a statement about Alley that must 
have been directed at members worried about China’s current trajectory ‘Though some events 
went all the way from cold controversy to heated shooting and caused him suffering, he never 
lost faith in China, its people, progress and future…..’.991 
When Alley died, Jack Ewan described him as a ‘great New Zealander, life-long friend of the 
Chinese people and staunch worker for New Zealand China Friendship’. There was no mention 
of his Marxism, although Alley’s death seerved to become a catalyst to promote the projects he 
had initiated and that the Society would continue to support. 
We of the Society, with whom he was so closely associated, can look back with pride and 
gratitude on the contribution of this great patriot, and forward with determination to 
work to achieve what Rewi had not yet completed… I believe Rewi would wish us, as 
the Chinese say, to ‘turn grief into strength’. ‘Don’t mourn for me – organise’ might well 
have been his message.992 
A delegation went to China to attend memorial services for Alley. Bill Willmott was Secretary of 
the delegation. His report makes no mention of Alley’s Marxism-Leninism or China’s socialism. 
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All [memorial meetings] stressed the importance of continuing Rewi’s work in China… 
[they] had great political significance in China by bringing to the attention of the whole 
country the work and philosophy of this great New Zealander. Half work/half study 
schooling, devoting attention to the poorer areas of China, building friendship with New 
Zealand and other countries for world peace – all Rewi’s goals were emphasised…993 
 
Biographies of Alley 
There have been three biographies written about Alley. In Willis Airey’s A Learner in China, 
published in 1970, Airey allows only one chapter of the sixteen to discuss Rewi Alley’s post-
Liberation activities.994 Instead, the focus is on his life in New Zealand and his early life in China, 
as Airey attempts to produce a narrative that might explain to a New Zealand audience the 
gradual awakening of Alley’s social conscience and his eventual embrace of Marxism Leninism. 
Airey describes this as Alley’s ‘preparation’ in New Zealand and his ‘working things out in China’, 
quoting Alley: ‘I turned to the theoretical study of Marxism-Leninism, and began to see how 
things fitted together, and what the base of the new society should be’.995 
Airey’s book was distributed very widely amongst NZCFS members and was clearly written both 
for Alley’s supporters to know more about him and to expand the numbers of those who might 
be drawn into supporting China. It was a long time in gestation, perhaps in part because of the 
review process it went through to ensure that any contemporary views regarding the twists and 
turns of Chinese politcs could be accounted for retrospectively. Airey interviewed Alley when he 
was in New Zealand in 1960 and 1963, and on a mission to build wider contacts for the PRC in 
the face of Soviet hostility, although the book itself was mostly written in the mid-1960s. 
Alley contributed to this account through making his papers available and also, with Shirley 
Barton, reviewing material before the book was published. It is not unusual for authorised 
biographies to be reviewed in this way – ultimately it remains Airey’s work.996 The book was 
published in 1970 but had been mostly written earlier in the 1960s. This explains why it is more 
muted in terms of representing Alley’s ‘communism’ compared with NZCFS and CPNZ 
accounts of 1970. Yet the account Airey provides is entirely consistent with all that had been 
written about Alley already and with what would be written subsequently, such as the outpouring 
of commentary that accompanied Alley’s QSM in 1985 and his death in 1987. It is also consistent 
with the account in Alley’s own biography At 90: Memoirs of My China Years and the wide-ranging 
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collection of first-person remembrances published by New World Press in 1997 - Rewi Alley: A 
Collection in Memory.997 
Geoff Chapple’s Rewi Alley of China was published in 1980.998 In terms of a representation of 
Alley’s life it is basically the same story as Airey’s. However, it is stylistically different. Alley and 
Chapple travelled together for ’10,000 miles’ to the places in the PRC that were significant for 
Alley, and the narrative appears as Alley’s recollections and anecdotes along the way. The 
structure of Chapple’s book makes it difficult to follow, in terms of presenting a chronology of 
Alley’s life, but it is revealing of both men as Chapple seeks to explain, to his largely Western 
audience, what drove Alley. 
Alley was somewhat of a celebrity on the left by 1980, and there had been ten years of excitement 
about China by people on the left, although the CPNZ had recently broken with the CPC. 
Certainly Chapple was enthusiastic about his subject. 
In Chapple’s book, Alley is clearly very proud of what had been achieved by the PRC, while at 
the same time modest of his own contribution, neither does he seek to glorify the role of others. 
In part this serves to explain why some of the activities he was involved with before the founding 
of the PRC have been so understated: 
Mentions of Madame Sun crop up throughout Rewi’s story… ‘I don’t talk about 
Madame Sun because she doesn’t like being talked about or written about,’ says Rewi. 
He protects all those who have requested a low profile… and his own modesties too are 
embroiled in a general reluctance to discuss the underground.999 
While much of the narrative is consistent with Airey’s, Alley more clearly states his commitment 
to Marxism-Leninism than in earlier accounts, in particular noting that while he was motivated by 
social concern he saw Marxism-Leninism as the answer. Chapple accepts this, but still attempts 
to present it in a way that might convince an unsympathetic and anti-Marxist audience: 
Both Agnes Smedley and Rewi were quicker to form an emotional bond with the 
oppressed than to analyse the oppression in terms of Marxist theory. Yet the champions 
of China’s oppressed were communists…. He and Agnes Smedley now moved into 
direct touch with the theory and practice of Communism in China. In 1933, both 
became foundation members of a Marxist-Leninist study group set up in secret…’.1000 
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On the Gang of Four, Alley’s depictions reflect the period when the book was written. In 
particular, he was determined to show that China’s leaders were still committed to revolution and 
that the rejection of the Gang of Four had been widely supported by the Chinese population 
The group’s… claims of a pure socialism were judged merely shrill… Hua Guofeng was 
quick to oust the group and public support for the move seemed widespread and 
genuine… Rewi does not compare his own economic philosophies with any of China’s 
leaders, but it is obvious he sides with the Maoist line over that of a more centralist Liu 
Shaoqi.1001 
In November 2002 Anne-Marie Brady’s Friend of China: the Myth of Rewi Alley became the third 
book on Rewi Alley to be published. A series of reviews followed its publication, responding to 
Brady's revision of Alley's character and her claims regarding the ‘mythology’ surrounding his 
life. The publisher’s blurb described Brady’s book as a ‘radical and controversial analysis of 
Alley’s life and work’. It was enthusiastically reviewed by those who were critical of the PRC 
from the perspective of anti-communism.1002 Chapple, whose own book was dismissed by Brady, 
wrote in the NZ Listener that its release had given rise to at least one reviewer ‘standing astride 
[the] book and loudly proclaiming his own prejudice’.1003 
One of Brady's key research interests is the place of foreigners in China's diplomatic relations and 
Alley becomes something of an example. Friend of China probes the myth and reality of Alley's life, 
employing the life partly as an analogy to explore the role of foreigners in China's diplomatic 
relations and their sensitive place in China after 1949. Brady argues that foreigners are 
manipulated to serve the needs of the PRC. Central to Brady's thesis are two assertions. Firstly, 
that Alley was gay. Shanghai and China providing him the freedom to explore his homosexuality 
in a country and time when this behaviour was not tolerated in New Zealand. Brady's assertion is 
that this was a key influence in shaping the choices Alley made. Secondly, she argues that Alley’s 
choice to remain in China after the revolution was related to his sexuality and that it resulted in 
him becoming an uncritical propagandist for the Chinese government. However she presents 
little in the way of conclusive evidence to support her claims.1004 Chapple’s review of the reviews 
in the New Zealand Listener points out some of these failings (although doesn’t address Brady’s 
criticisms of his own work). 
Brady attempts to dismantle what she calls the myth surrounding Rewi Alley. She questions the 
integrity of his motives, exposes what she sees as contradictions in how he represented China 
                                                        
1001 Chapple, Rewi Alley, 202-3. Note that Liu Shaoqi was not yet rehabilitated (which happened in February 1980) but 
he was no longer being vilified as he had been in the early part of the Cultural Revolution. 
1002 See Jonathon Mirsky, ‘Review’, Asian Wall St Journal, 13 November 2002, Nicholas Reid ‘Rewi Alley on Sex 
Mission Too’, Dominion Post, 30 November 2002 and Neil Birss’ ‘From the Right: Rewi Alley “not a saint”’, Christchurch 
Press 23 November 2002. 
1003 Geoff Chapple, ‘They Say He Was Gay’, New Zealand Listener, 1 March 2003, 10. 
1004 See Chapple, ‘They Say He Was Gay’, 10, for a contrasting reading of the correspondence Brady relies upon. 
  254
and dismisses other biographical work written about him as ‘hagiography’.1005 The book plays on 
contested images of China, and has enabled some to vent their opposition to the position Alley 
has been awarded in New Zealand society. Neill Briss in his ‘From the Right’ column in the 
Christchurch Press wrote ‘Our adulation of Rewi Alley could haunt New Zealand when the Chinese 
shake off the vestiges of communism and reassess the terror it brought’.1006 Jonathon Mirsky, 
writing for the Asian Wall Street Journal, said ‘[Alley] led a comfortable life… aware that this 
comfort would continue just so long as he performed as cheerleader, flack, and deceiver for the 
Communist regime’.1007 
What China meant for Alley, from the 1930s, through the process of liberation and the 
establishment of the PRC and its programmes, was also about putting the ideals that had formed 
for him into practice. At the heart of his commitment, like so many others who believed in the 
project of socialism and the form by which that was being played out in the PRC, was a 
commitment to a certain set of ideals. In the period during which Brady is writing, the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the spectre of Tiananmen provided the immediate context for the work. The 
ideals that shaped Alley were much less fashionable than they were in the formative period in his 
life. 
Brady notes this context: 
I first became interested in the subject of Rewi Alley in the wake of debate… 
surrounding the Tiananmen massacre of 4 June 1989… After June 4… Alley’s 
contribution to the New Zealand–China relationship came under attack. Many 
commentators stated that New Zealand, like other Western countries, had 
misunderstood the nature of China’s reforms and some blamed Alley for this. They 
claimed that New Zealand had fallen prey to a romanticised picture of China…1008 
However, although she notes it, she takes little account of context in her analysis. In fact, a 
feature of The Myth of Rewi Alley is how it truncates events over different periods and uses them 
to reinforce one another, despite the complex situations that they each evolve out of. Roland 
Barthes, who Brady quotes approvingly, refers to such when he writes that myth ‘abolishes the 
complexity of human acts, it gives them simplicity of essences… it organises a world which is 
without contradictions because it is without depth…it establishes a blissful clarity’.1009 In the end, 
                                                        
1005 Brady, Myth, 5-6. 
1006 Neil Birss, ‘Rewi Alley “not a saint”’. 
1007 Jonathon Mirsky, ‘Review’. 
1008 Brady, Myth, p.ix. 
1009 Roland Barthes (selected and translated from the French by Annette Lavers), Mythologies, Cape, London, 1972, 143. 
Former-Hong Kong-based Reuter’s correspondent Derek Round defended Alley in the face of Brady’s book, writing 
‘most of what has been written about [Alley] over the years was factual and true… A Myth… is a widely held but false 
notion. [Alley] was a very real and very human person’ (Derek Round, ‘More truth than fable’, Christchurch Press, 14 
December 2002). Round is not right on this point. A myth is a socially powerful story – it is neither true nor false. It is 
however a story that lacks complexity. In this sense Brady does not demolish the ‘myth’ of Alley, she merely constructs 
a different one.  
  255
in Brady’s examination of Alley from the perspective of her own contingent and specific values 
she misses the most important aspect of his life completely. As Michael Crook remarks, 
She’s talking about these ideals… and she doesn’t understand that, so she talks in terms 
of things that she does understand: crass materialism and deviance. I think it is all a bit 
sad.1010 
Brady’s book did not ‘ring true’ for many who knew Alley, although since she began to research 
it after he had died she was constrained in a similar way to Airey or Chapple in terms of a 
personal engagement with him. 
Whether or not Alley was a committed Marxist in the 1930s remains a matter of controversy. Yet 
his Indusco project easily mapped against socialist ideas around industrialism and worker 
democracy and he wrote more and more about Marxism-Leninism as the years unfolded. 
Certainly, he was quiet about his ideological standpoint in the 1950s, and there is no doubt that 
the work that he was doing would have been compromised if he had announced it. Others too 
made this choice. Most obviously Song Qingling, whose efforts to join the Communist Party of 
China were rebuffed until the last year of her life, as she was much more useful as a 
representative of China’s ‘Coalition Government’ than she would have been as yet another 
member of the CPC.1011 
Brady’s work is organised around a simple opposition between truth and falsehood (which she 
calls ‘myth’). For her the PRC is a dishonest state that hides the truth and therefore Alley was a 
‘mythmaker’. At the very least this makes his work in Indusco irrelevant for her, although his 
enthusiasm and energy for the project is well known. At some level her analysis is part of the 
depoliticisation process referred to by Wang Hui and Michael Dutton. As class is de-emphasised 
the dichotomy between Chinese and foreign became the key one, replacing the class distinction 
between capitalist and proletariat or the friend/enemy distinction between revolutionary and 
anti-revolutionary. Alley then becomes a ‘New Zealander’ who lived in ‘China’ and his political 
commitment does not matter. Alley himself may have contributed to this. He may well have been  
one of many people in China who thought that radicalism had not delivered its promise so a 
more moderate approach was necessary, and his own commitment to a radical agenda in the past 
was re-written to give emphasis to this. Yet he was also one of the people who saw considerable 
improvement in people’s lives in the 1950s, so he maintained his commitment to the leadership 
of the CPC. 
Brady does not take Alley’s Marxism, the context by which he came to it, or the ideals that 
underpin it very seriously. In her thesis on the practice of China’s diplomatic interaction with 
                                                        
1010 Michael Crook, interview, Beijing. 18 July 2003. 
1011 See Israel Epstein, A Woman in World History, New World Press, Beijing, 1993. 
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foreigners, such as Alley, she draws on work published by the World Anti-Communist League. 
She displays a refusal to engage with Marxism-Leninism, despite it being key to Alley’s own 
analysis of himself. For example, Brady’s claim, addressed above, regarding Alley’s leaving the 
CPNZ and what it means to be ‘a good Marxist-Leninist’ – which she interpreted as blinding 
following the CPNZ’s leadership. She downplays the ideological questions and debates that 
inform the beliefs of members of Marxist-Leninist organisations. She also gives insufficient 
weight to the climate of anti-communism operating in New Zealand, stoked as it was by official 
policy, and the influence of this had on Alley’s representations to New Zealanders. 
The context that gave rise to Brady’s text also pervaded the Society’s position and prompted a re-
examination of Rewi Alley. His activities were constructed in a way to emphasise the less 
troubling aspects of his life. In doing so most emphasis now fell on his earliest activities in China. 
His involvement in the ‘interpretation of China was explained in terms of the period around 
Liberation and until recognition.1012 In Kathleen Hall a new hero emerged, who had also been 
involved in pre-Liberation China but without the complications of having represented China to 
the West or having said things about China that members of the Society no longer believed. 
 
The Emergence of Kathleen Hall 
Kathleen Hall returned to New Zealand from Hong Kong in 1951, where she had been working 
establishing a leper colony and having failed to gain an entry permit to join Rewi Alley’s school at 
Shandan.1013 She immediately became involved in the Society. However, it is not until 1958 that 
the NZCFS first makes mention of her activities in China, when she is recorded as providing a 
‘very interesting lecture’ in Auckland on ‘her time in China 1922-42’.1014 She rose quickly into the 
leadership of the Society, that same year replacing Shirley Barton as a National Conference 
delegate when Barton was unavailable. When Hall moved to Wellington in 1959, she was 
involved in helping to establish a branch there. This was a crucial step in the development of the 
Society into a national organisation. 
In late 1957 Song Qingling asked Hall to write a short article about her time in China on the 
occasion of the 20th anniversary of the China Welfare Institute but Hall’s response was too late to 
be included. In May 1958 Hall’s letter, accompanying the article, showed that she was engaged in 
very similar political activities to the others who were involved with the Society at this time. She 
reported she had been involved in celebrating the anniversary of the PRC with the Society, active 
                                                        
1012 See http://nzchinasociety.org.nz/rewi.html. 
1013 She had hoped to replace the Spencers but anti-foreign sentiment meant many bureaucratic hurdles and the 
foreigners leaving China at this time were seldom replaced (on this see Newnham, Dr. Bethune’s Angel, 195. 
1014 Minutes of the Auckland Branch, Jack Ewan Papers, NZCFS Archive. 
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trying to ban the bomb with the Peace Council, and ‘working hard to get a change in 
government’.1015 
Reflecting the insular nature of the Society at this stage – the Auckland Branch in 1958 had just 
51 members – Hall’s familial links were also important. Her brother Peter was a founding 
member of the Hamilton Branch and her cousin Ruth Lake was to go to China in 1963 to teach 
English. Lake’s husband Doug, who worked with the Foreign Languages Press, and their three 
daughters, accompanied Ruth. The Lakes would be key correspondents to their fellow New 
Zealanders during the Cultural Revolution, trying to articulate the enthusiasm they were 
experiencing into language that those far away would be able to understand. 
When Alley visited New Zealand in 1960 he and Hall met for the first time, and even then, 
according to Alley, what he remembered was that Hall stayed behind after the meeting to help 
with the dishes.1016 She talked with him a little about her own life in China and asked if she might 
be able to return to China. He arranged for her to be included in a delegation invited later that 
year for the PRC’s National Day celebrations. She was able to meet up with old friends Song 
Qingling and Nie Rongzhen and to scatter some earth on Norman Bethune’s tomb. She returned 
to again China in 1964, this time hosted as an individual. Freed from the ‘official circuit’ she was 
able to get back to the villages in the hills where her clinics had operated.1017 She died in 1970. 
Her death was not noted in the Society’s newsletter. The history of the Society is important to it, 
as are its ‘heroes’, and it continually found occasion to remember them, but Hall’s name was not 
mentioned. In 1976 when Muldoon went to China, the Society’s newsletter condemned the New 
Zealand Prime Minister’s ‘[riding] around China on the back of such people whom he openly 
despises’ and celebrated ‘unofficial representatives [who] established genuine friendly 
relations…’.1018  Rewi Alley, Jim Bertram, Vic Wilcox, and Shirley Barton are the only ones 
singled out for mentioning. In Alley’s poetry collection Snow Over the Pines where he includes 
poems commemorating the contribution of NZCFS stalwarts, Barton, Jim Wong, and Nat and 
Flora Gould have poems dedicated to them, but not Hall.1019 
Yet despite this omission, Alley was singularly responsible for Hall not being forgotten. In March 
1977, seven years after her death, he wrote a substantial article for the Society’s publication New 
Zealand China News entitled ‘Unsung Heroine’. 
                                                        
1015 See discussion at the beginning of chapter 3. 
1016 In fact they spent a full day together in Auckland, although it is likely that the modest Hall did not reveal all of the 
things she had been involved in. His anecdote about the dishes was designed to emphasise Hall’s commitment to 
service rather than depreciate her work at other levels. 
1017 Tom Newnham, He Mingqing: The Life of Kathleen Hall, New World Press/Graphic Publications, Beijing, 1992, 168-
69.  
1018 ‘Muldoon Visits the People’s Republic’, New Zealand China News, June 1976, 1. 
1019 Rewi Alley, Snow Over the Pines, New World Press, Beijing, 1977. 
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Unsung, but that’s how Kathleen Hall would have wanted it. A modest little woman who 
practiced service before self, and who, working to help the Eighth Route Army in the 
War of Resistance, made another link between New Zealand and China.1020 
Alley’s account of Hall begins with the story of how he came to know of her because she nursed 
George Hogg back to life. Hogg was on his way to meet Alley and to start work for Gung Ho. 
He also recalls how he and Hall had met in China when she ‘returned to China on a visit in 
1964…. [and] scattered… earth over Dr Norman Bethune’s grave’.1021 
This was actually Hall’s second trip to the PRC and she had met Alley on the first as well, in 
1960. Alley said that he had not known much of Hall’s story, despite having spent time with her 
in New Zealand and China in 1960. 
She did not speak much about herself… We knew that, when she came to Peking to buy 
medicines for Dr Bethune’s hospital, Japanese gendarmes arrested her and sent her to 
Hong Kong. When given more medicines by the China Defence League, she took them 
right across China into Shansi province… She returned to New Zealand and was a 
constant help to China friendship until her death.1022 
As Alley presented it, it was through others that Hall’s story was revealed to him and even then it 
was incomplete. Dr Guo Qinglan, the Chinese widow of the Indian doctor, Dwarkanath Kotnis, 
who had also served with the 8th Route Army 
asked if I had known her and was glad to hear of her life after her arrest… It turned out 
Kathleen Hall had recruited Dr Kuo and other medical workers to go to the Eighth 
Route Army. Kathleen also took her to the mission hospital at An Kuo before going into 
the hills. Kathleen came and went from Peking to Bethune many times with medicines 
and supplies and introduced Dr Kuo to Dr Kotnis… I would have liked to have heard 
more of Kathleen but Dr Kuo did not have time to tell old stories.1023 
Alley wrote this account of Hall’s time in China after the Cultural Revolution, but China’s 
trajectory was being represented at the time as continuing the revolution. Hall, accordingly, was 
characterised in terms of a ‘serve the people’ construction. Alley wrote: 
She was extremely popular… She nursed guerrilla fighters and was one with the people. 
My last impression of Kathleen was of her staying behind after a China Society meeting 
in New Zealand to wash up cups, put things straight. That was like her. Always she 
                                                        
1020 Rewi Alley, ‘Unsung Heroine’, New Zealand China News, March 1977, 7-9. 
1021 Rewi Alley, ‘Unsung Heroine’, 8. 
1022 Alley, ‘Unsung Heroine’, 9. 
1023 Alley, ‘Unsung Heroine’, p.8. For more on the Indian doctors who worked with the 8th Route Army see Dr B. K. 
Basu, Light on China: Call of Yanan - Story of the Indian Medical Mission to China 1938-1943, Foreign Languages Press, 
Beijing, 2003. 
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wondered what she could do to serve. The Communist-led Eighth Route Army always 
remained her ideal in downright and complete devotion to the ordinary Chinese people 
she grew to love so well.1024 
Despite this recollection from Alley, Hall’s story languished again until the arrival of Tom 
Newnham at Shandan in 1987. Newnham, who was to become Hall’s biographer and most 
important promoter, was working with Alley re-establishing the Shandan Bailie School. 
Newnham says that on announcing that he wanted to write another Alley biography, Alley sent 
him to Songjiazhuang to ‘talk to the old people there about New Zealand nurse Kathleen Hall’, 
that hers was a story worth writing about and that ‘[Hall] would have been famous if she’d been a 
man’.1025 
Others have said that Alley had been telling people for years to make sure that the Society would 
‘never forget Shirley Barton’.1026 Indeed in the introduction to his book New Zealand Women in 
China, Newnham reports that Alley said to him ‘There needs to be a book written about three 
New Zealand women in China, Shirley Barton, Barbara Spencer and Kathleen Hall’.1027 It was 
Hall on whom Newnham decided to focus.  
In 1989 Newnham asked ‘why has this remarkable life story remained untold for so long?’ He 
put it down to two reasons: she was a Christian missionary who ‘unashamedly sided with the 
Communists’, ‘she was a woman. The new regime in China, Newnham claims, conducted a 
‘sustained propaganda campaign’ against missionaries as ‘imperialist spies’, even as ‘monsters and 
baby killers’ and the New Zealand government too was ‘not disposed to bestow honour on 
somebody who, it was said “helped the Communists to power”’.1028 
A significant reason for Hall’s lack of exposure in New Zealand was that she spoke so seldom of 
the activities that she was associated with in China and when she did belittled her own 
involvement.1029 She seems to have believed that she had only done what any other would have 
in the circumstances. Accounts of the men she was closely associated with have also discounted 
or otherwise adjusted Hall’s involvement in order to further elevate their main protagonist’s 
achievements. Some accounts of both Hogg and Bethune have Hall falling in love with them. In 
the Canadian film, Dr. Bethune, Bethune’s biographers pursue the lovers’ notion despite the fact 
that Bethune and Hall only met on the one occasion and Bethune’s own account of that, 
endorsed by Hall, cannot possibly be interpreted in favour of any such relationship.1030 They also 
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give Hall a different Chinese name, ‘Miss Ho’. In the recent movie Children of the Silk Road Hall is 
transformed into an Australian with a drug problem.1031 
Alongside the issue of why Hall’s story was submerged for so long must be the question of why 
it emerged when it did. It cannot be mere coincidence that interest in popularising the Hall story 
from China arose in 1957, 1977 and 1987, three moments when the United Front was at its 
broadest and narrow sectarianism at it weakest. 1957 was after the period of Socialist 
Construction and before the Great Leap Forward, 1977, after the Cultural Revolution and 1987 
during a period of openness when, for example, village-level democratic elections were 
introduced.1032 Further, the 1990s, when the NZCFS embraced Hall, having largely ignored her 
pre-Liberation exploits for forty years, coincides with the Society’s post-Tiananmen anxiety and 
identity crisis – when it was looking for a rationale that did not hinge on support for China’s 
political trajectory over more recent years. Her ‘humanitarianism’ was ‘pure’. 
The Society’s changed goal of ‘acknowledging the significance of the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China’, instead of ‘correcting misrepresentations about China’ was advanced 
by Hall’s story of heroism in pre-Liberation China and her published work in proclaiming that 
the PRC was better than the period under the Guomindong. This was coupled with the end of 
her direct involvement with China before any of the periods that have subsequently become so 
complicated and contested such as the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution and the 
period of Reform and Opening-Up. Her discovery has another corollary too. From the mid-
1990s the Society for People’s Friendship Studies had been investigating the publishing of 
English language works about China for China’s expanding population of readers of English to 
learn about China’s history through the eyes of foreigners. The series, after some delays, was 
published in 2002 and 2003. It consists entirely of pre-Liberation accounts of China. 
The Society’s connection with Kathleen Hall’s memory eulogises: 
Her work behind the lines in the Sino-Japanese war [which] was secret and 
extraordinarily courageous… like Alley, her entire focus was on the welfare of the 
peasants.1033 
In this way, while also rewriting Alley’s memory, she is connected to Alley but her history is also 
disconnected from him. One aspect of this is the complete absence in the official representations 
of her history by the Society of George Hogg, and through him, Alley and Gung Ho. Presumably 
this is in part to set her up as a hero in her own right, uncluttered by Alley’s status. Similarly, her 
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story ends with her leaving China in 1942. It is just a pre-Liberation story, she was not involved 
in ‘interpreting China’ through the 1950s and 1960s until her death, so she did not look like 
someone who had been a slavish follower of People’s China even though she had worked as a 
‘friend’ of China. Significantly, it is the cause of the Chinese nation, rather than socialism, which 
China’s friends are seen as supporting. It is the second united front that sees a united China 
fighting a Japanese invader, which provides the framework for Hall’s activities. 
The story also provides an explanation of how Hall, as a Christian, could have come to provide 
support for the communists. 
At first she was wary of Mao’s peasant army: her Christian training and philosophy was 
antagonistic towards communism, and she feared that the communists were killing 
missionaries. However, word of General Nie Rongzhen’s support for local peasants 
filtered through; in fact, he became Kathleen’s close friend.  Mao’s tactics were to win 
the trust of the local peasants, then mobilise them into night raiders on Japanese 
outposts: farmers by day, guerrillas by night.  Kathleen realised that the robbery and rape 
that usually accompanied an army were not part of Mao’s ethic; the Eighth Route Army 
was vigilant in enforcing the honesty and courtesy of its soldiers.1034 
When, having discovered Hall some twenty years after her death, the Society sought some way of 
memorialising her, they first initiated the Kathleen Hall Memorial Nursing Scholarship. This was 
for post-graduate community nursing training in New Zealand and was done in 1996, the 
centennial of Hall’s birth. Kathleen Hall was remembered as a community nurse and the 
scholarship was an opportunity to remember her, and to promote on an annual basis her story to 
the nursing community through publicity related to the scholarship. 
Yet from 2002, when the Society made its shift into undertaking aid work in China, effort 
gradually went into converting the Kathleen Hall Scholarship into an aid and development 
project based inside China. The outcome was the He Mingqing Scholarship, inaugurated in 2007, 
and the withering away of the postgraduate award. 1035 The NZCFS now pays all the costs for 
student nurses, chosen from impoverished areas in China, to complete their training at a local 
medical training college with the expectation that they will then return to their area to work. This 
reflects the Society’s interest in aid, which has replaced its interest in publicity about China to 
New Zealanders, and is linked to the Society’s other aid and development activities. The first He 
Mingqing Scholar was from a national minority village in northern Guangxi province, drawing on 
connections the Society had with the Guangxi Branch of the All China Women’s Federation. In 
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2008, when a second scholarship began, it was for a student from Qiyang County, Hebei, where 
Hall herself was active. 
 
Conclusions 
The imagining and interpretation of the PRC by its New Zealand viewers has been affected by 
those who talked about the PRC to New Zealanders and those chosen, by their heroic status, to 
represent the PRC in New Zealand. The representation of Alley, as someone who told New 
Zealanders about the PRC, has been transformed as those who viewed the PRC through him 
have sought to re-position themselves in accordance with a new telling about the PRC. Not only 
is this interpretation subjective, but the re-positioning is also, and of itself, subjective. 
Understanding the construction of Alley and Hall in this context is of vital importance. 
For the Communist Party of New Zealand, Alley was an important marker of the Party’s 
connection with the Chinese revolution, but out of deference to the needs of the United Front 
and the particular politics of anti-communism, they did not openly associate either him with 
them or they with him, as this would involve ‘outing’ him as a communist. He was, accordingly, 
not identified to the New Zealand public as a member of the CPNZ until the late 1960s. The 
CPNZ always had other connections with the PRC and the CPC, in particular through Vic 
Wilcox – who was perhaps even more well-known and regarded amongst the CPC theoreticians 
and leading cadre than Alley – but also though access to material written about the PRC by 
journalists from fraternal and ideologically sympathetic parties who were based in Beijing. 
The CPNZ changed the way that it talked about and used Alley’s name over the period. As the 
egalitarianism of the Cultural Revolution reached its zenith the description of him as ‘famous’ 
disappeared. Yet he continued to give authority and status to the Party because, with or without 
the epithet, he was famous. In the 1970s, when there were a variety of communist parties in New 
Zealand, most sympathetic to the project underway in the PRC and the ideological 
pronouncements of the CPC, Alley ‘spoke for China’ in recognising the primacy,  in the eyes of 
the CPC, of the CPNZ. 
For the Society, Alley was its founder, and patron, and most famous son. While United Front 
politics waxed and waned and affected its direct engagement with the PRC, Alley remained a 
constant: his writing of greetings to the Society, his engagement in regular correspondence with 
particular members, his generous hosting of delegations and individuals in Beijing, and his 
visiting New Zealand on four occasions as a guest, spokesperson and representative not only of 
China but also of the Society. 
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The representation of Alley consistently maps over multiple changes in the representation of the 
PRC. Following the periodisation identified in chapter 1, the first of these corresponds to the 
period of the PRC’s ‘opening up’ between 1952 and 1957. It is dominated by ideas about ‘peace’ 
and ‘culture’, and sees relations enabled on a broad basis between the PRC and its New Zealand 
supporters. Alley in this period was presented as a ‘peace worker’. The second period began 
around the end of the 1950s and ran until the high point of the Cultural Revolution in 1969. This 
period saw Alley being increasingly radicalised in the literature and the image of him for the 
Society and the CPNZ becoming conflated into one. A third period, around the recognition of 
the PRC by the New Zealand government in December 1972, saw Alley being able to be much 
bolder in his political positioning, although simultaneously less engaged in promoting his political 
beliefs, as anti-communism falls away and New Zealand sought engagement with the PRC on 
much wider grounds. 
For members of the Society, in the period immediately after recognition, the People’s Republic 
of China in 1976 was about politics, and so too was Alley. His particular role was in celebrating 
the achievements of the Cultural Revolution, and ‘explaining’ of China New Zealanders. As the 
great changes in China from the late 1970s through the 1980s took place, Alley’s status was very 
important in making sure that people in New Zealand understood that China, although changing, 
still represented the hope and promise of the revolution. When he died, his memory was invoked 
not just for all he had contributed but in the expectation that what he had begun all those years 
earlier in Shandan and with Indusco would continue. 
For the NZCFS however the truth-event of Tiananmen not only coloured what it believed about 
the PRC, it also changed the way that it talked about Alley. It reduced its promotion of his 
contributions to ‘telling the truth about China’ and emphasised instead his practical contributions 
during the period leading up to liberation. It even introduced, in Kathleen Hall, a new hero who 
was uncluttered by the problems that Alley’s sixty years of supporting China reflected. By the 
turn of the millennium, China had all but completely ceased to reflect a politicised image. For 
many members their interest in China was ‘cultural’ instead. Alley had to be re-configured, now 
alongside Hall, in order to fit with this new image. 
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Conclusion 
When the PRC was founded there were no formal links between China and New Zealand and 
even when the 1957 Nash-led Labour government suggested having them there was considerable 
pressure put on them from United States and, particularly, United Kingdom authorities not to do 
so. This was the Cold War, a hot war from 1950-53 when Chinese ‘volunteers’ and New Zealand 
troops in Korea as part of the United Nations contingent faced off against one another. New 
Zealand was on the side of the ‘free world’ and China behind the ‘red curtain’. There were few 
Chinese New Zealanders, and they tended to be close to the politics of KMT. The Republic of 
China maintained an embassy in Wellington. 
It was in this context that the NZCFS was founded and attempted to build people-to-people 
links between the two countries. This was done by initially utilising the New Zealand-based 
supporters of Rewi Alley’s work in China, and those who had worked with Alley in China when 
they began to return home after the PRC was founded. Steadily these supporters expanded to 
include other left-wing New Zealanders involved in peace and trade union activity, but not 
significantly beyond this, especially as anti-communism was widespread and the New Zealand 
media was not disposed towards positive coverage of either China nor Alley.  
For the most part the 1960s saw a continuation of the government’s relations towards the PRC 
and communism, again dominated by war, in this case the conflict in Vietnam. This decade also 
saw continuous rule by the conservative National Party and a close relationship between New 
Zealand foreign policy and that of the United States and the United Kingdom. Yet despite the 
continuity of government policy, New Zealand society was changing, with a considerable growth, 
especially amongst young people, of interest in counter culture and the search for alternatives to 
the life they saw around them. For many China offered this alternative. The Communist Party of 
New Zealand, although small even in proportion to New Zealand’s population, shared a 
platform with the Communist Party of China through their common opposition to what they 
saw as Soviet revisionism. 
When recognition occurred, essentially coinciding with the election of the Kirk Labour 
government in 1972, not only was the long-held goal of the NZCFS achieved there was also a 
blossoming of engagement with China as it became much easier for ordinary New Zealanders to 
do so. Society tours flourished and were soon complemented by commercial tours as well. In the 
aftermath of Britain joining the European Union and China’s reform and opening up process 
New Zealand businesses began to see the PRC more and more as an opportunity. Domestic 
changes in China saw the commitment that the CPNZ had made to the Chinese revolution lapse 
and even the groups who maintained some fidelity with an image of China and its revolution 
differed in terms of what they had a relationship with: a present ‘actual existing socialism’ or a 
now discarded revolutionary project. 
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The 1980s saw a continuation of this shift in New Zealand’s engagement with the PRC, 
especially as Chinese politics, or a repudiation of radical politics, saw opportunities for New 
Zealand ‘prominent people’ to be introduced to the possibilities the PRC offered. Sister city 
relationships were formed and the interest in China became genuinely bi-partisan across National 
and Labour lines. Although the interest in China as an alternative other from disrupted by the 
Tiananmen event commercial and elite politics interest continued to develop, as did an interest in 
a ‘cultural’ China. Immigration changes in the late-1980s saw significant numbers of Chinese 
New Zealanders who had been born or raised in the PRC for the first time. By the end of the 
decade, in part due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the deregulatory changes in the PRC, 
those interested in Marxist politics were smaller in number, and fewer and fewer of those that 
held to such beliefs saw China as representative of their ideological commitment. 
In the 1990s, through to the 50th anniversary of the Society, the interest in a cultural China, 
including Chinese language, continued to grow and the Society saw many Chinese New 
Zealanders drawn into the Society’s activities. New Zealand businesses increasingly saw the 
possibilities of the Chinese market, and importing goods from China, as essential for New 
Zealand’s economic development. China was more assertive on the world stage further 
emphasising the importance of strong connections between the two countries. The Society was 
seen as important too, as the unbroken links that it had maintained with the PRC since the early 
years were valued in Beijing, and could be utilised by the New Zealand state.  
Although this context is important, this thesis is more a history of an imagined ‘China’ than a 
history of China, or indeed a history of the organisations and people whose articulations about 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been its focus of study. As such it is indebted to the 
work of people such as Eric Hayot, Haun Stassy and Steven Gao whose Sinographies has 
introduced a conceptualisation of something different from a study of China (sinology) – a 
writing of China.1036 The writing of China is not fixed. As Hayot writes, ‘the West is no more the 
same every time it interacts than China is when it interacts with the West’, so too the individuals 
and organisations in this study.1037 
This is an attempt to provide a sympathetic reading of a wide range of material and trying to 
understand what the PRC has meant at different times, in different circumstances and to 
different people. Although all the accounts have been from those enthusiastic about the PRC and 
the CPC-led project there have still been changing images. This thesis is a study of beliefs and 
claims and it is about what people saw happening after 1949, and why they thought what they 
thought. Such a deep contextualisation involves the re-reading of the texts that have ‘written’ the 
PRC for sympathetic New Zealanders. They involve a rhetoric of truth and accuracy and stress 
                                                        
1036 Eric Hayot, Haun Saussy and Steven Yao, Sinographies: Writing China, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
2008. 
1037 Eric Hayot, The Dream of China: Pound, Brecht, Tel Quel, Ann Arbour, University of Michigan Press, 2004, xix. 
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the value of personal encounters, but it is also striking that the emphases change as what is being 
sought changes. 
Truth is a highly complicated concept, as has been explored extensively in philosophical 
literature. The accounts of those who went to the PRC exhibit a range of the different ideas 
about truth. They were alive to concepts of subjectivity. They also understood that what is true is 
substantially influenced by the foundational beliefs of the person to whom it is expressed and the 
status and perceived authority of the person doing the telling. Less complicated than truth, is 
truthfulness. Bernard Williams reminds us that without denying the contingency of much that we 
take for granted, truth still needs to be defended as an intellectual objective and a cultural value 
through a commitment to truthfulness. He identifies two basic virtues, Accuracy and Sincerity, 
the first of which aims at finding out the truth and the second at telling it.1038 Taking into account 
the contextualisation of the accounts examined here, visitors to the PRC overwhelmingly sought 
out the truth, as they understood it, and attempted to tell it. In addition though, visitors to the 
PRC were highly conscious that they were engaged in a polemical exercise to promote what they 
believed to be the successes of the socialist project in China. They accordingly adjusted the image 
they presented in order to comply with what they were aware would be the reception in New 
Zealand. 
These representations, then, were affected by the reception and perceived reception of the ideas 
about the PRC in New Zealand. This was itself strongly influenced by government policy. 
Around the time of official recognition of the PRC by the New Zealand government, things for 
the supporters of the PRC got considerably easier. Rewi Alley’s trips, and his position on the 
PRC and activities taking place there, were more favourably and more extensively covered in the 
media and there was an explosion of people-to-people activities. Since Alley was the most 
important interlocutor between the PRC and New Zealand his image came to reflect, if not 
embody the changing understanding of people’s China. When he also was re-written, after 
Tiananmen, the New Zealand China Friendship Society (NZCFS) found an additional hero in 
Kathleen Hall, to stand alongside him, who also permitted the ‘reclaiming’ of a tradition of the 
Chinese revolution that it found supportable.1039 This changing reading of Alley (and in fact the 
changes in the reading of Hall) is no slight. He needs to be understood in his context. In 
particular this means in relation to the historically contingent ideas and events that shaped him 
and the reception of the promotion in New Zealand of the projected he supported in the PRC. 
To promote the validity of their accounts, travellers to the PRC have privileged eyewitnessing, 
claiming that one had to see China to really know it. They made claims as to ‘a commitment to 
                                                        
1038 Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002. 
1039 See Elizabeth Perry’s effort to do the same with respect to the ‘Anyuan revolutionary tradition, ‘Elizabeth Perry, 
‘Reclaiming the Chinese Revolution’, The Journal of Asian Sudies, 67, 4, 2008, 1147-1164. In the NZCFS’s case they claim 
the work done before Liberation as reflecting heroic activities towards a highly desirable outcome. 
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accuracy’ which required them to challenge what were dominant ideas in New Zealand, that ‘it 
may seem remarkable but, it was, in my experience absolutely true’ or even that ‘The Western 
media lies: China forges ahead’.1040 As Timothy Kendall has identified also happened in Australia, 
publications had titles such as Journey to New China, ‘I saw China’, Return to China, and ‘China as 
we saw it’ each of which suggested that the author was not only in a position to reveal the ‘truth’ 
or ‘reality’ of life in the PRC, but also that the authority of their perspective was tied up in the 
personal authority of their representation. 1041  Further, the eye-witness accounts were always 
subject to a moulding and reshaping through a process of guided engagement with the PRC, by 
guides and translators, experts such as Alley, and those who saw themselves as the interpreters of 
the PRC who were part of the New Zealand-based organisations. At the same time, there is little 
doubt that the claim ‘seeing is believing’ was taken literally by these travellers. Some chroniclers 
of such travel, unsympathetic to the CPC-led project in the PRC, have claimed that travellers 
typically failed to question the reality of what they saw, and took their ability to ‘see’ the truth for 
granted.1042  Yet a close analysis of the accounts examined here suggests it is possible to give a 
much more favourable reading than this. That is, the travellers to the PRC were alive to contrary 
interpretations but believed what they saw.  
Reading accounts of a changing China requires a contextualization of the PRC’s people-to-people 
activities. This needs an understanding of the basis of people-to-people diplomacy in Marxist-
Leninist theory. In addition, the PRC has been viewed differently at different times by the West, 
there have been a series of different campaigns that have been undertaken in the PRC, and the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) has interacted with different strata of society at different 
moments. Each of these factors should be considered in producing a periodisation of people-to-
people activities, against which the New Zealand engagement with the PRC can be examined. 
In addition to these macro factors there are specific and particular factors too, that manifest 
themselves in changing images of the PRC. Different visitors with different agendas wrote a 
different China. Who was talking, what they wanted to say, and what they wanted to say about 
New Zealand through China, have all impacted on the representation of the PRC. In addition, 
what might appear as specific and particular factors, in that they are not about any changes in the 
PRC per se, have come about because of changing ideological and cultural fashion. Amongst other 
evidence, this is suggested by the two different representations of the New Zealand University 
Students’ Association tours to the PRC in 1971 and 1974 and the consistency those two 
                                                        
1040 James Bertram, Return to China, Heinemann, London, 1957, 1. Margaret Garland, Journey to New China, The Caxton 
Press, Christchurch, 1954,  38. Wilcox, ‘Western Media lies: China forges ahead’, People’s Voice, 23 September 1967, 1. 
1041 Timothy Kendall, Ways of Seeing China: from Yellow Peril to Shangri-la, Curtin University Press, Freemantle, 2005. 
Garland, Journey to New China. Harold Kay, ‘New China As I Saw It’, Challenge, August 1955, 7. Bertram, Return to China. 
Don Franks, ‘As We Saw It’, New Zealand China News, New Zealand China Society, November 1976, 3. 
1042 Note that these alternative interpretations are themselves contextual in that they have only become predominant 
since those outside (and perhaps inside) the PRC lost faith in the CPC-led Chinese project’s emancipatory potential. 
Elizabeth Perry details this ‘repudiation of revolution’ which she notes is a ‘fairly recent phenomenon’. See Elizabeth 
Perry, ‘Reclaiming the Revolution’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 67, 4, 2008, 1147-1164. 
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representations have with the contemporaneous reports by respectively, the Committee of 
Concerned Asian Scholars and the delegation from Tel Quel. 
In part these reports are complicated by the problems relating to what travelers, and even non-
native residents, think is happening in a society that is not their own. But on another level there is 
a further complexity in that a Marxist believes that the experiential distortions are just those 
brought about by a class viewpoint. 
The work of Alain Badiou is of considerable relevance to the construction of changing images of 
the PRC by New Zealanders. The New Zealand-China relationship has seen a series of 
transformational truth-events, each different depending upon the perspective of the viewer. For 
all of them, the organisation from which the individual viewers came was consolidated and 
repositioned took place in relation to a new understanding of the PRC. This analysis suggests 
that the shifting nature of what is understood as true (as an interpretation of the situation), gives 
rise to a reconstitution of the subject. Where individuals are gathered into a collective entity then 
this leads to a reconstitution of the group’s collective identity. 
Badiou himself, writing about the PRC, identifies the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
(GPCR) as a ‘Truth Event’ in terms of its failure: its unsuccessful attempt to rupture the form of 
the party-state. Badiou notes that while it is true that the GPCR was a power struggle, that of 
course constitutes a revolution is. But what sort of power struggle? For Badiou, the activities 
within the Cultural Revolution constantly exceeded and threatened the structure of the 'party 
state' (universities, administration and the army).1043 But the party-state survived, and Wang Hui 
suggests the GPCR was followed by a process of depoliticisation to ensure that there would be 
no more cultural revolutions.1044 In its failure, Badiou regards the Cultural Revolution as having 
been the 'last revolution'. The implication is that this was the 'last revolution' within the form of 
the party state and that therefore another form of politics is required. 
As Wang Hui has identified, after 1978 there was also a conflation of the state and the party.1045 
This ‘rigidification’ also made its way into Chinese people’s organisations just as the CPC 
changed its independent international activity towards supporting ‘various political parties… 
proceeding from state strategic interests, instead of ‘supporting Leftists and combating 
revisionism’. The GPCR delineates two periods in the representation of the PRC in the material 
analysed here.  
After the Third Plenary of the 11th Party Central Committee in December 1978, the 
CPC… usher[ed] in a new historical period of reform and opening and the socialist 
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modernisation drive. To fit in with the developing domestic and international situation, 
China made a major adjustment of its foreign policy.1046 
This process of re-interpretation of the situation that is part of Marxist-Leninist practice gives 
Badiou’s ideas particular relevance. On both sides of the people-to-people relationship thought 
was given to the specific practice required in a changed situation. 
From China’s Liberation in 1949, until the GPCR, the nature of the relationship that the NZCFS 
had with the PRC strongly corresponded with the particularities of Communist Party of China-
led political campaigns. The relationship was dominated by ideas about peace, and by what 
members of the Society saw as ‘combating anti-communism’. Relations slowed and were replaced 
by Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ)-CPC links as the campaigns in the PRC shifted 
the Chinese domestic situation leftward and as the Peace Committee closed, as it did in 1966. 
The Chinese People’s Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries was also closed 
1966-1971. 
As suggested, the ‘Truth-Event’ of the GPCR resulted in a depoliticisation of PRC society, and 
the rolling up of the Chinese state and party into one. So, although for members of the NZCFS 
the People’s Republic of China in 1976 was about politics – and bringing those politics and the 
political significance of the Chinese revolution to New Zealand – this was to rapidly change. The 
death of Mao was the start of a drift away from politics, in part as the politics of the PRC became 
so difficult to follow. This was especially true for those who had already been intimately involved 
in supporting the PRC for a period of time. 
Further, ‘politics’ in China became ‘national politics’ instead of an interest in the revolutionary 
project. This resulted in a changed view of ‘friendship’ from one about being on the right (or 
rather the left) side of a revolutionary dispute to one more common in contemporary English 
usage and with an expectation of support rather than critical engagement. 
It was the Tiananmen crisis, however, that ultimately represented a truth-event for the Society. 
This transformed the NZCFS and has coloured its identity since. The image of the PRC was 
reconstructed away from having a benevolent CPC governing in the interest of the people. In so 
doing, the self-image of the NZCFS was also reconstituted. The Society no longer sought to ‘tell 
the truth about China’. It rejected a role in politics and claimed to have no position on political 
questions being debated within the PRC. Yet, having worked through a transformation over this 
period, the Society began to draw members from a broader cross-section of New Zealand society 
than before. It also got involved in new activities such as aid work in poorer parts of China. The 
changed image of the PRC changed the Society. Not better or worse, just organised around 
different truths that were attractive to a different sort of person. 
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The CPNZ transformed differently, most clearly as a result of the Sino-Soviet split and the 
Party’s rejection of Soviet ‘revisionism’ between 1960 and 1966. This was its truth-event in the 
sense Badiou uses the term. The CPNZ’s ideological analysis meant it reimagined itself from 
being merely a national communist party to an anti-revisionist communist party. There were 
other implications too. The CPNZ became increasingly sectarian. It also appears, as in Nick 
Knight’s analysis of the CPA (ML), to have followed the CPC line too closely to be useful to 
changing New Zealand society in the way its goals suggested.1047 From the beginning of the 
1970s, each twist and turn in the line that the CPNZ determined was to be pursued in New 
Zealand, often as a result of a reading of changes in China, resulted in new organisations. Each of 
these organisations, had a slightly different reading of New Zealand, and each reading contained 
within it a different image of China. 
In the period from 1978-1982, communist parties in New Zealand by-and-large began to follow a 
line removed from that of the CPC. In part this was because the New Zealand organisations 
realised that there was little to be gained from holding the ‘China franchise’. For the CPNZ, for 
example, China no longer reflected its ultra-leftism. In addition, the CPC was now engaging with 
a range of parties. There were other factors too: China wasn’t as exciting as other places, such as 
the Philippines. This was especially true for the Workers’ Communist League (WCL) which was 
far more entwined in the student movement than either the CPNZ or the Preparatory 
Committee. Secondly, the party that did hold the ‘franchise’ was the Preparatory Committee and 
it was small and relatively insignificant in terms of left politics in New Zealand. Accordingly, 
when a delegation from the WCL went to the PRC in 1982 they saw it as an opportunity not for 
closer links but for distance:  
A lot of people still believe that the League is a ‘China-line’ Marxist organisation, and we 
now have the chance to show that we are not, in the sense that we do not (like the old 
CPNZ and the PC) faithfully follow every twist and turn of Chinese policy’.1048 
There is a Christian theme that runs through both the history of New Zealand China relations 
and through the ideas of truth that underpin this thesis. It reflects that Christianity is a significant 
part of the dominant culture in New Zealand and part of China’s otherness to New Zealanders. 
The practice of Christianity was what first drew missionaries such as Kathleen Hall to China and 
the idea of ‘godless communism’ was part of the climate that the early NZCFS fought to 
overcome. When the early travellers spoke of the PRC’s openness and desire for peace, their 
ability to attend church was part of the evidence they presented. One of the student groups, in 
1976, also challenged their hosts that they wanted to attend mass.1049 Of the 1974 student tourists 
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who did not find the utopia they sought in China, some turned to Christianity as a locus for their 
faith. 
There are theological elements to the study too. It is Christian theologian Soren Kierkegaard 
through which the idea of subjectivity is introduced. His ideas of truth are that the ideas about 
the world can be approached objectively but a person’s own way of being is necessarily 
subjective. Later theorists identified that this subjectivity must also affect how supposedly 
objective truths are considered which takes us through Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida. Badiou 
takes us beyond subjectivity to a post-foundationalism where objectivity and subjectivity can 
again exist together, by evoking the Christian mythology of Paul. Ideas of truth-telling that the 
viewers of the PRC engaged in have also been based in Christian texts. The Bible suggests that 
seeing is evidence of truth, as John 19:36 claims: ‘We know this is true, because it was told by 
someone who saw it happen. Now you can have faith too’. In such ways eye-witness accounts are 
privileged. The transmission of the eye-witness accounts to a broader group based on their 
beliefs in the success of the project they are being told about is also hinted at biblically: from 
John 20:29, ‘the people who have faith in me without seeing me are the ones who are truly 
blessed’. As contemporary theologian Jack Crabtree points out, this verse is for future 
generations: it is faith, not sight, that matters.1050 
Although the GPCR represents a great divide in China’s 20th century history, the New Zealanders 
who interacted with the PRC seemed slow to adjust. The communist parties were first in coming 
to terms with the fact that there was now a multiplicity of ways to engage with different Chinas. 
The NZCFS came later. Yet this process of awakening has been fruitful, ultimately, to the New 
Zealand-China people-to-people relationship. If a dreamed China is like a library, then, at the end 
of this study, those who seek an engagement with the PRC now can choose from a much larger 
collection. Each reading, like each writing, contains a different ‘China’. These texts are not equal 
though ultimately each one has a situated perspective, an ideological understanding, and is 
enlivened by the question asked since time immemorial: ‘who rules, over whom’? 
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Abbreviations 
 
ATL  Alexander Turnbull Library 
CPAFFC Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, previously 
known as the Chinese People’s Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign 
Countries (CPACRFC), also known as Youxie 
CCAS  Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars 
CORSO Council of Organisations for Relief Service Overseas 
CPA Communist Party of Aotearoa 
CPA (ML) Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist) 
CPC  Communist Party of China 
CPNZ  Communist Party of New Zealand 
GMD  Guomindong (Nationalist Party) 
GPCR  Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
NZLR  New Zealand Labour Review 
NZCFS New Zealand China Friendship Society, at first called the New Zealand China 
Friendship Association and then New Zealand China Society, sometimes 
referred to as ‘the Society’ 
NZCR  New Zealand Communist Review 
NZUSA New Zealand University Students’ Association 
PC  The Preparatory Committee for the formation of a Communist Party of New 
Zealand (Marxist-Leninist), also referred to as ‘the Preparatory Committee’ 
PLA  Albanian Party of Labour 
PRC  People’s Republic of China 
SPA  Socialist Party of Aotearoa 
SUP  Socialist Unity Party 
WCL  Workers’ Communist League 
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